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Abstract 
This thesis examines organizational responses to the deregulation of electricity 
industry in New Zealand between 1987 and 1997 based on a qualitative study 
of seven organizations. The study employs a case study methodology using 
semi-structured interviews for primary data collection. In total thirty-eight 
respondents responsible for determining the strategic direction of each 
organization - senior managers and organizational board members - were 
interviewed. Ensuring the accuracy of this raw data through a process of 
triangulation, data was then analysed manually to extract themes as they 
emerged. 
This thesis contributes to the body of literature on organizational change in 
three key areas. First, the thesis proposes that researchers should view 
change as a pOlitical process and therefore should examine it from a strategic 
choice and multilevel perspective. Second, having observed both adaptive and 
transformational change types in the same institutional setting, the thesis 
argues that ownership, governance structures and community ties - particularly 
when contrasting rural and urban contexts - influence the process of 
organizational change. Third, the thesis argues that the changes to CEO and 
dominant coalition are a fundamental and necessary precursor to the 
implementation of transformational change. 
1.1 Overview 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
This thesis examines organizational responses to the deregulation of New 
Zealand electricity industry between 1988 and 1998. It is based on a qualitative 
study of seven organizations in the distribution sector of the New Zealand 
electricity industry. In step with wider economic reform during this period, 
deregulation of this sector was introduced in an attempt to stimulate 
competition and develop efficiency in the electricity industry. These legislative 
changes took place over a ten-year period and also allowed the electricity 
organizations to provide input into the legislative process. The government first 
attempted to redefine the ownership of each organization in the distribution 
sector. Organizational responses to this action varied, ranging from reactive 
and incremental, to anticipatory and transformational. Through the use of a 
qualitative methodology, this research focuses on the dynamics of change 
within these companies as a result of these legislative changes. The purpose 
of the study is to provide a rich insight into the organizational dynamics of such 
change. In particular, the thesis proposes two answer two questions. First, 
given the institutional change, did firms adopt similar or different change 
strategies? Second, what factors influenced the choice of organizational 
change strategy? 
1.2 Research Design 
A qualitative case study methodology was considered appropriate for research 
on the organizational change process of New Zealand electricity companies for 
three reasons (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bryman, 1988). First, the research 
required an open-ended methodology that would allow the accommodation and 
incorporation of the richness of all· views of respondents; this ruled out the 
consideration of a restrictive positivistic approach (Cassell and Symon, 1994; 
Bryman, 1988; Merriam and Simpson, 1995). Second, there is a dearth of 
studies, which examine the change processes in a holistic manner, as most 
extant research tends to focus on specific strands such as the use of 
resources, for example operational reviews for efficiency (Pettigrew, 1988). 
Third, organizational change is context-specific and the case study 
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methodology is well suited to study context-specific phenomena (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994; Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Yin, 1994). Literature on 
organizational change does not have many instances of the process of change 
as it unravelled in a specific context or a setting. In addition, authors like 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) explicitly suggest the use of comparative case 
studies to study organizational change. 
While case study design went into decline in the 1960s owing primarily to its 
idiosyncratic nature and a preference for experiments and surveys (Daft, 1980; 
Bryman, 1989), its resurgence as a viable research methodology can be 
attributed to Robert Yin (1994). Yin (1994) argues that the case study design 
allows the holistic and meaningful nature of real life events, such as 
organizational and managerial processes, to be retained. According to Stake's 
(1994) typology case studies can be intrinsic, instrumental or collective in 
nature. This research should be classified as a collective case study. This 
method is used for cross case comparisons of an instrumental kind with the 
implicit assumption that understanding these cases will lead to better theorising 
about a larger population of cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). A similar 
typology is offered by Yin (1994) who classifies cases as descriptive, 
exploratory and explanatory. This research would be classified as explanatory. 
1.3 Significance of the Thesis 
This research contributes to both theory and practice of organizational change. 
First, there is an acknowledged lack of extensive and robust academic analysis 
of the actual process of change within organizations. Current literature on the 
process of organizational change is primarily based on anecdotal evidence 
from those that have either directly experienced or been involved with the 
implementation process (Pettigrew, 1988). This thesis addresses this gap in 
the literature by presenting empirical data on the process of organizational 
change during a period of uncertainty. This provides a significant opportunity to 
explore, substantiate and extend organizational change theory. 
Second, with an international trend favouring deregulation as a means to 
improve efficiency in many economic sectors, understanding the effects that 
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deregulation has on organizations has become increasingly important. New 
Zealand is commonly recognised as being at the vanguard of deregulatory 
change (Boston et. aI., 1996). Therefore an opportunity exists to develop a 
greater understanding of the implications, subtleties and difficulties inherent to 
the deregulatory change process from a multi-level perspective. By gathering 
data on the organizational change process it may be possible to derive 
generalisable responses to environmental change that could provide assistance 
to policy-makers and organizational managers in the development, 
implementation and management of institutional and organizational change. 
Such findings could also have an application in further theoretical development. 
The following section provides a summary of the institutional context of the 
electricity distribution sector in New Zealand. Following this is an overview of 
the thesis. 
1.4 The New Zealand Electricity Distribution and Retail Sector 
The New Zealand electricity industry, as elsewhere worldwide, consists of four 
distinct sectors - electricity generation, transmission, distribution and 
retailing/trading (Culy, 1992: 4). Generation, or the production of electricity, and 
transmission, the transport of high voltage electricity, is conventionally regarded 
as a strategically important and therefore politically sensitive natural monopoly. 
Historically central government operated both functions under the New Zealand 
Electricity Department (NZED). Distribution is defined as the business of taking 
"high voltage electricity and transforming it down to a level that can be used by 
the final customers" - both commercial and residential (Electricity Task Force, 
1989: 14). Electricity retailing/trading includes selling "electricity to the final 
customer, handling sales contracts, retail metering and other customer 
services" (Farley 1994: 9). Historically a single company both distributed and 
retailed electricity within protected franchise areas. It is change that was forced 
on the distribution and retail/trading sector from 1988 to 1998 that this thesis 
focuses on. 
Successive New Zealand governments have invested heavily in the 
development of electrical reticulation to stimulate economic and social 
development. Electricity generation and transmission was closely administered 
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by the state under the NZED, generally the only 'organization' with access to 
enough capital to fund such developments. To speed the reticulation process 
the operation, maintenance, supply (and in some cases generation) of 
electricity networks came under the auspices of special local authorities -
Municipal Electricity Departments (MEDs) and Electric Power Boards (EPBs) 
referred to collectively as Electrical Supply Authorities (ESAs). EPBs were a 
special and separate (single function) form of local government created by the 
Electrical Power Boards Act (1925). Each EPB operated as a protected 
monopoly within the boundaries of a territorial local authority, and run by locally 
elected boards of up to 12 members, elected every three years by local 
constituents. Organizational surpluses were used to fund capital expenditures 
and increase reserves (Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, 1989: 2-7). EPBs ranged in 
size from Auckland (218,000 consumers) to Tararua (5,500) (Putnam, Hayes & 
Bartlett, 1989: A-5). MEDs were the trading arms of territorial local authorities 
given authority to operate by the Local Government Act (1974). MEDs were 
also a protected monopoly and administered by committee members appointed 
by the municipal council (Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, 1989: 2-6; Ministry of 
Commerce, 2001). Unlike EPBs, MEDs used operating surpluses to fund local 
government activities (Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, 1989: 2-7). MEDs ranged in 
size from Christchurch (108,847 consumers) to Bluff (1, 137) (Putnam, Hayes & 
Bartlett, 1989: A-5). The nature with which ESA board composition was 
determined introduced a bias favouring the desires of domestic consumers 
(Farley, 1994). This would later become an issue of contention but, during the 
consolidation of the industry, served to establish electricity as the main form of 
energy supply for domestic consumers. 
The rapid growth of ESAs in the early part of the 20th century saw several 
different structural variations emerge. These structures bore little resemblance 
to overseas electricity industries in that there was not a series of large vertically 
integrated private suppliers (see Table 1.1) (Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, 1989). 
However this unique arrangement was generally acknowledged as fostering a 
highly effective industry, with the majority of New Zealanders connected to an 
electricity supply by the 1960s (Electricity Task Force, 1989; 8). 
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Despite the industry's effectiveness, a lack of competitive pressures and a 
focus upon local service provision rather than profit, distribution businesses 
arguably lacked operational and economic efficiency (Putnam, Hayes & 
Bartlett, 1989: 2-17). In 1987, distribution companies numbered 59 in 1987, 38 
as EPBs, 21 as MEDs. 
EPB (urban and rural) with no generation capability other than for standby purposes. 
EPB with supply from both bulk and own generation. 
EPB purely self-sufficient. 
MED (urban) distributing electricity from bulk supply. 
MED distribution including and adjoining local authorities. 
MED self-sufficient. 
MED drawing supply from EPB. 
MED distributing own generation, with bulk supply from EPB. 
EPB run by government. 
Table 1.1 Variations in ESA Structure (Rennie, 1989: 94) 
It was the lack of technical development and compulsion for efficient operation 
that alerted New Zealand's government to the need for the redefinition of the 
institutionallregulatory structure upon which the electricity sector was based 
(Spicer et ai, 1996). The State Owned Enterprises Act (SOE) (1986) had partly 
addressed this. In the face of an economic crisis, the SOE Act (1986) 
deregulated and reformed the structure and strategy of government enterprises 
along commercial lines to encourage efficiency and financial performance of 
the entire economy (Spicer et ai, 1996: 9; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This 
included the corporatisation of the NZED, which underwent transformational 
strategic, structural and cultural change to meet these commercial objectives 
becoming the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ). The success 
with which the commercialisation process in ECNZ was regarded saw the 
government turn its attention to the transformation of the wider sector, where 
the regional focus of electricity companies was identified as incompatible with 
the government's strategic vision for the industry (Rennie, 1989). This vision 
was: 
'To ensure that energy services continue to be available at the 
lowest cost to the economy and' are consistent with sustainable 
development achieved by the efficient and effective provision of 
energy services through properly functioning commercial systems 
with competitive incentives" (Bradford, 1997). 
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The Electric Power Boards Amendment Act (1989) signalled the government's 
intent in the electricity distribution and retail sector when the government 
announced that ESAs would be corporatised. Resistance to change was highly 
visible particularly in EPBs where trustees established a group called the 
Trustees of New Zealand (TONZ) to lobby the government. As Farley (1994: 
44) observed: "The main objective of TONZ was to seek modifications of the 
reforms to produce as little change as possible from the status quo, which was 
regarded by their members as generally being a very satisfactory way of 
managing the industry. They supported introducing some commercial 
freedoms but were adamantly opposed to privatisation." 
In May 1990 the government ruled that EPBs could be owned by local trusts 
while MEDs could remain in local authority ownership. However, in the general 
election held that year a new party was elected to power that did not favour 
trust ownership preferring privatisation of ESAs and with legal complications 
associated with determining ownership the government's timetable for change 
was delayed. In 1991, the new government introduced the Energy Sector 
Reform Bill that contained provisions for the corporatisation of the ESAs. The 
Bill led to extensive public debate about the appropriate ownership of the ESAs. 
Ownership was still contentious with diverse views on appropriate ownership of 
the ESAs. The Bill was later split into five separate Acts including the Energy 
Companies Act (1992) which provided for the corporatisation of the ESAs and 
the removal of franchise protection (Ministry of Economic Development, 2001). 
Following the passing of the Energy Companies Act (1992), 44 energy 
companies were formed from the existing ESAs, with a diverse range of 
ownership structures that mirrored the debate prior to the legislation (Farley, 
1994). All local authorities initially elected to hold the shares in corporatised 
MEDs rather than vesting them with other persons or groups. Each EPB used 
the discretion provided by the Energy Companies Act (1992) to develop a share 
allocation plan that met legislative requirements. Most favoured trust 
ownership. 
This thesis investigates the process of organizational change implemented by 
seven electricity companies during this period of environmental upheaval. 
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Introduced in depth later in this study, these organizations are Buller Electricity 
Limited (BEL), Electricity Ashburton Limited (EAL), MainPower Limited (MPL), 
Dunedin Electricity Limited (DEL), Southpower Limited (SPL), Power New 
Zealand (PNZ) and Electra Limited (ELL). 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter one has briefly introduced 
the research, its design and significance, as well as provided an overview of the 
New Zealand electricity industry context in which this research was conducted. 
Chapter two outlines the research design and methodology utilised in the data 
collection and analysis process. It provides an overview of the motivation for 
the study and the formalisation of a research question. It discusses the 
characteristics and motivation for the use of the qualitative paradigm, 
specifically in this research case study methodology. An overview of the data 
collection and analysis techniques is provided. 
Chapter three examines the models, theories and concepts of organizational 
change. This provides the framework for the analysis of case study data to 
explain the divergent process of, and forces for, organizational change in seven 
New Zealand electricity distribution companies. The chapter explores the 
theoretical distinction drawn between continuous and discontinuous 
organizational change, the concept that the environment is the primary trigger 
for organizational change is introduced and 'environ-centric' theories of 
organizational change are reviewed. The influence that values, ideas and 
beliefs - the 'design archetype' - have on the organizational change process is 
introduced to integrate the environmental and strategic choice literature to help 
explain divergent responses to institutional change. 
Chapters four and five describe the process of organizational change 
implemented in the seven organizations that constitute the data for this thesis. 
Chapter four presents the cases of Buller Electricity Limited (BEL), Electricity 
Ashburton Limited (EAL) and MainPower Limited (MPL). These organizations 
followed an adaptive process of organizational change, adapting their strategic, 
structural and cultural configuration in reaction to deregulation of the electricity 
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distribution sector. Chapter five presents the cases of Dunedin Electricity 
Limited (DEL), Southpower Limited (SPL), Power New Zealand (PNZ) and 
Electra Limited (ELL). These cases followed a transformational process of 
organizational change, transforming their strategic, structural and cultural 
configuration in anticipation of environmental change associated with 
deregulation of the electricity sector. 
Chapter six compares and contrasts the process of organizational change 
implemented in each of the seven electricity companies. With reference to the 
literature covered in chapter three this chapter investigates and clarifies the 
organizational, social and political factors that influenced the organizational 
change process and contributed to the emergence of divergent organizational 
responses to environmental change. 
Chapter seven draws the thesis together and discusses the findings of the 
cross case analysis in Chapter six in relation to change theory. The thesis 
proposes that change should be viewed as a political process and therefore 
examined from a strategic choice and multilevel perspective. Second, the 
thesis argues that ownership, governance structures and community ties 
influence organizational change. Third, the thesis argues that the changes to 
CEO and dominant coalition are a fundamental and necessary precursor to the 
implementation of transformational change. A model of the change process is 
presented that captures the effect that ownership has on the organizational 
change process. The implications of these findings are discussed in relation to 
policy development, management practice and future research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two 
Methodology 
The following chapter outlines the research design and methodology utilised in 
the data collection and analysis process. I firstly provide an overview of the 
motivation for the study and the formalisation of a research question. I then 
discuss in detail the distinguishing characteristics of the qualitative paradigm 
and in particular the case study methodology. My motivation for using the 
qualitative case study as a method for understanding organizational change is 
provided. Finally I provide an overview of the data collection and analysis 
techniques employed. 
2.2 Ethics Approval and Research Question 
The impact that government driven change has had in New Zealand's 
economic and social spheres provides a rich and readily accessible field for the 
study of organizational change. Ideologically guided by the triple concepts of 
deregulation, commercialisation and efficiency, and propelled generally by 
legislation, New Zealand's economic transformation from a welfare to free 
market state has been acknowledged as being at the forefront of change and 
applauded world-wide (Boston et. aI., 1996; Spicer et. ai, 1996). However 
beyond the economic literature on New Zealand's change, few studies "provide 
an inside look at the dynamics (and problems) of transforming" (Spicer et. ai, 
1996: xvii). This is not confined to New Zealand alone, as "there is a dearth of 
studies which can make statements about the how and why of change, about 
the processual dynamics of change" (Pettigrew, 1988). The deregulation and 
corporatisation process of New Zealand electricity distribution companies 
provided a unique opportunity to fill this gap. 
The first step in the process was to gain formal approval from the University 
ethics committee for the research. A research proposal was drawn up and 
submitted for examination. The research methodology and approach was ruled 
acceptable and subsequently approved (see Appendix 1.1). While waiting on 
approval I sought to develop a deeper understanding of the electricity 
distribution industry, a process Janesick (2000) refers to as warming up and 
preparation. Although made aware by coverage in the popular press of the 
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changes that the industry had been undergoing, my understanding of the 
intricacies of the field was scant. A wide array of secondary data sources such 
as newspaper articles, historical dialogues and annual reports were therefore 
used to gain familiarity with the industry's development. This orientation 
process assisted in grasping the fundamental strategic and structural issues 
associated with the sector's development and supported the feasibility of the 
research. It also enabled me to define the purpose for the study and refine a set 
of research questions upon which the analysis would focus (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). 
The primary motivation for the research was to utilise the unique opportunity 
that institutional change in the electricity sector presented us and develop a rich 
insight into the organizational dynamics of change in a discontinuous 
environment. With legislative changes having furnished the rationale and 
timetable for change, I was presented with the unique opportunity to record the 
process of change only. In particular, I became interested in specifically 
identifying the factors that influence the path that organizations follow when 
implementing change during a period of environmental turbulence (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1988; Strebel, 1994). This focus resulted in the development of two 
primary "grand tour" research questions (Creswell, 1994: 70): 
1. Did electricity companies adopt similar or different change strategies? 
2. What factors influenced the choice of change strategy in electricity 
companies? 
These questions would provide a theoretical focus, or anchor, for the entire 
research process. 
2.3 Research Design 
My intention to generate theory through creating a rich description of the 
organizational change process led us to the conclusion that a qualitative 
methodology would best serve my purpose. Qualitative research methods offer 
social science researchers an open-ended or constructivist means of examining 
and understanding a complex social phenomenon such as organizational 
change first hand (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Cassell and Symon, 1994; Miles 
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and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bryman, 1988b; Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984; Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). 
2.3.1 The Qualitative Research Paradigm 
Confusion surrounds the nature of qualitative research, what it is and how it 
works (Van Maanen, 1983). Van Maanen (1983) states that ''the label 
qualitative ... has no precise meaning ... it is at best an umbrella term covering an 
array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and 
otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of ... naturally 
occurring phenomena in the social world." (9). 
Qualitative research rests on five "intellectual undercurrents ... (that provides) 
qualitative research with its distinct epistemology" - "phenomenology, symbolic 
interactionism, verstehen, naturalism and ethogenics" (Bryman, 1988a: 50). In 
simpler terms the qualitative view of reality is markedly different from those of 
positivistic approaches. Rather than approaching research with a priori 
assumptions that there is one "reality out there to be studied, captured, and 
understood", qualitative research methods contend that reality is socially 
constructed (Le. multiple-realities) by individuals as they attempt to understand 
their situation through the development of meaning and order (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000: 9; Cassell and Symon, 1994; Patton, 1990; Bryman, 1988a: 52; 
Merriam, 1988; Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). The qualitative paradigm therefore 
focuses on interpreting and explaining this socially constructed reality within its 
dynamic and natural context, as opposed to imposing a "static" image of social 
reality, and allows the development of a ''thick'' description of everyday 
occurrences (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 10; 
Bryman, 1988a: 101; Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Wolcott, 1982; Bogdan and 
Taylor, 1975; Geertz, 1973). 
As a result of the different paradigmatic approaches, qualitative data collection 
varies markedly from the traditional positivist approach typified by tools such as 
surveys. Rather than abstracting theories from the analysis of (typically) 
numeric data provided by remote participants, qualitative data generally takes 
the form of words "based on observation, interviews, or documents" (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 9) while the researcher becomes the ''instrument for data 
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collection and analysis" (Merriam, 1988: 19; Bogdan and Biklen, 1992). In 
order to collect such data, qualitative researchers must win the trust of 
participants to gain access to information - often a long and complex process 
(Yin, 1994). Furthermore the data collection process itself is "typically carried 
out in close proximity to a local setting" (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 9). This 
generally takes the form of observation, structured or semi-structured 
interviews on one or more occasions, which can complicate the process and 
add to the time spent by the researcher in the field (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Yin, 1994). 
The nature of the qualitative data collection process enables researchers to 
''preserve chronological flow" and go beyond "explaining" events to actually 
determining "causality" (Miles and Huberman 1994; 145 - 148). Consequently 
the utilisation of qualitative research methods such as ethnography (Bittner, 
1967), grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), participatory action 
research (Oja and Smulyan, 1989) and case studies (Whyte, 1955) has grown 
as researchers strive to accommodate context specific and temporal aspects of 
their research interest not available through the quantitative positivistic 
paradigm (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Yin, 1994; Tushman and Nelson, 1990; 
Johnson, 1987; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Pettigrew, 1985; Quinn, 1978). 
Further arguments for the qualitative paradigm include the ability of data to 
provide undeniable evidence that promotes the construction of new theory 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; 10). 
For the above reasons qualitative research becomes particularly attractive for 
the study of the process of organizational change. However there remains 
ongoing debate in regards to the contextual and subjective nature of qualitative 
research, particularly and not surprisingly from exponents of the quantitative 
paradigm (Tucker et. aI., 1995; Bryman, 1988a; Cronbach, 1975). Such 
arguments are primarily concerned with methodological rigor (internal 
validity/reliability) and scientific generalizability (external validity) of results 
generated by a research paradigm reliant on subjective methodologies. 
Howe and Eisenhart (1990) propose five standards to ensure methodological 
rigour in qualitative research that include appropriate and competent data 
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collection and analysis techniques, complete literature review and the 
revelation of researcher subjectivity as a means of countering such arguments 
(Merriam, 1988). Miles and Huberman (1994) in particular addressed this issue 
by providing "detailed advice on a method-by-method" basis for "doing" good 
qualitative research, but themselves acknowledge that their views may appear 
"narrow-minded, even arrogant" in light of the paradigm's non-prescriptive 
approach (308 - 310). Patton (1989, 1987) suggests four types of triangulation 
- data, investigator, theory and methodological - as a means of addressing 
concerns of subjectivity. In this way it becomes possible to moderate for 
extreme subjective interpretation of qualitative data (Yin, 1994); an exemplary 
illustration of this is found in the research of Flynn et. al. (1991) who 
incorporated all four triangulation methods in their research on gender and 
collaboration. 
Concern with generalizability arises from the synonymy with which qualitative 
research and case study research are treated (Bryman, 1988a: 87). However, 
although qualitative researchers are more concerned with the observation of 
process and generation of theory than statistical generalization (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Merriam, 1988), Bryman (1988) suggests several measures that the 
qualitative researcher can take to address these concerns. These include a 
study of more than one case, the provision of a rich description to enhance 
"transferability", the examination of more than one case by more than one 
researcher or seeking a case that represents "typical" or conversely "deviant" 
characteristics (Bryman, 1988: 87 - 90; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
2.3.2 Summary 
The qualitative paradigm is a phenomenological, open ended and holistic 
approach to observing and analysing situations within a "real life contexf' (Yin, 
1994: 3; Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). This offers an alternative to the positivistic 
paradigm and enables researchers to study first hand the process of sense-
making and understanding within its natural context (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Yin, 1994; Patton, 1989; Van Maanen, 1983). My choice to follow this 
paradigm stems from my desire to capture the process - or 'how' - of 
organizational change in a rich manner (Yin, 1994). Acknowledging the 
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validity/generalizability concerns associated with the paradigm, the principle 
aim and nature of my research question precluded the use of a quantitative 
approach for its inability to provide a rich, contextual and chronologically 
descriptive account of the change process as it was occurring (Merriam, 1988). 
Furthermore my personal strengths, interests and world-view biased me 
towards the qualitative approach. For these reasons I chose to employ case 
study as the research design. 
2.4 The Case Study 
Although often treated as such, the "case study is not a methodological choice 
but rather a choice of what to be studied" (Stake, 2000: 435). That is, the case 
is the subject of observation, while the methodology is the means by which a 
researcher gathers and interprets data provided by the subject (Stake, 2000; 
Merriam, 1988). Case studies can vary in complexity based on whether they: 
employ qualitative and/or quantitative methodologies; focus on individuals, 
groups or phenomena; include single- or multiple-sites (Stake, 2000; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Merriam, 1988). It is also crucial to consider the 
researcher's motivation (intrinsic/instrumental) for using the case study design, 
which directly affects the cases descriptive or explanatory mode (Oenzin and 
Lincoln, 2000; Stake, 2000; Yin, 1994 Bryman, 1988b). 
2.4.1 A Definition 
Utilising Stake (2000) and Merriam (1988: 9) I have defined and identified a 
case as a "bounded system" or phenomenon where patterns of behaviour, 
"coherence and sequence are prominenf' and can be identified, contextualized 
and analyzed (Stake, 2000: 436). This provides a particularly useful basis for 
justifying my treatment of individual organizations as separate cases (units of 
analysis) in this research (Yin, 1994). Extending this logic, a case study is the 
in-depth analysis of such a "bounded system" with the intent of producing a 
descriptive account that aims to enhance my understanding of a particular 
phenomenon (Stake, 2000; Yin, 1994; Merriam, 1988). Yin (1994) defines the 
case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 1994: 13). It is 
clear that my research aims met such criteria based on these definitions. 
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Therefore the collective instrumental case study was selected as a valid and 
appropriate means of investigating the phenomenon of organizational change. 
The collective instrumental case study is a particular form of the research 
design that allows the researcher to observe and record phenomenon such as 
organizational change within context and, from that data, evolve or create 
theory (Stake, 2000; Merriam, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989). As a qualitative form of 
research, its holistic approach retains data that allows the identification of 
temporal and causal relationships within several cases, providing researchers 
with the means of addressing the how question in a 'rich' manner - an 
opportunity not awarded by quantitative counterparts (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Yin, 1994; Van Maanen, 1983). Collective instrumental case studies are 
particularly applicable where the research aims to "provide insight" or "redraw a 
generalization" (Stake, 2000: 437). As a result, "the case is of secondary 
interest...(and) plays a supportive role ... (to facilitate) my understanding of 
something else" (Stake, 2000: 437). This resonates well with the aim of this 
research. In this context, the analysis of organizational change in electricity 
companies serves a purpose beyond the descriptive account of the individual 
case and allows us to advance our understanding of organizational change 
theory generally. 
2.4.2 Multiple Case Studies 
By replicating the research design to incorporate several organizations I 
developed a mUltiple-case approach to the study of organizational change (Yin, 
1994). Multiple-case study research allows the researcher to simultaneously 
look at the universal to "build abstractions across cases" (Merriam, 1988: 154) 
while trying to "deepen understanding and explanation" through the analysis 
and incorporation of the particular (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 173). That is, a 
mUltiple-case research design allows researchers to both acknowledge the 
unique within individual cases and avoid overemphasis of exceptional 
circumstances, which strengthens the creation of a "more comprehensive" and 
relevant general theoretical framework (Bryman, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Merriam, 1988: 155). 
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Dependent on the level of analysis, multiple-case studies can be further 
classified as either holistic or embedded in nature (Yin, 1994: 39 - 40). Where 
an holistic design investigates a phenomenon from a broad (e.g. global) 
perspective, an embedded design looks in particular at the "subunif' level (e.g. 
divisional) effects (Yin, 1994: 41). As mentioned earlier, my interest lies beyond 
the individual case and can therefore be classified as holistic in approach. 
Selection of the mUltiple-case design also addresses issues of generalizability 
raised by quantitative researchers. Although my aim was to observe the 
process of organizational change and generate theory rather than generalize 
about a population, I chose the multiple-case design as a means of countering 
such an argument as it is considered to be more "robust" and "compelling" than 
a single-case approach (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994: 45; Eisenardt, 
1989; Merriam, 1988). My choice to use the mUltiple-case design was based 
on the argument that by incorporating several organizations I would acquire a 
broader and "deeper understanding" of the phenomenon of change which 
would reduce the potential for one exceptional case to bias the development of 
theory (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 26; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bryman, 1988). 
Furthermore, the mUltiple-case approach was not employed with the intent of to 
follow a sampling logic and claim that my findings would IItrepresent' a larger 
pool" (Yin, 1994: 47). Instead, I employed 'replication logic' where I sought to 
develop a general theory that could predict whether cases would manifest 
similar or contrasting results when faced with the phenomenon of change (Yin, 
1994: 45). In general, where results are predicted to be similar the cases are 
said to be literal replications, where results are dissimilar "but for predictable 
reasons" the cases are theoretical replications (Yin, 1994: 46). The selection of 
cases in this. research conforms to the definition of theoretical replication, as the 
cases were chosen for "theoretical, not statistical reasons" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
537; Bryman, 1988; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
2.4.3 Summary 
The qualitative case study is a research design that can take many complex 
and varied forms. I have chosen the instrumental collective qualitative multiple-
case design as it is particularly effective in answering the how and why 
16 
questions fundamental to explanatory research (Yin, 1994). Such a design 
lends itself to the generation of theory for its ability to: 
1) Identify causal relationships and patterns of behaviour over time; and, 
2) Acknowledge the importance of context; 
when attempting to capture the effects of a contemporary phenomenon on a 
bounded system (Stake, 2000; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Merriam, 1988). The multiple-case design addresses 
concerns raised about generalization through replication logic, however I 
reassert the point the case remains of secondary interest to the generation of 
theory. In addition, authors like Greenwood and Hinings (1996) explicitly 
suggest the use of comparative case studies to study organizational change. 
Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal and Hunt (1998) also call for a multilevel perspective 
while studying organizational change. 
2.5 The Process of Qualitative Data Collection 
2.5.1 Research Site Selection 
The case selection process first involved identifying the population of electricity 
companies and selecting potential participants. At the time that this research 
began there were 36 separate organizations and from this initial identification 
survey it emerged that electricity companies could be differentiated based on 
their size (based on the industry standard of customer numbers) and ownership 
structure (See Table 2.1). I deliberately chose to approach organizations that 
differed on these two variables (Eisenhardt, 1989). Although I was not 
concerned with the representative nature of the sample but with theoretical 
replication, I believed that selecting organizations with diverse forms would 
reinforce the 'robustness' of theory generation and placate those concerned 
with generalizability (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Pettigrew, 1988). In total 12 organizations were approached to participate in 
the study over an 11 month period. 
2.5.2 Research Sites Access 
The first point of contact with each organization was through letters of 
introduction addressed to each organization's CEO/Managing Director outlining 
the aim, intention and requirements of the research (Creswell, 1994: 148) (See 
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Appendix 1.2). Gaining access to each organization was a significant hurdle, 
as I had no informal means of contact, so it was imperative to gain the approval 
of these "gatekeepers" (Arskey and Knight, 1999; Creswell, 1994: 148). 
Trust Council Customer CouncillTrust Whole/Part 
Owned Owned Cooperative Combination Private 
Electra Dunedin Electricity CentralPower 
Hawke's Bay Power Southpower PowerNZ 
CI) 
DI Mercury Energy Powerco ... 
co Northpower TransAlta ...J 
TrustPower 
WEL Energy 
Central Electric Electricity Invercargill Electricity Alpine Energy Bay of Plenty 
Counties Power Ashburton Electricity 
Eastland Energy Otago Power Wairarapa 
King Country Energy Electricity 
E MainPower NZ 
:::J Marlborough Electric :c 
CI) Tasman Energy 
::E Top Energy 
Waipa Power 
Waitaki Power 
Waitomo Energy 
Westpower 
Buller Electricity Kaiapoi Electricity Wairoa Power Citipower 
CHB Power 
iU Scan Powe r E 
(J) 
Table 2.1 Research Context: Selected and Final Participants (Selected in italics, Participants 
in bold) 
I was particularly concerned that access would be denied due to confidentiality 
or time concerns as organizations were at the time experiencing significant 
structural and strategic changes. However despite my reservations there was a 
highly positive response to the request; seven organizations actively sought to 
participate by contacting me by telephone. Two declined outright while the 
remaining three organizations proved elusive despite the distribution of a follow 
up letter, fax and phone calls. All CEO's/Managing Directors of participating 
organizations expressed a keen interest to assist in the research process 
providing open access to any members of staff and secondary resources. 
Details associated with gaining access to each site was negotiated after an 
initial discussion with a senior staff member or the CEO's/Managing Director's 
personal assistant. 
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2.5.3 Participant Selection 
With the direct support from the head of each organization, arrangements were 
made to interview managers and board members involved in a strategic 
management role. In all cases access to operational strategic heads was 
possible, however in several cases conflicting schedules limited the 
accessibility of board members. Time constraints in particular influenced the 
interview process in Mainpower, requiring that I conduct a group interview 
including the Managing Director (MD), Energy Services Manager and Network 
Manager. Legitimate concerns about whether this type of group interview could 
accurately capture individual views and differences without bias can be raised. 
While it is not possible to argue that group dynamics did not play a role in 
respondent reactions and attitudes in this instance, the data on later analysis 
did exhibit consistencies with the other cases. Consequently, the potential for 
bias should be acknowledged when the data recorded in the Mainpower case is 
read with the other cases. 
The purposive nature of the selection process limited the number of participants 
to those that had a degree of strategic input and knowledge of the change 
process (Patton, 1990; Bogdan and Biklen, 1992) (See Table 2.2 below). 
Defence of the purposive approach can be found in Miles and Huberman 
(1994), Creswell (1994) and Merriam (1988) who argue that as the qualitative 
case-study seeks theory generation selection of participants should be based 
on their ability to contribute to this process. In total thirty-eight individuals 
involved in the change process of each organization were interviewed in a 
semi-structured manner with a focus upon the process of strategic and 
structural change over the reform period. . A few participants raised 
confidentiality issues, prompting me to assure all participants that individual 
names would not be included in the final presentation of the data. However 
most were more than happy to include other details such as their position within 
the organization. 
19 
Ie", ,'> , ..... ()igaijizati~n'" 'v',- "",, c, .X~',';~;~c',,~5;·lc;.e.:"7,'Rani~~arit$"~ '---..-~ " ,-,,-c;_,~- '. -~ __ c '-, 
CEO 
Buller Electricity Limited Corporate Services Manager Operations Manager 
Network Manager 
Board Chairman 
CEO 
Assistant CEO/Contracting Manager 
Dunedin Electricity Limited Corporate Services Manager 
Operations Manager 
Network Manager 
Electrical Services Manager 
CEO 
Company Secretary/Support Operations 
Electra Limited Network Team Leader Marketing Team Leader 
Project Team Leader 
Sales Team Leader 
CEO 
Electricity Ashburton Limited Commercial Manager 
Network Manager 
Financial Controller 
Managing Director 
MainPower New Zealand Limited Energy Services Manager (ONE INTERVIEW) 
Network Manager 
CEO 
General Manager Network 
Power New Zealand Limited General Manager Contracting 
Manager Financial Services 
Manager Human Resources 
Chairman 
Board Member 
Managing Director 
CEO Connetics (Contracting Company) 
Southpower Limited General Manager Strategic Business Development 
General Manager Enersis (IT Division) 
General Manager Corporate Services 
General Manager Network Services 
General Manager Trading 
Table 2.2 Organization and Interview Participants 
2.5.4 Data Collection - Multiple Methods 
Creswell (1994) and others (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 
1989) identify numerous sources of qualitative data which can be classified 
under "four basic types: observations, interviews, documents, and visual 
images" (Creswell, 1994:149). In this research three of those four types were 
utilised in the collection of data on organizational change. 
The primary method was via semi-structured but focused interviews conducted 
in a one-on-one manner (Creswell, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1987). This methodology was selected as the 
most appropriate way to access data for two reasons. First, as organization 
change in the electricity industry was a contemporary phenomenon that had not 
been documented previously, it was the only method available to me that could 
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provide the appropriate data on the process of organizational change (Yin, 
1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, although the 
use of quantitative tools would have provided data of a pre-specified nature on 
the variables involved in organizational change, I rejected such an approach as 
it would have had limited application in the generation of theory on the process 
of change. The use of semi-structured interviews provided an open-ended but 
targeted methodology that allowed inclusion of variables not considered when 
entering the field (Yin, 1994: 80). 
The second source of data I utilised was historic documentary evidence 
(Creswell, 1994; Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1987). Such evidence 
came in the two form: memos and strategic documents provided by participants 
during or following the interview and; other secondary evidence provided by 
various books and government departments that outlined the history and 
development of the industry pre- and post-deregulation. As such this data was 
not analysed but used to form a rich picture of the context in which organization 
change occurred. 
The third source of data was direct observations made by the interviewer 
(Creswell, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Patton, 1987). During the process of interviewing notes were made of the 
interview "site", noting such things as the "condition of the work spaces or 
buildings" and the general impression of the demeanour of staff that I came into 
contact; these were incorporated in a "reflective" write up of the interview 
process (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 66) (See Appendix 1.3). Particular 
attention was paid to the interviewee's surroundings and attitude/mood as 
received. 
By utilising multiple sources of data in the data collection process I was able to 
develop a longitudinal picture of change within each organization on the basis 
of "converging lines of inquiry" (Yin, 199'4: 92). This convergence, referred to 
as triangulation, allowed us to confirm and place in context the issues and 
points raised in each interview (Yin, 1994; Patton, 1987). The use of multiple 
data sources also enabled us to address the issue of construct validity by 
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"essentially provide(ing) multiple measures" of the phenomenon of 
organizational change (Yin, 1994: 92). 
2.5.5 Data Collection - Interview Process 
The interview process followed a similar form in all cases. Having arranged a 
suitable time for each interview to occur, I travelled to each location. Upon 
arrival a secretary generally introduced me to each interview subject or, where 
several interviews occurred on the same day, another interviewee. After a brief 
discussion of a general nature to 'break the ice' each subject and I would retire 
to either a personal office or a general interview room such as a boardroom. I 
would reiterate the research objectives to re-familiarise the subject with the 
objective as outlined in the letter of introduction. Permission to use a tape-
recorder during the interview was sought. The tape-recorder was not used as a 
"substitute for listening" as detailed interview notes were taken during the 
interview process; rather the recorder was used to ensure preservation of detail 
that could otherwise be missed (Yin, 1994: 86). Permission was denied in only 
one case, and justification for not relying on the tape recorder alone was found 
in another interview where the recorder failed to function correctly. Each 
interview lasted between fifty minutes to one-hour forty-five. During that time 
the interview focused on answering the "grand tour" research question through 
addressing a series of ''sub-questions'' (Creswell, 1994: 70) (See Appendix 
1.4). However, following the semi-structure methodology, this question 
schedule was fully open ended to allow issues of importance not foreseen by 
me to be raised and elaborated on by the subject (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Yin, 1994; Merriam, 1988). Subjects were also given an opportunity at the end 
to sum up their personal views and address issues they believed might have 
been missed during the interview overall. This opportunity for individuals to 
speak on the process and implications of organization change in itself often led 
to the revelation of much data often on a more open and candid manner than 
had occurred during the early stages of the interview. On completion many 
would offer a drink where more informal conversation would continue. I had to 
make mental notes during this stage. Due to interview schedules, I would often 
be 'on-site' for two to four days. This allowed ongoing interaction with 
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management and general staff and gave me the opportunity to gain further 
insight into the general 'atmosphere' of each organization. 
2.5.6 Researcher Bias 
While the process of data collection and analysis followed a methodologically 
rigorous path, there always exists the potential for researcher bias to taint the 
interpretation of the data collected, and therefore the reliability with which 
subsequent findings can be attributed. Qualitative researchers therefore must 
be constantly aware of their own biases, preferences and preconceptions and 
their ability to determine not only the form and process of analysis, but 
ultimately the outcome (Merriam, 1988; Miles and Huberman, 1994). To avoid 
uncertainty in such matters exponents of this form of research, notably Wolcott 
(1982), Lofland and Lofland (1984), and Guba and Lincoln (1981), assert that 
researchers in the qualitative mode make personal preferences and 
preconceptions open to scrutiny. 
I entered the PhD programme and this research with what, in retrospect, could 
be viewed as a naive and ideological belief in the virtues of privatisation and 
corporatisation. My preferences on entering the field for the data collection 
process were that public or government involvement in areas that could be run 
by the private sector was both economically and socially irresponsible. 
Consequently my initial bias was that change, preferably radical, was not only 
beneficial in the context of electricity companies, but positively desirable. 
However, when I set out to analyse the raw data I found this set of values 
constantly challenged. The diverse range of strategic paths that each of the 
participating organizations followed, and the results and outcomes that 
followed, did not match my preconceived notions. . This confused me, clouded 
my judgement and confused the issues. The compelling voice and consistency 
of the story that the data told forced me to reassess and re-evaluate my own 
biases, and it was not until I went through this process of self discovery that the 
data could emerge to tell the respondents own story of change. However, while 
this process was a personal battle over an entrenched ideological belief, it was 
not a solitary path, as discussions and debate with academic staff and personal 
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acquaintances helped me come to grips with my own biases and the data. 
Such informal means of triangulation were invaluable in the analysis process 
and enabled me to produce a much more neutral document. This thesis in no 
way presents an argument with a particular agenda and, while I believe that this 
thesis presents an accurate picture of the process of organizational change, 
awareness of this internal struggle will be of benefit to readers. 
2.5.7 Summary 
The process of qualitative data collection ran relatively smoothly despite initial 
concerns regarding access. After reviewing the population of organizations, 
sites were selected on the basis of theoretical replication logic. Twelve 
organizations were approached with seven choosing to participate in the 
research process. Access to each organization was arranged through the 
highest level, with all providing considerable support. I chose a purposive 
approach to participant selection to ensure that each could contribute 
significantly to meeting the research aim. In total thirty-eight individuals were 
interviewed over a period of eleven months using a semi-structured, open 
ended interview methodology. From this raw data and through the use of 
multiple methods I was able to commence with data analysis to develop a 
longitudinal picture of the organizational change process. 
2.6 The Process of Qualitative Data Analysis 
2.6.1 Interview Transcription and Verification 
After each round of interviews had been completed, I returned to Christchurch 
to transcribe each tape verbatim. This process took between one and two days 
per interview to complete and resulted in 403 pages of transcribed data, or 
241,946 words. On completion, copies of these transcripts were returned to 
each subject for final review and confirmation that the document was a fair and 
accurate representation of what was said. Furthermore, each interviewee was 
asked to add details that they thought necessary to further explain the process 
of organizational change. All transcripts were passed without significant 
amendments other than those made to spelling errors or terminology not 
correctly transcribed. Several subjects took the review opportunity to add detail 
where they thought appropriate. These were included in each interview at the 
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point marked by the subject. This process assisted in developing a converging 
line of inquiry and internal validity by providing an additional means of 
confirming the reliability and completeness of the data (Yin, 1994; Jick, 1983; 
Denzin, 1970). 
2.6.2 Data Analysis - Coding 
With verification from each participant completed the process of data analYSis 
could begin. Qualitative data analysis remains a contentious issue, as there is 
no prescribed "right way" (Creswell, 1994: 153). Tesch (1990: 140) sees 
qualitative analysis as a process of "de-contextualization" and "re-
contextualization" where data is systematically reduced to "segments" and 
"codes" (Bogdan and Bilken, 1992) that enable the identification of "themes" 
and 'patterns" (Marshall and Rossman, 1989: 114). 
This research relied on a manual process of sentence-by-sentence pattern 
coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Each transcript was read and 
re-read with recurrent themes and patterns noted in the margins (Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). 
Pattern coding was chosen for its particular ability to: reduce data into clearer 
"analytic units"; be used during data collection and facilitate more focused 
enquiry; help evolve a "cognitive map ... for understanding"; "lay the groundwork 
for cross-case analysis by surfacing common themes" (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 69). Pattern coding over the eleven-month data collection process 
assisted tremendously in understanding the change from a practical and 
theoretical standpoint. 
The pattern coding process was completed with the assistance of a computer 
using a simple word-processing package (Microsoft Word), where complete 
quotes from each interview could be combined and categorised under thematic 
headings and sub-headings (See Appendix 1.5). This was a particularly time 
consuming process, but allowed for further review of the data and facilitated the 
combination, reclassification and understanding of thematic revelations 
(Merriam, 1988). The example provided in Appendix 1.5 illustrates data 
provided by South power participants of the impact of change on structural 
configuration. It is possible in this instance to see the categorization of data 
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from each interview based on the impact that change had on staffing numbers. 
Traditional themes such as those of decentralisation, centralisation and 
downsizing emerged from the data supporting established literature on 
organizational change are visible on the left. However other themes that were 
not predicted, such as the influence of physical location and importance of 
maintenance of ownership, emerged strongly from the data provided by all 
sites. Such revelations assisted in the generation of theory and after many 
iterations proved to be the "conceptual hooks" upon which the analysis is hung 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 72). 
Miles and Huberman (1994) and Weitzman and Miles (1995) emphasize that 
''the researcher who does not use software beyond a word processor will be 
hampered" (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 43). However Weitzman and Miles 
(1995) also point out that there is "no such workable thing" as the "ideal 
program" (337) and that regardless of the power of software, it is the individual 
that ultimately determines the categorisation of data. I agree with Weitzman 
and Miles (1995) and my decision not to use a dedicated software package for 
analysis rested on three factors. First, I was comfortable with the process of 
manual coding having implemented such a process in previous research. 
Second, I did not have access to any form of data analysis software until well 
into the coding process. The time required for data re-entry would have 
negated any time advantage granted by the software. Third, Microsoft Word 
served my needs adequately with such tools as text search, and allowed for 
flexible addition and removal of themes and text - a process that can be difficult 
and time consuming in other packages (Weitzman and Miles, 1995). 
2.6.3 Data Analysis - Narrative Construction . 
With the interview data coded I incorporated secondary sources of data to 
construct a ''thick'' narrative (Geertz, 1973) or "case description" (Yin, 1994: 
104) that summarized the sequence of events and themes that constituted the 
change process within each of the participating organizations. The creation of 
each narrative was a long and iterative process that involved the writing, 
rewriting and the constant revisiting of theory and data (Dey, 1993; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). However the iterative nature of the 
26 
process allowed me the opportunity to gain a deep and intimate understanding 
of each case and provided a solid basis on which theory could be developed 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly I 
defined and redefined key concepts and categories as well as relationships 
linking them until it became apparent that the analysis had "run its course" 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 62) and that any further modifications would not 
substantially enhance the fit between theory and data - the condition of 
theoretical saturation (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Two reviewers familiar with the raw 
data reviewed these narratives independently. Such investigator 'triangulation' 
ensured that subjective views were not clouding or misrepresenting the story of 
change (Patton, 1989, 1987). 
An implication that can be drawn from this process is that the fit between the 
researchers conceptualization and the data may be good but not perfect. 
However, this argument can also be targeted at quantitative methods, as to find 
a set of independent variables that explains one hundred percent of the 
variation in a set of dependent variables is nigh impossible (Mintzberg, 1979). 
2.6.4 Data Analysis - Cross Case Comparison 
Once the process of pattern coding and narrative construction had been 
completed for each case it was possible for me to engage in the process of 
cross-case analysis to strengthen theoretical developments beyond the 
individual (Eisenhardt, 1989). This added a level of theoretical and thematic 
abstraction that enabled a deeper understanding of universal themes 
associated with the process of organizational change (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Significant similarities and 
differences emerged from the data through the 'Juxtaposition of seemingly 
similar cases" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541). These contrasts provided us with the 
opportunity to identify factors that fundamentally influence the process of 
organizational change presented in the following chapters. 
2.6.5 Summary 
The data analysis process was a long, and at times tedious, process. After 
interviewing 38 individuals in seven different organizations a verbatim 
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transcription was made of each conversation. Once verified by participants, 
each script underwent a process of pattern coding, which helped reveal themes 
important in the process of organizational change. A 'thick' narrative case 
incorporating multiple sources of data was built on these themes to gain a 
longitudinal appreciation of the change process. From these descriptive 
narratives I engaged in cross-case comparison. This allowed a level of 
abstraction that, with liberal use of literature, enabled the development of a rich 
theoretical understanding of the process of organizational change. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The primary motivation of this thesis is to provide insight into the factors that 
influence and can explain the process of organizational change during a period 
of environmental turbulence. The field of inquiry is one sector of the electricity 
industry - that of distribution/retail companies - an area that offered a potential 
source of rich data having been subject to significant change for over a decade. 
My research question was formulated in an open-ended manner so that I could 
take a "grand tour" of the field and capture as much relevant data as possible 
on the phenomenon of change (Creswell, 1994: 70). The explanatory nature of 
this research required that I select a research paradigm that would accurately 
capture the process of organizational change, and were particularly concerned 
with retaining contextual and temporal variables. 
Acknowledging concerns of validity and generalizability I chose to follow the 
qualitative paradigm, a phenomenological, open ended and holistic approach to 
observing and analysing situations within a "real life context" (Yin, 1994: 3; 
Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). In particular I employed the instrumental qualitative 
mUltiple-case study as the research design, a design that has strengths in 
being able to identify causal relationships and patterns of behaviour over time 
and acknowledge the importance of context. Through replication logic I 
address the issue of generalizability and validity, but remain adamant that such 
concerns remain secondary to the generation of theory. 
The data collection process went well having gained the consent of top-level 
gatekeepers. Twelve sites had initially been selected on the basis of theoretical 
replication logic, but in the end seven chose to participate. Utilising a purposive 
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approach, 38 strategic managers and board members were interviewed using 
semi-structured interviews. From this raw data and through the use of multiple 
data sources I was able to commence with data analysis to develop a 
longitudinal 'thick' description of the organizational change process in each firm. 
From these descriptive narratives I engaged in cross-case comparison, which 
allowed a level of abstraction that promoted the development of a deep 
theoretical understanding of the process of organizational change. The 
theoretical developments and findings that were distilled from this process of 
iterative analysis are presented in the following chapters. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three 
Literature Review 
The following chapter examines the models, theories and concepts of 
organizational change. This body of work provides us with the framework for 
focusing, analysing, synthesising and making sense of our data to explain the 
divergent process of, and forces for, organizational change in seven of New 
Zealand's electricity distribution companies. 
At present there is a dire need for research ''about the how and why of change" 
both within the organizational change field in general and more specifically the 
electricity industry context (Pettigrew, 1988: 15). Literature to date on change 
in the electricity sector deals primarily with understanding and developing 
economic and regulatory arguments for electricity deregulation from an 
international (predominantly American) institutional perspective (Joskow, 1983; 
Gilbert and Kahn, 1996; Murray, 1998; Kuhn, 2000; VanDoren, 2000); although 
New Zealand as a recognised international leader in electricity industry 
deregulation does contribute Significantly (McLay, 1992; Culy, 1992; Culy, Read 
and Wright 1995; Gunn, 1996; Read, 1997). 
However, although it is necessary to acknowledge the underlying ideology and 
institutional (political, legal, economic) effects of such literature, in itself it does 
not capture and account for divergent responses to radical environmental 
change at the organizational level. In order to do this researchers must utilise 
the analytical framework established by organizational change theorists. This 
theoretical grounding provides us with a point of departure from which 
researchers can firstly make sense and secondly enhance and develop our 
theoretical understanding of the change process. 
This chapter opens by exploring the theoretical distinction drawn between 
continuous and discontinuous organizational change (Tush man et. al. 1986; 
Nadler and Tushman, 1988). Examining this typology I introduce the concept 
that the environment is the primary trigger for organizational change and the 
dominant 'environ-centric' theories of organizational change are reviewed. I 
acknowledge that radical environmental change does not always lead to 
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organizational change and recognize the ability of strategic decision-makers to 
determine the change process. By incorporating the notion of strategic choice 
researchers can account for the influence that values, ideas and beliefs have 
on the organizational change process and enables us to introduce the concepts 
of 'design archetype' and change 'tracks' (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, 
1988). These concepts develop organizational change theory by integrating 
the environmental and strategic choice literature to explain divergent responses 
to institutional change as a product of strategic decisions based on values. 
Empirical studies of organizational change that specifically address the process 
from this perspective is not currently available and I direct attention to the need 
for examination of the values-organization-environment relationship to bridge 
this gap. 
3.2 Organizational Change Models 
Organizational change literature focuses on answering three fundamental 
theoretical questions: (1) what types of organization change exist, (2) how do 
organizations change and (3) why do organizations change. The contingency 
model of organizational change developed by Nadler and Tushman (1990) 
provides us with a useful framework for answering the first of these questions. 
This model identifies forms of strategic change by differentiating along the 
dimensions of. extent (continuous and discontinuous change) and timing 
(anticipatory and reactive) of change (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Tushman 
et aL, 1986; Nadler and Tushman, 1990: Meyer et. aL, 1990; Strebel, 1994). 
3.2.1 Continuous, Discontinuous, Reactive and Anticipatory Change 
Continuous and discontinuous organizational change types lie at opposite ends 
of the change continuum. Continuous organizational change, synonymous with 
first-order, evolutionary, incremental change or· convergence (Tush man and 
Romanelli, 1985; Tushman et. aL, 1986; Bartunek and Moch, 1987; Meyer et 
aL, 1993), are incremental in nature and made: ''to enhance the effectiveness of 
the organization, but within the general framework of the strategy, mode of 
organizing, and values that re already in place" (Nadler and Tushman, 1990: 
79). Continuous incremental changes can often demonstrate so little 
momentum as to be misconstrued for inertia (Tushman et. aL, 1986). 
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In contrast discontinuous or second-order, revolutionary, radical, frame-
breaking change involves a "reformed mission and core values ... altered power 
and status .. .reorganization ... revised interaction patterns ... (and) new 
executives': significant departures from historic practices that "have an impact 
on the whole system of the organization and fundamentally redefine what the 
organization is or change its basic framework, including strategy, structure, 
people, processes and (in some cases) core values." (Tush man and Romanelli, 
1985; Tushman et. aI., 1986: 37 - 38; Bartunek and Moch, 1987; Nadler and 
Tushman, 1990: 79; Meyer et aI., 1993; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). 
Discontinuous change is "difficult and risky" and can triggered by a change in 
11nstitutional or market contexts" "leadership", or a decline in performance 
(Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Greve, 1998; Newman, 2000: 604). Nadler 
and Tushman (1989; 1990) and later Strebel (1994) further differentiate 
organizational change as either reactive or anticipatory. Reactive change is 
made in II response to some external event" while anticipatory change is made 
"in anticipation of events still to come" (Nadler and Tushman, 1990: 79). 
3.2.2 Typology of Strategic Organizational Change 
By differentiating between continuous, discontinuous, reactive and anticipatory 
change, Nadler and Tushman (1990) were able to create a typology of strategic 
organizational change based on the intensity and severity of discontinuity; 
Tuning, Adaptation, Re-orientation or Re-creation (80) (See Table 3.1). 
Types of Organizational Changes 
Incremental (Continuous) Strategic (Discontinuous) 
Anticipatory TuninQ Re-orientation 
Reactive Adaptation Re-creation 
Table 3.1 Nadler and Tushman's (1990: 80) Typology of Organizational Change. 
Tuning refers to 11ncremental change made in anticipation of future events" 
seeking increases to efficiency without "any immediate problem'~ Adaptation is 
"incremental change made in response to external events"; Reorientation is 
major strategic change made in anticipation of II external events that may 
ultimately require change'~ Re-creation is "strategic change necessitated by 
external events ... that threaten the vety existence of the organization" (Nadler 
and Tushman, 1989: 197). 
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3.3 Organizational Change Theories 
Although the model of Nadler and Tushman (1990) provides us with a useful 
but rudimentary tool for assessing and categorising organizational change 
retrospectively, to more fully understand the process (the 'how' and 'why') of 
change we must more explicitly examine the organization-environment 
relationship. 
Four major theories endeavour to explain organizational change: contingency, 
resource dependence, population ecology and institutional. Each argues that 
change is externally motivated by the organization's need to remain aligned 
with the environment (Nilakant and Ramnarayan, 1998). They argue that 
organizational change is driven by a need to reduce uncertainty and increase 
stability by aligning internal strategies and structures with the changing 
demands of the operating environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 
1962; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967; Hage and 
Aiken, 1970; Blau, 1970; Aldrich, 1972; Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985; 
Tushman et. aI., 1986). The rate and extent of environmental change is 
determined by the interaction and demands of socio/cultural, economic, 
physical and technological factors (Emery and Trist, 1965; Duncan, 1972; 
Shortell, 1977; Tushman et. aI., 1986; Ford et. aI., 1988; Nadler and Tushman, 
1989; Scott, 1992; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, Newman, 2000). A change in 
anyone of these factors can result in organizations being 'misaligned' with the 
demands or expectations of the operating environment. This can manifest itself 
within the organization as operational and financial under-performance, 
requiring strategic redirection and structural adaptation 
(specialisation/integration) to achieve fit (Dunbar and Goldberg, 1978; Nystrom 
and Starbuck, 1984; Weick, 1987; Donaldson, 1995). Empirical studies support 
the environment-structure (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Nadler and Tushman, 1988) and size-
structure (Child, 1975; Khandwalla, 1973) linkage. 
In a similar vein resource dependence theory, population ecology theory and 
institutional theory deal with organizational change from a shared perspective 
with each arguing that organizational change is driven primarily by factors 
33 
external to the firm. However each theory differs in its treatment of, and 
approach to explaining, the environment-organization relationship. 
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) explains 
organizational change as a strategic (intra-organizational) response to the 
(extra-organizational) problem of resource acquisition (Donaldson, 1995). 
Embedded within a process of political interactions, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
argue that decision makers actively adapt and change their organization to 
manipulate the operating environment to 1) reduce reliance on other 
organizations and 2) promote stability. However Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) 
argument denies managers the ability to create real change in the environment 
and organization and, by emphasizing the view that organizations seek 
autonomy, fails to acknowledge the interdependent nature of organizational 
activities (Donaldson, 1995). 
Exponents of population ecology theory, primarily Hannan and Freeman (1977 
and 1989) and Aldrich (1979), extend Darwin's theory of evolution and natural 
selection to explain change in populations of organizations. Populations of 
organizations can be identified by their conformity to an "elaborate taxonomy" 
or blueprint of formal structure, activities and normative order (Young, 1988: 3). 
Internal factors such as history and management and external factors such as 
legislative requirements determine an organization's form and subsequently fit 
with the environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979). Based on 
the degree of alignment with the environment, an organizational form may be 
selected by the environment to survive and occupy a niche that allows the 
acquisition of resources, or equally the environment may choose to reject the 
form and leave it to 'die' (Hannan and Freeman, 1977 and 1989; Aldrich, 1979). 
Although empirical support for the argument is strong (Hannan and Freeman, 
1989; Rao and Neilsen, 1992) population ecology theory is weakened by its 
treatment of organizational change as a process of selection and inability to 
define or distinguish different rates of ctiange (Young, 1988; Donaldson, 1995). 
Furthermore, treatment of the organization 1) at the "species" level and 2) as a 
cognizant entity fails to acknowledge the influence of managers in the 
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development and operation of organizations (Silverman, 1970; Weick, 1979; 
Young, 1988: 2; Donaldson, 1995; Nilakant and Ramnarayan, 1998). 
Institutional theorists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987) argue that an 
organization is shaped by ideas, values, norms, myths and symbols that have 
gained legitimacy through their implementation and embodiment in the 
organizational environment (Donaldson, 1995). Institutional norms and values 
directly affect an organizations configuration in either a coercive, mimetic or 
normative fashion (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organizations adapt and 
change in response to such pressures to achieve legitimacy, either wholly 
integrating the new ideas or adapting in a loosely coupled fashion where an 
appearance of conformity exists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 
1983). Although the argument that coercive 'state' pressures cause 
organizational change does have empirical support (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; 
Fligstein, 1990) the validity that isomorphic and normative pressures 
significantly contribute to an organization's configuration is less well supported 
(Donaldson, 1995). 
3.3.1 The Need for Theoretical Development 
Despite strong empirical evidence in support of all the above theories of 
organizational change, each has generally been criticised for their deterministic, 
anti-management approach (Donaldson, 1995). Although formulated at 
different levels each theory incorporates two implicit assumptions. 
First, organizational change is seen as adaptive in the sense that organizations 
either respond to environmental changes or act in anticipation of environmental 
changes. In both instances, organizations respond to either actual or 
anticipated changes in the environment, which are assumed to be independent 
of the organizations. While the possibility of organizations influencing the 
environment is acknowledged (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), attention has largely 
focused on organizational responses to environmental change. This is in 
keeping with a functionalist tradition that views environmental conditions as 
determining organizational characteristics (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Child, 
1997). Thus, all contemporary theories within this functionalist paradigm such 
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as structural contingency theory (Donaldson, 1995), organizational ecology 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1989) and institutional theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) 
emphasize environmental influence on the organization rather than 
organizational influence on the environment. In doing so these theorists do not 
adequately account for the 'free will' or 'strategic choice' available to 
organization decision-makers in managing uncertainty (Child, 1972; Bourgeois, 
1984; Whittington, 1989; Donaldson, 1996). 
The strategic choice perspective is an exception to these approaches since it 
views change as a political process and incorporates both proactive and 
reactive initiatives by the organization (Child, 1997). Child (1972) in particular 
highlights the importance of strategic choice in the process of organizational 
change, stressing that "managerial perceptions, values, interests and power" 
create an enacted environment that determine the extent of strategic-structural 
re-orientation (Chandler, 1962; Weick, 1995; Donaldson, 1996: 65; Child, 
1997). A large body of literature has developed to support this thesis focusing 
variously on; the CEO's background (Fligstein, 1985), attitudes (Lewin and 
Stephens, 1994) and leadership style (Tichy and Ulrich, 1984; Tichy and 
Devanna, 1986; Kanter et aI., 1992; Dunphy and Stace, 1993) as well as the 
values, preferences and alignment of the 'dominant coalition' of senior 
management (Cyert and March, 1963; Nadler and Tushman, 1990). By 
incorporating the notion of strategic choice we can look beyond the 
environment-organization theories and recognise the influence that perceptions 
and values have on the change process. Yet rather than nUllify the 
environmental approach we can strengthen its ability to explain organization 
change by acknowledging that the environment-organization relationship is 
socially constructed and interactive rather than deterministic in nature (Weick, 
1969; Giddens, 1979; Giddens, 1984; Donaldson, 1995). That is, in contrast to 
the traditional analysis of organizational change where the environment and 
organization were treated as cognizant entities, we are able to more accurately 
treat organizational change as a social phenomenon that occurs in an enacted 
environment (Weick, 1969; Giddens, 1979; Giddens, 1984; Young, 1988). 
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Second, change theories implicitly assume that either the top management or 
the dominant coalition (Cyert & March, 1963) in the organization orchestrate 
organizational responses to environmental changes. This is in keeping with the 
separation of ownership and control in the corporate form. It is assumed that 
the top management will act in the best interests of the owners of the 
corporation - an assumption that is challenged by economic theories such as 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). The 
separation of ownership and control is quite appropriate when one is studying 
change in large corporations in a context with relatively stable political and 
economic institutions. Literature on organizational change, largely developed in 
the North American context, emphasizes organizational responses to 
environmental shifts associated with competitive pressures and technological 
changes (Tushman & Anderson, 1997). The thriving literature on innovation 
and new product development exemplifies this approach (Tush man et ai, 
1997). However such environmental shifts rarely, if ever, lead to changes in 
ownership and governance in a way that can alter the organization's ownership 
and governance structure. Therefore, change is rightly seen as an 
organizational response facilitated by the top management or the guiding 
coalition. However, if the environmental shift, such as an institutional change, 
changes the ownership and governance in an organization, then these 
ownership and governance issues need to be taken into account while 
examining the dynamics of organizational change. The phenomenon of 
privatisation is an example of an institutional change that affects an 
organization's ownership and governance structure. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect ownership and governance issues to play a role in shaping the 
dynamics of organizational change under privatisation or deregulation. 
Generally, organization change theories remain silent on the effect that 
ownership and governance has on the actual process and extent of change. 
However, an emerging body of literature (Buchanan and Badham, 1999) that 
focuses on the importance of organizational politics argues that the extent and 
nature of change required, the urgency with which change is required and its 
acceptability to stakeholders determines the change strategy and political 
approach/intensity employed by decision-makers. Buchanan and Badham 
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(1999) have developed a four quadrant model that suggests where the purpose 
and methods for change are clear, and is acceptable to stakeholders it can be 
introduced in an apolitical and participative manner. Conversely, where change 
is required, the purpose and methods of implementation are unclear and 
threatens the values and ideals of stakeholders it is necessary for decision-
makers to 'win the turf war' through politicising the issues. In this situation 
Buchanan and Badham (1999) argue that strategic decision makers must utilise 
the ability of political interplay in order to forcefully manage the change process, 
a method the authors term 'power-assisted steering'. However, rather than the 
pejorative and often dismissive view that politics is necessarily underhanded 
and unethical, the authors view the politicisation of change as a legitimate and 
necessary means of implementing change. By acknowledging the importance 
that pOlitics plays in the change process researchers can further expand the 
strategic choice perspective. 
To summarize, although organization and strategic choice theories provide 
researchers with a solid basis for the analysis of organizational change from an 
'enviro-centric' perspective, there remains a "considerable amount of 
unexplained variance" when trying to trace the development of organization 
types and change (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988: 42). These theories do not 
adequately account for internal factors for change, nor explain why firms in 
specific institutional sectors continue to respond differently to the same 
institutional change (Fox-Wolfgramm et. aI., 1998; Buchanan and Badham, 
1999; Newman, 2000). What is required is an extension of the theories of 
organizational change that acknowledges the role ownership and governance 
plays in the change process and accounts for the divergence of organizational. 
responses to uncertainty by simultaneously acknowledging environmental 
(external), organizational (internal) and human (social) variables. 
3.4 Organizational Archetypes and Tracks 
The work of Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993, 1996) provides a convenient 
framework to study first- and second-order organizational change from such a 
perspective. Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993, 1996) contend that theorists 
must understand organizations both in terms of structures and patterns of 
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ideas, beliefs and values in order to understand why organizations respond 
differently to environmental uncertainty. The pattern of underlying ideas, beliefs 
and values is conceptualised as an 'interpretive scheme' upon which decisions 
for organization change are based (Giddens, 1979; Ranson et. aI., 1980; 
Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Weick, 1995). Greenwood and Hinings (1988) 
combine an organization's structural aspects and interpretive scheme into a 
single concept called a 'design archetype', defined as a "set of structures and 
systems that reflects a single interpretive scheme" (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1993: 1052). The concept of the 'design archetype' extends the early 
prescriptive taxonomy/typology literature (Chandler, 1962; Pugh et. ai, 1969; 
Miles and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1978: 944; Mintzberg, 1979; Miller and 
Friesen, 1980a) to acknowledge the role that values, willingness and ability for 
action play in determining a set of preferences for strategic and structural 
design (Agyris, 1973; Giddens, 1979; Miller and Friesen, 1980a; Beyer, 1981; 
Stinchcombe, 1990). 
Drawing on neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995), 
Greenwood and Hinings (1993) suggest that design archetypes may be 
institutionally and context specific - that is a limited number of 'legitimate' 
templates or configurations may exist in a given institutional or operational 
environment. Furthermore they argue that mimetic, normative and coercive 
institutional forces lead organizations to converge towards what is perceived by 
an organization's interpretive scheme to be an institutionally legitimate design 
archetype (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). As a result Greenwood and 
Hinings (1988, 1993) suggest that it is possible to identify and classify 
organizations into three archetype states based upon the coherence of the 
relationship between the interpretive scheme and the organization's structural 
and strategic configuration (See Table 3.2 overleaf) (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991; Scott, 1995). 
The interpretive scheme-structure connection suggests that organizational 
change will occur only where a misalignment between the two is perceived to 
be problematic by strategic decision-makers (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). 
Misalignment could be caused variously by changes to the institutional 
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environment, management or ownership of the organization, events that have 
the capability of introducing sets of ideas and values that contradict established 
strategic and structural norms (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988: 303-304). 
Archetype Description 
Archetype Coherence Structure and processes are consistent with 
and reinforce the interpretive scheme. 
Embryonic Archetype Coherence Structure and processes nearly consistently 
reflect the ideas and values but there is some 
misfit. 
Schizoid Incoherence Two contradictory sets of ideas and values 
exist in the orQanization. 
Table 3.2: Archetype Descriptions (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988: 303-304) 
This misalignment may cause strategic decision-makers to reassess the 
'design archetype', based on their perception of alignment with the 
organization-environment relationship, and implement change. Greenwood 
and Hinings (1988: 304) present this process of realignment as interpretive "de-
coupling" and "re-coupling" and propose that the path an organization follows in 
its attempt to maintain archetype coherence can be captured as change 
'tracks'. 
'Tracks' trace the path organization decision-makers follow as they seek to 
maintain value-structure-environment coherence by moving within or between 
archetypes over time (Table 3.3 overleaf) (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988: 28). 
In their simplest form, tracks that move within archetypes are analogous to 
continuous/incremental change, while those that move between archetypes 
conform to the notion of discontinuous/radical change (Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985; Nadler and Tushman, 1990; Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). 
Four 'prototypical tracks' have been developed that Greenwood and Hinings 
(1988) suggest extend Nadler and Tushman's (1990) model by capturing the 
temporal and dynamic nature of change as organizations seek archetype 
coherence. Each track varies in complexity as they trace an organizations' 
movement between 'convergent', 'embryonic' and 'schizoid' archetype states. 
The tracks of 'inertia' and 'aborted excursions' emerge as a result of the 
dominance of the existing interpretive scheme. The organization's 
configuration remains unchallenged as the extent of change is restricted to the 
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tuning or adaptation of structures and processes aligned with the traditional 
values and beliefs of strategic decision makers (Nadler and Tushman, 1990). 
Track Description 
Inertia Consistent structural adjustments aligned with 
prevailing interpretive scheme. 
Aborted Excursions Limited 'decoupling' of interpretive scheme from 
structure later reversed with archetype retention. 
Reorientations (Transformations) Full 'decoupling' later 'recoupled' with a new structure 
- design archetype 
Unresolved Excursions Incomplete 'decoupling' without completed 
'recouplinQ' . 
Table 3.3: Track Descriptions (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988: 304-309) 
The 'aborted excursion' differs from inertia in that the organization briefly flirts 
with the idea of change only to reverse the process to return to the status quo. 
'Re-orientations' are complex in nature and may follow a track where change is 
implemented variously in a linear, oscillating or delayed fashion. 'Re-
orientations' reflect a complete transformation of interpretive scheme and 
organizational configuration. 'Unresolved excursions' represent a sustained 
period of incoherence where organizations remain caught between ''two 
contradictory sets of ideas and values" (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988: 28). 
Although Greenwood and Hinings (1988) offer distinct 'prototypical tracks' of 
organizational change, they suggest firms are less likely to "move between 
archetypes" or engage in second-order change but instead converge towards a 
prevailing archetype to meet established institutional norms (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1993: 1058). The reason that Greenwood and Hinings (1988) give for 
such convergence is that in most organizations the 'interpretive scheme' is 
strongly embedded (or 'tightly coupled') in the institutional context. The 
assertion that most organizations will seek convergence and avoid second 
order or archetype change has found empirical support in a study by Meyer and 
colleagues where, despite environmental upheavals, second-order change 
occurred only thirty percent of the time (Meyer et. aL, 1990; 1993; Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1993). This and other empirical studies (Miles and Snow, 1978; 
Miller and Friesen, 1980; Ranson et aL, 1980; Walsh et aL, 1981; Kimberley, 
1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995) support the proposition that the 
interpretive scheme influences and restrains strategic choice by selectively 
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monitoring and determining an organizations domain of operation, principles of 
organizing and criteria for performance evaluation, creating in itself a 
'legitimate' institutional framework. 
This may help explai~ the findings of Newman (2000). In a study of Eastern 
European firms faced with rapid institutional change, Newman (2000) found 
that radical institutional and environmental change did not always lead to 
discontinuous organizational change. Instead an inverted U-Shaped 
relationship existed between institutional-level and transformational, second-
order organizational change. To explain this convex relationship Newman 
(2000) proposed that too much institutional change neutralized the validity of 
traditional organizational templates and created organization wide confusion 
and uncertainty that inhibited the ability of strategic decision makers to make 
sense of the environment, learn and implement second-order change (Levitt 
and March, 1988). This also supports the argument of Buchanan and Badham 
(1999) of the importance of politics in the change process. 
Conversely where changes to an 'interpretive scheme' challenge the 
organization-environment relationship rapid organizational change can occur 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Newman, 2000). In other words the extent, 
direction and nature of organizational change is not so much dependent on the 
organization-environment alignment, but more with the level of dissatisfaction, 
pattern of value commitments and capacity for action exhibited by strategic 
decision makers (Stinchcombe, 1990; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal and Hunt 1998). 
In summary, the 'design archetype' and change 'track' concepts provide us with 
novel approach to further our understanding of organizational change. By 
simultaneously acknowledging the importance of internal and external forces 
for change, Greenwood and Hinings' (1988) conceptualisation extends change 
theories beyond their structure-environment focus to incorporate the empirically 
proven effects that strategic choice and values have on organizations and the 
change process. 
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3.4.1 Summary 
Review of anecdotal and empirical evidence has made it clear that while the 
environment is the primary trigger for organizational change, it does not always 
lead to organizational change. Instead, the values, ideas and beliefs of 
strategic decision-makers can influence the organizational ,change process. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993, 1996) provide researchers with the ability 
to acknowledge the significant impact that an interpretive scheme can have on 
strategic and structural design through their conceptualisation of a 'design 
archetype', defined as an institutionally determined template or configuration of 
strategy and structure. This thesis argues that organizational change will only 
occur where strategic decision-makers perceive that there is a misalignment 
between an organization's configuration and the environment. Empirical 
studies of organizational change that specifically address the change process 
from this perspective ad that examine the values-organization-environment 
relationship are required. 
3.5 Towards a New Model of Organizational Change 
To date, studies taking the environmental approach have dominated the field. 
This has provided researchers with a rich theoretical and empirical basis upon 
which the cause and effects of organizational change can be studied. The 
environmental approach has enabled researchers to establish that it is possible 
to create a typology of organizational change based on the extent and timing of 
change (Nadler and Tushman, 1988). It has also provided a means of 
understanding change as a political (resource dependency theory of Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), ecological-sociological (population-ecology theory of Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977 and Aldrich, 1979) and sociological (institutional theory of 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 and Zucker, 1987) process. 
However, despite their popularity contingency models and theories, with their 
focus on the environment as the cause of organizational change, fail to 
adequately account for the effect that individuals or groups have on the 
organization (Donaldson, 1995). That is, although the environment plays a key 
role in organizational development and operation, we must remember that the 
values and beliefs of individuals (particularly those of strategic decision makers) 
create perceptions of the environment that determine the final structural and 
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strategic configuration of organizations (Giddens, 1979; Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1988; Weick, 1995). The theoretical work of Greenwood and Hinings 
(1988, 1993, 1996), I suggest, bridges this gap with their theory of 'design 
archetypes'. By incorporating the ideas of strategic choice theory into an 
institutionally based model of change 'design archetypes' account for why 
organizations facing the same institutional change follow different paths. 
Furthermore, by acknowledging that 'design archetypes' are specific to 
industries or sectors - that is embedded within historic and institutional 
(structural, strategic, cultural) norms - the analysis tool is particularly relevant to 
the study of organizations within a sector facing discontinuous change such as 
deregulation. 
However, although Greenwood and Hining's (1988) theory appeals to intuition, 
their propositions have not been tested empirically. In general there remains a 
real shortage of empirical research that can confirm and elaborate on much of 
the theoretical arguments to explain the 'how and why of change' (Pettigrew, 
1988: 15). Furthermore researchers don't have a theory to explain why one 
type of change occurs rather than the other or how the process of change 
proceeds within the firm (Newman, 2000). Therefore, the current study seeks 
to contribute to the literature through an empirical study of differing 
organizational responses to institutional change. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four 
Cases of Archetype Inertia 
This chapter describes the process of organizational change implemented in 
three of the organizations that form this research as experienced by the senior 
management of each. In response to environmental change associated with 
the deregulation of the electricity sector these organizations - Buller Electricity 
Limited (BEL), Electricity Ashburton Limited (EAL) and MainPower Limited 
(MPL) - followed a similar reactive and adaptive process of organizational 
change. The extent and scope of change implemented conforms to 
Greenwood and Hinings' (1988: 304) definition of archetype inertia where 
"consistent structural adjustments aligned with prevailing interpretive scheme" 
were made. 
The process of organizational change is traced in depth through the use of 
direct quotes from participants, which are highlighted in the text through the use 
of italicisation. 
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4.2 Buller Electricity Limited (BEL) 
4.3 Overview 
Buller Electricity Limited (BEL) is an electricity distribution and retail company 
based in the small town of Westport on the west coast of New Zealand's South 
Island. BEL supplies electricity to the northwestern region of the west coast, a 
geographically rugged distribution area of 4,654 square kilometers. However, 
despite the large supply area, BEL remains one of the country's smallest 
electricity companies, with thirty staff serving approximately 4,000 
predominantly rural customers. While its core activity is electricity distribution, 
BEL also provides energy retail, contracting, design, construction, and 
inspection, testing and appliance retail services. The Buller Electric Power 
Trust (BEPT) wholly owns BEL. The BEPT succeeded the Buller Electricity 
Power Board (BEPB) (established 1948) in 1993 after a consumer vote, in 
accordance with the requirements of the Energy Companies Act (1992). 
The case of BEL is one that illustrates a process of incremental and reactive 
organizational change. Despite facing significant institutional change forced 
upon the electricity sector by legislation, BEL's strategy, structure and culture 
remains rooted to its past. The following section outlines the history, context 
and specific changes undertaken by BEL in response to deregulation. 
4.4 The Electricity Archetype in BEL 
Prior to the deregulation of the sector, Buller Electricity's predecessor the BEPB 
was an organization that played an integral part in the community with a long 
history and association with the Buller district. The BEPB traditionally played 
an important role in the community - "the company has always had a very high 
profile" (CEO), not only because of the importance of electricity but also 
"because it· is one of the largest employers" (Operations Manager). The 
BEPB's role in the community as an electricity provider and social organization 
meant that the BEPB, as with "every little power board had their own sort of 
identity" (Operations Manager) that the organization and community cherished. 
4.4.1 Organization Ownership and Strategy 
As with all electricity power boards nation-wide, ownership of the BEPB was 
with the community. A board of trustees comprised of local members elected 
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by the public every three years closely monitored organization operations. This 
arrangement had significant strategic implications for the BEPB. 
The BEPB trust board was charged under legislation to ensure that the BEPB 
operated in an effective manner, providing electricity to all regardless of cost. 
However effectiveness was not the sole concern of the board. Public 
ownership and interest in the BEPB due to its status in the community meant 
that board members, reliant on public opinion for re-election, also unofficially 
ensured that a low cost strategy was maintained. This community focus saw 
the BEPB offering power prices and other services at a subsidized rate, 
benefiting the consumer/elector financially. 
(The goals or the objectives of power companies were very similar 
to the local authorities. (They were) community owned and try( ed) 
to provide reasonable prices for the district" (Corporate Services 
Manager). "All cost was borne a hundred percent by the Buller 
Electric Power Board. If a customer was connected we paid for the 
service - we paid everything" (CEO). "Under the old power board 
structure we (were) always trying to do work at the company's 
expense for the benefit for the customer" (Operations Manager). 
The BEPB played an important social role in the Buller district. It not only 
provided electricity for the community, but also - due primarily to its status as a 
publicly owned trust - maintained a social service role by ensuring that it 
provided ongoing employment for members of the local community. 
Consequently the BEPB played an integral role in both the economic and social 
well being of the community. 
"We had more of a social aspect (focus) of trying to provide 
employment in the district, providing support to the community by 
the way of a number of grants. So it's very much a community 
focus" (Corporate Services Manager). 
This is particularly evident in the rationale used for advertising the 
organization's product, which was not solely driven by a need to increase sales. 
"We've always supported the local newspaper (and) we've always 
spent a significant amount of money on advertising our product -
the first (reason) is to make the newspaper viable and (the second) 
to try and increase the sales of electricity" (CEO). 
In the pre-deregulation period, BEL was a typical example of the Electric Power 
Board (EPB) archetype. The configuration of ownership, management and 
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organizational structure, the strategic focus and culture all conformed to the 
established norms of other electricity companies nation-wide. 
4.4.2 Organization Structure 
The organization structure of the BEPB also conformed to the norms of the 
sector. Despite its small size, the BEPB was highly bureaucratic with several 
layers of management. Typical of power companies, the organization's 
structure reflected the two dominant disciplines present within the firm -
engineering and financial. A company secretary controlled the financial 
aspects of the firm, while a chief engineer took control of both the physical 
maintenance of the electricity network as well as the overall organization. 
"We had the old power board structure whereby the engineering 
come under (the) engineer, and (the) secretary had the 
administration. There was about a five layer management 
structure" (CEO). 
However in 1988 the BEPB rationalized the management structure to bring 
both managerial positions under the CEO position. This decision was forced on 
the trust board by the simultaneous retirement of both chief engineer and 
secretary treasurer positions. In 1988 the trust board voted to appoint the 
incumbent chief accountant - a local resident who had spent his entire career 
with the BEPB - as CEO. 
"I started on the 23rd May 1977 (under) the old Buller Electric 
Power Board. (At that time) the company had as its management 
structure an engineer and a secretary treasurer. (On) the 30th June 
1988 I became chief executive, which was the first stage of having 
one person controlling the operation of the company. What 
happened was that both the incumbent and secretary treasurer 
retired at the same time, so (the board employed one CEO) instead 
of recruiting different people" (CEO). 
4.4.3 Organization Culture 
The strategy and structure of the BEPB contributed to development of a distinct 
power board culture defined by an autocratic management style, an 
engineering focus and a 'job for life' mentality. 
The bureaucratic and hierarchical structure of the BEPB, as well as the 
'paternal' approach of the trust and CEO, affected the management style within 
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the organization. As all operational decisions had to be approved by the CEO 
and/or trust board, the management style was highly formalized. 
"It was vel}' much (the) CEO was at the top and the managers 
reported to him - it was vel}' much a straight line management 
(and) the CEO was in charge of the whole process" (Corporate 
Services Manager). {The CEO had to convince the board" 
(Operations Manager). 
This exemplified a command and control approach and as such there was little 
demand for input into managerial decisions from those at lower levels of the 
organization. 
"We were (operating) in the old traditional ways. You shut up and 
did it (your job) that way. There was a bit of a culture that they 
(employees) do what we tell them to do" (Network Manager). 
This created problems in the organization, in particular a lack of information 
sharing, as employees retained operational knowledge for themselves to 
ensure the maintenance of job security and status. 
"In the old days it (operational knowledge) was kept up here (in the 
head) like the foreman or the supervisor might keep all the 
switching systems in his head' (Operations Manager). 
Furthermore the level of long term strategic planning within the BEPB was 
minimal: {Traditionally decisions, particularly to expenditure, were made on gut 
feeling" (Network Manager). 
With the BEPB's strategic focus on electricity provision at a subsidized price, 
the organization was dominated by an engineering culture focused on building 
and maintaining the physical network. 
"We had 39 staff and of course it was run by engineers" (CEO). 
{There was definitely a culture here in this company (that focused 
on) line crews to get the work done pretty quickly pretty smartly" 
(Network Manager). "Everything related to looking after the network 
lines and poles and substations" (Corporate Services Manager). 
Not only did engineers dominate the culture, but it was also defined by the 
composition of employees. Most employees were from the Buller region with 
very few "outsiders" included: 
"We were recruiting from within the district. All the staff were born 
and bred here in the area - basically 99 percent of the staff here 
were born and bred" (CEO). 
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Many had been with the organization their entire working life: 
"Our staff have been very stable, I think the shortest is five years is 
our youngest employee" (CEO). 
This stability was attributed to several variables: 
1. The BEPB's employment policy; "Basically (in) the old Buller Electric Power 
Board you had a job for life" (Operations Manager). 
2. The BEPB's relatively high wages; "It's (working for the power company) 
seen as probably one of the better paying positions (Corporate Services 
Manager). "We haven't had a lot of staff turnover but obviously when you 
pay, especially for females, the highest - it might be as high as the local 
authority - it is obviously a key driver (for retention)" (CEO). 
3. The work ethic of West Coast people; 'The biggest resources we have here 
is the human resource. You'll find that throughout the whole West Coast-
loyal workers, workers that'll stay with the power company for their life. It's 
just a trait of West Coast people, they are loyal to their employer" 
(Corporate Services Manager). 
The length of service and community spirit that employees shared was viewed 
as a strength by the CEO, who acknowledged that the BEPB had a "close 
group of people and long serving employees have been our strength" (CEO). 
4.4.4 Summary 
Charged with providing electricity for the region by an act of parliament, the 
BEPB had traditionally played an integral role in the economic and social well 
being of the Buller Community. The BEPB not only provided electricity, but as 
one of the largest employers in the region contributed to the welfare of a 
declining community. The BEPB was well entrenched in the community, yet 
despite having its own unique identity shared many values and features with its 
contemporaries. Buller's archetype comprised of these four elements: 
community ownership, a hierarchical structure, a community focus and an 
engineering culture. 
4.5 Organizational Change in the BEPB 
The deregulation of the electricity sector forced the BEPB to change its 
ownership structure. 
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"What we've seen in a relatively short time (is that) legislation has 
forced change" (CEO). "With this change it was going from a power 
board which is basically like a government company to private 
enterprise" (Operations Manager). 
However, although the legislation was aimed at introducing competition and a 
commercial focus, the BEPB remained focused on the community. 
"Its been argued right from the start with our trust and our 
management (that) what is the point of making huge profits (and 
the) government taking a third of that in tax? And then (us) issuing 
a dividend to the shareholder - which is the trust - who in turn then 
issues those dividends out to the consumer. By that time there is 
another taxation implication as well - so it's only a portion of that 
(profit) the consumer gets so that (commercial approach has) sort 
of not been the focus" (Corporate Services Manager) 
The BEPB reacted to the deregulation by employing a consultant to research 
the solution best suited to maintaining local ownership of the company's assets 
and achieve both commercial and community aims. 
"Our legal adviser at the time was Bell Gully BuddIe Weir in 
Wellington and Liz Kelly was the key solicitor who had experienced 
reform in the UK, and she promoted the trust ownership that we 
locked into" (CEO). 
As legislation required a community vote to determine the final ownership 
structure consultants were also used to conduct market research to gauge the 
community's opinion of the BEPB, as well as customer needs and wants. This 
research indicated that the majority of consumers approved of the BEPB and 
would support maintained community ownership. 
"We used consultants to get market research done. (We found) 
people were happy with the price of electricity, and as long as it 
appeared to the community that there was a reasonable price 
relative to the rest of the country they were happy (with the 
company)" (Corporate Services). "Research undertaken indicated 
that a number of people would rather stick with Buller Electricity 
provider and they are quite more than satisfied with the service that 
we provide" (CEO) 
With legal and community support for the status quo, the management and 
board of the BEPB promoted the trust structure as best way to meet community 
desires. 
"We always had a reporter ... at the monthly board meetings so our 
people (the community) were informed at what was going on" 
(CEO) 'The decision of the board was basically ... to keep the 
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control of the assets in the district so you're controlling your own 
destiny" (Operations Manager). 
At a community vote in 1992 the community trust structure was selected. Two 
reasons were offered for the selection and appropriateness of the trust 
ownership structure for Buller's electricity' company. First the effects that 
government reform had had on the local economy meant that the general 
community was generally resistant to change. As a high profile employer in the 
,area the BEPB was particularly important as the Buller region's economy has 
been drastically affected by government reforms and conservation policies 
which had seen many local government departments and businesses 
downsized or closed. Such events had raised significant and general public 
opposition to government reforms. 
lilt was very much a government town, and obviously with the 
restructuring of government departments a lot of those professional 
people left the district. The demise of that's continued right through 
to today - over a thousand jobs lost through the district since 1985" 
(Corporate Services Manager). 'The central government policy of 
restructuring affected (the) local community and Buller Electricity is 
the only local thing left! The significant job losses meant local 
people were sick of reform and wanted to protect their local power 
company" (CEO). 
Second was parochialism and the strong community spirit of the Buller district. 
liMy view is that the town is a very parochial town very much a 
socialist background to the community and I think it's a bit of a 
hangover from that" (Corporate Services Manager). 
The composition of the trust board was also significant. Although the 
government had indicated that it desired commercially experienced and 
focused boards, a degree of latitude remained in the legislation due to the 
government's legal inability to dictate the final ownership structure. This 
enabled the BEPB to select a structure and promote candidates with 
experience on the community board. As a result, many representatives elected 
to the trust board were not radically different from the past. 
"Some of our board members were former employees of the 
company which helped. For instance one of our former engineers, 
who was probably one of our long serving engineers, became a 
director. And one of the other persons in charge of the lines he'd 
been a board member for 25 years. So we did have at board level 
some very good engineering skills. And probably what's happened 
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because of that those older two people on the board they were 
pretty frugal, there has not been a lot of waste as you might see in 
other companies. So that has been (a) key driver to the direction 
that we have gone down"(CEO). 
With the community trust structure and representatives selected Buller 
Electricity Limited (BEL) was formed and "on the first of April 1993 the whole 
thing was deregulated" (CEO). BEL was not officially formed until ''the 13th 
April, because we were running one month late" (CEO). 
4.5.1 The Reactive Change Process 
Following the formalization of the ownership structure, the renamed 
organization initiated internal changes. Implemented by senior management 
with the assistance of consultants, the opportunity was presented for the 
organization to undergo significant strategic, structural and cultural change to 
meet the change in focus of the new operating environment. However this 
opportunity was not taken and instead the changes introduced were small and 
incremental in nature. 
Shortly after corporatisation employment consultants conducted an employee 
review of all managerial positions to ascertain whether managers had the 
requisite skills for their positions. At the top the CEO had individually 
undergone a review "process to see whether I stayed here" with the board and 
subsequently retained his position. His reselection as head of the organization 
rested on his accounting ability, experience and long-term association with the 
organization. 
"I've been here for over 21 years, I've got a fair bit in my head as to 
how it (the organization) operates and listening. See I've worked 
with five engineers in that time and I listen to them and I have 
learned a lot" (CEO). 
All other managers within BEL were also required to undergo the review 
process. 
"When we were formed into a company basically all of the 
management positions were re-advertised - we used employment 
consultants for that (Corporate Services Manager). '~/ot of the 
staff reviewed their duties ... the staff were concerned about their 
future, but we went through the process without any major problems 
at all" (CEO). 
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Despite the management review, there was only a limited impact on second tier 
management. Although BEL "actually did reduce our staff by one or two to give 
us enough room to make some changes" (CEO) this was done through natural 
attrition. This not only maintained the company's 'Job for life" tradition but also 
enabled the organization to "download" internalized knowledge. 
"One of our older serving people, charged with the line crew, was 
put to one side reporting to me. He was 18 months from retirement 
and we had 18 months to download what knowledge he did have. 
So rather than making him redundant and putting people over him 
where he would lose his status we decided to pull him out of the 
field and have him reporting directly to me" (CEO). 
Restructuring did result in the development of a new Corporate Services 
Manager position. This position was primarily established to handle the 
increased monitoring workload associated with the government's new 
compliance regime. 
"The board interviewed me. I (had) started (my employment) under 
the old structure mainly in the financial area. (The new position) is 
an administrative, corporate financial support to all of the divisions 
along with (dealing with) the Ministry of Commerce compliance 
disclosure" (Corporate Services Manager). 
However the CEO saw the new division more as a means of maintaining and 
retaining the services of long-term employees. 
'The real reason we formed the corporate service division was that 
we had people sitting in the wrong seats. We had a lot of long 
serving employees who were no longer appropriate to hold those 
supervisory roles. So what we really had to do was, out of our 
existing resources, relocate people" (CEO). 
Therefore, although the industry was required to shift to a commercial and 
divisionalised structure, the structural changes implemented within BEL were 
comparatively moderate. The 'restructuring process' effectively resulted in the 
redistribution of organizational resources. 
'The change process hasn't been a radical change from the 
companies perspective it's a change because of legislation that's 
really a matter of adaptation rather than change. We never did 
anything radical; we basically did what we were required to do 
under the legislation. (We) kept thinking, just taking our time, 
making sure that the decisions we were making weren't the wrong 
decisions. Because we were such a small company we wouldn't 
have the lUxury to be able to buy our way out of our problems that 
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would show up immediately if we made a wrong decision" 
(Corporate Services Manager). 
4.5.2 Strategic, Structural and Cultural Organizational Change 
Despite ongoing environmental turbulence, BEL had deliberately sold the 
benefits of an ownership structure that maintained the traditional organization-
community relationship and culture. The selection of the trust structure in 
combination with the reselection of the CEO explicitly indicated the board's 
desire to preserve the ownership of the organization's assets for locals, and 
maintain the traditional operational and cultural values of the electricity 
company. Combined with the organization's strong connection and 
identification with the community there was a shared desire at the ownership, 
managerial, organizational and community level to maintain the status quo. 
Consequently, the nature of strategic, structural and cultural organizational 
change was typical of first-order change. 
4.5.3 Strategic Change 
Significant strategic change in the form of a merger with neighbouring electricity 
company Westpower was considered early on. 
"We did meet with Westpower (and) at that meeting it was decided 
there were no benefits that could be achieved with a merger. Since 
then I have publicly said on a large number of occasions that there 
were no benefits between Buller and Westpower merging, because 
we would both be too small to survive in the current environment. 
There was actually no benefits or no synergies that would be of 
value to both parties" (CEO). 
However researching the viability of the proposal did not go beyond official 
CEO meetings. Yet despite the CEO's statements as neighbouring 
organizations scale economy benefits and cost savings could have been 
achieved as proven by several other electricity organizations (for example 
South power) at the time. Behind the official reasons for turning down the 
opportunity, the Network Manager suspect's merger talks were called off due to 
interpersonal differences between CEO's and the traditional parochial rivalry 
that existed between the two regions. 
"Our CEO has met with the CEO in Westpower and while they talk 
business with each other there isn't that personal connection. 
Westpower is not (seen as) much good (possibly) parochial 
differences" (Network Manager). 
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The potential for loss of control and ownership of the assets may also have 
played a part. 
A second significant strategic opportunity was BEL's proposal to build a 
hydroelectric dam in the region. 
"We went into build a major hydro scheme with Downer in 1992" 
(CEO). 
Promising long-term employment and a steady source of revenue for the local 
economy, the plan to tackle such a scheme matched both the electricity ethos 
and community focus of the organization. However despite years of negotiation 
and legal battles, the Minister of Conservation unilaterally scuttled the plan. 
Appealing the decision the gov?rnment undertook "a political judicial review of 
the Minister of Conservation's decision not to grant us access to enable this 
hydro project to proceed, because the hydro scheme was a large one with high 
conservation costs" (CEO). Pressured by environmental lobbyists, the 
government supported the Minister's decision. This created significant 
dissatisfaction within the local community, but reinforced support for BEL. 
'That really fired up the local community. For the first time we had a 
public meeting of over a hundred people and the community was 
vety angty. Even today a lot of the people are vety disapPOinted 
with the decision that was made by the Minister of Conservation" 
(CEO). 
It is not· clear what the consequences for BEL would have been had either a 
merger occurred or the hydroelectric dam been completed. Denied the 
opportunity to pursue both strategic options, BEL instead retreated to follow a 
reactive and incremental change strategy. As changes to legislation were made 
BEL's management reacted: "once someone said ok we're going to legislate 
we did it" (CEO). However, rather than look beyond the immediate implications 
of institutional change to try and identify further strategic opportunities, strategic 
changes were made simply to meet statutory requirements. 
"What we have done is we've fine· tuned" (CEO). "Look at how we 
can get by without doing anything extra" (Network Manager). 
BEL's management when dealing with strategic change at the organizational 
level also took this reactive approach. With a focus on cost saving, the 
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management and board of BEL monitored the environment for improved 
operational methods introduced successfully in other electricity companies. 
"What we've done is I've always run with the hounds. What I mean 
by that is that if some companies have some good ideas and as 
soon as any changes have come in the company has run with 
those changes" (CEO). 'They're (the board) seeing what other 
companies are doing and if its saving money then they adopt that" 
(Operations Manager). 
This approach to strategic change allowed the organization to introduce small 
changes to meet both statutory requirements and appear increasingly 
commercial while meeting the expectations of the organization and community. 
The ownership structure of BEL was identified as a fundamental reason for the 
organization's strategic approach. Although the government required all 
electricity companies to operate along commercial imperatives, the community 
trust and CEO instead chose to implement systems that ensured the 
organization could maintain its traditional social 'paternal' function. 
'The trust desires a low rate of return, and we pay them minimum 
dividends. We just pay the dividend to cover their operating cost 
you know therefore our prices are pretty low". 'The affect that the 
government's restructuring has had on the community has meant 
we have taken a social responsibility focus" (CEO). 
4.5.4 Structural Change 
Although the potential impact of environmental change was great, the continuity 
of BEL's strategic focus as determined by the community trust ownership 
structure saw the organization introduce limited structural changes. Where 
changes were made they were made only in response to statutory 
requirements and often mimicked the actions of similarly sized electricity 
companies. 
The implementation of structural change process was primarily managed and 
driven by the CEO - "the CEO was in charge of the whole process" (Corporate 
Services Manager). Consultants were utilised to provide assistance in the 
development of BEL's structure "at the time" (CEO), but their role was limited to 
providing assistance with meeting compliance regulations that BEL did not 
have the expertise or management resources to address. 
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'~ lot of the compliance requirements required outside consultants 
in our case and (it's) probably no different than any other power 
company" (Corporate Services Manager). 
Structural changes in BEL illustrate the effect of coercive isomorphism, where 
an organization's structure reconfiguration is required as a result of statutory 
requirements. Legislation meant that "there was a requirement to split line and 
energy charges so we split them" (CEO). The requirement to financially 
separate network and energy businesses was not regarded as a radical change 
by the management of BEL. Other structural changes were made in reaction to 
changes made by other electricity organizations, developments that were 
assessed as compatible with the strategic and cultural tradition of BEL. 
'They (the board and CEO) love Electra (particularly) in operational 
issues. So we all seem to (do) whatever Electra is doing, it's (seen 
as) the right way to do (change). And so they (the board) are vel)l 
much of the opinion that whatever Tasman is doing is no good and 
whatever Westpower is doing is not much good either" (Network 
Manager). 'The way industl)l was heading at that time you had to 
see what other people were doing and change anyway. Other 
things will change depending on how the industl)l is going" 
(Operations Manager). 
Approaching structural change as an incremental process - lithe restructuring 
process is redesignating positions" (CEO) - BEL's CEO merely renamed extant 
internal divisions. Although this process saw the management layers 'officially' 
reduced lion corporatisation we (introduced) a three tier structure which was far 
better" (CEO) this had minimal impact on the organization. 
No redundancies were forced on the organization, with staff leaving only 
through natural attrition. 
"We actually did reduce our staff by one or two only by one or two 
to give us enough room to make some changes and to redesignate 
all the positions" (CEO). 
4.5.5 Cultural Change 
In the face of discontinuous environmental change, BEL managed to maintain a 
strategic and structural configuration not too different from its predecessor the 
BEPB. The underlying values and beliefs of the board and management had 
fundamentally determined the strategy and structure of the organization. Such 
influences also contributed to the maintenance of the organization's culture. 
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Associated with the commercialisation of the electricity sector was the widely 
held belief that a fundamental culture change was required within each 
organization "it was just that what was happening in the industry at the time" 
(CEO). However although management acknowledged the need for a new 
commercial culture focused on customers; 
"People were reluctant to change - people don't just change for the 
hell of it especially when you have a monopoly type business it's 
very easy to go cost plus mentality" (Corporate Services Manager). 
BEL's CEO tried to introduce organizational change through the use of the 
Employment Contracts Act (1992). 
"Something had to change. A lot of the staff reviewed their duties 
shortly after the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act so 
we made significant changes to our terms and conditions of 
employment. We eliminated all allowances eliminated double time 
eliminated a lot of the old service allowances at that time" (CEO). 
However managers acknowledged that this did not have a significant effect on 
the organization's culture. 
"You can't change just by putting a contract in place. I think 
whoever thinks that they're kidding themselves. People decide 
what culture they take on board not what you tell them - it's their 
decision not my decision" (Network Manager). 
The organization also began to document procedures to encourage the sharing 
of 'internalized' knowledge and teamwork. 
"Personalised knowledge is a problem. It means people tend to rely 
more on people doing their work and if they're not there all of a 
sudden certain parts don't get done" (Network Manager). 
Despite CEO encouragement resources were not dedicated to the 
documentation process, which remained an ongoing 'work-in-progress'. 
"We're still doing it's sort of an ongoing thing we're too small to 
appoint someone it would just about be a full time job for a year. 
We haven't got the lUXUry of appointing someone so we thought 
we'd just do it as it comes along" (Operations Manager). 
Similarly, although the CEO acknowledged the need for cultural change, there 
was a lack of investment made in staff training and development. 
"There's no investment in staff I'm afraid. Sure there's a board 
policy where if the staff wants to go to certain training that is 
appropriate the staff will approach the board and the company will 
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support them in that. But that's relying on the proactive nature of 
the staff. Meanwhile the staff are too busy (saying) - 'I haven't got 
time to learn anything new' and 'I've got my task here and I can do 
it a hundred percent right'. So you keep hearing 'I haven't got time 
to learn have a look at thatm (Network Manager). 
Consequently, although an attempt to change the culture was made by BEL's 
CEO, the lack of investment in cultural change programmes as well as the lack 
of obvious strategic and structural changes meant that the organization's 
culture remained focused on electricity. 
"Our focus has been to get the job done. That's the first goal- to 
get the power out to the customer" (Corporate Services Manager). 
"We have people still doing jobs at the company cost when they 
should have been 100 percent paid by the customer" (CEO) 
4.5.6 Attributes of BEL's Change Process 
The case of BEL provides us with a valuable insight into the variables that 
determine the nature and extent of organizational change. 
The community trust form of ownership retained the traditional community-
organization relationship, values and archetype. This restricted the ability of 
management and government to introduce widespread strategic, structural and 
cultural changes. 
'The government never had control over the trust owned power 
companies because we weren't necessarily profit driven to the 
extent the government wanted" (Corporate Services Manager). 
Although statutory requirements saw changes made to infrastructural and 
support structures, the demands of the owners to remain true to the values and 
beliefs of the past meant that the organization fundamentally continued 
unchanged. 
"If you look at our annual report it looks like we've made 
tremendous changes but really bottom line nothing has ... 1 would 
sum this company up as a typical textbook case of not how to do 
things. I mean you get a management organization book you read 
in there sort of yeah that's it we'll do the opposite that's how I sum it 
up (Network Manager). "From where we sit from the old power 
board structure to today it the same old company" (CEO). 
A significant factor preventing change was the lack of change in the CEO's 
managerial approach. The CEO's autocratic management style maintained the 
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traditional management-staff distinction and undermined his own calls for 
cultural change. 
"It's (an) autocratic leadership style that our CEO has that's really 
still forcing that old culture" (Network Manager). "Our CEO 
basically comes to management first (to) discuss ideas and we'll 
discuss them on a management level. Then staff are advised 
depending where the CEO thinks it (change) should go" 
(Operations Manager). 
Despite the CEO's opinion that many gains had been made, members of the 
management team identified that his need to maintain control of the entire 
organization, as had been required of the role in the past, was a major 
impediment to change. 
'He gets involved in those processes instead of maybe just 
explaining the outcome he desires and then actually leaving the 
logistics issues up to other people that can sort them out" (Network 
Manager). "If he (the CEO) feels there's a need for change then we 
change" (Operations Manager). "From my perspective he tries to 
do a managers job more than a CEO's job. He's providing more 
management functions than leadership functions. If something 
doesn't go quite right he wants to fix it right there and then and he 
tells us how to do it or he goes to somebody else and says get this 
thing fixed. So he's vel}' much 'do it that way' and that's it. And if 
we come up with an approach and we start doing that and he sees 
that happening and he doesn't really feel it's the right way he'll 
interfere unless he's fully aware of what's actually happening. So 
you approach him to let him think it's his idea so it will work" 
(Network Manager) 
The traditional strategic community focus was identified as a barrier to change. 
'The approach to the community focus has been a /ittle bit of a 
barrier to us changing to toe the line basically (Corporate Services 
Manager) "I'm still having to come to grips with a vel}' conservative 
approach probably by the board I don't want to rock this boat too 
much I think that is really the main driver that has actually that we're 
doing this (change) so late. " (Network Manager) 
This conservative approach rested on the board's belief that it ~as imperative 
to maintain a strategy that benefited the community 'The thing is the company 
has always had a vel}' full on community based focus"(CEO). BEL's rural and 
isolated position was identified as contributing to the organization's limited 
change. "We're our own /ittle company here" (Network Manager). 
"We were isolated (and) companies weren't getting us involved in 
training and things like that" (Operations Manager). "Being a small 
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company I probably feel that I suffer from professional isolation" 
(Network Manager). 
Isolation protected BEL from the effects of competition, such as competitive 
tendering for contracting work and energy retailing. BEL's distance from urban 
centres meant that it was not financially viable to compete in the area, providing 
a buffer that allowed the organization to continue operating in a 'traditional' 
manner. 
"I know people have rung First Electric (competitors) some of our 
staff have done it to see what their package is. And they're (the 
competitors) not interested in getting into the market in rural areas -
only major urban - and I think it'll be some time before the domestic 
consumer sees any benefits" (Corporate Services Manager). 
"Were we to bring another contractor in - because of our 
remoteness you know Greymouth are our nearest opposition - it 
would cost quite a bit they would charge quite dearly I'd say to 
come up and work for this company. The company sorted it out 
and said no it's cheaper to have our own staff" (Network Manager). 
BEL's isolation was also identified as a significant barrier to the introduction of 
"new blood" to the organization. 
"They (the board) advertised extensively throughout New Zealand 
and I guess it was reluctance to come to a rural area, people 
thought that was a step backwards probably the salaries that we 
were offering weren't (attractive) the opportunity for progression for 
those people wasn't there. Recruitment is a problem" (Operations 
Manager). "We advertised to people with an emphasis on going 
outside the district to bring in new blood and when we endeavored 
to recruit we found that the people that we were looking for really 
didn't suit the role" (Corporate Services Manager). "It is very 
difficult recruiting people in this area. We advertised extensively on 
a number of occasions but have not had many applicants" People 
don't want to come here. To recruit people in these remote areas is 
extremely difficult because they need to be a different type of 
person they really need an interest in the type of terrain and 
obviously the adventure opportunities that exist in the area you 
know you've got to be that way inclined you've got to be into 
tramping and fishing and those type of things to like what we have 
to offer" (CEO). 
BEL's inability to attract new and 'suitable' managerial staff - that is individuals 
that valued the 'West Coast' way of life and were compatible with the culture of 
BEL - reduced the likelihood of BEL successfully introducing widespread 
second order strategic, structural and cultural changes. 
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Counter to extant theoretical literature outlining the entrepreneurial and 
innovation advantages associated with a small organization, the organization's 
size was identified by BEL's management as a significant barrier to the rapid 
implementation of widespread, second-order change. Due to its size BEL 
managers did not: 
"Have the lUxury of being able to employ full time managers, and in 
fact a lot our managers are very much hands on working managers 
rather than just a purely management role and that's even including 
the CEO so it does make it difficult to be able to plan and look at 
strategies" (Corporate Services Manager). 
That BEL could not dedicate managerial staff to purely strategic issues due to 
its size was generally acknowledged as a reason for the organization's inability 
to radically change or even keep up with the change process. 
"It certainly would have been easier if you'd had the lUxury of having 
people that were more dedicated to strictly management roles 
where they could basically manage the business manage the 
change manage the implications" (Operations Manager). '~s a 
small company we are multi skilled and it has been extremely 
difficult to keep up you know with changes" (CEO). 'To a certain 
extent because of our size we've taken the wait and see attitude" 
(Corporate Services Manager). 'There's been things that haven't 
been done ... you're talking of 5 years of constant change its very 
hard to be able to put a strategy in place to be able to overcome it 
particularly fora small company" (Operations Manager). 
Despite the structural norms emerging within the industry, the BEL's small size 
meant it was not able to develop the structures emerging within its peers. 
"We had to break it (BEL) up into business units and that was done 
in a financial setting only rather than in the management structure. 
We broke that into initially about six business units thinking that this 
is what we had to do, but it became evident that we were so small 
we didn't have enough people to fill the positions that that would 
create" (Corporate Services Manager). 
Consequently BEL was seen to be lagging behind larger electricity companies. 
"Bigger companies had sort of implemented years ago this sort of 
set up but because we were small sort of out of the way company a 
lot of the stuff was in house" (Operations Manager). "From the 
government's perspective and the purpose of restructuring power 
companies yeah we've probably been a little slow" (Corporate 
Services Manager) 
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The financial strength and stability of BEL also provided a substantial buffer for 
the management and owners of BEL. 
"We've been debt free for ten years and we felt that we could 
continue to be just as efficient as we were and I think the 
performance indicators have confirmed that our performance in a lot 
of those areas was far superior to our neighbours" (CEO). 
This cash rich status was primarily due to the company providing electricity to a 
major industrial facility, the income from which allowed the organization to 
pursue the traditional community focused strategy. 
"We have one large dominant customer called Milburn New 
Zealand limited that takes over 52 percent of our load. Over the 
years we have put Milburn's load and the company's together. We 
were able to avoid significant costs to the district whereby all 
consumers here were benefiting so historically our prices have 
always been amongst the lowest in New Zealand historically" 
(CEO). 
Some saw the lack of a clear strategy for change was seen by as an 
impediment to BEL implementing radical change. Although the CEO was sure 
that there was a clear vision for change and that BEL would have changed 
irrespective of environmental upheaval "we've got a bit more vision although we 
were going to get better anyway without the reform" (CEO), some managers 
believed otherwise. 
"There is no clear strategy - I stress that to the board and the CEO 
but they say there is a clear strategy so we are a bit different in 
those opinions" (Network Manager). "Probably some of the sort of 
things that we should be doing by way of customer focus strategies 
have probably gone by the way" (Corporate Services Manager). 
"We get our vision statement every year and basically every year 
we are working towards that. It changes every year depending on 
how the industry is going" (Operations Manager). 
Consequently some lamented that BEL was strategically short-sighted, and that 
BEL's inability or unwillingness to devote resources to strategic planning had 
resulted in the organization taking a reactive, 'fire fighting' approach. 
"In this company it's always fire fighting and you never get out of it 
you know. You douse the fire here and in the meantime there are 
four flaring up behind you - you never get anywhere. We may do 
things very efficient but are we doing things effective, are we doing 
the right thing. Maybe we're doing it spot on right but are we doing 
the right thing is this really needed to actually help this company - I 
sometimes wonder" (Network Manager). 
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Where attempts were made by management to promote organizational 
changes, the board and CEO viewed it as creating unnecessary problems. 
"I'm obviously trying to persuade them (the board and CEO) in a 
certain direction and too much persuasion is sort of stirring - you've 
got to have some of these ideas lets go for that you know lets get 
out of this vicious circle" (Network Manager). 
BEL was a small organization with a history and tradition tightly embedded 
within the Buller community. Servicing a struggling rural area, BEL was a 
provider of both electricity and employment, and the organization's identity was 
as much aligned with the electricity sector as it was with the community. 
Therefore when a new regulatory environment introduced a new commercial 
operating imperative, the conflict of values meant that BEL was highly resistant 
to change. On corporatisation this resistance manifested itself when BEL, with 
community support, adopted the community trust structure. The selection of 
this ownership structure reduced internal pressure for change and allowed the 
organization to maintain traditional values that proved to be at odds with the 
intent of deregulation. Therefore, although BEL did introduce changes as 
required by law, these were reactive and first-order in nature only as the 
"strategy really with the reform has been survival" (CEO). 
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4.6 Electricity Ashburton Limited (EAL) 
4.7 Overview 
Electricity Ashburton Limited (EAL) is an electricity company that serves the 
Mid-Canterbury region on the east coast of New Zealand's South Island. 
Headquartered in the medium sized town of Ashburton, EAL is a small 
organization that employs 100 people to meet the electricity distribution, retail 
and construction demands of 24,780 customers. EAL's distribution network 
provides electricity for a predominantly rural area of 6,664 square kilometres. 
Prior to corporatisation, EAL's predecessor had been an EPB the AEPB -
(Ashburton Electric Power Board established 1921), and shared strategic, 
structural and cultural similarities with its peers. However EAL chose to 
implement a unique ownership structure. Having initially formed a limited 
liability company with the Electricity Ashburton Trust following the Energy 
Companies Act (1992), an ownership review and public ballot in 1995 resulted 
in the organization adopting a customer co-operative form. Despite the radical 
institutional change that initiated this change process, the organization's 
ongoing concern with community welfare and safeguarding local ownership of 
the company's assets meant that the process of organizational change in EAL 
closely conformed to the archetype of incremental, reactive and first-order 
change. 
4.8 The Electricity Archetype in AEPB 
Common to the heritage of all EPBs, the AEPB had been a community owned 
organization with a locally elected board. Board membership was comprised of 
prominent local businessmen - primarily farmers due to the rural nature of the 
region - with little commercial experience. This combined with the nature of the 
statutory environment of the time lent itself to the development of an 
organization concerned with community welfare rather than commercial returns. 
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"We were not a company we were just a local body and the board 
was elected by a vote which meant we didn't have what we would 
term professional directors in those days - they were just people 
who thought they could run a business. They weren't directors then 
they were board members of course in those days they were from 
other businesses they had business experience but not at director 
level" (Financial Controller). 'The make up of the board perhaps in 
the old day we went through it was all local farming community 
elected people on a board" (Commercial Manager). 
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Consequently the members of the AEPB board traditionally took a "hands on" 
approach with the organization, involving themselves with the day-to-day 
management of the organization. 
'The old days community elected people wanted a hands on 
approach and they spent more time selecting what model of 
vehicles going to be bought rather than the profit you're going to 
make" (Commercial Manager). 
4.8.1 Organization Strategy, Structure and Culture 
The nature of the operating environment meant that the AEPB also conformed 
to the typical power board profile. Strategically, as a protected monopoly, the 
AEPB "was just a power company that was trundling along it had a monopoly 
do what it liked charged what it liked and nobody could ever moan about it. .. 
when I first started here it didn't matter about customers before they'd like it or 
lump it because they couldn't find the power anywhere else" (Financial 
Controller). As the only provider of electricity services the primary focus rested 
on electricity network construction and maintenance. However the inclusion of 
appliance retailing and ancillary services meant that lithe original (strategic) 
approach here was very much a 'be all things to all men' type approach - it was 
a one stop shop" (Network Manager). 
The structural profile of the AEPB was also fundamentally identical to that of 
other EPBs. The organization was divided in two, based upon engineering and 
financial disciplines, and maintained a hierarchical and bureaucratic system. 
"We had the traditional power board structure where there was the 
chief executive. In those days it was styled general manager 
effectively the same thing and I reported to the board. And then the 
organization (was) divided into two under that - we had a chief 
engineer and a secretary treasurer (and) we operated like that" 
(CEO). 
The General Manager (GM) of the AEPB was an engineer with many years 
experience in the organization. 
"I've been in the electricity industry my whole career. I first came to 
Ashburton back in the days when it was the Ashburton power and 
gas board in 1971 as the assistant engineer and 78 as chief 
engineer and became general manager at the end of '86" (CEO). 
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The GM had ascended to th~ position in a somewhat 'traditional' manner, 
styled to take over the reigns of the organization on the retirement of the 
incumbent. 
"I'm an engineer by training electrical engineer. As chief engineer I 
was effectively the deputy general manager - in fact I was actually 
styled that a year or so prior to my predecessor retiring and had 
been away to some management training courses during the 
course of that time as chief engineer. I was here then as chief 
engineer and deputy to my predecessor who retired and took over 
his position on his retirement - I suppose it was reasonably 
common way (to advance in the organization)" (CEO). 
The GM's management style was paternal in nature. 
"Looking from (the GM's) point of view there's almost a fatherly sort 
of view on it like almost like a big family" (Network Manager). 
The GM's paternal approach in conjunction with the strategic and structural 
configuration of the AEPB contributed to the development of the enduring EPB 
culture - one focused on engineering and a 'job for life' mentality. 
Consequently the AEPB had loyal and long serving staff. 
"We have a vety low turn-over rate" (CEO). "I'm a long time 
employee it must be close to 25 years. I started here from school 
as an apprentice electrician went through a technical background 
NZCE" (Commercial Manager). 
This sense of loyalty developed a pride in and ownership of the AEPB that 
manifested itself in staff investing time and energy into the organization above 
and beyond their duty. 
"If there's a problem after hours its not a problem getting staff. 
People come in on their own time - come in at six o'clock at night 
and there's quite a few people still here and they're here because 
they want to do the job, not because they're afraid tomorrow they 
won't have a job" (Network Manager). 
Furthermore, as a consequence of the close rural community in which the 
AEPB operated, the organization was perceived as "much more relaxed" 
(Network Manager) than other urban based organizations. This dedicated and 
loyal culture was identified as having developed out of the AEPB's small size 
and rural operating environment; 
"I think small parochial and stable is where that's (culture) really 
come from" (Network Manager). 
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4.8.2 Summary 
The strategic, structural and cultural profile of AEPB was typical of the 
electricity archetype. The AEPB had developed a strategic and structural 
configuration to meet the statutory requirements of the operating environment. 
These variables, combined with the demands of the local operating 
environment, created an organization culture deeply aligned with the local 
community, focused on engineering, operational tradition and loyalty. The 
AEPB archetype therefore contained the four components typical of rural EPBs: 
community ownership, a hierarchical structure, a community focus and an 
engineering culture. 
4.9 Organizational Change in the AEPB 
4.9.1 Pre-Legislation Change 
In 1987, following 66 years of stability, the first changes to affect the AEPB 
emerged "when the power boards became taxpayers in 1987" (Financial 
Controller), which removed the special company status afforded all EPBs and 
MEDs. However this was not regarded as a significant change by the AEPB, 
as it required only small adjustments to be made to improve financial reporting 
systems. 
"We had to improve our reporting. We didn't have a great system -
the computer system was there but the reports weren't being 
prepared on a regular basis and gave us accurate information the 
end of month. We had to just tidy up our system reporting to 
provide the accurate information as at the end of each month rather 
than at the end of each year which is what happened. Just 
improving reporting, taking it to the board, and they would say 
IWhat about this' and you'd just upgrade your reports for quite a 
considerable time until we finally got what was suitable from their 
point of view" (Financial Controller). 
Rather, it was after the corporatisation of ECNZin 1987 that the AEPB board 
and management were alerted to a strategic shift in the operating environment. 
The board of the AEPB saw the corporatisation of ECNZ as a push to introduce 
a customer focused service philosophy b.ased on reducing costs throughout the 
industry. 
l'The biggest change was when there was the marketing movement 
where words like customer satisfaction were really booming in the 
service industries. That was led from ECNZ (and was) obviously a 
govemment-come-ECNZ push to try and drive this thinking through 
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the whole industry so that was the biggest change" (Commercial 
Manager). 
However, although a defined marketing strategy was new to the AEPB, such a 
strategic approach was not perceived to be a radical threat to the status quo 
nor at odds with the traditional electricity focus of the organization. 
"There was an ECNZ move to grow sales and that was the textbook 
theory at that time was you grow sales through customer 
satisfaction delivering the products and services that customers 
wanted the marketing type concept. There was starting then to 
come in some emphasis on marketing, which hadn't ever really 
been in place prior to that, and an emphasis on customer service. I 
guess it was pervading the whole industry" (Commercial Manager). 
Rather, the 'new' marketing focus appeared to be an improvement and 
refinement of the traditional organization strategy of supplying electricity for the 
community. This assessment is supported by the rapid implementation and 
success with which the marketing focused approach was adopted. A former 
engineer with an interest in marketing issues was assigned the role to lead a 
new marketing division, which was established quickly. 
"Someone (was) styled marketing manager, he was from an 
engineering background. He now has qualifications in business 
studies and marketing that he would have been embarking on 
about that time had a particular interest in that. .. (that process took) 
a couple of months" (CEO). 
This newly emphasised strategic focus saw the organization meet with early 
success. 
"We did that (change) more or less over night and we were leaders 
in the industry there - we won the inaugural marketing award" 
(Commercial Manager). 
ECNZ not only set a precedent with marketing, but also provided insight into 
the structural implications of government restructuring. However it was not until 
the passing of the Electricity Power Boards Amendment Act (1988) that the 
board and management of the AEPB were spurred into making structural 
adjustments. The implications of this legislation and the threat that it posed to 
future ownership of the organization, its assets and income, forced the AEPB 
into action. With the assistance of consultants, the AEPB underwent a strategic 
and structural review. 
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"It was collective decision making by the senior people within the 
management at the time. It involved seven or eight people and the 
chairman and a couple of other board members - in those days we 
had a board of eight - it involved the chairman and two others. And 
we had a series of meetings where we addressed the overall 
strategic plan for the organization. One particular meeting we ran 
over three days - went away from here and had a consultant as a 
facilitator. And that together with other meetings that were held to 
compliment that resulted in a decision on a new structure. And that 
was promoted to staff in particular and also the public" (CEO). 
Despite the initial urgency, few changes of significance were made. To 
consolidate power at the top, the GM position was renamed CEO. With one 
person clearly in control of the organization, and with the assistance of 
consultants, a programme of restructuring was undertaken. The major 
contribution of the programme was to reduce the levels of hierarchy and 
remove the traditional separation of engineering and financial disciplines. 
Traditional operating divisions were formally renamed and cross-functional 
corporate support services integrated. 
"We did some restructuring - the first round - while we were still a 
power board. We made the structure flatter with me having more 
direct reports going away from that traditional split of engineering 
and non engineering ... lt had more direct reports to me and 
therefore more divisions and each of them smaller than the 
traditional engineering and non engineering" (CEO). 
Despite the potential for radical and anticipatory change, the initial round of 
restructuring resulted in incremental changes that increased the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the organization. No redundancies ensued and consequently 
few problems were encountered resulting in the entire process being completed 
in '~ couple of months" (CEO). 
"I think (the reaction to change was) pretty positive in those days. 
There were no redundancies involved and I think generally 
speaking the whole organization would have had a feeling of having 
a new lease of life" (CEO). 
With government reform delayed as a result of legal complications and a 
intervening general election, the period from 1988 to 1991 remained relatively 
stable in the AEPB despite uncertainty associated with the direction that the 
government would take. The enactment of the Employment Contract Act 
(1992) did however provide a means for organizational development by 
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providing an institutional environment in which direct workplace-employee 
negotiations were encouraged. The AEPB utilised this legislation to their 
advantage, removing union involvement in workplace bargaining issues. 
"We're not involved in any national awards we're not involved in any 
collective contracts that involve people outside this company with 
the way the employment law has changed and employment 
contract practices have changed there are vel}' few left like that. It 
certainly reduced the influence that the unions can have on the 
place" (CEO) 
However the effects of the legislation were limited within the organization to 
reducing issues of demarcation. The ability to negotiate directly with staff for 
the benefit of the organization rather than based on the norms of the industry 
enabled the AEPB to develop a greater degree of organizational flexibility. 
"It (the Employment Contracts Act) cut out a lot of the silly 
nonsense that used to go on - demarcation between jobs for 
example where you had certain tradesmen who weren't allowed to 
do other tradesmen's work that sort of thing. In that way its made a 
lot more flexibility and also we've been able to effectively negotiate 
directly with our own staff. (We) can come up with an agreement 
that suits the people that work in this place and the management of 
this place rather than have it dictated to us by other employers or 
other groups of employees" (CEO). 
The implications of the reaction of AEPB's management to redesigned 
employment contract law did flot radically alter the employment relationship. 
Instead the CEO, who actively pursued a personal interest in employment 
relations, negotiated employment contracts in a traditional manner, 
"I've always taken an active role in employment contract negotiation 
and the like. I had developed an interest in that and in those days 
we had national awards and regional awards (and) I was deputy of 
the industrial committee for the electricity supply industl}' and had 
an active involvement in negotiating national awards so I retained 
some of that interest" (CEO). 
Consequently, the degree extent of change in reaction to the new institutional 
environment was limited. The employment relations environment within the 
AEPB maintained the traditional paternal, community spirit approach where 
contracts were negotiated as much for the benefit of the employees as the 
organization. 
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"It lets us have employment contracts agreed on terms and 
conditions that suit Ashburton people - (not) people in other parts of 
the country - without being any disadvantage here" (CEO). 
4.9.2 The Reactive Change Process 
(The next step was corporatisation, and that resulted in a fairly 
sweeping changes" (CEO). 
The passing of the Energy Companies Act in 1992 signaled a new period of 
activity for government reform of the electricity sector. This legislation forced 
the AEPB to determine the ownership structure of their organization and 
operate as profit-making, corporate entity. The AEPB became a limited liability 
company, and was renamed Electricity Ashburton Limited (EAL). 
"All the power boards and MEDs were corporatised and the electric 
boards were no more and far more commercial orientated directors 
were put in to run what became the power companies and that 
certainly happened here" (CEO). 
The first changes impacted on the membership of the board. Initially frozen by 
the 1988 Electric Power Boards Amendment Act and later re-appointed by the 
government following the 1990 Electric Power Boards Amendment Act, 
membership of the board was reconfigured. Smaller in size, the new EAL 
board retained two members from the previous board, while four of the five 
were members of the Ashburton community. 
(~t board level I think we had probably of the eight member power 
board we only ended up with two of the five member board of 
directors only two being from that eight elected members and the 
other three were new appointments. One was from Christchurch 
and the others were local people" (CEO). 
Despite the new composition of the board's membership, little impact was 
made on the traditional board - management relationship. 
(There are little differences in working relationships and so on but 
nothing particularly major and that's more been a refinement of 
what we had in place before that rather than any sweeping change" 
(CEO). 
Initially the board and management of the organization decided that the 
organization should become "a trust owned company and that was for a period 
of about two years" (CEO). Selecting the trust ownership structure during the 
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first review period ensured that the organization's assets and operational focus 
remained with the local community. 
(~t board level they (the board) were conscious of the impact on 
families and income and employment and all the rest of it. And that 
was quite a factor in negotiations that went on" (Network Manager). 
This traditional community concern eliminated the consideration of more radical 
ownership changes such as full privatisation, but the selection of the trust 
structure ensured that the organization was able to satisfy commercially 
orientated statutory requirements. In 1994, compelled to again review the 
ownership structure, the board reviewed the trust ownership structure. The 
structure that emerged - a community co-operative - provided a vehicle that 
allowed even greater community influence over and involvement in the 
organization than the previous trust structure. 
(The trustees were required to come up with a new idea for the 
shareholding of the company. And the decision was (to develop) a 
customer owned company-operative - one of only two in the 
country. All our customers are shareholders. They have a nominal 
shareholding valued at a hundred dollars - non-tradable doesn't 
change in value. Directors are appointed by an animal cal/ed a 
shareholders committee and that comprises seven people - four of 
them are elected by the shareholders by postal vote once every two 
years, the other three are appointed by the Ashburton district 
council. The district council has an important role - (although) aI/ 
the individual customers have a hundred shares each that only 
totals about 1.3 million shares out of 31 million that are issued. The 
large majority are in a block of deferred shares held by the district 
council. It gives them no voting or controlling rights, but in the event 
of the individual shareholders deciding that the company should be 
sold, or that there be a major transaction resulting in a large block of 
assets being sold, the district council would get the proceeds of 
that" (CEO). 
According to the CEO, the board and management selected this co-operative 
structure as the best means to resist the change and ensure that the 
organization would remain owned by, and strategically focused on, the local 
Ashburton community. 
(The trustees who owned the shares for the first couple of years of 
corporatisation looked at what they thought would be best for this 
community. It's a very parochial community the town the urban and 
rural sectors of it are very interdependent and it was seen as a way 
of giving Ashburton people what they wanted. There was certainly 
resistance to privatisation like some of the other power companies 
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have done, especially in the north island with share giveaways and 
other forms of privatisation, and it was well received the concept. 
And I think our shareholders - our customers are effectively the 
same people - are pretty happy with it" (CEO). 
4.9.3 Strategic Change 
Despite having met all statutory obligations associated with the corporatisation 
process, the strategy of EAL retained the traditional community focus. This 
was clear from the organizations mission statement. 
"Ours is currently Electricity Ashburton - Your Power Partner. That 
type of thing's quite reasonable - it gives the impression that you're 
trying to create a partnership with your community. That's I think 
quite a good way of doing it" (Financial Controller). 
In resistance to government intent, the strategy of EAL protected the 
community from the pressures of competition by operating as far as possible in 
the traditional power board manner of providing an effective, low-cost electricity 
supply that would meet the demands of a growing rural community. 
"There was no need for strategies except to make sure you had a 
reasonable supply of electricity to those that needed it when they 
wanted it and that still applies today" (Financial Controller). "From a 
strategic point of view it (EAL's strategy) would be more along that 
line I suppose trying to ensure that you remain competitive with 
your pricing and you're providing a power supply that's reliable and 
available" (Financial Controller). "Prices are determined by the 
market bearing in mind what influence there might be from those 
community and shareholder issues" (CEO). 
Therefore, where strategic adaptations were implemented within EAL they were 
generally made either because 'they've been forced upon us (by) the 
government" (Network Manager); 
"We've got to live with it - we can't work outside the law" (CEO). 
''The legislation's there it has to be complied with there's not a lot of 
option" (Financial Controller). 
or as a result of contact with other organizations; "you've always got your 
ear to the ground to find out what your neighbours doing" (Financial 
Controller). 
The resistance to, and limited degree of, strategic change within EAL was 
related to the initial strategic choice associated with the finalization of the 
organization's ownership structure. The community ownership structure 
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enabled the board to maintain a close involvement in the strategic management 
and decision-making process of the organization, fundamentally no different to 
the directive and collective approach followed by its predecessor. 
"The board has quite a big influence here quite a major influence" 
(Financial Controller). "Our overall strategies are collective 
decisions so the board and myself and a couple of the other senior 
managers too really collectively decide the strategy and from time 
to time we've produced formal strategic plans" (CEO). 'There was 
internal pressures right from board level1n terms of cutting costs 
and maximum efficiency that's flowed down through the 
management structure" (Network Manager). 
With a shared community focus and traditional mindset the maintenance of the 
status quo and resistance to government driven change was supported at the 
CEO and senior management level. 
"I find my focus and the boards focus has been on resisting the 
governments proposals. The government just pushed it (change) 
through in a fairly arrogant and undemocratic way we don't agree 
(with) and have said so - all the directors say and their 
disagreements with the way the governments gone about things" 
(CEO). "If he (the CEO) doesn't agree with something he'll argue 
against it if he thinks its better some other way. The board are 
usually quite good in that respect - if he thinks it's in the best 
interest for the company and on the wrong track (he'll argue) but 
that doesn't happen vel}' often. You get people around the table 
you generally come up with the right answers. The chairman 
invariably tries to get a complete consensus he likes to keep it 
going until evel}'body does agree which is a good way of handling it 
rather than just a majority" (Financial Controller). 
That the board continued to operate in a traditional manner was not perceived 
by management to be a problem for the organization. 
"I don't have any problem with that - someone has to set the policy. 
They're going to be guided by management anyway. We'll have a 
strategic planning session with a couple of the board members and 
have some ideas and toss them around go from there" (Financial 
Controller). "If you compare us with a fully privatised company 
which tends to act principally in the interest of the shareholders. It 
tries to make profits for the shareholders as a general rule those 
companies tend to have higher prices but pay higher dividends 
make higher rates of return and pay higher dividends to their 
shareholders. Here there is a balance between those two things 
and our prices have tended to be lower but there would be those 
that argue that we are not making sufficient return on our assets 
relatively low although that's improving" (CEO). 
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However the board's community focus and paternal approach was identified as 
having delayed strategic decisions associated with the introduction of change 
within EAL. 
"Its certainly impacted in the strategy. Ultimately when the hard 
decisions have had to be made they have been made, but they 
tend to become a lot more drawn out. A lot more soul searching 
goes into it. And at times that can be worse, because it appears to 
people to be procrastination or because its drawn out they don't 
know where they're going or where they stand for a lot longer so it 
can have a negative effect" (Network Manager). 
Strategic change in EAL was limited. With a board intent on preserving the 
status quo the focus remained on resisting the environmental forces for radical 
change by maintaining a strategy that enabled the organization to meet 
statutory requirements while retaining the core ideological philosophy of 
community service. With alignment at the senior management level, the board 
and management of EAL implemented incremental, first-order changes that 
primarily refined the organization's strategy in reaction to environmental 
change. 
"From the boards point of view they just took it (change) as it come" 
(Financial Controller). 
4.9.4 Structural Change 
The extent of structural change implemented within EAL following the Energy 
Companies Act (1992) was limited. Although the new statutory environment 
provided the opportunity for significant organizational transformation, EAL 
instead chose a path that resulted in incremental structural changes made in 
reaction to environmental developments. 
Following the corporatisation of EAL, the first structural change considered 
important by. the organization's strategic management was the development 
and upgrade of infrastructural reporting systems. A change in statutory 
requirements meant that EAL was forced to develop a more refined financial 
reporting system than rudimentary bienni~1 expenditure logs. 
"The first major one (change) was when we became a corporate 
entity under the companies act. The requirements then were far 
more arduous in terms of reporting, more detailed reporting 
required of a far higher standard. You just monitored things more 
carefully on a more regular basis than the way we used to do a set 
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of accounts every 6 months for the board. They were (now required 
to be) done monthly. So we had to upgrade our systems to cope 
with all that and that's just the way business is run these days. I 
don't see it as anything out of the ordinary it's just probably what 
everyone else was doing anyway just a bit slower into getting onto 
that sort of system" (Financial Controller). '~t management level 
we changed financial reporting. We know a lot more now about the 
business month-to-month and even day-to-day about how it's going 
financially. In the old days a lot of things you didn't really know until 
after the end of the year and you were looking back" (CEO). 
The development of the reporting regime took a consultative, incremental and 
haphazard approach as the financial controller constantly consulted the board 
and reviewed requirements. 
"We discussed it between us, how we were going to achieve what 
we wanted, and they were then put into place. We did a trial run for 
a month to see if it worked. If it didn't work we'd revisit it again and 
reorganize until we got what we wanted. And we produced 
something for the board and maybe the directors would say well 
yes that's ok, but if you did this to it, it would be better still. So 
upgrade it again. So there was a constant upgrading process - in 
fact it's still continuing really" (Financial Controller). 
The increased demands for information associated with the new regime 
required EAL to upgrade and introduce computers to assist in financial and 
asset tracking. However this was not seen as a radical change, but perceived 
as a means of improving the organization. 
"Computer systems have improved dramatically over that time and 
the information is much easier to get from computers" (Financial 
Controller). "We have become much more computer orientated and 
used those sort of tools and information, but I don't think its actually 
changed the basic way we do things" (Network Manager). 
Following the Energy Companies Act (1992) EAL instituted only limited 
structural change as the organization had already established formal operating 
divisions based on financial, commercial and network competencies. However 
with the growing threat of competition for electricity supply and 
contract/maintenance work associated with the deregulation of the industry, the 
management of EAL financially separated their network and construction 
maintenance operations. 
'XCurrently) there's Financial Controller, Commercial Manager and 
myself on a level. There was (after corporatisation) another guy (for 
construction/contracting) on the same level who had all the work 
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staff reporting to him. The network would get prices and issue 
contracts to the construction maintenance division. They tendered 
for the work like an external contractor in-house" (CEO). 
This separation, following the emerging norms of the industry, was driven by 
EAL's management in an attempt to reduce overheads by opening up network 
maintenance to competitive tenders from other electricity network maintenance 
companies. 
"It was just the general process the industry was going through. 
You had to get competition and the only way to get competition was 
to set them up as a contracting area and they would tender for work 
outside of here, and others would tender for work in there" (Network 
Manager). 
The new statutory requirements also required a split in the financial reporting of 
network and energy functions. This resulted in EAL more precisely defining the 
roles of the commercial and network mana.gers. 
"It's (structure) been very much influenced by the government" 
(CEO). "The government split the company in two forced us to look 
at things and make changes" (Network Manager). 
Institutional pressure to change not only came in the form of legislation, but 
from other electricity companies. The uncertainty associated with the 
deregulation of the industry meant that EAL looked at other firms for guidance 
on how to 'fine-tune' their own structure. 
"The way this company is structured is the way like a lot of the 
industry has gone. Certainly we are very conscious of what other 
companies are doing and we keep looking at it and we do lots of 
little bits of fine-tuning. We've had things that were picked up from 
other organizations" (Network Manager). "We look over the fence 
and see what other people are doing, and I guess they look back 
this way. We're doing that all the time, and in that way I guess we 
all come up with something that's not altogether that dissimilar from 
each other" (Commercial Manager). 
Organizations of a similar size were seen as particularly influential in 
developing EAL's structure. Many structural changes were modeled on their 
approaches, but the management of, EAL argued that 'radical structural 
development was limited by the access to resources as determined by their 
size. 
'The way we now organize our control centre its much more along 
the lines of the likes of Electra in the North Island and we've seen 
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what they've done there and we've picked up some of their 
approaches. There might be a tendency to look to others of similar 
sizes because I think that's of more help than say us looking at 
Southpower. Because they are just so much bigger and so many 
different focuses. They've set up quite a number of subsidiary 
companies for example because they've got the size that each 
subsidiary company is big enough in its own right. We haven't. 
Southpower set up for example their contracting Connetics and that 
runs as an autonomous company in its own right. It would be 
possible (here) but we haven't considered that it would be an 
advantage over just running it as a business unit sharing the 
corporate overheads with other business units" (Network Manager). 
This concern was borne out in 1994. After two years of operation as separate 
divisions, the network and contracting arms were re-amalgamated under the 
traditional network function. Two reasons were cited for the reversal of this 
structural change. Firstly, due to EAL's relative isolation, the company was 
neither attracting competitive tenders for work on its own network, nor was its 
own division able to offer competitive bids to work outside the traditional 
franchise area. 
"What they (contracting) found is in this locality - like in 
Christchurch you've got Connetics and Alstom you've got 
competitors local. Here the nearest competitor is either 
Christchurch or Timaru and we were missing out on work in most 
places by about the value of our traveling. And they (competitors) 
priced in here the difference was about the traveling time which was 
logical" (Network Manager). "Competition has never really 
manifested itself - but that threat has been there and its caused us 
to react to it" (CEO). 
Secondly, the separation of the network and contracting was not proving to be 
financially viable as it had introduced additional overheads. 
'tAtter) we split off the contracting construction side into a separate 
division, we didn't see that that was providing advantages after a 
couple of years of running it that way (so) we decided to put that 
back together" (CEO). There was two divisions - the network 
division and construction and maintenance division - and that was 
amalgamated into one, which became the network division (in) 
1994 basically (for) cost saving. What was felt then was there was 
we'd put a lot of overheads in the business and not really achieved 
anything. So all those works people were brought in as part of 
network" (Network Manager). 
The reversal of EAL's divisionalisation had few ramifications for the business 
from the perspective of senior management. However the restructuring did 
80 
require redundancies, a process managed by the CEO with the assistance of 
human resource consultants. 
"I took advice from consultants in the human resource field as to 
how to handle it. And I guess I really followed that advice and my 
own views combined with that on how it should be handled" (CEO). 
However the redundancy process was not seen to have had a significant effect 
on the organization. The CEO followed a traditional approach to implementing 
the redundancies where "there was a little bit of room for one or two volunteers 
and other things being equal last on first off' (CEO). Senior management 
perceived the process as well managed by the CEO whose "priority was to 
keep people informed and not keep them in the dark more than was necessary" 
(CEO). Those made redundant where required were assisted to find work 
elsewhere. 
'There hasn't been that 'throw-you-to-the-wolves' and see if you 
survive type attitude - its quite protective" (Network Manager). 
The numbers involved in the process were few - 'There was a redundancies of 
half a dozen people including the chap who was on the equivalent level to what 
I was on but they've been vety minor in terms of numbers" (Network Manager). 
Furthermore the immediate impact on the organization was minimised as a 
result of the growth in demand for electricity. This provided EAL with a revenue 
stream that granted the organization latitude to maintain a degree of slack. 
"We've also .. been fortunate to have a lot of load growth so we're 
vety busy. And because we've been so busy ttying to service our 
customers, I wouldn't say costs are secondaty, but they are not the 
paramount thing" (Network Manager). 
Later, in 1998, EAL also sold its retail appliance business. Having maintained a 
traditional 'one-stop-shop' strategy for the benefit of the community, the 
divestment of this 'non-core' business was implemented a lot later than EAL's 
contemporaries. However increased competitive pressure in the retail sector 
meant the retaining business was no longer attractive to the management and 
board of EAL and after much debate the decision to sell was made. 
"We've (had to) sell off our appliance trading business. We were 
one of the last to hang on to that. It had been considered from time 
to time and there were always mixed feelings arguments for and 
against it actually took that long to come to a decision that we will 
do it rather than say lets wait and see a little bit longer. Evetyone 
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that wanted it ended up with a job with the new employer or went 
out on their own and that really worked quite well. We got a little bit 
of flack from the community - a section within the community didn't 
want to see us sell that business, regarded it as theirs because they 
own this company and they should have been able to keep it" 
(CEO). 
The structural changes implemented in EAL were limited in scale and scope. 
EAL's board and management had chosen to follow a traditional strategic focus 
that restricted the desire or ability to implement wide-sweeping change. 
Furthermore, the size of EAL was identified as a significant factor in structural 
change. The lack of resources associated with a small sized organization was 
perceived to have denied EAL the ability to develop the organization's structure 
beyond that of ensuring it would adequately cater for traditional operational 
requirements. EAL's decision to reverse the separation of network and 
contracting areas citing a lack of financial viability and competition only added 
weight to the argument for a traditional strategic focus. Consequently, 
structural change in EAL took the form of small, incremental adaptations made 
in response to institutional cues. EAL's structural profile therefore did not 
significantly differ from that of its predecessor. 
"Apart from the amalgamation of those two (network and 
contracting) divisions it (structure) hasn't really changed" (Network 
Manager). 
4.9.5 Cultural Change 
Cultural change in EAL was also limited. One aspect identified as significantly 
different from the past was the increased focus on marketing following the 
corporatisation of ECNZ. 
"Marketing now is in everything, so it's growing as a culture. 
Everyone follows that same thinking I think that's the change that's 
been there and now its just there its just part of it" (Commercial 
Manager). 
However the development of a marketing focus primarily appeared to be a 
formalization of the traditional community-customer focus approach. 
"We've had customer relations courses - customer focus has 
always been to the fore in any staff newsletters and on occasions 
the chief executive will write an editorial or something that is 
sometimes customer based people are just conscious of it" 
(Financial Controller). 
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Consultants were used "only as a coordination type role" (Commercial 
Manager) to assist in the development of staff awareness of marketing 
concepts. Consequently most cultural development took an ad-hoc, reactive 
approach where '~ lot was self motivated - the people had their own personal 
individual drives that motivated them in that way of thinking that's just how it 
developed really" (Commercial Manager). 
'~ lot of training (was) lead by example, believe in what you're 
doing, and that filters through to the people under you. At the time 
we were developing even the linemen type people the labouring 
type staff all went through the same training at that time all had to 
understand what we were trying to communicate" (Commercial 
Manager). 
The small size of the organization was seen to have assisted in the 
communication of the need for cultural adaptation. There was no introduction 
of "outside people at the top level of this organization" (CEO) to lead radical 
change. Instead the family like culture produced a high degree of trust between 
management and staff that reduced the likelihood of tension and conflict and 
allowed the informal approach to cultural change. 
"In many respects it makes it (change) a lot easier. It's easier to 
communicate to people you're not always looking for hidden 
agendas and what's up your sleeve. I think it makes it a lot easier 
for people to trust each other. I think small parochial and stable is 
where that's really come from" (Network Manager). '(In) an 
organization this size it's people coming in one on one even 
wandering around having a yam to them all those sorts of things" 
(Commercial Manager) 
The potential for competition did reinforce the importance of the message and 
drove a change in attitude through the organization, but again because of 
EAL's isolation and protectionist strategic approach this was regarded as a 
gradual adaptation rather than a radical change. 
'There has been quite a bit of change in the attitude. If you go back 
to the old local body type attitudes they have (changed). That's 
just been a very gradual change and brought about partly by 
internal pressures and also because of the threat that other 
contractors will come in so therefore they're going to have to act like 
a contractor" (Network Manager). 
Cultural change was further encouraged when EAL embarked on a 
documentation process to formalize and increase the quality of operational 
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procedures. However a lack of resources and time to devote to the 
development of such documents circumvented the programme's completion. 
"We have done more of that. I guess one of the things that have 
stopped us - because we have some extremely high load growth 
we've been that busy keeping track of that or doing that that we 
haven't got a lot more of the procedures we should have had 
addressed. And I think if you look at the Southpowers and Alpines 
and people like that we'd be behind people in terms of standards 
and codes of practice and things like that" (Network Manager). . 
Overall the extent of cultural changes made in EAL was limited. Although a 
focus on marketing was developed, this was not regarded as a significant shift 
from the community focus practiced by EAL's predecessor. Furthermore the 
'family' type approach to change along with the lack of competition meant that 
the pressure for radical cultural change was not forthcoming. 
4.9.6 Attributes of EAL's Change Process 
The story of EAL's evolution is a case illustrative of reactive and incremental 
development during a time of discontinuous change. Throughout the process 
EAL's owners and management has reacted to meet the requirements of a new 
statutory environment. At the same time the relative isolation from competitive 
forces has allowed the organization to maintain a traditional form of ownership 
and fundamentally limited strategic, structural and cultural change. 
That EAL was first owned and operated as a community trust and then later as 
a community co-operative indicated to both management and the community 
that the organization would maintain a traditional strategy. As shown above, 
this directly impacted on the extent and nature of strategic, structural and 
cultural change. 
In support of current literature on organization change, the background and 
nature of the CEO was a primary influence in determining the process of 
change in EAL. The CEO was "a very conservative gentleman he doesn't 
generate a lot of change himself', an 'industry insider well embedded in the 
operating and cultural traditions of the organization. Consequently the CEO 
was highly aligned with the strategic focus of the board and unlikely to 
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challenge their approach but more inclined to take follow a conservative board-
management approach. 
'~t the end of the day he's the conduit between the directors and 
what they want and how it's going to be achieved by the rest of the 
management team and staff. So that is the filter in the middle and 
its got to be effective to make the organization effective" 
(Commercial Manager). 
Furthermore, the CEO's ongoing role in human resource management issues 
enabled him to maintain a hands on, paternal leadership role. As "there haven't 
been dramatic changes in the staff' (Financial Controller), this traditional 
approach was supported by a group of like-minded long-serving senior 
managers. 
Ashburton's isolation from competition and parochial/rural culture was identified 
as fundamental in determining EAL's process of change. 
'~shburton does everything in a rural way" (CEO). 
The small size of, and the importance that EAL has in the, community 
influenced the degree of strategic, structural and cultural change deemed 
necessary or appropriate within the organization. 
"It's a vel)! parochial area - it's vel)! parochial quite inward looking 
vel)! protective in many respects. Even at director level here there 
is more concern given to individuals and their well-being than there 
would be in Southpower and the other big Christchurch companies. 
I think it's slowed the rate of change and the severity of change 
here" (Network Manager). 'The only thing that's a local issue is 
local parochialism in a rural community like this. Really I think the 
farmers are the worst of them not willing to change hang on to what 
you've got and hang onto it tight. (It) slows you down and some of 
the steps that we're going through could have happened earlier or 
quicker. It's my natural instinct from a commercial basis to work 
vel)! quickly but when you've got this sort of process you've got to 
go through a consultative type political process which can be 
frustrating" (Commercial Manager). 
The social impact of organization change was particularly influential in affecting 
the management of the process. 
"You've go to be conscious that the people you're going to continue 
mixing with they have got relations that still work here and (have) 
relations that went down the road (made redundant). You've got to 
be a bit more softly-softly with it and much more explanatol)! of the 
reasons so that they can fully understand the process themselves, 
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come to terms with it and accept it. There are fifteen and a half 
thousand in this town but everyone seems to be related to everyone 
and everyone knows what everyone else does" (Network Manager). 
Isolation somewhat protected EAL from the onslaught of competition and 
minimized the necessity for radical, rapid organizational change and even 
delayed the process of incremental changes such as documentation. 
"I suppose its slowed some of the changes - it comes back partly to 
our isolation. If you take Southpower as an example all the 
procedures that they put in place has enabled contractors to do a 
lot more work. What we find here is there is not a lot of contractors 
who actually want to do the work. So having the procedures in 
place- in fact we wrote contract procedures for network faults and 
no-one else wanted to do it, there was no-one here that wanted to 
come to Ashburton to do the work. So it was a bit of a futile 
exercise so our provincial location tends to minimise the need (for 
change) in some respects" (Network Manager). 
However although parochialism and isolation slowed or minimized the impact of 
change it was not necessarily regarded in a negative light as EAL continued to 
operate as a successful community orientated organization. 
"I don't actually see it as a disadvantage or anyone's lost out from it" 
(Commercial Manager). 
Closely correlated with EAL's rural location was the organization's size. 
Serving a small community influenced the resources and income available to 
EAL, which the managers viewed as a limiting their ability to implement both 
radical strategic and structural change. 
"Economies of scale comes into it - power companies have to have 
size to survive with our own structure and management and what 
have you which some would argue was a bit unnecessary" 
(Financial Controller). "Lack of resources is the biggest one 
(impediment to change) and to a certain extent lack of what would 
you call it impact I suppose at some sort of national/eve!" (Network 
Manager). "We've got not so many customers to share our 
overhead costs around. And we haven't got some of the resources. 
We can't afford to employ ourselves or engage the resources that a 
larger corporate organization would be able to afford by the 
economies of scale that they have" (CEO). 
However senior management did not necessarily regard the small size of EAL 
as a disadvantage. 
"Big is not always beautiful as we know from a personal service 
point of view" (Financial Controller). "I think size was an advantage. 
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Small was an advantage in the early age of the marketing 
movement. Smaller size was good because we had less inertia 
(and) decision making could happen overnight (Commercial 
Manager) "We don't actually have the depth of knowledge and the 
skill and the resources of a big organization, but we can react a lot 
quicker if we want to" (Network Manager). "I think we're small 
enough so that we can act quite quickly we haven't got the inertia 
that sayan organization ten times this size would have and we can 
make decisions without involving too many people" (CEO). 
Furthermore despite its small size, EAL was able to meet statutory 
requirements and the demands of the community while introducing structural 
changes aligned with similarly sized institutions. 
"I think we've all done similar things over the years especially power 
companies of a similar size I think have a similar sort of a staffing 
structure sort of nothing spectacular or different about it it's just 
something that falls into place" (Financial Controller). 
The historically strong links that EAL had with the community determined the 
ownership structure adopted by the organization. Primarily concerned with 
maintaining ownership and control of the assets in local hands and minimizing 
the impact of change on the community, EAL followed a traditional strategy. 
Where structural changes were made to EAL, they were implemented in a 
reactive and incremental fashion. Where changes were implemented that 
negatively impacted on the organization and/or community - such as 
redundancies or price rises -senior management laid the blame externally. 
"We do we you know do our best to point the finger at he 
government. They're the bad guys and we're not and I think that's 
generally accepted by the government because it's true. It is easy 
for us to say that because we firmly believe that that's the truth" 
(CEO). 
However, overall the degree of organizational change implemented in EAL was 
limited in nature and extent as the perception of senior management was that 
'the job' in EAL had not and was not likely to change and that radical change 
was therefore unnecessary. 
"Our core trade if you like of building and maintaining lines that's 
unchanged apart from the natural advances. The majority of the 
people in the organization are the hands on people out in the field 
(and) they're effectively doing the same job - building and 
maintaining the lines" (CEO). 
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4.10 Mainpower New Zealand Limited (MPL) 
4.11 Overview 
Mainpower New Zealand Limited (MPL) is a small electricity company situated 
in the North Canterbury town of Rangiora. MPL's service area covers the entire 
North Canterbury district, a geographically rugged and predominantly rural area 
of 12,324 square kilometres, making it the country's sixth largest supply area. 
Power supply for the town of Rangiora was established as early as 1920, but 
was formally established in 1928 with the formation of the North Canterbury 
Electric Power Board (NCEPB). Although government legislation forced 
corporatisation in 1992, MPL's owners delayed their final decision on the 
ownership structure until 1995 whereupon a community and charitable trust 
was established. Today MPL provides electricity to approximately 23,486 
customers in one of the South Island's fastest growing regions and has a staff 
of 108. MPL has a particular focus on providing network-contracting services 
through its contracting division. 
MPL New Zealand is a case of reactive organizational change. It is also 
illustrative of first-order change. Although the changing statutory environment 
demanded a new commercial focus from the industry, MPL maintained a 
'traditional EPB' strategy, structure and culture. The following section outlines 
the history, context and specific changes undertaken by MPL in response to 
deregulation. 
4.12 The Electricity Archetype in NCEPB 
4.12.1 Organization Ownership, Strategy, Structure 
Determined by coercive institutional pressures, the pre-deregulation ownership 
structure, strategy, and organizational structure of the NCEPB conformed to the 
traditional EPB archetype. The ownership of the NCEPB, as in all other EPB 
cases, was with a community trust board, which played a fundamental role in 
the day-to-day running of the organization. 
In the power industry, especially in the medium small to medium 
sized companies the chairman had a role to play (in day to day 
affairs) more so than the commercial definition of company 
chairman" (CEO). 
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By virtue of legislative compulsion and the subsequent tradition of the industry 
the NCEPB's strategic focus rested on ensuring that all customers within its 
service area was provided with electricity regardless of cost. 
"Reliable secure supply of electricity. (That) used to be the entire 
mission statement - safe, reliable supply of electricity" (Network 
Manager). 
Structurally the NCEPB also conformed to the EPB archetype, operating under 
a hierarchical, bureaucratic structure run by engineers 
"It was managed by engineers and people from an engineering 
background and I think that we only had two engineers two 
managers in its history since 1926 a fellow Buckingham followed by 
a guy (called) Harris" (CEO). 
4.12.2 Organization Culture 
The organizational culture of the NCEPB was also reflective of the EPB 
archetype: an engineering dominated management style and low staff turnover. 
The management style at the NCEPB was bureaucratic, a function of the 
separation of engineering and finance aspects of the organization. However 
although a formal hierarchy for managing the organization existed, the ability of 
NCEPB's management to direct the organization with strategic skill was 
questioned by one respondent. His observation was that the traditional 
management style was 'ad-hoc'. 
"In the old structure we had the chief engineer at the top and he 
was involved in the engineering function, and we had the 
accountant and the treasurer or the secretary doing the financial 
functions and management was the result. And it (management) 
didn't actually happen by design - it was just whatever came out 
became the management" (Energy Services Manager). 
Some saw this as a problem as management decisions were seen as 
spontaneous and without much consideration - 'Just being a result of decisions 
made" (Energy Services Manager). 
Due to the organization's small size, the traditional style of management within 
the NCEPB was also highly personal. 
"I would say that the managing director at Power New Zealand 
wouldn't know two thirds of his first names of his staff (but ours) 
would know the name of every one of his staff' (Network Manager). 
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This situation was seen as a strength, as it allowed management to closely 
control organizational matters. 
"We only have that many senior staff, you can count them on one 
hand (so) the controls over industrial matters is so tightly held that it 
never gets out of hand" (CEO). 
As a result of NCEPB's strategic and structural configuration, which conformed 
to the archetypal norm of EPBs, the culture of the organization maintained an 
engineering focus. 
"We were in a state of get those (electricity) lines up, build lines. 
And if we weren't building lines and putting up a transformer up 
every day there was something (seen to be) wrong" (Network 
Manager). 
However this culture was seen to be appropriate for the context in which the 
NCEPB operated. 
'The culture of the organization was engineering based, and rightly 
so I suggest, because it was related to the period when electricity 
was being reticulated in most areas of New Zealand" (CEO). 
The NCEPB also reflected the employment pattern typical of rural EPBs. The 
NCEPB played an important role in the Rangiora community, as it was "the 
second biggest employer in this community" (CEO). As a consequence of this, 
the organization's rural location and the EPB culture, the NCEPB also had a 
highly stable work force. 
"We don't have staff turnover - we've got very long term serving 
staff here" (Energy Services Manager). 
The power board was also attractive to employees because of its relaxed 
"atmosphere" and locality. 
"It's more of a rural atmosphere in the organization. Those that 
work within the organization that have the opportunity to go home 
for lunch. Most people go home for lunch it's that sort of (company) 
- in the cities they (employees) just go to a cafeteria or something" 
(CEO). 
Furthermore, the 'tight-knit' and 'mate-ship' spirit within the Rangiora 
community carried over into the day-to-day operation of the NCEPB. 
'This is a small rural community and that everyone knows each 
other" (Network Manager). "It's rural it's you know a lot of these 
people that work here are friends they are the community. They 
play in the same rugby teams, if they don't play in the same rugby 
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teams they play against each other, they go to meetings and they 
help each other in their back yards" (CEO). 
This 'community-spirit' was particularly evident in the area of labour relations. 
Although organizations in New Zealand were highly unionised during this 
period, the NCEPB and community culture created a bond that enabled the 
organization to avoid a confrontational approach to employee issues. 
"One of the culture things that was interesting was there was no 
(union problems) - people belonged to the union but it was like a 
compulsory membership thing in the early days - but there was no 
industrial disharmony" (Energy Services Manager). 
The employee profile of the NCEPB workers had a substantial influence on the 
organization. As long serving members of a substantial community 
organization each employee had a great deal invested in the ~rganization; not 
only as employees, but also as customers and, indirectly, owners. 
4.12.3 Summary 
The NCEPB's strategy, structure and culture conformed to the EPB archetype. 
Under a statutory requirement to supply electricity, an engineering focused 
strategy, structure and culture dominated the NCEPB. The organization had 
developed a hierarchical structure. The strategy and culture of the organization 
was also fundamentally affected by its close relationship with the community. 
The organization was aware of its role and impact as a provider of both 
electricity and employment to the small, rural Rangiora district. Underlying this 
was the fact that the NCEPB was run by a community trust with the best 
interests owned of the community at the forefront of organizational decision 
making. Therefore NCEPB's archetype fits the traditional electricity company 
archetype demonstrated by the other cases: community ownership, a 
hierarchical structure, a community focus and an engineering culture. 
4.13 Organizational Change in the NCEPB 
Following the corporatisation of the government owned generation and 
transmission sector (ECNZ) in 1987, government interest was growing in 
similar changes being forced on the wider electricity sector. Subsidies of rural 
electrical reticulation were removed with the decommissioning of the Rural 
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Electricity Reticulation Council (RERC), a government body that provided 
funding for rural electricity development. 
"Come the late eighties that was (the old ways) all over. The 
RERC was starting to be wound down and the whole industry and 
the focus of the industry has changed from an engineering focus to 
one being commercially focused" (CEO). 
And for the first time electricity companies became taxpayers, removing their 
special company status. 
(The first the real trigger for that (change), even though there were 
a number of studies in the mid-eighties, the first thing that really 
started the process was April (87 - we became taxpayers for the 
first time" (CEO). 
Aware of the implications for asset ownership and operation that institutional 
changes similar to those implemented in ECNZ would have on the organization, 
the NCEPB trust began to investigate the need for the development of a new 
financially focused approach throughout the firm. This move away from the old 
engineering focus was seen as "a paradigm shift" (Energy Services Manager), 
a distinct change from the past that required an individual with financial skills to 
lead the organization. Such skills were not seen to be present at the top 
managerial level by the board, but the process of change was simplified with 
the simultaneous retirement of both the chief engineer and secretary treasurer. 
The two most senior people retired within a year - the senior 
administrator and the senior engineer both retired - and that was a 
blessing in disguise. That was essential" (Energy Services 
Manager). 
After advertising the position nation-wide, in 1988 the NCEPB appointed a new 
CEO, an accountant with a background in the electricity industry. 
I was with another power company with an accounting background. 
(CEO) . 
This appointment was significant. As only the third head of the organization 
and the first from outside the organization the introduction of a new CEO with a 
new approach meant there was a potential for significant organizational 
change. 
"When I joined the purpose of my employment was to manage the 
change transition. It was all going to happen within a year or two" 
(CEO). 
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However as an appointment from within the industry he had also been 
indoctrinated into the cultural, strategic and structural norms and expectations 
of the industry. This meant that he was sawy with both financial disciplines 
specifically and the electricity 'ethos' in general. The new CEO and board 
expected rapid change. 
"Chances are this organization wasn't going to last because the 
reform of the industry was going to overtake it, and they were 
looking to someone to take it out the other end" (CEO). 
However although the CEO was new to the organization, the ranks of senior 
management remained unchanged. 
(Interviewer): "Did you change the people in charge of the different 
functions?" (CEO): "No one thing that I did inherit was some 
damned good people!" 
4.13.1 The Reactive Change Process 
Despite earlier predictions otherwise, the change process was far from rapid. 
Although the EPB Amendment Act (1988) extended the term of incumbent 
board members as "interim trustees" (CEO) and put in place "directors 
designate" (CEO) the change process faltered. Two reasons delayed the 
change process. The first barrier was that the government had to seek legal 
advice on the ownership status of electricity companies. Uncertainty 
surrounding this issue meant that the government was in no position to force 
change upon each electricity company. Secondly, the fact that 1990 was an 
election year meant that the government was eager to avoid the contentious 
and potentially politically destabilising outcome of these changes. 
Consequently, a process that was to take months was delayed for years. 
liT hey sat there for three years although it was going to happen in 
months it actually took three years because there was a change in 
government and so on - labour government went out national 
government came in" (CEO). 
As a result of government prevarication the industry, according to NCEPB's 
CEO, remained in a period of 'limbo'. Uncertainty surrounding the final form 
that the industry would take meant that the NCEPB remained unchanged. It 
was not until 1992 when the government reached a full and final decision on 
appropriate ownership structures, the industry framework and timetable for 
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reform with the Energy Companies Act that the NCEPB began to implement 
change. 
"But it (change) still happened - but it didn't happen until '92. June 
'92 the Act was passed. But even then it - the corporatisation 
process - wasn't completed until April '93. The '92 Act also 
signaled the timeframe for the deregulation of our industry which 
happened in April '93" (CEO). 
4.13.2 Ownership Structure 
With the government's policy and timetable for change outlined in the Energy 
Companies Act (1992) the NCEPB established a board of trustees to run the 
now corporatised organization - MPL. However, unlike its peers, MPL's interim 
board chose not to immediately finalize the ownership structure. Initially the 
CEO lobbied for a radical change in ownership structure. Taking the intent and 
spirit of deregulation at face value, the CEO's opinion was that partial 
privatisation would result in the best return for the community. 
"I was looking for at least a 50 percent share give away back in '93" 
(CEO). 
This option would result in the full distribution of shares in the company; 2.5 
million shares to consumers, five million granted to a MPL Foundation (a 
charitable trust) and 7.5 million to the MPL Trust for future sale to a cornerstone 
shareholder. However the incumbent board was concerned with preserving the 
assets and value of the organization for the local community. 
'There was an uneasiness amongst the decision makers. I would 
have been the odd one out because I would have liked to have 
seen some shares in the market place pushing the reform. But it 
was a bit idealistic, and it (the privatisation option) was only 
changed at the last minute. If we'd had a share give away we would 
be like Wairarapa Electricity owned by - in fact we wouldn't be here 
today. And I suppose in some ways that would have been a good 
thing in terms of reform of the industry - it wouldn't have been good 
for the Individuals that work here" (CEO). 
Instead, ambiguity in the law allowed the final ownership structure decision to 
be delayed. The interim board dissolved and ownership of MPL was vested 
temporarily with the MPL Trust. Membership of the MPL Trust was determined 
by the organization, and it was formed on the understanding that a full and final 
decision on the subject of ownership would be finalised by 1995. 
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"The company appointed some permanent trustees in '93 and they 
stayed in place until '95" (CEO). 
In October 1995, after three years of observing the development of the 
operational environment, the MPL board made a final decision on the 
ownership structure where all shares would be conferred to a new MPL Trust. 
"We didn't have an ownership structure sorted out until October 95. 
when everyone else had done it back in 93, so we were in limbo for 
a while" (CEO). 
In this form eighty percent of the organization's shares would be held by the 
MPL Trust on behalf of the regions electricity consumers, with the remaining 
twenty percent held by a charitable trust - the MPL Foundation - whose 
income from MPL's profits would be distributed to benefit the local community. 
Subsequently trustee membership was put to a public ballot and a new trust 
board was elected. 
"It all sorted out sorted itself out. Our ownership was resolved in 95, 
at which time we had an election and a new bunch of trustees came 
on board as a result of the democratic process" (CEO). 
At that time the CEO role was also redesignated to that of managing director. 
This promoted a closer relationship between management and directors and 
also created a sense of comfort for the board, whose influence over the 
organization could more closely be maintained. 
"Back in 95 when we were corporatised my role changed from 
being the CEO to being the CEO as well as being on the board. So 
I am the link - (I) also carry responsibility as a director so that 
makes them just that much more comfortable" (CEO). 
The closer relationship also ensured that the board and management were 
aligned in their vision for the organization - to remain community owned and 
focused. The balance of power and dynamics of this relationship was markedly 
noticeable in the change in beliefs surrounding the ownership of the 
organization expressed by the CEO. Previously a proponent of quickly 
implementing full privatisation, the weight of the board's approach to the 
ownership issue forced him to re-evaluate his views on change and eventually 
agree to supporting the status quo. 
"I had a particular view on ownership back in '93. If we had pursued 
what we wanted to achieve back in those days we wouldn't be here 
today. So I believe looking back on it, it (the delay in ownership 
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structure finalization) has been a blessing, because we can 
reassess and reevaluate just where we should be going and take a 
little more time over it (change)" (CEO). 
Once finalised, the ownership structure of MPL fundamentally influenced the 
nature and extent of organizational change. Driven by a desire to preserve 
ownership and control with the Rangiora community, the community trust 
structure confined strategic, structural and cultural organizational change to the 
first-order. 
4.13.3 Strategic Change 
Although MPL pursued a strategy similar in appearance to its predecessor, 
institutional changes had forced a shift in operating priorities. Required to 
operate as a fully corporatised entity, MPL shifted away from its engineering 
focused strategy and instead moved to meet statutory reporting requirements 
and improve operating efficiency by focusing on costs. 
'That (accounting focus) was a paradigm shift" (Network Manager). 
"Its actually changed the thinking of engineers as well to be honest -
we're more utilizing our assets today fully utilizing what we've got 
rather than building it up" (Energy Services Manager). 
This focus on costs saw a change in decision making away from investing in 
networks for the sake of ensuring security of to ensuring value for the dollar-
that is, as in other organizations, a cost based decision making process was 
instituted in place of 'gut feeling'. 
'The challenge I think when the CEOs became accountant driven 
was that we actually got true management" (CEO). (Interviewer) 
"What do you mean?" (Energy Services Manager) "Proper 
management of direction of strategies instead of them just being a 
result of decisions made they were conscious decisions that were 
then followed through". 
However rather than challenge the traditional strategic focus, this new cost-
focus complemented the existing framework by forcing efficiencies throughout 
the organization. Consequently few problems were encountered. 
"Once we got an understanding between the engineering function 
and the accounting function - that the accountants don't do 
engineering and the engineers don't do accounting - it worked 
really well" (Energy Services Manager). 
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A significant strategic opportunity was MPL's consideration of a proposal to 
merge six electricity organizations together to form a larger conglomerate. 
"One of the early initiatives was to put six together ourselves in fact 
it was the whole top South Island. We have many reports written by 
consultants and it should have happened in my opinion" (CEO). 
Such a strategy had not been possible in the previous statutory environment, 
and if implemented would have embraced the intent and spirit of the 
government's legislation with the potential for significant financial savings 
through scale economies. However the concept was fundamentally 
undermined by each trust, as the primary concern of all organizations remained 
with maintaining ownership of the asset and its inherent value for the local 
community. The protectionist culture, inherent to MPL and all other community 
trusts, meant that consideration of a merger was at best an aborted excursion. 
"It did not happen because it was premature, the cultures within the 
other organizations were not ready for it" (CEO). 
The ownership of MPL fundamentally determined the strategic direction of the 
organization. Although the board was identified by senior management as 
commercial and no longer strictly concerned with the 'day-to-day' affairs of the 
organization: 
'The ownership structure influences (us) strategically, the 
ownership structure and the make up of the directors. (However) 
the directors of the company are solely limited to policy and 
direction" (Energy Services Manager). "We have a commercial 
board and they understand ve/y clearly where the line is between 
board and management" (CEO). 
The underlying protectionist policy and culture of community ownership 
remained unchallenged, which prevented the pursuit of more radical strategic 
options such ,as mergers and full privatisation. 
4.13.4 Structural Change 
The CEO, hired by the board for the express purpose of implementing change, 
managed and drove the structural change process in MPL. The CEO was 
recognised as ''ve/y important, critical to the organization's success" (Network 
Manager). However despite the CEO's initial desire for the radical 
transformation of MPL, board restrictions placed on strategic options available 
to strategic management resulted in a series of evolutionary and reactive 
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structural changes implemented to meet statutory requirements. Consequently 
the change process was not considered to be radical in nature and consultants 
were not employed to assist. 
"There were a number of restructurings here. (Consultants weren't 
used) because it was an evolutionary process whereby it was all in 
hand. There was no necessity" (CEO). lilt wasn't as though it was 
heading to court or anything like that where you need the legal 
profession supporting you in some way" (Energy Services 
Manager). 
The process of structural change was a case of coercive isomorphism. 
"It's not of our own making that it's a result of government 
legislation" (CEO). 
Statutory obligations above all else determined MPL's final structural 
configuration. 
(Interviewer): "Have other organizations influenced MPL?" (CEO): 
"I don't think so. I suppose the organization that has had a real 
influence on our organization has been the government -legislative 
change and the need to do it (change). We've made our own 
decisions as we've seen fit. I don't believe we've taken into account 
what others have done." 
In the process of structural change MPL formally recognised, separated and 
renamed divisions within the formerly integrated business. The primary force 
for this separation had been tightening of information disclosure regulations 
associated with the Electricity Companies Act (1992). Under this legislation 
electricity companies were required to increase the 'transparency' of financial 
transactions by financially separating traditional monopoly (lines) and potentially 
competitive (electricity retailing, contracting) functions. 
"We have set up a structure in MPL that fully recognizes that we 
have three businesses. We are a lines business, an energy 
business and a contracting business. . We structured the 
management of those businesses and the financial reporting of 
those businesses and they all have their own balance sheet and 
their own budget so that at a moment's notice anyone of them could 
be cut adrift" (CEO). "We got back to core business and separated 
the businesses far enough so that they could be divested" (Energy 
Services Manager). 
However, although this process encouraged the theoretical consideration of 
divestment, the results of the restructuring process were far from radical. 
98 
Instead MPL renamed and tightened the budgetary control of traditional 
functional areas. 
Substantial structural change could have resulted from the divestment of areas 
of MPL's operation. MPL did sell its appliance retail business and household 
wiring activities, a significant move in that MPL would no longer provide the 
traditional total energy service. 
"We made a conscious decision to get out of any business that we 
concluded that we shouldn't be in. And I guess MPL was one of the 
first in New Zealand to divest or get out of the anything to do with 
appliances, repairing, house wiring and straight out domestic 
electrical work. When I arrived we used to repair fridges and 
toasters and we had three shops and so on. So we got rid we of all 
of that" (CEO). 
However the implications of divestment were far from radical. Each of these 
business areas was considered 'non-core' - that is not part of the fundamental 
business of 'lines and transformers'. Furthermore, these business units 
operated in a highly competitive, low-margin commercial industry, which 
lessened their contribution and value to the 'core' business. The opportunity 
that divestment presented for the implementation of change on a wider 
organizational scale was not pursued. 
MPL also pursued the acquisition of a similarly sized electricity contracting 
businesses. This resulted in the purchase of a neighbouring organization's 
contracting division with the view for expanding the policy further. 
"We bought Tasman Energy's contracting company in Nelson and 
we'd like to get one or two others" (CEO). 
Again, just as with the divestment of appliance retailing, the acquisition of 
another business could have provided the impetus for widespread 
organizational change, enabling the introduction of a widespread change 
programme that could fundamentally alter the strategic, structural and cultural 
configuration of the firm. However the acquisition of the business was not seen 
as anything other than expanding MPL's ability in a traditional operating 
function. 
I~t some point we're going to put them al/ together and their own 
board of directors and let them get on with their own thing. Now 
that won't happen for a year or two, but it will happen. And the 
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chances are what I'll do in the first instance is just do the ownership 
split leave the industrial environment intact no changes just give 
them notice that they now work for XYZ' limited and contract the 
entire management back to MPL. Nothing changes except working 
for legally another entity - they won't notice any other change" 
(CEO). 
The purchase of another contracting company was aligned with the electricity-
focused culture of MPL and the wider electricity industry. Consequently the 
acquisition did not encourage radical transformational change, as it neither 
threatened the strategic, structural and cultural status quo of MPL. 
Redundancies were an issue in MPL. As a major employer in the community, 
MPL had and continued to playa significant 'social-welfare' role. However as 
commercial (cost-focused) strategies were introduced to all profit centres, it 
became evident that the organization was overstaffed and redundancies were 
implemented. 
"For sixty years they (staff) were comfortable - we had about 160 
staff back in those days. And when we came out the end of that 
phase we were just under a hundred" (CEO). 
However, the redundancy policy over the initial change period was one of 
natural attrition. Using a sinking lid policy - where individuals that left the firm 
were not replaced - the management of MPL avoided a confrontational 
approach to the process. This approach essentially preserved the traditional 
job for life mentality and appeared to conform to the community focused 
concerns of the community trust. Very few staff left in the initial round of 
redundancies, with those over fifty offered a retirement package. 
'There was some resentment because I got to hear about it but at 
the time a number of those that took advantage of it appeared to be 
reasonably comfortable with it" (CEO). (Network Manager): "If you 
go back to the eighties there weren't that many redundancies in that 
first round were there?" (CEO): "Yeah lots - we had three years of 
sinking lid." (Energy Services Manager): "Where people walked 
down the road three was only actually a handful of people that 
walked at the end of the day." 
However over the reform period the organization reduced its staffing level by 
over one third. Yet despite the significant reduction, employees were not 
perceived to have blamed the organization for the situation, but rather projected 
responsibility on the government. 
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'There is a realization out there that it's not of our own making that 
it's a result of government legislation" (CEO). 
Strategic management did not visibly challenge this opinion. 
4.13.5 Cultural Change 
Although the deregulation of the electricity industry threatened significant 
change, MPL was able to implement changes that allowed the organization to 
meet both statutory requirements as well as maintain traditional cultural values 
and expectations. Consequently there was no perceived need for significant 
cultural change beyond the need for a focus on efficiency. 
The Employment Contracts Act (1992) was used as a tool to reduce union 
influence in the operation of MPL. Exploiting the cultural values of the 
organization to his advantage, the CEO sought direct control of employment 
contracts and appealed to the 'job for life' mentality by promoting individual 
contracts as a means to enable organizational flexibility, profitability and thus 
secure job security through organizational success. 
'There is a mentality which I've continued to promote in this 
organization and that is one of job security comes with success if 
we run a successful company then I can guarantee those job 
security" (CEO). 
However, far from a tool for transformational cultural change, the use of the 
Employment Contracts Act (1992) to create a stronger organization-employee 
bond helped maintain the traditional cultural 'paternal' role of the organization 
and reinforced the employees' sense of 'ownership' of their electricity network. 
This approach found overwhelming support as a result of the combination of 
poor union representation and the traditionally amicable labour relations 
environment. 
'There was a move away from union association. From a hundred 
percent union to almost one percent in a vel}' short time because 
there was gross dissatisfaction at the union" (Energy Services 
Manager). 'There was a realization that the organization that was 
actually paying the wages and (that) the organization that they were 
working for actually cared about them. And as I said it wasn't of our 
making it just happened where there were a number of meetings 
staff meetings, a number of votes and the next thing I knew 
evel}'one was out of the union and evel}'one was signing their 
individual employment contracts" (CEO). 
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The negotiation of employment contracts did not have a significant effect on the 
organization's culture. However problems did arise following the development 
of a new management position dedicated solely to industrial relations. 
"There was no industrial disharmony until we had somebody 
appointed (as) personnel management and industrial relations 
officer. It was more the person than the position that sewed a 
negative seed - you know (staff were saying) 'Don't trust that CEO 
fella or you'll get screwedlll (Energy Services Manager). "I put it in 
(the industrial relations position) because I needed someone to 
monitor the impact of restructuring on the organization, and there 
was a negative aspect to that (appointment)" (CEO). 
This problem was solved with the CEO dealing with all labour relations matters 
himself. 
'That position lasted about two or three years (then) I took it over." 
(CEO) 
Rather than challenge the status quo, the CEO used the Employment 
Contracts Act (1992) to promote and maintain a stable 'paternal' environment. 
This approach harnessed the existing community-spirit to develop a team 
approach within the organization, increase efficiency, maintain stability and 
ensure maintenance of the operational status quo. 
The introduction of an ISO programme to document all operational procedures 
was adopted by the organization initially to improve the organization's ability to 
meet statutory reporting requirements, including financial reporting and OSH 
(Occupational Safety and Health) audits. 
'There's certainly a lot more quality legislated requirements in our 
work - we've introduced ISO systems and all of that to try and keep 
up with it" (Network Manager). 
The documentation process was also recognised as an important tool in 
implementing and embedding operational changes, primarily the development 
standardised procedures and safety protocols. 
'They're (ISO processes) are important to the culture. If you're 
trying to introduce change they become an acceptable driver to the 
culture. It's really easy to instill change what you do is make that 
change part of your ISO requirement" (Network Manager). 
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Furthermore, the CEO recognised that the ISO process encouraged 
participation in the development of the organization and a sense of individual 
ownership of the organization. 
"It's more important than that - it encourages pride in the whatever 
level you are in the organization. You're part of that quality and that 
success and it doesn't matter if you're a linesmen or a manager you 
feel that you own part of it that you work for MPL" (CEO). 
Again, rather than challenge the status quo, the ISO documentation process 
provided a means to meet institutional requirements and refine operational 
procedures. From a cultural perspective the ISO process, rather than change 
the traditional cultural values and ideals, harnessed and reinforced the sense of 
community-spirit, pride and individual organizational ownership already present 
within MPL. 
4.13.6 Attributes of MPL's Change Process 
Similar in nature to the BEL and AEL cases, the MPL case provides us with 
further evidence of the variables that fundamentally influence the process of 
organizational change. 
The ownership structure selected by MPL had a significant effect on the nature 
and extent of change. Although MPL's strategic management identified that 
there was now "a commercial board", the concept of operating 'commercially' 
appeared to be limited to shifting away from involvement with the day-to-day 
management of the organization and meeting the statutory requirement to 
operate as a profitable commercial enterprise. 
"They're not involved - it is not acceptable for them to be involved 
in day to day running and they do not make an attempt to" (Energy 
Services Manager). "It's more commercial focus and you can see 
that in our mission statement (compared) to what we had before" 
(CEO). 
Although the organization may have been operating more effiCiently than 
before, the board's selection of the community trust form of ownership 
fundamentally prevented the introduction ·of second-order change. Instead, the 
community-trust structure protected traditional underlying community-focused 
values and beliefs of the organization from radical strategic, structural and 
cultural change. This was clearly illustrated when the CEO was forced to 
103 
reassess his push for full privatisation of MPL. As a consequence of the 
protectionist approach of the board, structural and cultural organizational 
change was confined to the first-order. 
Initially employed for the purpose of instituting organizational change in MPL, 
the CEO saw himself as a transition manager. However two factors associated 
with his employment reduced the likelihood that change would be radical and 
discontinuous in nature. Firstly, as a board appointment, the trust could ensure 
that the mindset of the CEO was aligned with the conservative aims for the 
organization. Secondly, having worked for many years within the electricity 
industry as an accountant, the CEO was well indoctrinated in the traditional 
values and norms associated with EPBs. Consequently, although the CEO 
was recognised as important to the change process, his role was primarily 
restricted to overseeing the introduction of a financial focus to the organization. 
"I think its been extremely important in the period we've been 
through that we've had an accountant actually running the 
organization. I'm not sure whether an engineer would've applied the 
same methodologies especially taking it right down to the budget 
level, capital maintenance for reviews" (Network Manager). 
Strategically 'hamstrung' by the community-focused trust, the CEO maintained 
the centralised role traditionally filled by his predecessor. This was particularly 
evident in labour relation issues. 
"I mean it's very rare within an organization, even a small 
organization with a hundred staff, where the managing director 
controls all industrial matters. In my filing cabinet there is 
everyone's personal files. I negotiate all employment contracts with 
input from the managers" (CEO). 
This CEO defended this approach. 
"I have an umbrella view - I understand the relativities. They (other 
managers) are responsible for a particular part of the organization 
and don't have access to all of the information that's peculiar to 
some other managers' area. I have that and I keep in keep track or 
get involved to the point that everything remains in balance" (CEO). 
As a consequence of the board's restriction on strategic options and the CEO's 
indoctrination in and alignment with the traditional norms and values of EPBs, 
the nature and extent of organizational change was restricted to financial and 
structural adaptations to statutory requirements. 
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MPL's rural location affected the nature of organizational change. The small 
size of the community and MPL's position as a large employer meant that being 
rural was perceived as a weakness, particularly surrounding issues of 
restructuring and redundancies. 
"There are weaknesses" (Network Manager). "Especially the fact 
that this is a small rural community and that everyone knows each 
other. But that (being small rural company) does impact on you 
know the relationships and the organization you can't avoid that" 
(CEO). 
MPL's status in the community when combined with its rural location also 
reduced staff turnover and acted as a barrier to the development of 
organizational change through the introduction of 'new blood'. 
"We don't have the staff turnover we've got very long term serving 
staff here to the point where it's a worry" (Energy Services 
Manager). 
Despite the industry's deregulation, MPL's rural location also reduced the 
likelihood of competition immediately affecting the organization. 
"Not that that (deregulation) had a major impact on our culture as it 
didn't create an operating environment that allowed effective 
competition - there was competition but it was just marginal" 
(CEO). 
MPL's close ties with the community and low staff turnover reduced the impetus 
for internally driven change which, compounded by the lack of external 
motivators in the form of competition, minimised the urgency for and likelihood 
of radical strategic, structural and cultural change. 
The size of MPL was identified as a significant constraint on the ability of the 
organization to implement change. The small size restricted the organization's 
access to resources, particularly monetary, which meant that it was unable to 
pursue radical strategies similar to the organizations larger contemporaries - or 
"sleeping giants". 
"You've only got to look at what Power New Zealand has done in 
the last two or three weeks the acquisitions they've made they're 
going out to borrow over a billion dollars to pay for them a billion 
dollars and we worry about fifty bucks" (CEO). 
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However, although size was identified as a restriction on the strategic options 
available to MPL, it was perceived as an advantage in implementing structural 
and operational change. 
"One thing about being a small organization is that you can do 
things reasonably quickly, you don't have to go through committees 
and councils" (CEO). 
This was particularly noted in relation to issues of industrial relations, where the 
small size of MPL was perceived to allow a more personal approach to 
implementing, and enabled a greater deal of control over, the process of 
change. 
"Our in house industrial arrangement has worked and worked I 
would suggest extremely well. And my guess is that one of the 
reasons why its worked is that particularly when you only have a 
hundred staff which means we're not a big organization. the 
controls over industrial matters is so tightly held that it never gets 
out of hand" (CEO). 
Despite the deregulation of the electricity industry and the employment of a new 
CEO, the control exerted by the community-trust meant that the vision for 
MPL's future focused on maintaining the operational status quo. This approach 
rested on the belief that there would always be a need for a specialist rural 
electricity company such as MPL. 
"I believe there is an opportunity in New Zealand for a rural type - a 
company that specialises in rural based networks" (CEO). 
Although there was recognition that environmental change could force the sale 
or demise of MPL, ongoing resistance to and the slow implementation of 
legislative change meant such a scenario was not perceived as an immediate 
nor realistic threat. 
"In time I think (change) could happen, but it's not going to happen 
overnight - in fact it won't happen - I don't think that it will happen -
in the next 5 years. It'll be vety slow unless the (monetary) 
numbers become so attractive that the trustees have no alternative 
but to sell (as) legally (required) under the trustee act. That could 
happen, but I think it'll be resisted"(CEO). 
The case of organizational change in MPL is illustrative of a process of 
incremental and reactive change. This process in the first instance was 
determined by the ownership structure chosen by the organization. The values 
of MPL's community-trust structure remained aligned with the traditional and 
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over-riding concern for the welfare of the local rural community. This 
fundamentally restricted the degree of strategic change acceptable to the 
organization that, despite early moves to implement change in the organization 
through the employment of a new CEO, dictated the nature and extent of 
structural and cultural change. Consequently the process of organizational 
change was slow, incremental and reactive. 
"Here we are ten years down the track and it's (change) still 
ongoing basically - even I thought it was going to happen a lot 
quicker than it did" (CEO). 
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Chapter Five 
Cases of Archetype Transformation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the process of organizational change implemented in 
four of the organizations that form this research as experienced by the senior 
management of each. In anticipation of environmental change associated with 
the deregulation of the electricity sector these organizations - Dunedin 
Electricity Limited (DEL), Southpower Limited (SPL), Power New Zealand 
(PNZ) and Electra Limited (ELL) - followed a transformational process of 
organizational change. The extent and scope of change implemented in these 
cases conforms to Greenwood and Hinings' (1988: 304) definition of archetype 
transformation, with each organization 'decoupling' from the establish 
institutional archetype to later 'recouple' with a new design archetype. 
The process of organizational change is traced in depth through the use of 
direct quotes from participants, which are highlighted in the text through the use 
of italicisation. 
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5.2 Dunedin Electricity Limited (DEL) 
5.3 Overview 
Dunedin Electricity Limited (DEL) is the Dunedin City Council (DCC) owned 
organization that serves the city of Dunedin located on the Otago Peninsula in 
New Zealand's South Island. With 128 staff DEL supplies 49,864 connections 
to a predominantly urban area of 1,101 square kilometers. DEL's history stems 
back to activities that began in 1904 when the Waipori Falls Hydroelectric 
Company Limited constructed the Waipori Power Scheme, New Zealand's 
largest private generation facility. The predecessor to the DCC acquired this 
company for the city in 1907 and continued the development of electricity 
generation and distribution, later under the auspices of the Dunedin City 
Council Electricity Department (DCCED). The DCCED continued to operate as 
an arm of local government fundamentally unchanged until June 1990 when 
the DCC forced the corporatisation of the DCCED to create Dunedin Electricity 
Limited. This radical departure from tradition was initiated by the DCC in 
anticipation of the development of a competitive operating environment while 
taking cues from the changes introduced to the government's generation and 
transmission businesses. Convinced that similar changes for the distribution 
sector were imminent the DCC initiated change in its MED to increase financial 
and operational efficiency in a bid to protect control and ownership of the 
organization's assets. However in a change path similar to that seen in 
South power, as the boundaries and norms of the operating environment 
solidified and the pace of environmental change failed to meet initial 
expectations, DEL's strategic, structural and cultural change process took a 
more reactive approach. 
5.4 The Electricity Archetype in DCCED 
5.4.1 Organization Strategy 
The DCCED conformed strictly to the electricity company archetype. 
Strategically the organization was bound by legislation to "have a safe and 
reliable supply" (Electrical Services Manager). As has been identified in all 
preceding cases, the process of strategic decision-making was a highly 
political, centralized and bureaucratic affair. Typical to MEDs, a local 
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government committee, comprising of councillors concerned with maintaining 
tenure, dealt with all strategic and politically sensitive issues. 
'The Dunedin City Council Electricity Department reported to an 
electricity committee of council. The reports on price increases all 
would have gone to an electricity committee in the past and a more 
political decision would be made there" (Network Manager). "I was 
appalled at how bad things were when I got here compared to the 
Government - the central Government I thought that was bad 
enough. Here it was a damned sight worse and I understood why 
with a bit of digging. Prior to my arriving, and it happened long 
before my arrival, all the electricity business of a strategic nature 
was discussed at council meetings with the press present. When I 
first came along the press used to trod in and sit on the chairs along 
one wall, because the company hadn't been formed yet. You could 
not debate any strategic issues without the staff or the public 
reading about it in the Otago Daily Times the next morning. You did 
not have time to discuss - to communicate - with your own staff 
what had been discussed at the board table. You didn't have the 
ability to keep anything quiet in order to manage its release - it was 
appalling" (CEO). 
As was the norm for all electricity companies, the chief engineer and general 
manager strictly oversaw the implementation of this strategy, fulfilling the 
command and control role that came to be associated with the sector. 
"In terms of the decision making process there, pretty well all the 
decisions were made by chief engineer or the general manager. 
There was no decision that wasn't made there" (Network Manager). 
"In that environment the general manager could not afford to have 
new information put in front of him, he'd be embarrassed to (not) 
know anything about it (operational issues). So what evolved was 
that nobody did anything unless the general manager approved it. I 
got here my secretary, (she) was the secretary of the previous three 
general managers, trots through with this mail and asks 'What do 
we do now?' We sit down and open the mail. I don't know why but 
I go along with it for a little bit and we start opening mail. A nice 
long table with this huge big office that the general manager used to 
have and she started opening the mail. And she'd pass it to me 
and I'd look at it and she'd say 'What do you want me to do with in' 
I'd say 'Well give it to Joe, give it to Fred'. And I began wondering 
why I was doing this - why isn't she doing it? It was the way it had 
always been - the general manager would read the mail, would 
decide what action was required' and would dictate instructions. 
And they'd be 'Fred, would you look at this letter. I believe we 
should do this here, implement it, come back and tell me why you 
think I'm wrong.' And she (the secretary) would with dictation take 
him those notes and they would go down with the letter. We'd get 
through that and she said 'Now I need you to sign all these letters', 
and she hands me a whole bunch of letters. And it's trivial stuff you 
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know - rebates of deposits of connections and all kinds of crap. 
And I said 'What am I doing this for?' And she said 'Well nobody 
else is allowed to sign correspondence.' Unbelievable!" (CEO). 
With legislation protecting the organization from competitive pressures and 
providing the strategic focus, the DCCED's sole concern lay with the creation 
and maintenance of an electricity network. All strategic management decisions 
were made outside the organization. 
"When I came here there was forty eight corporate people, and a lot 
of corporate work was done outside - the thinking corporate work 
was done in other places" (Corporate Services Manager). 
This resulted in an organization focused purely on the physical/engineering 
aspects of the business with little regard to economic feasibility or 
accountability . 
"There was no such thing (as financial accountability) - as long as 
the job was completed, satisfactorily completed, it was considered a 
success. Basically budgets came and went. There was an audit 
trail if you wanted to find it. But there was nobody too worried about 
it" (Electrical Services Manager). "Generally (there) was only direct 
costs being charged. Depending whatever resources they had or 
whatever costs they generated, they requested a budget to support 
that whether or not the expenditure was actually needed. The true 
costs of doing work wasn't properly identified" (Network Manager). 
"Generally these local government owned organizations 
organizations had over engineered everything and over maintained 
everything because there was no commercial pressure to do 
anything else. It was a monopoly asset and, . you know, you built 
the best buildings and built the best wires and whatever" 
(Chairman). They all had the mission statement on the wall; 
"Dunedin Electricity exists to provide safe, efficient and reliable 
electricity. It was printed by the electricity association, signed by 
the national president. There was not a measure in the company 
for safety, reliability, efficiency or economy - not a bloody measure!" 
(CEO). 
5.4.2 Organization Structure 
Just as the strategy of the DCCED conformed to the electricity company 
archetype so too did the structure. 
'The old MED was organized like a. triangle - something vel}', vel}' 
deep - it was whatever the opposite of flat was - unflat. The 
general manager made all the decisions, and then he had two or 
three people reporting to him, and they had two or three people 
reporting to them, and then they had two or three people reporting 
to them. And it just went down and down. I think - at the corporate 
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level - I think there was six layers just at the corporate level at the 
time. You had chief clerks and senior clerks, and down to whatever 
the person answering the phone was" (Corporate Services 
Manager). 
Similarly, with no compulsion for strict financial accountability, the DCCED also 
lacked rigorous reporting and infrastructural support systems. 
liThe previous systems - you'd be struggling to call them systems. 
In terms of the paper flows, all the paper, all the clerical people 
used to be on one floor they used to occupy a whole floor of this 
building. And sitting in the corner was one man who was the Chief 
Clerk and all the paper used to go across his desk and what 
anybody did he had to have a look at it. He had a huge pile of 
paper on one side of his desk, and a huge pile on the other, and all 
these people just used to feed him the information, and he just used 
to follow up the systems and procedures that had been in place for 
twenty or so years. A lot of them were redundant - there wasn't 
even any need to do them. We had the ludicrous situation where 
we had a full time person paying a hundred and thirty people and 
we had a full time pay clerk. And it was really just because a lot of 
the systems were antiquated and a lot of the practices we were 
using were bad news" (Corporate Services Manager). 
5.4.3 Organization Culture 
The DCCED also conformed to the cultural archetype of the electricity industry. 
Engineers and electricians that had 'grown-up' within the MED dominated the 
organization. 
'~ lot of the staff within this department had come in as apprentices 
and schoolleavers, and they hadn't had the opportunity to see what 
the state sector and the private sector was like. They had no idea 
they were ... this local sector was all they knew, so they had nothing 
to compare it against" (Operations Manager). 
The 'job for life' mentality typical of the electricity industry archetype was also 
evident in the DCCED. There was "almost nil turnover" (Network Manager) 
within the organization and salaries were tied to length of service "there used to 
be merit increases, once you got them you got them for life" (Network 
Manager). The combination of low turnover and the hierarchical, bureaucratic 
and technical nature of the industry meant that it was difficult for individuals to 
advance through the organization. The knowledge of senior staff members was 
not readily shared to ensure continued maintenance of status. 
'The real problem was of course it was really difficult for people to 
step up through the structure. And knowledge was seen as a 
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power base, and information was a power base, and you didn't 
share your knowledge with anybody or you never told them exactly 
what they wanted to know. So if anybody ever wanted to know 
something, you told them eighty five percent of it and just retained 
that other fifteen percent. So it was an attitude thing as wel/" 
(Corporate Services Manager). 
Consequently a highly formalized and inflexible culture developed within the 
DCCED, with clear lines of demarcation where "nobody did anything unless the 
general manager approved it" (CEO) as there was no recognition or 
encouragement of personal development. 
"We were inflexible. We found too much your job my job. 
Demarcation was quite a bad problem - that person (the 
Lines/Cables Manager) was particularly that way. He had grown up 
through the ranks and been a line mechanic, and he was focused 
there was only one way to do it - only one way we've done it aI/ the 
time, because that was the proven way. (Assistant CEO, 
Contracting Manager). "If you can imagine something that was non 
achievement orientated, you know people just came to work and 
had a happy time and went home. And what they didn't finish today 
they just did tomorrow and if it didn't happen tomorrow it happened 
the next day" (Corporate Services Manager). 
5.5 Anticipatory Change in the DCCED 
5.5.1 Governance Developments 
In 1988, following central government legislation, local body government was 
undergoing a period of significant reform that required municipal authorities to 
amalgamate. In reaction to this process the DCC began to restructure all 
council departments to develop potential financial and operational benefits for 
ratepayers. The restructuring process also included the council's electricity 
operation, which came under particular council scrutiny when structural and 
strategic changes were brought upon the Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand (ECNZ) in the same year. The reorganization of ECNZ and 
associated political rhetoric alerted councillors of the DCC that changes to the 
nature and focus of the industry were imminent. The DCC's primary concern 
was ''trying to ensure that business is retained in the city" (Chairman), which 
was under threat without proof that municipal owners could run an efficient 
company. In an anticipatory move to protect it's interests and assets in the 
electricity sector, the DCC established New Zealand's first commercial board. 
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"The business (was) formed into (a) company with separate board 
of directors to be operated on a commercial basis. And that was 
the driver to do things better. And then when the board picked it up 
we said "Well we've got to". I mean our vision was to be the best in 
New Zealand" (Chairman). 
Comprised of local businesspeople, this board was given the authority to 
implement the changes necessary to create an efficient and sustainable 
electricity operation. 
"They (the council) had they appointed one or two outside people 
outside council, people with business interests and pretty right wing 
views compared to what the council had in those (old) days and 
says to them 'OK, we want this business run properly', so they 
appointed them" (Corporate Services Manager). 
5.5.2 Strategic Change 
This initiated a process of strategic review. The board envisioned a new 
strategic focus based upon achieving profitability through growth. Taking into 
account disadvantages related to geographic location and resource availability, 
the strategy focused on ensuring council ownership by achieving efficiency 
through the transformation of the MED into a high quality, growth and profit 
focused commercial operation. 
"It started with a strategic plan, because we identified the areas 
where the business would grow - and that's pretty hard sometimes 
in a monopoly. And it was the contracting area that we identified as 
being something that could grow, we could do other work on other 
networks and develop specialist skills for private work and cable 
work and other things that were allied to, you know, to electricity line 
businesses and the areas that... So the areas that we wanted to 
grow we were able to force a commercial model in more quickly 
than other areas. That involved / guess some review of the 
management structure" (Chairman). 
The first measure the board and council took to develop a commercial 
electricity operation was the involvement of consultants Arthur Young. Arthur 
Young was commissioned to review the MED and recommend changes to the 
organization's strategy, structure, infrastructure and culture that would assist 
the development of an efficient and sustainable electricity operation. The 
consultants found that although the organization was an effective provider of 
electricity, efficiency was impeded by a lack of a clear strategy, a cumbersome 
structure, poor infrastructural development and a 'non-achievement' culture. 
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Arthur Young proposed a plan for the radical restructuring of the MED which 
involved the implementation of widespread structural, managerial and cultural 
change. 
"Arthur Young became an instigator in the (change) process, 
recommended that they (the council) restructure electricity and they 
proceeded on their course" (CEO). 
5.5.3 A New General Manager 
In light of Arthur Young's findings and recommendations the board immediately 
began the search for a new General Manager (GM) and senior management 
team to lead the MED through the change process. The review report 
suggested that the incumbent MED managers did not possess the skill or focus 
necessary to implement major strategic and structural reform. The board 
"decided to advertise the chief executive's position and corporate services 
manager's position just to see what sort of response they got. And then all the 
internal people got the chance to apply, and external people applied" 
(Corporate Services Manager). 
'The board just says 'OK, this is what we've got to do and the first 
thing we've got to do is these are the changes we want. Can the 
current people provide it?" (Corporate Services Manager). 'They 
(the council) proceeded on their (Arthur Young's) course and they 
and they (the council) went out to get a chief executive. Their 
incumbent here had grown up inside the company, they did not 
perceive he had the skill the focus to lead the changes necessary 
(so) went outside to get somebody, they got somebody" (CEO). 
In 1989, the board appointed an 'outsider' to the position of GM. However 
despite having announced the appointment publicly, after six months of 
protracted contract negotiations the negotiations broke down and no 
appointment was made. 
'The guy they appointed diddled around, and in the end they broke 
off the negotiations. So that caused terrible difficulties here for 
morale, because they announced who the person was before 
signing any documents, and they couldn't reach agreement" (CEO). 
In October 1989 the board made a second appointment. Although an engineer 
by training with years of experience in the New Zealand electricity industry, the 
new GM had not risen as tradition dictated 'through the ranks' of the 
organization but was instead selected for his ability as an engineer, accountant 
and change manager. 
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"I was '2IC' (second in charge) in Southland (Electricity), so it was a 
promotion for me. While I'm an engineer by training, I moved into 
the commercial side in Southland, and I acquired a interest and 
focus on the accounting side of the business .- which went back into 
my Chief Engineers days. And I think those two things counted 
greatly - without that as an engineer I wouldn't have got here" 
(CEO) 
Once a self confessed "dyed in the wool public servant" (CEO), the new GM's 
attitude and focus had changed during his employment with the ECNZ owned 
Southland Electricity. Changes there due to ECNZ's restructuring had enabled 
him to develop financial and managerial competencies that Dunedin's MED 
board was looking for. Furthermore he was also skilled as a change manager, 
having implemented new financial systems and procedures in Southland 
Electricity . 
"Because ECNZ ran Southland I moved in the commercial area, 
and at that point I actually started preparing the company budgets 
for the whole company - because the company cash flows were 
dominated by electricity revenue. And previously that had not been 
part of the chief engineers perspective - he was only looking at 
operation and maintenance of capita/. The billing side was all left 
with the accountant, and it was a mystery to anybody else. As 
commercial manager I took responsibility for the retail sales and the 
bulk purchase of electricity. And so what I did, job costing focus on 
accounting initially, and then moved into the company into the 
company forward planning - financial planning - all with no 
accounting background - probably could only have happened in the 
public service! But that's I'm sure what got me the job here. I 
wasn't an engineer just coming here, it was the other skills that 
Dunedin was looking for" (CEO). 
However selection of the GM was not solely based on industry experience as 
the board considered it equally important that the GM share their philosophy 
and vision of growth for the organization 
'~s Chief Executive (he) is a guy with a tremendous amount of 
experience in the industry - probably one of the most experienced 
electricity Chief Executives left in New Zealand. His vision was the 
same as the boards so that made it a lot easier" (Chairman). 'tMy) 
focus and determination to get information, getting people to use 
that, I think got me the job here" (CEO). 
Following the GM's appointment other key changes occurred to assist the 
transformation of the organization including the removal of media coverage of 
board meetings and the retirement of the former GM from the board. 
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"The key in the first instance was getting the press out of the board 
room. That meant that I could afford to be surprised and it wasn't 
going to be blazoned across the ODT front page "Chief executive 
ignorant of business operations" and al/ this sort of crap. We got 
the press out in about two or three meetings. The other constraint 
that disappeared quickly was the former chief general manager was 
on the board when I arrived. But he'd gone within a month, and that 
was to my relief. I didn't arrange for that, but I was relieved when it 
happened because he would have been too much of an anchor on 
the changes that were needed" (CEO). 
5.5.4 Structural Change 
On his arrival the GM found an organization sceptical of change. 
"I got here the morale was terrible, confusion was rampant and 
everyone was convinced that within my first week I would sack a 
third of the staff' (CEO). 
However the CEO's first concern was to review the electricity department's 
structure using Arthur Young's recommendations and appoint senior managers 
to each redesigned position. The consultants had recommended the physical 
and accounting separation of DEL's functional areas into core profit centres -
contracting, network and generation. The motivation for the creation of profit 
centres was two-fold: to develop awareness of the true cost to the organization 
of various services and to stimulate cultural change. 
'XWe were) breaking away from the old school there. Everybody 
did everything for everyone's good, and two guys had a problem 
they got together and sorted out a solution - never mind who was 
bearing the costs - they never knew the cost" (CEO). 
Over a period of two weeks the GM reviewed the structure and although he 
agreed with the majority of recommendations he further separated and fine-
tuned aspects associated with engineering that he believed would assist in the 
development and growth of the MED. The GM prepared the final organizational 
structure, splitting the business into four core functional profit centres; 
1. Contracting: amalgamated electriCity technicians, workshop and lines; 
2. Network: separated from contracting to create a new division concerned 
with the planning and administration of the network; 
3. Marketing/retail: a new function separated from the traditional network area 
solely focused on customer needs and the buying and selling of electricity; 
4. Generation. 
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This new organizational structure was intended to create a more commercial 
structure in anticipation of the development of a competitive electricity industry. 
With the organization's structural form finalized the GM began to determine the 
composition of the senior management team. Three senior managers were 'let 
go'. 
'There were people inside that had to go. We got rid of three 
people all clearly elderly senior people in the company in those first 
two weeks they were all difficult exercises. But they had to be done 
that was clear because they were never going to bring the change. 
They had been trained in the council ways for thirty or forty years 
and were never going to make the changes" (CEO). 
With assistance from the board, which insisted on being involved in the 
process, the GM selected individuals to take each of the available managerial 
positions. Three outsiders were appointed, two to the newly established 
functions of corporate services and marketing, another to the extant but 
redefined role of financial planner. The remaining appointments - the traditional 
contracting and network functions - were made internally. 
'The GM employed an outsider as marketing manager to look after 
the retailing, and the three of us (corporate services, marketing, 
financial) were outsiders and two inside people (were) appointed to 
other roles (network, contracting)" (Corporate Services Manager). 
With the new management team assembled, the GM took them all on a 
strategic retreat to develop an aligned vision and strategy for the MED. 
"We went through all the typical bloody drama that went on during 
that period, with silly bloody motivational course and all that rubbish 
and nonsense. We did a lot of analysis of business analysis and all 
that sort of crap; we had retreats in Central Otago, and I guess it - in 
the long run probably was the right general direction - but a lot of it's 
bullshit" (Operations Manager). 
Although some held the process in little esteem, the new team emerged with a 
new focus on leading the organization to the forefront of the industry through 
continuous improvement and cost competitiveness. 
'The buzz word - continuous improvement is our logo thing, you 
know, in our strategic plan. And that's what it's all about all the time 
- just doing better all the time, finding better ways of doing things 
and examining what we're doing" (Corporate Services Manager). 
'There's been an attempt - I say that an 'attempt' - to put ourselves 
into a leading market position, as against a straight out electricity 
118 
department blindly going along making electricity for Dunedin. So 
we've basically done - everything that we've done has been to that 
strategic plan; to put ourselves into a market leading position that's 
been or driving force and motivation" (Operations Manager). 
The first priority to achieve this strategic goal was to develop a financial and 
information infrastructure that would supply the organization with the data 
necessary for effective and efficient decision making in a competitive 
environment. 
'The initial task of course involved getting the systems in place so 
we could run the company properly - getting the skill sets into the 
company and getting rid of the ones that were no longer necessary. 
The GM's philosophy was if its been run that way for the last ten 
years it must need some changes" (Corporate Services Manager). 
"If you've got your accounting systems operating appropriately with 
full allocation of overheads then you can decisions on an economic 
basis, as well as on a risk basis" (Chairman). 
They invested considerable resources in the development of a standardized 
and computerized financial and asset management system that could collect, 
analyse and distribute fundamental business information in a standardized 
form. 
"Management information, financial information and non-financial 
indicators (were developed) making sure that the information is 
getting to people. At the management team level we don't want to 
get a different set of format for his reports than what we get from 
other profit centres. They all come to us from the accounting 
section in similar format" (CEO). 
As information regarding the financial position of each profit centre became 
more accessible, the manager of each could begin to accurately determine an 
appropriate cost structure for internal charging. 
"Its been a piecemeal thing as the better information we were 
getting. Once we broke it into profit centres, and once we 
introduced this internal charging regime we could better see the real 
costs of things were, and we could see what we were getting for 
doing that particular work" (Corporate Services Manager). 
The development of a commercial relationship between departments was a 
significant change from the past. With a focus on cost reduction, the new 
accounting regime forced departments to push for more competitive rates and 
created pressure internally to reduce overheads. The GM manipulated this 
new aggressive relationship to promote maximum cost reduction. 
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'They (profit centres) charge each other for services provided as a 
mechanism to make sure we get the lowest total cost solution. And 
that caused a lot of tensions. We tried to manage those at the 
creative level, although the destructive tension level - that requires 
meetings at times to iron problems out. But that's how we run it" 
(CEO). 
However unlike the past where the GM personally controlled all aspects of the 
MED's operation, each member of the management team was solely 
responsible for overseeing the change process in their area as they saw fit. 
The GM stated his philosophy to his management team as: 
"You're (MED managers) here for your functional responsibilities, 
that's all. I want you to you come and tell me what your unit is 
doing that you think disadvantages the company, and we'll discuss 
that. We might agree, we might disagree. But the primary business 
function focus is your own business" (CEO). 
Concurrent with the development of financial reporting protocols was the 
documentation and standardisation of operating procedures. 
"We had to put a lot of effort into having standards, making sure 
that standards were written down. They were there, but they might 
have been in the form of twenty memos over fifty years so we did a 
lot of documentation" (Network Manager). 
This process was seen as fundamental to the change process, as it removed 
the barriers to information sharing and enabled each manager to identify 
strengths and weaknesses and also areas where cost savings could be mode 
or competition introduced. 
"We did a lot of documentation in terms of standards so we could 
externally tender out. We also had to get up to date. If you're going 
to be tendering out work. .. then they (standards and records) need 
to be right up to date before you tender the work out. So in the first 
few years quite a bit of effort went in to - had to go in to - getting the 
records up to date. Then they could be used as a basis for 
tendering out work as well" (Network Manager). 
By early 1990 the central government began to move towards the development 
of a contestable electriCity market, the GM saw the opportunity to radically 
redesign the MED through the separation of electricity marketing/retail and 
generation functions. The GM believed that "the Government may just seize all 
electricity assets to restructure them" (CEO) and argued that it was imperative 
to separate network and retail functions to introduce transparency, remove 
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monopolistic cross-subsidisation and reduce the likelihood of such intervention. 
With the DCC intent on retaining the network operation, all electricity marketing 
and retailing functions of the MED - regarded as 'non-core' by the GM and 
board - were fully separated to create United Electricity. 
"I was a pioneer in line and energy separation. It didn't happen 
overnight it evolved. We started it back here - we came in and 
formed United Electricity. That separation occurred in 1990 - it had 
been recommended by Arthur Young and we just fine tuned it, 
improved it. We thought the functions were separated it looked like 
the right answer. And we thought that the Government was going 
to drive for and would happen" (CEO). 
Now operationally independent from the MED and under the guidance of a new 
CEO, United Electricity sought out joint venture partners to achieve economy of 
scale benefits for electricity retail functions. In a similar vein changes were also 
made to the relationship with the electricity generation arm of the MED, which 
was separated and corporatised as Waipori Power Generation. 
"We saw generation and transmission separated at ECNZ at least 
corporately, even though they didn't break the 50E up until 1994. 
So we started down that same track. We sold Waipori assets, the 
council actually formed another company and sold the Waipori 
generation assets. The council thought 'We don't want them 
seizing our generation assets, so we'll form a company, we'll sell 
the assets then and we'll leverage at fifty percent with finance from 
a bank and make it vel)! difficult to unravel" (CEO). 
The extensive structural changes to the electricity department with the 
separation of electricity retail and generation functions created a wave of 
uncertainty among individuals at all levels in the organization. The jolt that this 
created within the MED was utilised by the GM as a culture shock to wake the 
wider organization up to the urgency for change. 
"I co-operated completely with it (structural separation). When we 
sold the assets the staff were shell shocked - they couldn't believe 
that their assets had been taken away from them. It was one of the 
reasons I co-operated because I needed a culture shock to wake 
them up" (CEO). 
At the same time as generation and marketing/retail aspects of the organization 
were split, the remaining organizational areas also faced significant change. 
Following the organization wide introduction of commercial accountabilities and 
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senior management's insistence on focusing only on core operational areas, 
many departments considered non-core were reduced and/or removed. 
"We cut off a lot of limbs" (Operations Manager). "We had a big 
focus on freeing up funds. So whereas before we had a stores side 
that spread across four acres and five and a half million dollars 
worth of stocks and twelve people working there, we identified the 
need to get out of the buildings. So we sold off all the buildings, got 
rid of most of the people and reduced the size" (Corporate Services 
Manager). 
Many operations traditionally performed 'in-house' were no longer regarded as 
economic given the ready availability of and access to similar services outside 
the organization. The Assistant CEO summed up this philosophy in his 
dealings with the MED's own fleet service garage. 
It I said) what you've got to do is you've got to get to the stage 
where you are completely self-supporting, that is not our core 
business. If you want to stay there and stay open what you've got to 
do is show that commercially you can survive. So we cut them off -
they still reported to me - and said IRighto go for it, do whatever 
you like it's your business you run it'" (Assistant CEOI Contracting 
Manager). 
This process was replicated throughout the organization. The result was that 
before the end of 1990, most activities not directly associated with the delivery 
of electricity such as appliance retailing were no longer performed by the MED. 
"We eventually got to the stage where things shrunk and shrunk 
and shrunk until we eventually got rid of it - it's not core business, 
we can get the same thing done anywhere" (Assistant CEOI 
Contracting Manager). 
By the end of 1990 the organization looked significantly different from the past. 
With generation, retail and ancillary services removed the functions that 
remained centred on electricity contracting and network management. 
5.5.5 Cultural Change 
Although the GM recognized the need for cultural change during a time of 
strategic and structural turmoil, there was little investment made towards the 
development of a new organizational culture. Rather the GM relied on 
individuals to meet the challenges presented by the new cost focused operating 
environment. 
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"I don't think I introduced the skills, the people either had it or 
developed it themselves I guess. I created the environment" 
(CEO). 
At the senior management level little need for a radical cultural change was 
required. Change at the operational level was more difficult. Initially the GM 
communicated his expectations and the need for change through newsletters, 
outlining the issues and potential impact of environmental and organizational 
change. These newsletters were manipulated to ensure that the message that 
the GM wanted conveyed was broadcast. 
"We started off a newsletter the first day I got here - that was going 
out weekly and it was totally about change and focus and there 
were just constant stories. I dictated a lot commuting in the car and 
I was hunting for success stories out of the media about other 
companies - even in other sectors - where there were parallels. 
And we just kept communicating this way, by putting that on paper. 
No one knew where the stories were coming from except my 
secretary. We invited questions from staff to feed into the 
newsletter. We got bugger all so we invented them, and nobody 
ever knew. I'd write 'Last week this question was asked' and we'd 
put in the answer because it was a question and answer I wanted 
communicated. There was in fact bugger all questions come off the 
staff, which in itself must be positive feedback. Either the staff were 
ignoring these newsletters - and I don't believe that - or they had no 
questions, they were getting answers" (CEO). 
The traditional top-down communication methodology was employed 
throughout the change process. Early on in the process the GM developed 
'team-briefings', monthly meetings where senior management could discuss 
strategic issues. In turn, senior managers took relevant information and 
replicated the briefing process with their respective staff. Senior management 
monitored the ~esponse of individuals during these meetings to assess and 
identify those most able to accept and cope with change successfully. 
lilt (communication) happened from the top down, because (the 
GM) introduced monthly team briefings and mini board meetings. 
So all of those thing$ added together collectively to get the 
message across to the managers. I did the same I had regular 
meetings with the staff. I told them what my visions were early in 
the piece; I prided myself in being honest, that if I thought it was 
going to affect their future I'd tell them - good or bad. And I just kept 
on banging and banging away, and doing those sort of things; 
communicating, meetings, one to one. It didn't take very long to 
pick out who was going to come along for the ride and who wasn't" 
(Operations Manager). 
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Cultural change was also promoted through the devolution of decision-making. 
With increased investment in the development of an information and support 
infrastructure senior managers were able to ''introduce accountability to people 
at the lower level" (Corporate Services Manager). 
"We made them responsible for what they were doing, took away 
the idea they could explain to the next person up the line. They 
weren't accountable for what they did, they just used to do things 
because somebody told them to do and they wouldn't make a 
decision themselves. We focused on the outputs and what they 
were trying to achieve" (Corporate Services Manager). "Allow them 
to think for themselves and be prepared to get it wrong - for them to 
get it wrong a couple of times. But as long as they only do it once, 
or make the same... my attitude to my people is make a mistake, 
but only do it once that's all; if you do it twice, come and tell me 
about it I want to talk to you about it. But do it once - I don't want to 
know. (That approach) really just evolved" (Operations Manager). 
With senior management support, the delegation process was a "slow process 
of helping and motivating and drawing people along, (creating) milestones 
along the way, benchmarks along the way; give them a little bit of initiative see 
what they do with it" (Operations Manager). 
Change was also instigated early in the change process through contractual 
renegotiation and job evaluation. Where previously "all of my (MED) staff were 
all under the same employment contracts as council" (CEO) the GM sought to 
develop an organization different from the council by negotiating a direct 
employment relationship that did not involve the council. The first step in the 
process was job evaluation. The Hayes evaluation system was employed to 
assess individuals based on their job and personal fit with the needs of the 
MED using three basic competencies - knowledge, problem ~olving skills and 
accountability. 
"S0 we just started a job evaluation. That was interesting. The 
outcome of that was to see a significant increase in the evaluation 
and remuneration of marketing and financial positions at the 
expense of engineering and technical positions. That did not go 
down well. That occurred at about the December to - almost 
stretched through to June 1990 - took a long time" (CEO). 
The restructuring of generation, marketing/retail and non-ancillary services in 
1990 fundamentally changed the shape of the MED; the redundancies that 
resulted from the strategic and structural realignment played a fundamental role 
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in the cultural shift experienced by the organization. The GM indirectly drove 
the redundancy process in the MED through the expectations placed on senior 
management to meet strict financial/operational objectives. 
'~ lot of redundancies have been driven from further down. I give 
all the managers the signals and wait for them to come in and say 
"I've got to put some people off." And its worked very well. The 
only ones I've had to directly instruct if you like are direct reports to 
me, because that's my job. And we've got down from where we 
were to where we are by that process. The managers realise it 
themselves that they had to make change" (CEO). 
As functions traditionally provided by the MED were removed, the strongly 
embedded 'job-for-life' culture was fundamentally challenged. However 
although the redundancy process came as a shock to the wider organization, it 
offered many the opportunity to leave the organization with dignity. 
"Some of them took it as an opportunity to get out of the job they 
didn't want to stay in. One of the problems we faced with a lot of 
staff particularly with the line mechanics. What does a lineman do 
when he gets to fifty fifty-five years of age he can't continue to climb 
poles in the snow and the wind and the rain. Some people saw it 
as an easy way out. They get concerned about their future they 
knew we can no longer carry people - in days gone by every 
linemen that got a bit old they gave them a job in the store and you 
can't perpetuate that sort of thing. A lot of them that were getting old 
saw this as an opportunity to get out saving face. Privately they'd 
say 'If you're going to make people redundant consider me', publicly 
they'd' say Those bloody miserable bastards kicking somebody out 
that's spent his life here given his heart and soul to the company 
and they go and do that to you'" (Assistant CEO/Contracting 
Manager). 
Nevertheless for the majority there was growing unease and resistance to 
change after the first round of redundancies in 1990: morale within the MED fell 
and uncertainty at the senior management grew. 
"I remember a meeting we had on restructuring issues. All the staff 
were pulled in and I wouldn't say either of us were going to be 
lynched, but there wasn't much sympathy from the floor. That was 
just anger from people who had never worked anywhere else. 
They couldn't understand the need for change" (CEO). 
In response to these concerns the GM offered senior management a 
compromise solution that would allow the maintenance of non-core services 
and reduce the impact of job losses. 
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"I went to John and said 'Listen we've got a bit of a problem with 
company morale they're wondering when the next restructuring is 
going to happen and how many job losses there are going to be'. 
John put it to the management team and said 'OK from here on 
we've got two ways we can go. We can continue the way we are 
going then make gradual changes as we see circumstances 
change that will obviously mean job losses as the less profitable 
businesses go, or else I can make a guarantee to the staff that 
there will be no more redundancies. What we'll do is we'll have to 
manage that via wage control- which way will you vote?' Every 
bugger - every single one of them - voted to continue the way we 
were going. And John said 'Now hang on I told you I will guarantee 
no more redundancies do you want me to do that' and they said 
'No'. They could see is that what he'd done had been sensible and 
had to be done" (Assistant CEO/ Contracting Manager). 
However senior management recognised and agreed that such a move would 
be detrimental to the organization long term. Stalling the process would offer 
only short-term relief and negatively impact on the process and speed of 
change: "We all agreed that no we had too much dead wood to clean out yet, 
that was an unacceptable strategy" (CEO). Consequently the redundancy 
process continued unabated. 
"Individual managers were aware of the fact that they had budgets, 
they had to achieve results, and those budgets had to achieve a 
return on the money that was invested in them and had to take the 
action necessary to get that return" (Corporate Services Manager). 
Two redundancy rounds were completed prior to the end of 1990, which, for the 
sake of consistency, were overseen by the contracting manager. 
"We made a philosophy that it would all be done through one 
person for the reason of even handedness for consistency so we 
couldn't be seen to be playing favourites with people. That 
happened to be me because most of them (redundancies) were in 
my section. Once you start to do it you start to see all the pitfalls 
and you don't want anybody to drop the company in it so we handle 
all the redundancies through the one section through the one area" 
(Assistant CEO/Contracting Manager). 
Justified on commercial/financial grounds and based partly on the outcome of 
the Hayes job evaluation the contracting manager implemented the 
redundancies recommended by each senior manager, a process that reduced 
the workforce by over half. These actions were in retrospect identified as 
imperative to the development of an aggressive competitive culture, alerting the 
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organization to the drastic need for not only structural and strategic, but also 
cultural change. 
"I made over a hundred people redundant. The philosophy right 
from the start of the company restructuring was lets be as kind as 
we can, make things obvious that it's going to happen. Its 
(redundancies) sort of going to create a sort of an attitude around 
the place that we're going to get leaner and meaner - we are in a 
competitive business and there will be some job losses" (Assistant 
CEO/Contracting Manager). 
The size of the MED was seen as advantageous to management during the 
implementation of redundancies. 
"It's (the redundancy process) easier to do in a bigger organization 
than a smaller organization. When you're making redundancies in 
a group of twenty it's much more noticeable than if you're doing 
redundancies in a group of a hundred it was easier to manage. Not 
only that if you go too far with your restructuring and you get rid of 
more people than you wanted to you've got other resources to call 
on" (Assistant CEO/Contracting Manager). 
The redundancy process provided each senior manager the opportunity to 
selectively remove those perceived to be most resistant or unlikely to change, 
'getting rid of the deadwood' was the phrase common to all senior managers. 
'The sort of attitude change we managed to get (was) by getting the 
people out. Unless you get the people with the right attitude 
restructuring won't work. (That attitude is achieved) by getting rid of 
the people that don't have it. It's cold and it's cruel and it's hard and 
the hard part for the people that are left to grasp is the deadwood 
get all the money, get all the handouts. They get kicked out, but 
they get out with a pot of gold in their hands. And the people that 
are there left behind have got three times as much work to do and 
you don't pay them any more. That's the hard message to get 
across to people. (But) they've got to have the right attitude to start 
with. I don't think you can change attitudes - either people have got 
that attitude or they haven't. Now unfortunately we've still got some 
people here who don't. But in the right positions we've now got 
people there who have the right attitude" (Assistant CEO/ 
Contracting Manager). 
5.5.6 Corporatisation 
By the end of 1990 the Dunedin MED had implemented a series of changes 
that fundamentally redefined the organization's strategic, structural and cultural 
configuration. Although significant progress had been made towards 
transforming the MED into a competitive and efficient commercial organization 
127 
the DCC remained concerned at the potential for central government to force 
divestment. The DCC therefore took the initiative and using ECNZ as a model 
applied the SOE model of corporate separation to its relationship with the MED. 
"Dunedin was ahead of the field, because the council from '89 to 
'92, that council had already put in place separate companies for 
Dunedin Electricity and Waipori and Otago Citigas, which was all 
part of the old electricity MED. So they had already made that 
separation before they (legislation) came through, and had boards 
of directors in place. And part of the '92 reform legislation really 
ratified what we had done, rather than have to go through the 
establishment plan process again that others had to. So it was 
driven by a desire to operate these businesses in a more 
commercial manner, purely and simply that" (Chairman). 
The first corporatised electricity company in New Zealand, Dunedin Electricity 
Limited (DEL) was created. Strategic oversight of the organization was 
transferred from a committee of the DCC to a holding company Dunedin City 
Holdings Limited (DCHL). The membership of DCHL comprised of 
commercially experienced directors appointed by the DCC, and was charged 
with seeing that DEL operated in a fully commercial manner based on an 
agreed series of operating goals. 
"They (the council) established Dunedin City Holdings Limited, 
which was a further corporate structure between the council and 
Dunedin Electricity. Once Dunedin City Holdings approves the 
statement of corporate intent then it's just basically down to the 
directors and management to achieve the objectives as set out in 
the statement of corporate intent" (Network Manager). 
This fundamentally changed the relationship between the management of the 
former MED and its owners. The GM was no longer directly answerable to a 
committee of the council, but instead faced a board of directors now as CEO of 
DEL. 
However by mid 1993 it was becoming apparent that the competitive model 
used by DEL was not the model that was emerging in the electricity industry. 
Legislation had forced corporatisation rather than competition on the sector and 
electricity company owners moved to maintain control of their respective 
organizations having begun to realize higher returns from their assets. 
'The legislation didn't force a competitive position, the legislation 
forced the corporatisation of the activity which then made the 
owner, who in our case was the local authority, appreciate that it 
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should be getting an appropriate rate of return from its investment 
which it had never ever got before" (Chairman). 
Consequently most electricity companies protected their former franchise areas 
from the intrusion of competitors and opposed the consideration of joint 
ventures or competition for fear of loss of income or control. By 1993 the 
strategic and structural configuration that emerged in the industry was one that 
offered a vertically integrated regional electricity service that in turn protected 
the traditional monopoly franchise areas. With neither legislative requirement 
nor economic pressure to embrace a competitive approach, DEL's 
contemporaries had entrenched themselves in defence of the status quo. 
"The problem with our neighbours is they're protecting their own 
patch. They're not subject to competitive pressures that are forcing 
them to look at long term cost solutions for their own business. 
We're tendering out to Southpower but no one else is (tendering 
out) around here. OK it's easier for the urban guys because there's 
more competition, but not a lot more. But we were tendering out in 
the hope that it would taunt our neighbours into having to do the 
same. And they haven't - they just sit there and lie about it" (CEO). 
''They're (other electricity companies) all internally focused and 
they're going to hold onto their patch come hell or high water" 
(Assistant CEO/Contracting Manager). "Power companies around 
us still give their internal contracting group all the work. They only 
get work done by others if they've got a bit of a peak, or there's 
some specific project work which they mayor may not have the skill 
for which they'll utilise our contracting group or one of the other 
nationally based (companies)" (Network Manager). 
In particular the owners of DEL were seen to be a handicap to the expansion of 
the organization. 
"We're not winning much business with our owners, but that's 
because they're (other electricity companies) not making it 
available. Of all the small companies around us, they won't touch 
us because they see us making huge profits for our shareholder, 
and they have this perception that if they get together with us our 
shareholder will make great profits at their expense. They just don't 
think commercially enough - that's because they're not in a 
commercial environment, they're in a trust environment. There's a 
whole lot of bogies there" (CEO). 
In reaction to the defensive stance maintained by electriCity companies and the 
subsequent lack of change in the operating environment, the CEO of DEL was 
forced to reconsider the strategic and structural configuration of the 
organization. 
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"In '93 I went up to council and said 'We got it wrong. The world's 
changed, we've got to change. We've now got to bring the 
generation and distribution sectors back together in focus'" (CEO). 
Pursuing the vertically integrated strategic approach that had emerged in the 
industry following the Energy Companies Act (1992) appeared to be the only 
option available to DEL to achieve growth. With no legislative developments to 
force change on the electricity industry and little impetus from within the 
industry itself DEL's CEO felt compelled to follow the industry norms and 
worked on an integrated future for the organization. 
"1994 to '97 we've been focusing on an integrated future, because 
that's where the world was going. I'm still convinced it was wrong, it 
was just heading down the area health board track. But you've got 
to stay with your competitors or you get left behind. It took about a 
year to get everyone to agree, and there were a few playing some 
dirty pool. But in the end I appointed the same set of directors to 
both (network and generation) companies, and in the process I 
became the chief executive of the generation company again. That 
brought the strategies back together, because we thought the world 
was going down that integrated regional company mode" (CEO). 
However full implementation of this integrated strategic approach was not 
possible. The restructuring DEL had undertaken in anticipation of the 
development of a competitive market place had separated the functions of the 
business to such an extent that it was possible only to regain control of the 
generation business. This did not radically affect the structure of the 
organization, with generation included as another stand-alone division. 
Pressure to follow the industry was not limited to external institutional sources, 
but also emanated from DEL's owner the DCC. Although the council was not 
theoretically able to determine DEL's strategic direction following the 
development of DCHL, ineffectiveness at the board level enabled the council to 
directly influence the decision making process. The subsequent political 
interference reduced strategic and structural options available to the 
organization. 
lilts been much harder to have the change process effected 
because of the political interference. That's one of the areas we've 
had to put up with. It would have been nice to have some 
shareholders who had a different philosophy. I think it (the council) 
is trying to ensure that business is retained in the city. They have 
al/ these esoteric type views coming to the fore and motives, 
although they're way off beam. One of our problems here is that 
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the mayor. One of her platforms was keeping electricity prices 
down and she had a deliberate ploy to interfere. We thought we 
had the structure pretty right with the holding company in place as 
an intermediary between council and the commercial wing, but the 
holding company has not played its role effectively. Its basically 
passed all major decisions back to council without 
recommendations, and that's a recipe for disaster. So the holding 
company hasn't been strong" (Chairman). 
For instance the CEO's desire to seek the purchase of other lines companies or 
pursue a joint venture partnership to facilitate growth in the business was 
refused outright for council fear of the political ramifications that loss of control 
and ownership of the network asset could have. 
"Our council is not willing to sell the line assets and nor are they 
going to be willing to buy another set somewhere else - it doesn't 
makesense to them" (CEO). 
Furthermore maintaining ownership and strategic control of the electricity 
company provided councillors the ability to maintain voter/consumer support. 
"In the DCC there is that social element that always comes in that 
you've got to look after the poor people. And whoever these poor 
people are they have to be looked after all the time there, or we 
can't put up the price of power, or we've got to keep the price of 
power down to attract more business. And so they use the 
electricity company as a tool in their wider philosophy" (Chairman). 
With opportunities for growth restricted in both contacting and network spheres 
the period from 1993 to 1996 became one of consolidation in DEL. During this 
time of stability investment was put into developing the infrastructure and 
quality standards through the implementation of an ISO programme and 
investment in computer technology to assist in daily operational matters. 
5.6 Reactive Change in DEL 
As a result of the lack of environmental change, the process of cultural change 
between 1993 and 1998 was slowed. Although there had been a significant 
culture change at the senior management level of DEL, at the lower levels the 
competitive/customer-focused strategy had yet to be embraced. Resentment 
within DEL at the operational level caused some problems as the radical 
strategic and structural changes forced upon the organization were questioned 
when compared to the protectionist strategies implemented by other electricity 
companies. 
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"One of the biggest problems we face in getting attitudes to accept 
what we're doing is (that) we are the only people that have done it 
(change). All of our neighbours have pulled up the drawbridge and 
they're sitting behind their castle walls watching the world go by and 
that's the hardest thing to get across to our staff. The CEO said 
'We will make all of our work done by contracting contestable so 
that anybody can bid for work and get it. You've got to go outside 
into the cold world out there and make it up with work outside. But 
our neighbours don't let us win the work they tender for our work 
but we can't for theirs because they don't put it out and that's the 
one of the biggest barriers we face in changing staff attitude. They 
ask why should we be at the bleeding edge? Here we are bearing 
ourselves for people to come and take our work and our neighbours 
in other companies aren't giving us the opportunity to do likewise 
and that's a mental barrier a mental block that's been built up 
between some of our staff and management" (Assistant 
CEO/Contracting Manager). "I keep telling my people the pain they 
go through is like the Olympics. The event the adrenaline is so high 
you don't even know what's happening - you've suffered the pain in 
the years beforehand. And that's what it is for my guys at the 
moment. The tendering out process and losing work is causing us 
to streamline our processes, and sorting out our staff and they think 
its unfair because they look at the neighbours and say 'Yeah you've 
been saying that for eight years, it's wearing a little thin'" (CEO). 
However DEL continued to downsize, removing many of the more opposed to 
change through attrition. 
"Where there were 330 staff when I arrived there are 120 now. And 
of that 120, a third of them didn't work here - the other two thirds 
did, but 40 of that 120 we've hired since. So what have we got, 80 
out of 330 is all that's left out of that period. We still have some 
residual cultural problems with that 80. I've got some high skilled 
people that gravitate to the top. The dunderheads we get rid of' 
(CEO). 
For those that remained, there was no specific cultural change programme 
introduced. Rather barriers to change were broken through the implementation 
of an ISO programme that reduced the reliance on intrinsic and personalised 
knowledge. This process was further assisted by the introduction of new 
employees with skills and abilities (primarily financial) sought after by DEL and 
the development of clear performance standards. Each of these change 
initiatives was backed up with weekly team meetings within and between 
operational areas to promote the development of a stronger performance 
focused culture. However in general the cultural change process in the period 
after 1993 was primarily regarded as 'fine-tuning'. 
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"Its (change) only been fine tuning in the last few years, the real 
coarse changes happened in the first two or three years. And that's 
when the change in philosophy was rammed home, you know -
we're here to add value you guys are responsible for what you do, it 
is a waste of time just saying the guy up there told me to do it that 
doesn't work any more. So really there was significant change in 
the first two or three years, and then its really been a bit of fine 
tuning since. A bit of tinkering here, a bit of tinkering there" 
(Corporate Services Manager). 
5.6.1 DEL's New Vision: An Asset Management Company 
By the middle of 1997 the likelihood of further legislation forcing change on the 
electricity sector was growing. Having indicated its dissatisfaction with the 
vertically integrated development of the electricity industry in 1996, the 
government foreshadowed the introduction of legislation that would force full 
ownership separation of electricity network and retail energy businesses. 
However it was until the introduction of the Electricity Industry Reform Act 
(1998) that the industry was called to implement this radical new structure. 
This structural configuration was neither new to DEL nor seen as likely to result 
in radical changes for the industry. 
"What the Government's proposing doesn't put any competitive 
pressures on that. It's going to leave these forty power trusts just 
running the lines assets, and that's how they like it - no pressure 
close to retirement. We were there in 1993 - in fact in the fact in the 
sense that that was when United was formed. We were actually 
there in 1990 internally. So when I read that Trustpower says "Oh 
yeah, we've done it internally", I think "Oh yeah, you might have 
done it in 97 but we've done it in 90." But that's life. So right now in 
fact our focus has moved on" (CEO). 'The Government 
announcement of a month ago said that that's (separation) going to 
happen. We've been going through this agony for five years before 
the government made the decision but we are already there. We've 
done all the hard work" (ASSistant CEO/Contracting Manager). 
However as the operating environment would be forced to change DEL's CEO 
saw this as an opportunity to pursue the development of a new, more radical 
strategic and structural approach for DEL. 
"Separation of line and energy is not the end of the exercise. 
There's another phase to be done,' and we're going to move on to 
that next phase" (CEO). 
The next phase was to develop the only aspect of the business that the CEO 
identified presented the opportunity for significant growth in the industry - asset 
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management. With council owners insisting that DEL develop a greater return 
on assets but also restricting the divestment of its own or purchase of other 
networks, the CEO sought to develop the organization's management 
competencies to achieve growth through the management of other companies. 
"So if they're (the council) not willing to sell, they're not willing to 
buy, I can't grow the business unless I get the hell out of it and take 
something out of the management function - which I now think 
offers the opportunity" (CEO). 
The CEO no longer considered DEL's strengths, competitive advantage and 
future growth potential to be in the electricity industry but rather, given the 
management and infrastructural competencies developed and available in the 
organization, in asset management. 
"I'm in the asset management business. I can't offer the cost 
savings unless I can take the manager away. So that's why we've 
got to separate asset ownership from asset management - either 
that or privatisation of the assets. One of those two have got to 
happen, and I think the privatisation route is a) hard and b) not 
necessarily the best answer. The real synergies to have are not in 
the asset, the synergies are in better management - and that's 
people synergies. You can get that by contracting that out to an 
asset manager. You've got to break the moulds, head off in 
another direction. So that's what we're about" (CEO). 
The CEO had taken his cue for this approach from similar models employed in 
other deregulated industries. 
'There's a number of examples in other sectors. The model that I 
focus on is the hotel sector. Hotels these days are a huge chunk of 
steel and concrete owned by superannuation insurance companies. 
These are long-term investments for other investors for future 
security. They are managed by international hotel management 
companies" (CEO). 
5.6.2 Attributes of DEL's Change Process 
The owners of DEL (the DCC) initiated change in anticipation of 
environmental/legislative change to protect the income stream associated with 
the electricity company. Consequently the MED was developed as a separate 
corporate entity with senior management free to implement radical 
transformational change to meet the anticipated demands of a competitive 
environment. Consultants were fundamental to DEL's strategic and structural 
change process. Consultants systematically and independently assessed the 
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MED's strategy, structure and culture and provided the DCC with an 
organizational model and plan for the implementation of change that legitimised 
the corporate management philosophy. The new GM/CEO, appointed as a 
change agent by the DCC, lead the MED's transformation from being a 
'government department' to a 'corporate entity'. With the mandate to 
implement change the GM/CEO first utilised the consultant's plans and later his 
own ideas to meet the developing norms of the operating environment. 
Although his style remained directive, it was more conSUltative than the 
traditional autocratic method of his predecessors and relied on the skills and 
abilities of senior management to identify problems and implement change. 
The trust that the GM/CEO had in the ability of his senior management 
stemmed from his ability to control appointments. 
DEL's urban location also significantly influenced the change process. Based 
in a city, senior management had ready access to resources that enabled them 
to introduce changes beyond the scope of rurally located EPBs. DEL was also 
exposed to more competition than EPBs, which stimulated the implementation 
of more radical, transformational changes than those witnessed in EPBs. In 
addition, the theoretical distance between the community and organization 
associated with the council ownership structure enhanced the ability of senior 
management to implement transformational change with less concern for 
community welfare than in EPBs. Associated with DEL's urban location was 
the organization's size. DEL's size enabled access to financial and managerial 
resources that senior management could devote specifically to the change 
effort. Where expertise was not available internally, DEL had the financial 
ability to employ consultants to assist senior management. Furthermore the 
size of DEL allowed the organization to sustain a divisional structure, which 
provided the basis upon which transformational change was launched. 
The process of organizational change in DEL was a top-down, CEO driven 
process initiated by its owners and assisted by conSUltants in anticipation of 
environmental upheaval. The GM/CEO and senior management reconfigured 
the MED's strategy and structure in a top down directive manner that was 
neither consultative nor participative. This change process involved the 
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complete transformation of the strategy, structure and culture of the MED, 
resulting in the creation of a corporate entity far removed from the traditional 
electricity archetype. 
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5.8 Southpower Limited (SPL) 
5.9 Overview 
South power Limited (SPL) supplies electricity to over 150,000 primarily urban 
customers in the city of Christchurch and immediate Central Canterbury and 
Banks Peninsula areas of New Zealand's South Island. Formed in 1920, the 
Christchurch City MED (CCMED) can trace its lineage to 1903 when electricity 
first reached Christchurch. Under the control of the Christchurch City Council 
(CCC), the MED developed and maintained Christchurch's electricity network 
for sixty-seven years. In 1987 changes forcing the commercialisation of 
government owned generation and transmission businesses convinced the 
CCC that changes to the distribution sector were imminent. In anticipation of 
change, the CCC and MED began to investigate how control and ownership of 
the MED could best be maintained. In 1988 this quest resulted in the formation 
of a joint venture with three different councils - the Christchurch City Council 
(87.6%) the Selwyn District Council (10.7%) and the Banks Peninsula District 
Council (1.6%) - to create Southpower Limited (SPL). SPL is New Zealand's 
third largest company of its type with 390 staff providing electricity retail, 
network design maintenance and construction services to an area of over 8,018 
square kilometres. South power's listed subsidiary Enerco New Zealand, in 
which SPL has a 69% holding, supplies gas to over 100,000 North Island 
customers. The case of organizational change in South power Limited involves 
both anticipatory and reactive approach to change. Having implemented 
radical and discontinuous strategic, structural and cultural changes in 
anticipation of the development of a new operating environment, SPL later 
shifted to follow a more reactive change strategy. 
5.10 The Electricity Archetype in CCMED 
5.10.1 Organization Strategy 
A protected monopoly owned by the CCC, the CCMED's strategy, structure 
and culture fit the profile of the traditional electricity company archetype. 
Similar to EPBs, the CCMED held a statutory monopoly over the supply of 
electricity in a stable environment. 
"We were a monopoly business in a franchised area. There was 
no way anybody else could provide energy in our patch. It was 
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captured customers" (MOJ. "We came from an environment where 
we didn't really have any risk" (GM, Trading). 
Protected from competition the CCMED had a narrow strategic focus intent on 
the development of the electricity infrastructure and the promotion of electricity 
use. 
"If you look at the old MEOs and power boards where they first 
started off, they wanted to build load, they wanted to promote the 
use of electricity, to get cash flow to actually fund the business 
because they were very capital intensive in the very early days. 
They had to build all sorts of brand new lines and so on to get out to 
the customers, and they needed the cash flow. The old (legislative) 
structures just did not legally permit you to get into any more than a 
very narrow focus" (GM, Network Services). 
5.10.2 Organization Structure 
The CCMED also shared structural characteristics typical of the industry 
archetype. The CCMED was divided into two (engineering and financial) 
functional areas, overstaffed, hierarchical and bureaucratic. 
IIHistorically the business was functional technical, based on trade 
groups. Clear line management was evident, with excess numbers 
within the business" (CEO, Connetics). 'The MEO in 1988 was I say 
a just in case organization - (a) heavy focus on engineering, had its 
own clerks in abundance (it was) very difficult to get them (staff) 
using common resources common to the whole corporation. (There 
were) a lot of in house services. They had their own gardeners, 
their own tradesmen - carpenters, painters, etcetera - I'm not 
talking about specific to industry tradesmen, I'm talking about 
general building tradesmen and the like. They had very large staff 
- they had gosh a whole floor full of draughtsmen" (Chairman). 
At the infrastructural level the CCMED also shared with other electricity 
companies a lack of quality systems and procedures, particularly financial - "it 
was very much a local Government department, with very poor information 
systems" (MO). 
5.10.3 Organization Culture 
The CCMED not only appeared similar to other electricity companies in it's 
strategic, structural and infrastructural' configuration, but there was also a 
cultural likeness. 
'These old power boards and MEOs had been very engineer 
oriented and there was a pretty take it or leave it attitude towards 
captive customers, and there was overcapitalization over-
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engineering. They had enormous yards, warehouses full of cable 
that would never be used and substations that were obsolete 
because we had bought too many just in case" (Chairman). "It was 
a purely engineering focused organization trying to achieve very 
narrow outcomes - just keep the power, the lights on regardless of 
the cost. Engineers decisions were never challenged by anybody 
else, all customers were treated the same. Performance measures 
- there were no performance measures around the organization, 
yeah the list goes on and on" (GM, Trading). "The staff of the 
organization basically operated on the basis that the customer took 
what they gave them and should be grateful for it" (MO). 
The dominance of the engineering discipline in the CCMED created a distinct 
cultural split in the organization, between those in engineering/operational and 
administrative/support functions. This division was typical of the industry and 
led to antagonistic rivalry between the two. 
"It was totally driven by engineering excellence - operational day to 
day imperatives where the accountants didn't talk to the engineers 
and any reporting was pretty basic" (MO). 
Typical also was the bureaucratic, hierarchical job for life mentality embedded 
within the CCMED. As an organization protected from competitive forces, the 
CCMED offered individuals a stable and reliable career path that brought with it 
traditions, hierarchy and a centralized control mentality. 
"People were promoted as of right over time to managerial 
positions. It was no different to the council worker on the end of a 
shovel. There was a sense of a job for life mentality, with no clear 
responsibilities - people showed up to do the same thing day after 
day" (CEO, Connetics). {The MEO was a very stuffy traditional 
organization, very, very traditional. It was only during the early 
eighties when the people were apparently still calling each other Mr. 
and Mrs., like Mr. Sugdon and Mrs. Bishop from Coronation Street. 
That's apparently what the culture was like. And there are people, 
my payroll manager for instance still called one or two of the staff 
members when I arrived in 1989 Mr. White, still called him that". 
"There were a lot of empires, you can imagine the bureaucracy" 
(GM, Corporate Services). "The culture of the place there was 
almost no delegated authority. The general manager in those days 
signed every single letter that left the place - there was no 
delegated authority" (MO). 
This stability also raised among CCMED staff a strong sense of personal 
identification with the organization, reinforced by the kinship of the engineering 
fraternity and the esteem and political strength that was associated with 
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providing electricity to the community. This served to develop and strengthen a 
separatist identity within the CCMED. 
"I found the word we and us never got used much, the word I and 
mine were used a great deal .. . the most insular (council department) 
of them all was the MED. The words Christchurch City Council 
didn't appear anywhere inside this building, not on the letterhead, 
not on the front of the building, not on the invoices. And of course 
they had their own electricity suppliers association, and they were 
mighty people within it, and they had been allowed to grow apart 
(from the council) and they were they were the largest department 
in terms of staff size the staff numbers" (Chairman). 
This insular culture was reinforced by the lack of compulsion to meet the 
demands of financial accountability. 
(They (the MED) were a tremendous financial resource (but) there 
was no suggestion of managing money in a treasury sense so we 
(the council) actually could monitor them on a day to day (basis). 
The MED had their own separate ones (accounts). It was cost plus" 
(Chairman). "We've come from an environment where we had an 
entire monopoly ... and where we've never really had any real 
accountability, we'd just report it (operational performance) to the 
council we weren't actually required to make a profit" (GM, Trading) 
However one important factor was that the CCMED was owned, controlled and 
integrated with the operations of the local city council, in this case the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC). 
"MEDs were functional departments of territorial local 
authorities ... in the ownership of the city councils. They were just 
another department in the way that the parks department or the 
street works department or the water works department are" 
(Chairman). "We were really just, you know, infrastructure 
managers for the city council - like the water works group" (GM, 
Trading). 
This had several direct implications for the strategic development and operation 
of the CCMED. With a stable operating environment, the level of strategic 
planning was limited to electricity pricing and network development. At this 
level, the CCMED was obliged to meet the demands of the CCC. 
"We were actually a committee of the Christchurch City Council and 
if a city councilor got annoyed about something, he'd ring us up and 
we changed it" (GM, Trading). 
Pressure to adjust pricing and operational strategies was not directly in 
response to consumer demands through a trust body as was the case in EPBs, 
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but rather was the result of council members seeking to secure their political 
standing. 
"Politics played a major part because it was part of the City Council" 
(Board Member). "In the old days the owner was telling you to 
charge your business customers more, charge your residential 
customers less, we want to be re-elected" (GM, Trading). 
The setting of "retail electricity prices was a decision as politically sensitive as 
setting the rates each year" (Chairman). The implication of such political 
interference "was tremendous cross subsidy of commercial power charges 
were heavily subsidising residential because it was a there were a lot of voters 
out there" (Chairman). 
"When I first arrived there were massive pricing cross-subsidies 
between residential customers and commercial customers. 
Commercial customers were paying twice what residential 
customers were paying. There was no reason for it, except that 
retail prices were set politically. The MEO as it was back then had 
the worst retail pricing cross subsidy in the country" (GM, Corporate 
Services) "We had one of the worst cross subsidies between the 
commercial sector and the residential sector of any of the 
companies in the country" (MO). 
Council interference also resulted in the eCMED undertaking uneconomic 
operational activities. Pressure was constantly placed on the eeMED to 
undertake city 'beautification' activities such as replacing electricity pole with 
underground cables, the cost of which was borne by the CCMED. This was a 
shrewd pOlitical manoeuvre as such programmes were highly visible symbols of 
the effectiveness of incumbent council members to implement change in and 
develop the community. 
"Previously we undertook fairly unprofitable activities under council 
pressures, such as under-grounding you know. We'd spend two or 
three thousand dollars a kilometre to. put overhead wires 
underground, a complete waste of money. But it looks nice and the 
council didn't have to pay for it" (GM, Corporate Services). 
5.11 Anticipatory Change in the CCMED 
5.11.1 Governance Developments 
Following sixty-seven years of environmental stability the wave of deregulation 
sweeping through the New Zealand economy, particularly the government 
owned electricity generation and transmission sector in 1987, alerted the ece 
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to the potential for similar changes to be forced on the country's wider electricity 
sector. 
'There was a big political debate as to what was going to happen to 
the electricity supply authorities" (Chairman). "People saw 
legislation was coming that was going to make this business a 
commercial entity" (GM, Trading). 
The fear within the GGG was that the GeM ED, an organization of significant 
monetary and strategic value could be lost. In early 1987, motivated by the 
perceived threat of expropriation, the GGe established a committee charged 
with reviewing the eeMED and council's ownership options. 
"The council saw it as our duty to see that these that this particular 
asset of the Christchurch City Council retained in local ownerShip. 
There was a very real danger of central expropriation of these 
assets" (Chairman). 
The committee was charged with researching the effects that legislative 
changes could have on the GGMED, identifying the implications for continued 
eGe ownership and proposing a course of action that would protect Gee 
ownership of the assets and business. 
"There was quite a political battle to ensure that these valuable 
assets were not lost to local communities" (Chairman). 
In mid 1987 the committee recommended that immediate changes be made to 
the eGMED's governance structure, operation and relationship with the GeG. 
Based on the direction and intent of government reform in other sectors, the 
committee suggested the development of a new form of council operation, the 
Locally Owned Enterprise (LOE) that mimicked the SOE model. 
"We felt that there was benefit in copying that (SO E) act to create 
what we called an LOE a Locally Owned Enterprise - since then the 
term LATE has emerged" (Chairman). "The challenge was to set 
up business models that would avoid the Government need to 
regulate - produce a lot of rules particularly price control" (GM, 
Network Services). 
Under the LOE model, the council-ME.D relationship would be formalised, with 
a greater degree of separation between' owner-operator developed to promote 
transparency and the development of commercial operating imperatives. By 
implementing such changes the eGG could reduce the likelihood of 
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government intervention by proving that it was capable of maintaining MED 
ownership while allowing it to operate as a commercial enterprise. 
"We wanted to show a track record of arms length commerciality 
that would provide a good case study to support the political 
evocacy that Christchurch was undertaking. In other words we 
weren't just saying 'sure local bodies can put things at arms length', 
we had an example. The council was persuaded on the basis that 
the only way that you are likely to preserve this asset is to put it at 
arms length and so they agreed" (Chairman). 
The first action taken by the GCC was to replace the CCMED's standing 
committee with a new board of directors - "there was a transfer from the MEO 
to the MEB" (Chairman). Galled the Municipal Electricity Board (MEB), the 
council appointed body was given commercial powers of directorship and 
charged with overseeing the commercialisation of the CCMED - albeit under 
the watchful eye of the council. 
'They (Christchurch city councilors) agreed to set up the local 
municipal electricity board which would have directors - some were 
councilors and some were outsiders for want of a better term and 
that board would have company director type powers" (Chairman). 
Of most significance for the GGG in this move was the surrender of control over 
the setting of electricity prices to the new board. 
"The MEB was set up, and the significant thing was they were going 
to decide what the power prices would be, the retail electricity 
prices. It was quite a brave thing politically for the then Christchurch 
City Council to agree to" (Chairman). 
5.11.2 A New Managing Director 
The MEB quickly sought to replace the incumbent General Manager with a new 
Managing Director (MD), skilled in the electricity and change management field. 
After a short period a new MD was appointed. 
"I've been here since late 1987, I was actually general manager 
here before that. But I left and went to ECNZ where I was involved 
in the restructuring of ECNZ from the old NZEO to ECNZ. I was 
South Island regional marketing manager for them, where we did 
marketing as well as construction and maintenance, so that was the 
change management aspect of that. Then I came back here and 
I've been here since then" (MO). 
The new MD not only met desired competence criteria, but was also aligned 
with the GGG's desire and vision for the future of the electricity company. 
143 
"(The MD) and I as officers of the council saw it as our duty to see 
that this particular asset of the Christchurch City Council (was) 
retained in local ownership" (Chairman). 
The MD 'hand picked' a new senior management team as he sought to instil a 
different management approach to that of the MED. 
"New blood was brought in, so some new management was 
brought in. There were a lot of empires that Chris was determined 
to smash, and being an engineer he knew where the empires were 
likely to be" (GM, Corporate Services). 
Selection criteria rested on proven skills and abilities in a commercial 
environment and the implementation of change as well as having established 
an interpersonal relationship with the MD. 
"One of the first things I wanted to do was get a team of people 
around me that I knew I could trust and that I knew would perform in 
a team manner. I wanted to know that I had a group of people there 
that could do it (change) in the most economical way and when 
there were issues come and talk to me. You had the team already 
you didn't have to go through the team building exercise with the 
personalities, you had those people there. And I basically hand 
picked them based on the ones that I'd seen perform over the 
years. Quite a number of the people who were with me in ECNZ as 
a key group actually came across with me - sort of four or five key 
people" (MD). 
The skills and composition of the ranks of senior management reflected a 
transition in thinking and focus within the electricity company. Alongside the 
engineering staff traditionally considered central to the organization, people with 
analytical, financial and marketing skills now held key positions in the 
administration. 
"The management team here is a mixture of people who have been 
in the industry for a long time, and others with newer skills that we 
had to bring in - mainly analytical skills of one sort or another -
people who are good at financial modelling or computer modelling 
or systems" (GM, Network Services). 
Significantly a new position focused on marketing was created - "Southpower 
established the position of General Manager Marketing and Supply. In the past 
none of the electricity companies had had a marketing function" (GM, Strategic 
Business Development). The process of change in the ranks of senior 
management was eased as two key positions - network and financial 
management - "came up through retirement" (GM, Network Services), 
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removing the need to issue redundancies. With a 'hand-picked' team, the MD 
believed the competencies necessary to implement widespread organizational 
change were made available. 
"I got a good team of people around me who could share where we 
were going" (MD). 
5.11.3 Strategic Change 
Meanwhile the neighbouring Central Canterbury Electric Power Board 
(CCEPB) was also assessing its future. A small organization operating in a 
rural area, the CCEPB also recognized the potential threat legislative change 
posed to the maintenance of asset ownership. Aware of ecc actions, the 
CCEPB approached the council in early 1988 seeking to establish a joint 
venture electricity company. 
"The adjoining Central Canterbury Electric Power Board, seeing 
which way the wind was blowing and that power boards had no 
long term future came along to the MEB and said 'Why don't we join 
in a joint venture?' and that's where the term Southpower got 
coined" (Chairman). 
Arguing economy of scale benefits of the venture for both parties, the CCEPB 
convinced the CCC and in March 1988 the electricity companies were formally 
merged and board representation adjusted accordingly. 
"The legal status of the board of that body was that it was a joint 
standing committee of two local authorities, one being the 
Christchurch City Council and the other being the Central 
Canterbury Electric Power Board" (Chairman). 
Although the CeMED had a new joint venture board and a new MD, the 
organization had inherited the strategic, structural and cultural qualities typical 
to electricity companies. The MD's first concern, particularly following the 
merging of two organizations, was to start afresh with a new name to signal to 
the organization the need for change. The board and MD settled upon the 
name Southpower. 
"That's where the term Southpower got coined. The word 
Southpower first came into consideration when the board 
restructured the two organizations into a single organization - the 
con jOinting of the MED and the Central Canterbury Electric Power 
Board - into what was called Southpower, a joint venture" 
(Chairman). "Our managing director took a strategy saying 'Well 
we're not going to take either culture, we're going to create a new 
one, we're going to call it Southpower'. The Managing Director 
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didn't want either culture - he wanted a new one. It was absolutely 
vital to create another brand that wasn't one nor the other 
(organization)" (GM, Corporate Services). 
Signage, advertising and printed material was also developed to create a new 
'corporate' profile and alert the public to changes in their electricity company. 
'We knew we had to get to a particular point from a strategic 
perspective which meant that we then formulated the way forward' 
(MO). "We were not in copy cat mode. We had the opportunity to 
move into the lead, the opportunity to move early" (GM, Strategic 
Business Development). 
Over the first month SPL's senior management dedicated itself to the 
development of "business models that would avoid the Government's need to 
regulate" (GM, Network Services). For the first time in the organization's history 
the executive team reviewed the organization's core competencies and 
functions. 
"We identified what the purpose of the business was which had 
never been done, developed strategies around that purpose" (MO). 
From this process emerged the formal identification of SPL's core function and 
associated strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. 
"Our core business is our network, running an efficient distribution 
network. It's where the major asset value is, it's what our 
customers rely on us for and that is the asset and activity that we 
need to run as efficiently and effectively as we can. The second 
aspect of the core business is energy trading and making margin 
out of that. Everything else should really be a support to those two 
activities" (GM, Corporate Services). 
Despite SPL's core function being seen as little different from the past, the 
process of self and environmental analysis formed the basis upon which a 
vision for the future of the industry and organization was developed. 
"We formed a view of the future in terms of what the industry was 
going to look like, the things that we would need to have as an 
organization in order to take advantage of that environment, and 
then started to establish it" (MO). "It's about first of all taking a view 
of what the future looks like and then trying to assess what you 
need to do to change so you can be part of that environment" (GM, 
Trading). 
Learning from similar deregulatory experiences in other industries, SPL's 
management anticipated that deregulation would result in the consolidation of 
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many organizations and the convergence of complementary services to provide 
a customer orientated, 'total-energy' service. 
"In the U.S. you see the total energy approach of gas and electricity 
coming together, and you see telecommunications coming together 
- so yeah I mean there are lots of companies doing similar things -
the outcomes are still quite uncertain. You're seeing the 
internationalisation or globalisation of energy, but you're also seeing 
the convergence of a number of industries. You're seeing 
convergence of telecommunications, energy, banking - all those 
things are coming together with some quite significant ramifications 
for everything right through to credit card companies - and we did 
our best to make sure that we were appropriately pOSitioned" (MD). 
As a result senior management redirected the strategic emphasis of the 
organization, replacing the traditional electricity network development and 
maintenance focus with the need for wealth creation through customer service. 
"Shareholder wealth became the key measure of success and 
customers became central to do this" (GM, Corporate Services). 
"The key focus became shareholder wealth - protecting and 
growing the shareholders investment basically" (MD). 
The development of SPL's strategic direction "was a behind the scenes 
process, although we hinted and suggested where we were going. But there's 
always cynicism, which meant that· we had to go and lock ourselves away and 
get on and do it" (GM, Strategic Business Development). 
With the need for radical strategic change identified, it became evident that the 
organization was neither structurally nor culturally prepared for the competitive 
demands of a new operating environment. The old operating archetype 
needed to change. 
"The challenge to the management of the new organization was to 
turn it into a customer based entity and to look very carefully and to 
where the capital was being utilised to turn it from a just in case 
organization to a just in time organization" (Chairman). "Customer 
service, competitiveness, flexibility, an organization that could 
change quickly and cost reductions, cost effective (practices) were 
the key things that he (the MD) was looking for" (GM, Corporate 
Services). 
5.11.4 Structural Change 
Southpower's traditional hierarchical structure was identified by senior 
management as a significant impediment to change "so a restructuring of the 
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organization was done and a new management and organizational structure 
and business plan was evolved from that" (GM, Corporate Services). The old 
MED structure supported the established belief system of the bureaucratic 
culture, which left untouched would undermine the change process. Therefore 
the MD was intent on "recasting the structures in the organization to change the 
culture of the organization" (MO). 
Decades of non-accountability in a cost-plus environment had created an 
organization that neither required nor valued information systems and 
organizational feedback. SPL's MD made it a priority to find, record and make 
transparent operational and financial knowledge. 
"One of the first things to do was to look at the information 
requirements around the place and get some decent information 
systems going as well as a billing system that worked in conjunction 
with that so that at least you could start to manage the business. 
There was no financial reporting, there was no systems in place in 
fact to be able to do that" (MO). 
Significant investment was made in the computerisation of SPL's accounts and 
information system so that operationally the organization could begin to take 
control of its expenditure and income as well as more accurately track its 
network operation. 
"All our drawing map records were on paper, thousands of sheets of 
paper, all fading away with the ink drying off and flaking off. All 
those records have been converted to electronic form" (GM, 
Network Services). 
Three separate profit centres were created, network, contracting and electricity 
retail/sales, each supported by a centralised corporate services division. 
"We broke the organization up into functional elements - network, 
trading, human resources, information services those sorts of 
things" (MO). 
The motivation for organizational separation and decentralisation was to 
introduce a greater degree of flexibility and management 'focus' to promote the 
development of a more efficient, effective and competitive operation. 
"Our network people have different business practices to our 
customer services people. So its just been a lot easier in a lot of 
respects to decentralise a lot of things, to get greater management 
focus and actually doing justice to those diverse businesses" (GM, 
Corporate Services). "We structured ourselves in such a way that 
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things like the network had quite defined roles and goals in respect 
of what it was trying to do. Because superimposed on this issue to 
do with competition was the whole issue of greater efficiencies -
better returns and profits and all that sort of thing which we'd never 
heard of in the early days - so we could actually compete in the new 
environment" (MD). 
Decision-making was decentralised, supported by investment in training and 
support systems. 
"The management has decentralised into line management, so day 
to day supervision and performance development and so on -
supervisory responsibilities administration of time records - is the 
responsibility of various business units. So we have a fairly 
decentralised approach to that sort of management" (GM, 
Corporate Services). 
Although the definition of divisions formally recognized pre-existing operational 
areas, divisionalization particularly impacted upon the largest aspect of the 
business - network contracting. Contracting was operationally and financially 
separated. Furthermore, with management's focus on cost reduction, the 
contracting division would no longer maintain a monopoly over maintenance on 
SPL's network. Instead, as a semi-independent division, contracting would now 
face competition and have to bid for work in many operational areas in 
opposition to other contracting businesses. 
"Gradually contestability was introduced over that time by taking 
some work deliberately outside, getting other contractors, you 
know, to carry out the work. We did that basically to bring in 
competitive market pressure to bear on getting work done on the 
network" (GM, Network Services). 
Although not fully exposed to competition some saw this restructuring as 
counter to the organization's traditional and 'proper' raison d'etre. After several 
months, resistance to this change grew and the threat of industrial action was 
raised - "we got close to a couple of strikes" (MO). 
"There was a meeting at Packe Street where half the organization 
(employees) was. That meeting turned into a major moan and we 
had a mini-revolt" (GM, Strategic Business Development). 
The MD sought to appease the situation and avoid such confrontation by 
committing to a philosophy that valued open communication. 
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"Having been involved in the ECNZ restructuring I was determined 
not to go through such a confrontational approach again, so if you 
like I'd seen how not to do it (change)" (MD). 
Consequently SPL's senior management worked at gaining support for change 
by maintaining open communication channels through a process of 
consultation with affected parties. 
"We got working parties with the unions and using the data from the 
research we worked out with them productivity gains and we got a 
consensus in terms of what the numbers might be to do a particular 
task. Then we said this is what we've got and this is what we need, 
'hey there's a big gap there'. And we locked them in to the concept 
that things had to change" (GM, Network Services). 
In doing so senior management acknowledged that the pace of change had 
been too rapid and agreement was reached in regards to the extent and pace 
of change. 
"We agreed that we had moved too fast and extended for 12 
months the reform process so that the idea of setting up mini 
business units was accepted. We made the mistake of pushing too 
fast" (GM, Strategic Business Development). 
The threat of industrial action forced the management of SPL to make 
concessions and alerted them to the need for an open and consultative 
approach. However, as a result of the lessons learned, SPL "never ever had a 
strike during that whole process of reform. To a large extent it was (avoided 
through) a process of consultation" (MD). 
Senior management also sought to further enhance the operation through 
diversification into the retail appliance sector. In mid 1989 SPL launched a 
chain of retail stores under the brand "Power Max, which was a huge 
commercial retail business" (Board Member). The motivation for the 
development of this business was twofold. First, SPL's senior management 
anticipated the vertical integration of energy services. 
"The view was that because we're in the home evety month with 
the power bills we could actually market effectively. We had a 
competitive advantage in the in the appliance business" (GM, 
Corporate Services). 
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Second, diversification into a retail setting offered SPL's management the 
opportunity to experience and learn from a sector that already operated in a 
fully deregulated and highly competitive environment. 
"One of the reasons for getting into appliances was that was a 
competitive industry and that can be used as a role model for 
Southpower. We could observe how appliance people behaved in 
a competitive market and learn from that - a case study philosophy" 
(GM, Corporate Services). "That (diversification) was also a factor 
in making us thinking about, change all the things you need to know 
to get this (wider) business in shape for competition The appliance 
business which is a competitive part of the market was an example 
to the organization. We saw the sort of attributes of the appliance 
business we needed to have be successful" (GM, Trading). 
Adding further to SPL's development was its acquisition of two further MEDs 
following the government initiated amalgamation of local bodies. The 
amalgamation of the eee with neighbouring local bodies enabled SPL to grow 
considerably through the acquisition of adjacent electricity networks to become 
the sole provider of electricity services in the city and immediate urban areas. 
"We had local body amalgamation effective from November 1989 
when the Christchurch City Council was incorporated and eight 
local authorities were abolished. There were two minor MEDs 
Riccarton involved in that (amalgamation) Riccarton and Port Hills 
which were in fact bought by Southpower they paid the local bodies 
for them and so they merged into this mix as well so you had 
Riccarton Port hills Central Canterbury and Christchurch MED 
forming the entity" (Chairman). 
This affected the ownership structure of SPL. 
"What it (amalgamation) really amounted to was that the three local 
authorities that had formed part of the network owned the new 
entity Southpower limited. So that ended up on a valuation basis 
that is to Christchurch city 88 percent in round figures Selwyn 
district 10 and Lyttelton and Banks Peninsula district for a wee bit 
one-point something percent so that's the evolutionary process 
that's created the current Southpower Limited" (Chairman). 
However, the new ownership structure did not change the strategic focus of 
SPL. 
"Our job was to maximise the value of the investment for the 
owners when the when the joint venture was formed" (Chairman). 
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5.11.5 Cultural Change 
Although the need for change had been identified at managerial level, the same 
urgency for change was not present in the wider organization. 
"The key thing was to get the organization so that functionally it was 
capable of operating in a new environment but more importantly 
culturally it was able to operate. We needed a mechanism to 
change the culture" (GM, Strategic Business Development). 
"People feel vel)' uncomfortable with change generally. I mean 
gradual change they can cope with, but the step changes - human 
nature is such that it just tends to resist it" (MD). 
To develop understanding and mobilise support for change market research 
was commissioned. 
"We used market research to tell us how well we were doing and 
what the customers thought of us" (GM, Strategic Business 
Development). 
An analysis tool called SMART (Salient Multi Attribute Rating Technique) was 
used to identify the preferences and values (attributes) of customers and 
compare these to those of the organization, in doing so measuring alignment of 
the two. 
"SMART measures both qualitatively and quantitatively what is 
important to the customer by benchmarking against a non-existent 
competitor - a pseudo-competitor - and reveals what factors we 
need to focus on in order to beat or compete with that competitor" 
(GM, Strategic Business Development). 
In late 1988 the survey results revealed that public perception of the 
organization was poor. Although the effective supply of electriCity had been the 
primary focus of the Christchurch MED, this was viewed as only one of thirty-
five attributes considered important by customers. 
"(We found that) we didn't see beyond the meter and we had a lot 
of rules and regulations to set ourselves that weren't necessarily 
customer friendly. We weren't all that easy to do business with and 
we needed to handle enquiries speedily and promptly. And apart 
from doing the obvious things like getting the power back on when 
there is a problem (we found) that there are other ways that 
customers want to interact with us.. There's a lot of information they 
need about energy and energy usage" (GM, Network Services). 
"What we found we had done was measure the gap between staff 
and customer perceptions - a huge gap. If we had found the 
answers were right across the two, there was a cultural fit to the 
new emerging environment. We needed to find a match" (GM, 
Strategic Business Development). 
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The management group had underestimated the breadth of the organization-
customer gap "Some thought it was so out of line that they thought that the 
market research was wrong" (GM, Strategic Business Development) and 
closing this gap became the primary focus for senior management. The first 
stage involved the running of small group workshops where staff was asked to 
list their interpretation of customer expectations and values and how successful 
they believed SPL was in meeting these. Staff lists differed significantly from 
those of customers confirming earlier findings. 
"We didn't tell staff what the top ten was, and we got them to pick it 
from the attributes. We didn't want to see an order ranking of the 
top ten, just identify what they were and most got it wrong" (General 
Manager, Strategic Business Development). "We asked them what 
they thought the most important things were and how they ranked 
and they almost invariably got them all wrong. The staff's 
perception of what they thought was important and the customers 
perception were almost always totally different" (MD). 
The differences presented SPL's management with the evidence necessary to 
convince their employees of the urgency for cultural change. 
"SMART gave us power (to change). We didn't think SMART was a 
cultural change tool, but it was" (GM, Strategic Business 
Development). 
Staff expressed concern about the reliability and validity of the method but "the 
market researcher was bought in to explain the methodology which was most 
powerful - staff could criticise management but not external experts or 
customers" (GM, Strategic Business Development). SPL utilised SMART to 
develop a cultural change programme called 'Focus on Customers' that aimed 
to develop of individual competencies to stimulate a flexible, competitive culture 
similar to that of a popular fast-food chain. 
"We tried to draw on the McDonalds model where it became 
socially acceptable to be good with customers" (General Manager, 
Strategic Business Development). "Training and competence 
building, as well as developing self confidence was vety important. 
For many years people had been working in large crews with 
specialised tasks (and were) focused on doing the same thing day 
in day out (and) where there was no need for self-confidence. Now 
they were being asked to undertake a whole raft of things, and 
needed to develop confidence as the scope of their work had 
expanded. This required flexibility, responsibility (and) the ability to 
negotiate and communicate as well as operate within the codes of 
conduct/regulations. This was important as a driving factor for 
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change, as developing this confidence helped develop and add 
value to the organization by improving the service and range of 
abilities" (CEO, Connetics). 
Initially implemented by consultants, the organization was broken up into 
interdisciplinary work-groups that for the first time forced all staff to deal with 
people and problems outside their own operational areas. 
"Some people welcomed it as a breath of fresh air and said 'Well 
there's nothing radical about this'. Other people were saying 'Oh 
God, here we, go yuppies taking over the organization and trying to 
change it'. You know (they were saying) 'the engineering will be 
compromised' and all the rest of it" (GM, Corporate Services). 
Later SPL's senior management took over management of the programme. 
"We (senior management) took them (staff) through focus on 
customers - which is really the whole process of cultural change. 
We fed the market research back into the loop, and we had every 
staff member involved over those years and understand how we 
were doing whether we were improving where our problem areas 
were" (GM, Network Services). "It took four weeks to get through 
the organization in groups of about twenty with five or six senior 
people (running the workshops). This meant they (senior 
management) had to front up to the organization. This mechanism 
made people appreciate how serious the whole thing was" (General 
Manager, Strategic Business Development). "We literally had to 
role up the sleeves and get into it to get people to realise the extent 
of change they had to cope with. So we ran the whole organization 
in groups of about twenty people - and there was about eight 
hundred staff at that stage - through this process, showing them 
what the customers thought and where the gap was" (MD). 
Over time the programme stimulated cultural change by enabling staff to 
identify the link between personal action, organizational performance and 
customer satisfaction. 
"The concept that there was a customer behind the meter was the 
biggest change. It was often said in the past that we were largely 
engineering driven, that we didn't see beyond the meter -
particularly that we had a lot of rules and regulations that weren't 
necessarily customer friendly. We weren't all that easy to do 
business with in the past but these are the sorts of comments that 
are made. The biggest cultural change is to think that the customer 
- the person paying the power bill - is a customer, and we need to 
handle enquiries speedily and promptly" (GM, Network Services). 
"All of a sudden we got change, customer focus, market research, 
new innovations, externally focused, looking at the industry what's 
happening, preparing for competition, openly talking about 
competition, losing customers, retention, offering customers new 
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things and all that sort of stuff. It's just a completely different 
philosophy and culture, (one) that Chris was looking 'for" (GM, 
Corporate Services). 
Training in specific skill areas such as time management, personnel and 
financial management was also provided. Team leaders were given specific 
attention to ensure the development of a consistent managerial approach. 
'~ fundamental in Southpower's evolution was the introduction of 
ongoing training in team management, customer services and 
administrative competencies" (GM, Trading). 'Team leaders were 
trained together as a peer group in order to gain a consistent 
approach, and individual coaching was given on specific issues" 
(CEO, Connetics). 
To reduce anxiety and promote change "we (senior management) put in place 
a vety comprehensive communications programme with staff, which was not 
only newsletters and briefings and you know all the sort of team briefs and 
those sorts of things" (MO). 
"We spent quite a bit of money videos. We used to put a video out 
evety three months in the early stages and then evety six months. 
It showed other parts of the organization (to the entire staff) so that 
they understood how one part influenced the other, we used a video 
medium to help give them an understanding of what was going on. 
And you used the staff in it as well so that the staff were vety proud 
to be on this video. They'd talk about what they did and what the 
impact was on parts of the organization - they got to understand 
where they fitted in. That was vety powerful that whole 
communication process was an integral part of the culture change" 
(MO). 
Departmental briefings provided the main form of communication, but the MD 
also made it a priority to personally address the organization through 
'roadshows' . 
"I would stand up in front of staff - either large groups or small 
groups - so that I could explain what we were about and they could 
challenge me and ask questions. We had to talk to the staff about 
what we saw the shape of the industty being and the future and 
what that might mean to us as an organization. We had to work 
towards retaining the customers not towards pissing them off if 
you'll forgive the phrase" (MO). 
Initially these meetings were greeted with scepticism and often hostility. 
"In the early stages of reform they were slanging matches where 
people got things off their chest" (MO). 
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However the MD persisted with this approach in the belief that "the best 
approach to change management is to be up front and tell it as it is -
communication, consistency and honesty" (MO). 
"Even though it was confrontational at times it was vety important 
for them (staff) to see that you were prepared to front up to them 
and explain the issues, explain the rationales. And also able to take 
comments from them, take them on board and give them a reason 
as to why something they may have thought was a good idea 
couldn't be done. It's that whole issue of people being able to 
rationalise in their own mind what's happened and why its 
happened. If they can do that personally, they can go back to their 
spouses and families and explain what's going on rather than say 
'that bastard up there'! We put the fundamental framework and a 
philosophical view out there and said to people: 'OK you're with us, 
this is what we're going to do (and) we'll help you change. You 
don't have to - you might not feel you have the skills to do what we 
need to do. But we'll help you, we'll train you, we'll bring you up 
with the thing and hopefully you'll still feel with it - still feel that 
you're comfortable with it" (MO). 
Associated with investment in staff development was the decentralisation of the 
operational decision making process. 
"People have got much more authority to achieve, we've given 
more authority its been vety successful. Just given them the tools to 
make the decisions" (GM, Trading). '~ fair part of the cultural 
change was actually giving people the authority to make decisions 
on the basis of what they felt was the best thing to do, with the back 
up being if they got it wrong we'd look at why they got it wrong and 
we'd help them avoid getting it wrong again. But they WOUldn't get 
a kick up the backside or be fired just because they made their best 
effort and failed at it" (MO). 
This required investment in operational support systems, primarily in the form of 
protocols and computer networks. 
"We've had to set our business up so we can actually give people 
the freedom to get out there and make decisions, you know. We've 
had to put systems in place so they could actually make decisions" 
(GM, Trading). 
With decentralisation and autonomy came individual and group accountability. 
Financial and operational targets were set by senior management to ensure the 
maintenance of strategic alignment. 
"We set evety part of the organization with targets of where we 
wanted to be in terms of the satisfaction factor. And we said 'OK 
you people, go away and evety month we want to know what 
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you've done in terms of meeting the criteria and changing the 
customer satisfaction" (MD). 'There are financial performance 
measures, customer satisfaction performance measures. The one 
that really counts is financial performance (as) the long-term growth 
of shareholder wealth is what counts. To achieve that short term 
and long-term financial performance customer satisfaction is going 
to impact on that performance" (GM, Trading). 
However despite the achievements, the MD lamented the speed with which 
cultural change could be implemented. 
"It was a very radical change, for people to have to try and think in 
terms of providing a customer with service rather than just doing 
what they told them to do. What we would have liked to have done 
is put the change in place very rapidly and done a step change. But 
what we found is there is sort of a natural inertia with people in 
terms of how fast you can get them to change" (MD). 
Senior management's overall perception of progress made prior to 1992 was 
that ''the desire to move to customer service was well accepted by staff" (GM, 
Corporate Services) but the process of cultural change had been far more 
complicated and required more time and personal involvement than anticipated. 
"Cultural change is the hardest aspect to change - culture and 
behaviour. A number of changes a year in structure is very difficult 
to deal with. Management didn't realise how difficult that process 
was. They thought that the pace of change was reasonable, and 
that it would be OK to continue, but they found that there was a 
maximum rate of change that people could actually cope with and it 
is very slow - even for those most willing to change. Management 
thought that it would take three to four years for the bulk of the 
changes to be implemented, but it took a minimum of five to six 
years before they had broken through and made most of the 
cultural changes. It was a process of winning people on side. After 
three years it became socially acceptable to be good with 
customers, so we could tick that off on our McDonalds philosophy 
chart. But it took a long time. It just isn't acceptable to change 
quickly and get rid of the people that don't agree and replace them 
with ones who do because you chuck out· valuable skills, people 
with twenty thirty years of experience the ones who keep the lights 
on. So you need to retain the skills base and make sure they 
understand why the old ways are not acceptable" (General 
Manager, Strategic Business Development). 
Unlike its EPB counterparts, the change process in SPL began well before 
regulatory compulsion forced strategic and structural realignment. Against a 
backdrop of increasing uncertainty the council owners of the former MED, 
concerned with maintaining ownership rights, initiated change in anticipation of 
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deregulation. What followed was a three-year process of strategic, structural 
and cultural reorientation intended to create a commercially successful 
operation and prove to the government the viability of council ownership. 
5.12 Reactive Change in SPL 
5.12.1 Strategic Change 
By 1990 government impetus for change waned, compounded by the exposure 
of "fundamental problems with the 1918 Electricity Act" (GM, Corporate 
Services), resulted in an extended period of lobbying by electricity companies 
around the issue of ownership. 
"The barrier to reform was· figuring out who the hell owns them 
(electricity companies)" (GM, Strategic Business Development). 
"The legal debate was who owned these entities" (Chairman). 
Although the government had made progress towards the implementation of a 
deregulated industry, confusion and uncertainty surrounding the ownership 
issue slowed the process of institutional change. 
'The industry has slowed the process down. The Government 
stuffed up at the legislation level because they haven't followed 
through with the determination to enact or get their mind around 
some of the ideas. This has sent mixed signals, signals of 
uncertainty and has allowed small power boards to become 
involved in the political process which has slowed it all down" (GM, 
Strategic Business Development). 'There's the political aspect to 
how well they're (EPBs) lobbying Government to review the 
regulations to suit them rather than Southpower" (GM, Corporate 
Services). 
SPL used this period to concentrate on strengthening the organization, by 
following a more introspective, reactive approach to change than had occurred 
in the previous three years. 
"1990,1991, 1992 this was when the joint venture was getting up a 
full head of steam and the merging of the MED and the other little 
bits and pieces. That was the main sort of management of change 
of management of structure and of systems and of operation and 
the cultural change of the place" (Chairman). 'tAt that stage) 
Southpower's approach was reasoned - it stayed out of 
(government) policy making as it allowed us to be dispassioned. 
We were big enough to see changes made (to the industry) without 
the threat of losing out. This was in the best interests of the 
industry and customers rather than individual (company) motives 
where if we got involved we could be discredited for self-interest. 
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Rather we became a sounding board" (GM, Strategic Business 
Development). 
i , 
Rather than concentrating on implementing radical organizational change in 
anticipation of a new competitive operating framework, SPL's strategic focus 
shifted to consolidating on the g~inS made in the preceding years. 
i 
'This was a significant philosophical change influenced by trying to 
gain a secure position rather than competition" (CEO, Connetics). 
The introduction of the Ener9lY Sector Reform Bill (1991) reaffirmed the 
government's stance on MED ownership, the only requirement being that SPL 
hold a public poll to gauge put:>lic opinion on the issue. Few people took the 
opportunity to participate and generally supported the status quo. 
'There was a procedure for public consultation as to what form of 
electricity supply compa'f'Y the local people wanted and they 
(Southpower) had to produce an establishment afterwards. Public 
submissions were put in a~d the majority of submissions - and there 
weren't very many ofther I must say - favoured continuing local 
authority ownership" (ChaTman). 
With the passing of the EGA ir 1992, the relationship between owners and 
electricity companies was forralised and a timetable for change for the 
following 18 mon1hs was se1 d1n. 
With no change in ownership, a legislated timetable for change and the 
emerging lack of radical environmental change caused by the resistance of 
other organizations, SPL's change strategy shifted to a more reactive 
approach. The GGG in particular was influential in determining SPL's strategy, 
despite the owner-operator separation that the LOE model theoretically 
provided. Although it was recognised that "they (councillors) cannot direct the 
directors to do X' (specific actions) - they can suggest we might make changes, 
but they cam'iot tell us to do it" (Board Member) the council continued to put 
political pressure on SPL through the board, whose members were aware of 
the fragility of their positions - "In the end they can tell us at any time say we 
haven't got a job, putting people in who might do what we don't want to do and 
thats been a strong point in running this company" (Board Member). This 
influence was further stressed in the statement of corporate intent agreement, 
within which the Gee required SPL to meet the dual traditional goals of 
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providing electricity at moderate cost to consumers and ensure that the 
organization operated profitably in order to provide a source of income for the 
city. However these traditional goals, although now cushioned in commercial 
terms, neither threatened the commercial operation of SPL nor contravened the 
intent of the legislation. Furthermore they did not prevent the introduction of 
further structural and cultural changes. 
In reaction to the imminent introduction of competition in 1993, and in a bid to 
meet the eee's dividend expectations, SPL's senior management 
implemented a strategy of diversification that sought to reduce the 
organization's reliance on electricity alone. 
"This company hasn't got a chance of surviving unless its got a 
wider interest than just electricity" (Board Member). "Where in the 
world, given the trends in the world, do you see any sustainable 
single product company where that product ends up as a 
commodity? It's not sustainable. So you you've got your choices -
you either go to market via channels and form part of somebody 
some other retailers product offering, or you diversify and become a 
retailer, one of the products of which you offer is energy. That's 
looking forward a number many years, probably ten years, but the 
development of that will happen very quickly" (MO). 
In 1993 SPL diversified into the consumer gas market by purchasing Enerco, a 
large North Island gas company. This reduced SPL's exposure to the potential 
effects of regional competition, substantially increased the scale of SPL's 
operation and provided a base from which it could launch cost competitive 
energy services nation-wide. 
"We've got a lot of flexibility when we've got two fuels so we've got 
two networked the North Island and the South Island, you've got 
counter climate benefits from that there's a whole range of benefits 
and you've also got two fuels" (Chairman). "If you can supply more 
than one option to a customer you've got a greater chance of 
keeping him under your umbrella. That in today's environment is 
very important. When you've got your gas heaters you've got your 
gas ovens you've got all these alternatives, they come to you for 
that rather than go to someone else" (Board Member). 'We own 
sixty percent or seventy percent of the gas, listed gas company, so 
we've got you know a national presence. You know, we're the only 
national energy company in the country in that sense you would 
never have got into that position from the earlier situation" (MO). 
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This purchase represented the continuation of the radical cultural shift in the 
organization, one that senior management intended would recreate SPL as an 
'energy' rather than 'electricity' company. 
"We've gone into Enerco and widened into gas and Port-a-gas from 
other interests. We supply gas for customer use, and I think we 
look quite properly on the role of power authorities supplying energy 
rather than electricity or gas or whatever you want to name. We're 
an energy company, and I see that as the way of the future - you 
have to be able to go right across the field. We've been able to 
make good commercial decisions like going into Enerco and being 
able to expand the value and create a whole lot of shareholder 
value and do that for commercial reasons. I don't think this 
company's got a chance of surviving unless its got a wider interest 
than just electricity. You've got to have more strings to your bow 
these days than you did twenty years ago" (Board Member). "The 
stake that we have in Enerco could lead, could lead people more 
towards a total energy approach. Electricity companies had 
previously seen themselves only as electricity companies, not as 
energy companies, whereas I believe - I don't ever think we only 
thought of ourselves as a only an electricity company, even before 
we bought Enerco" (GM, Corporate Services). 
The diversification strategy was also seen in the continued development of the 
appliance retail business, which grew rapidly after 1992 "having relivened it with 
some fanfare" (Chairman). Substantial investment was also made in the 
development of new technologies. 
"We've provided seed capital and facilitation for Whisper-Gen which 
is a small scale multi fuel generator, and similarly with Computech 
which is a biomass trial and with Orca which is a sort of a smart 
home smart energy technology and we've put quite a lot into that. 
We have a subsidiary in the United States technological subsidiary 
wholly owned and we're thought of as relatively forward thinking in 
those sorts of connections" (Chairman). 
The rationale for this investment was seen as twofold. 
"Its (Southpower) invested in technology to ensure that it's going to 
be competitive in the future, that when technology shifts some of 
the aspects of energy trading that it wi/l be able to adopt those 
technologies and perhaps influence the directions of that to 
Southpower's benefit - that's one of the rationales. The other 
rationale is that there might be a business there in its own right, to 
supply and exploit those wider than perhaps the New Zealand 
context, but perhaps maybe make an export market out of some of 
those innovations" (GM, Corporate Services). 
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However senior management recognised that diversification was not always 
beneficial. 
"One of the problems with the diversification was that they take just 
as much management time to manage, they still have to be done 
successfully, and that can divert management attention away from 
the core, which is potentially more serious than diverting financial 
resources. If you're a manager and you've got fifty people working 
for you and you're diverted to a diversification project and you:ve 
got fifty people not performing satisfactorily or your business unit is 
not going in the right direction or there is some particular threat that 
is not being addressed, that is potentially more serious than this 
project over here failing at an early stage. Those issues came out 
through the diversification phase" (GM, Corporate Services). 
5.12.2 Structural Change 
The financial separation of SPL's network, contracting and electricity retail/sales 
divisions implemented prior to 1990 had been made in anticipation of the 
organizational form required for a competitive environment. However, although 
SPL made significant progress with each division having "had a couple of years 
practice as a profit centre, we weren't getting the efficiency gains. It was just 
observed that they weren't really seen as a separate units at all, so the 
efficiency gains weren't being gained" (GM, Corporate Services). This was 
particularly evident in the contracting division of SPL. With the goal of reducing 
costs SPL's strategic management separated the contracting business as a 
stand-alone commercial operation called Connetics. 
"The decision was made pretty much by the managing director. 
The corporatisation is to force efficiencies and to allow network to 
focus on what needs to be done, rather than trying to keep a work 
force occupied you know... try and provide them with competitive 
pressure on Connetics staff by opening (the) network up to 
competition" (GM, Corporate Services). 
The separation and corporatisation process was swift. 
t~ transitional board was set up to corporatise Connetics and they 
eventually became the board of directors of that company. So that 
board selected a chief executive, and systems were put in place 
over a four-month period - accounting systems and service level 
agreements and contractual arrangements between Southpower 
and Connetics. Evaluation was done of the assets, and the 
company bought the assets and so on. Staff contracts were 
transferred to the company, so quite a lot of focus went into 
successfully and professionally transferring everything across -
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what needed to be transferred across - to the company' (GM, 
Corporate Services). 
The separation of the contracting division under a new brand was a radical but 
reactive change that distanced the organization's association with SPL and 
allowed Connetics to operate Iiall over New Zealand not just work for 
Southpower" (Board Member). 
IIWith corporatisation, a development of a brand could begin. This 
was an important part in demonstrating the legal separation and 
development of Connetics and to finally show that there was no 
opportunity for cross subsidisation" (CEO, Connetics) IINow 
Connetics is a separate company and has its own board of directors 
and is accountable to the shareholder Southpower like any other 
company would be to its shareholders" (GM, Corporate Services). 
The introduction of corporate accountability and competition forced significant 
efficiency and productivity gains through the new organization. 
IIWhat we'd learnt was that by having contestability and introducing 
other contractors, that productivity can be improved considerably 
sometimes to the order of twenty to thirty percent. We have some 
very good examples of massive improvements in productivity -
where changing poles, it took something like sixty man hours down 
to about twenty changing a pole. Certainly the techniques used by 
contractors has lead to greater and greater improvements and 
therefore a downwards pressure on prices" (GM, Network 
Services). 
Ultimately however SPL maintained ownership and control of Connetics as 
divestment posed a strategic risk. 
IISelling Connetics is a constant consideration. But the only reason 
why we haven't sold it is we are not sure whether strategically we'd 
be weakened by having our major contractor owned by another 
party. They are a very important contractor to Southpower. We 
wouldn't want to be held to ransom by what might be effectively a 
monopoly in three or four years time. The contracting market is 
very tough to make money in. Like building contractors they're a 
dime a dozen - they're here one day and they're gone the next. 
And we don't want to be - so it's a risk management issue as much 
as anything why we haven't sold Connetics. But it's under constant 
review" (GM, Corporate Services). IIWe're not making money I 
might tell you out of Connetics our contracting business but I tell 
you something we certainly you need to keep an in group capability 
- in this sort of business you just imagine if we haven't got if we 
didn't have control over specialist staff' (Chairman). 
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Similarly the meter reading function was developed as a separate corporate 
entity (Calibra) and likewise the IT departments of SPL and Enerco were 
merged to create Enersis. The development of electricity retail competition 
scheduled for 1993 also saw SPL develop electricity purchasing as a separate 
corporate function incorporating "marketing, customer service, pricing and 
sales" (GM, Trading). The development of an associated infrastructure was 
required to manage this new function. 
"We had to go off and ensure we actually hired the right people to 
actually be able to manage, hire some expertise who were capable 
of managing that risk - and setting up systems to make sure that 
risk was actually being managed within the guidelines set out" (GM, 
Trading). 
However while new skills were required in the SPL, traditional 'blue-collar' 
aspects of the business were under scrutiny. Between 1992 and 1994 staff 
redundancy became an increasingly common event as SPL restructured to 
adapt to legislated institutional change. By 1998 lithe size of the organization 
was reduced somewhere to the order of 15 to 20 percent" (CEO Connetics). 
The changes made to SPL's strategic and structural configuration in reaction to 
the Energy Companies Act (1992) also led to senior management 
implementing the first significant downsizing, fundamentally assaulting the 
traditional, bureaucratic 'job-for-life' culture. 
'The legislation gave us a mandate for some of the things that -
whilst they were politically undesirable in a local sense - they were 
commercially necessary. And so it gave us a way of rationalising 
what was an unpalatable political situation to the public because 
you're shedding a hundred and something staff that's terrible 
they're losing their jobs and families" (MD). 'There was an 
enormous amount of downsizing with the separation of our 
businesses into individual entities - all the blue-collar workforce 
really" (Chairman). 
Resistance to change increased as strategic and structural changes impacted 
on staffing levels. 
lilt was a cultural shock. People had been gradually working their 
way up their positions up the ladder and then all of a sudden we got 
redundancies" (GM, Corporate Services). "People tried to cause it 
(change) to fail and set to do so deliberately because it threatened 
the comfort of their position" (GM, Strategic Business 
Development). 
164 
Although senior management blamed the need to downsize on the effects of 
deregulation, the process was internally driven as it provided senior 
management with a means to remove individuals that failed to, or actively 
resisted, change. 
"It (redundancy) wasn't just about removing the people it was also 
about removing the culture" (CEO, Connetics). "We got to a certain 
point after we'd been through the focus on customer stage where 
we had to say to some people 'You're either with us or you're agin' 
us. And I'm sorry, we've reached the stage now where if you're 
agin' us you'd better start looking for another job somewhere'. But 
by and large most people had made the change, and it was only 
those die-hards those few that were left who could potentially rot 
the barrel if you left them in so you just had to dispense with them. It 
only takes one or two bad apples, if you like, in a group and they 
can disrupt a huge part of the organization" (MO). "Retention of 
staff relied primarily on their ability - were they capable of doing the 
job required and did they have knowledge and expertise gained in 
the environment. (We) had to focus on this as it is a hard and tough 
competitive environment" (CEO, Connetics). 
Unlike rural organizations where availability of technically skilled staff was 
limited, SPL's urban location allowed senior management access to a wider 
'talent pool', enabling them the freedom to develop strict selection criteria that 
facilitated the implementation of cultural change. 
"We had a big pool of people to select from. It was the case in the 
early days, if you like, trying to select the best people. We needed 
a multi-skilled team and especially getting the right people in the 
right holes. In my opinion you can persevere with people who just 
aren't going to change or aren't suited for a certain job, and you've 
either gotta get them into the right job or they've got to go if they're 
holding up the process of change" (GM, Network Services). 
However based on his experiences in ECNZ the MD was concerned with 
ensuring that the changes did not cripple the organization as '~ number of 
people left because of the stress associated with the process of restructuring" 
(MO). 
'You can have all the theoretical purity you like, but in the end 
you're dealing with people. And you've got to try and bring them 
along with you - well you must bring them along with you because 
in the end they are the people that will make the organization work" 
(MO). 
A support infrastructure was put in place to ensure that first all staff (both those 
made redundant and those that 'survived') could cope with the downsizing 
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process and second that the process would not have detrimental long-term 
ramifications for the organization. 
"We made people available both to staff who were suffering from 
stress, but also to anyone who was made redundant we had a 
counsellors service available to them. We had job seeking advice 
and all those sorts of things. We provided quite a support network 
during that period to help both the organization itself and the people 
that left. That pays back many-fold in terms of just the mental well 
being of people in the organization. I mean if people don't get any 
support, or they don't know where to go to seek support, that is a 
huge cost to the organization because their mind, whether they like 
it or not, doesn't necessarily concentrate on the job. And so that 
has a cost to the organization" (MD). 
SPL's management implemented three rounds of redundancies in the six-year 
period from 1992 - 1998. As staff numbers reduced the investment in cultural 
change programmes was reduced. 
'The focus on customers ... sort of petered out, we wanted to keep it 
going, and we never formally shut it down. But now it has to 
become a focus on competition" (General Manager, Strategic 
Business Development). 
Senior management perceived that with the radical changes implemented in 
SPL the culture had successfully adapted, albeit slower than desired. 
"We went through that process for probably years, and I mean 
we're still moving through it. But it's not, it's not quite as, it's not as 
energy intensive from a senior management perspective now. Its 
actually got a momentum of its own, because people have 
accepted it. (MD) "Its taken seven eight years to get to a stage 
where we're reasonably comfortable" (GM, Corporate Services). "It 
(cultural change) took some time though - basically six years" (GM, 
Network Services) 
However remnants of the former MED culture continued to be identified as 
impediments to change. 
"Some of the baggage is still there, but we never seem to be able to 
do anything as quickly as we should be able to. And some of that's 
a result of legacy systems. We still have systems that are very 
cumbersome and slow to change but there isn't the same culture of 
speed and urgency that there is in other industries (and) 
organizations (that) have been in competitive environments for a 
long time" (GM, Trading). 
Leading many senior managers to make the following assessment of change. 
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"It would be easier to start by building up a company from scratch -
to start with a mission and goals and standards, and then start 
collecting the staff that you want and build a name for yourself and 
build up, rather than just get groups of staff who initially are 
somewhat disaffected necessarily persuade them" (GM, Enersis) 
"You know it's almost unfair to impose such huge change on an 
organization, it's almost better to start with a new organization over 
again. Separate the old way of doing things from the new and let 
people choose which organization to go to" (General Manager, 
Strategic Business Development). 
With the threat of asset 'expropriation' removed following the Energy 
Companies Act (1992) SPL's management's focus shifted from concern for 
maintaining ownership of the organization for the CCC and more with 
consolidation of SPL's competitive position. This saw the implementation of 
strategic, structural and cultural changes in reaction to, rather than anticipation 
of environmental change. However despite the shift to a reactive approach, 
SPL maintained a radical change approach. Strategically senior management 
continued to focus on organizational expansion and diversification to become 
an energy company. This was supported by structural change with the 
development of specialized divisions and corporate separation continued in a 
bid to stimulate internal competition and reduce costs. The process of cultural 
change also included downsizing and restructuring. This was framed as a 
'necessary' change to shift the culture from an engineering to a commercial 
orientation. 
5.12.3 Attributes of SPL's Change Process 
The ownership structure of SPL fundamentally determined when and how the 
organization changed. The initial impetus for change came as a result of the 
owner's fear of losing the organization. This fear initiated change first at the 
governance and senior management level and led to strategic and structural 
change. 
"With the ownership (structure) that was there it (change) wouldn't 
have happened" (MD). 
Further, unlike the community trust form of ownership adopted in an ad-hoc 
manner by EPBs, MED ownership was resolved early in the process of change. 
This reduced the influence of community intervention in the decision making 
process that had been seen in EPBs and granted the council owners the ability 
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to determine the extent and nature of organi ational change necessary to first 
ensure maintenance of ownership and secon meet legislative requirements. 
"What helped is that the ownership st" ture was sorted out early. 
Other companies went through a long pll. tracted process. We were 
allowed to get on to the job of understa ding the business we were 
in 1992 - energy" (GM, Strategic Busin s Development). 
The rapid and radical change undertaken rior to legislation by the newly 
appointed senior management was intende to fundamentally challenge the 
traditional MED archetype. However, despite the assertion that corporate 
separation of SPL from its owners had removed the effect of direct council 
intervention, political pressure continued to play a role in influencing the 
strategic direction of SPL throughout. As one senior executive reflected - "It's 
better to have your shareholder on your side rather than against you" (GM, 
Corporate Services). 
While the owners initiated the change process the MD, employed specifically 
for the purpose of implementing organizational change by the CCC, was 
fundamental in determining the extent and nature of change. 
'tThe MD) has been the continuum right through this really" 
(Chairman). 
As a board appointment the MD shared the board's (viz. council) mission to 
secure the ownership of the organization as an indefinite source of income for 
the city. Again using the quote from SPL's Chairman - '~s officers of the 
council saw it as our duty to see that this particular asset of the Christchurch 
City Council (was) retained in local ownership". Furthermore, as a former 
engineer and experienced change manager the MD was well indoctrinated in 
traditional and emerging operational values and norms. 
"Chris was an engineer (and) knows when an engineer is probably 
pulling the wool over their eyes with complicated stuff that seems 
vel}' complicated but it's not at all" (GM, Corporate Services). 
Consequently, the CEO had the ability to understand the barriers to and 
effectively communicate the need for change. With the experience and 
knowledge in both fields the MD was also recognised as a credible and 
authoritative change agent. 
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'XThe MD) has been absolutely vital. If there wasn't the leadership 
to create that and to absolutely demand it, it just wouldn't have 
happened. I mean it's just, I can't say how highly his leadership -
his leadership was actually needed to actually state the way this is 
going to be. ' (GM, Corporate Services). "We were all made to feel 
there was someone up there who has a plan, who has a vision, who 
is going to drive you through, who's going to lead you if things go 
bad. Someone who actually behaves in a way that everyone else is 
therefore expected to behave" (GM, Trading). 
In many aspects the MD fulfilled the traditional role played by his predecessor, 
taking an 'arbitrary' command and control role, while at the same time 
introducing changes to the organizational strategy, structure and culture that 
would fundamentally alter his role and the configuration of the entire 
organization. 
"It's fair to say that that the early part of the change process has to 
be lead by one person. If that, one person hasn't got a picture of 
where he wants to go and can articulate that in a way that others 
can implement, you're dead in the water. You can't use consensus 
management when you're going through a change process. You've 
got to say we've got to do this and after that you go for it" (MD). 
"Chris would just make an arbitrary decision to say this is the way 
it's going to be. Half of the decisions were wrong because he 
would back track later on, but I think he was determined to actually 
make those decisions and provide that leadership and sense of 
direction" (GM, Corporate Services). 
With board support and council approval by proxy the MD was granted the 
freedom to develop a vision of the future for the organization based on his 
assessment of the future. This vision was radically different from those of his 
predecessors and resulted in the development of radical discontinuous 
strategic, structural and cultural change initially introduced in anticipation and 
later in reaction to environmental change. 
The ranks of senior management, specifically employed by the MD as change 
managers, also played a critical role in the implementation of change. The MD 
acknowledged that ''you can't do everything yourself in these situations, even 
though you've got to be deeply involved in the early stages and be seen to be 
deeply involved". Together this 'dominant coalition', assisted by consultants in 
aspects of cultural change, provided the expertise and knowledge to institute 
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second order organizational change - developing a singular focus for SPL that 
underpinned the entire change process. 
"The key focus (now) is shareholder wealth - protecting and growing 
the shareholders investment" (MO). "The long term growth of 
shareholder wealth is what counts" (GM, Trading). 
The physical size of South power and the resources available to devote to 
change management were significantly greater than those of EPB's. This was 
seen as an advantage not only for the introduction of change, but also for long-
term survival of the organization. 
"Size is important as a factor for survival and competitiveness" 
(CEO, Connetics). 'The bigger you are the better you are, small 
companies won't compete in the future... the Ashburtons and the 
Mainpowers of this world, who have got large rural areas, in my 
book will struggle" (Board Member). 
Size was also identified as a major hindrance slowing the process of change, 
but again the importance of size and associated influence and access to 
resources were deemed more important. 
"Well if we were an organization of five people it would be far easier 
to change direction quickly. It's like the difference between 
changing the direction of a speedboat or the Titanic, it takes longer 
to change direction radically change direction in a larger 
organization than a smaller organization. That might not be such a 
bad thing in an industry, a long-term industry as Southpower with 
such significant sized assets as say a network" (GM, Corporate 
Services). 
Overall the size of SPL by virtue of its urban location allowed the organization's 
management the freedom to implement more radical organizational changes 
than smaller, rural EPB counterparts. 
The case of South power is one of an organization that has followed both 
anticipatory and reactive change paths. Forced into change by an owner's 
insistence on maintaining control over the organization's assets, Southpower 
was led by a Managing Director that followed a corporate model of 
management and change. This at first saw the organization follow an 
anticipatory strategy in an attempt to pre-empt the development of a 
competitive and uncertain operating environment. However as the anticipated 
environment did not eventuate the MD's anticipatory approach gave way to a 
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more reactive strategy, building on the developments of earlier years. However 
the nature and extent of change did not alter throughout as SPL's management 
- granted the freedom by the owners to achieve the goals by commercial 
means - maintained a focus on recreating the organization strategically, 
structurally and culturally to a point where "the organization now it bares no 
relationship to what it was in the past" (GM, Trading). 
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5.14 Power New Zealand Limited (PNZ) 
5.15 Overview 
Power New Zealand Limited (PNZ) was formed from the merger of; the 
Waitemata EPB (WEPB) that serviced Auckland's Western Suburbs/~orth 
Shore area and the smaller Valley Power EPB (VPEPB) that operated i the 
Coromandel Peninsula/southern Waikato region. Dominated by the W _PB, 
PNZ was the first electricity company to successfully complete a merg r of 
electricity supply operations and also the first to list on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange (NZSE), making the organization one of only three privately listed 
electricity companies. Today PNZ is New Zealand's second largest electricity 
company with in excess of 580 staff and 218,700 consumers spread over a 
primarily urban distribution area of 9,980 square kilometres. PNZ provides an 
array of services including electricity distribution, energy retail, contracting, 
design, construction, inspection, testing and training services. 
The case of organizational change in PZ is one of reactive transformational 
organizational change. Forced to change strategic emphasis following the 
deregulation of the electricity industry, PNZ has followed a corporate model of 
management and change to transform the organization from a public service to 
private sector archetype with a strategic, structural and cultural emphasis on 
commercial imperatives. 
5.16 The Electricity Archetype in WEPB 
5.16.1 Organization Strategy 
The WEPB conformed to the strategic, structural and cultural norms of the 
electricity archetype. Strategic planning in the EPB was dominated and co-
ordinated by a community trust board that closely monitored the day-to-day 
running of the organization. 
"In the old days the GM would take a week or ten days or even two 
weeks to prepare the papers needed for a board of directors 
meeting. Then it would take a week after to come down off the 
ceiling and to do the things that needed to be done. So his whole 
life was spent satisfying a bunch of directors" (CEO). "Every single 
cheque that left the company went through the board so if a cheque 
for a copper coil for twelve dollars was needed the board would 
write a cheque for it" (Manager, Human Resources). 
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Due to the organization's protected monopoly status "all the work was done on 
a cost plus basis and there was no accountabilities" (GM, Contracting). 
Consequently the strategic focus in the WEPB was no different from that of its 
peers with a 'paternalistic' approach that emphasized the importance of 
electricity delivery above all else. 
"You had a bunch of engineers, job for life straight from university 
who construct these hugely expensive over-engineered electriCity 
networks for the good of the consumer for the good of the public 
and we'll tell the public what they need - a paternalistiC mind set 
(Manager, Human Resources). 
5.16.2 Organization Structure 
The structure of the WEPB also conformed to the electricity archetype: the 
organization was a fully integrated self-sufficient business managed through a 
hierarchical, bureaucratic infrastructure. 
"It was one big business, very integrated. We had the whole 
process of designing the network, asset management/maintenance 
programmes, construction programmes through to the actual 
construction or repair of the network through to the billing of the 
customer. (It) was really quite a complete integrated process there 
weren't clear boundaries between those processes" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 
5.16.3 Organization Culture 
The culture of the WEPB was also reflective of the EPB archetype, with the 
dominance of engineers, a non-strategic management style, low staff turnover 
and a lack of consideration for customer needs. 
I~ company that was very engineer dominated and with no 
accountabilities. "Under the old power board there was no such 
thing as customers. They called them consumers and they got 
what they were given and they had no right to question. One of the 
guys said to me Iff a customer came in he wouldn't even go in and 
shake their hand if he was introduced to them'. They actually (had) 
that philosophy of They've got a cheek to come and talk to us. 
We're telling you this is how we're going to wire up this', it was 
unbelievable" (GM, Contracting). 'The old power boards cared too 
much about the customer" (Manager, Financial Services). 
The WEPB also presented the cultural characteristic of solidarity, strengthened 
by the role that trade unions played within the organization. 
"People had all been employed under the collective contract which 
was negotiated down in Wellington for the industry normally 
resulting in outrageous pay claims then their contracts had a 
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secondary pay increase element based on years of service so 
everyone was getting two bites of the cherry. The old pay structure 
which had you know sixteen grades and thirty-five levels within 
each grade and every six months you moved up half a level and job 
ABC all of that classic stuff" (Manager, Human Resources). "We 
had one big collective employment contract that was very much 
union dominant" (GM, Contracting). 
The lines of demarcation that developed out of industry agreements created 
strict lines of authority, resulting in little interdepartmental communication and 
suspicion that promoted the protection of self-interest regardless of the 
ramifications for the entire organization. 
"In the past people tended pretty much to work in their own areas 
and not worry too much about the company goals. Everyone 
worked in their own silo sort of thing" (Manager, Financial Services). 
"Everybody was holding onto power. They did no training of staff" 
(GM, Contracting). 
The power of national bargaining and traditional 'paternal' nature of the 
organization only served to reinforce this environment. The strategic, structural 
and cultural configuration of the WEPB was typical of the electricity archetype 
and succinctly summed up in retrospect by the Manager of Human Resources. 
'There was seven hundred and fifty employees and twenty levels of 
management. I can go through and describe you what is the 
classic mechanistic bureaucratic structure for you. We were a 
power board in every sense of the word; service based public 
servant, classic grey shoes and cardigan brigade, long service no 
accountability. It wasn't a profit driven organization; no commercial 
internal structures or reporting structures either; (no) financial 
reporting or any other sort of reporting. It was very unionised; 
everyone but the chief executive was part of one collective 
employment contract. (There was) second tier bargaining. 
Remuneration committees with unions on them to do wage reviews; 
length of service based appointments; almost the days where 
everyone had a card with their name on it and when someone left 
the organization their card goes out and everyone else's card goes 
up a notch. It was brilliant to observe it. This building was a rabbit 
warren; it was Iino(leum) floors, wood panelling, small corridors -
everyone was locked away, a huge bureaucracy. The key themes 
from a behavioural and organizational perspective would be: a 
collective mindset, which was refleCted in the contracts and the way 
people behaved; a service based public servant, no accountabilities 
with regard to any of the stakeholders - 'we'll tell the public what 
they need and we'll fix it and we'll make it'. Power boards by 
definition picked up almost had a sort of an unwritten social 
responsibility to pick up the work force that couldn't get a job in the 
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private sector. That sounds brutal, but we tended to pick up people 
that wouldn't have got a job anywhere else. Beyond that we had, as 
with many local or central government departments, a vety 
paternalistic mindset. Unbelievably generous superannuation 
schemes, medical insurance schemes, superannuation, industrial 
chaplains, industrial nurses. There was such a paternalistic 
environment that it really just kept reinforcing that mindset that says 
'I have a right to be here and I have a right to be looked after and 
the company's here for me I'm not here to work for the company" 
(Manager, Human Resources). 
5.17 Anticipatory Change in the WEPB 
5.17.1 Governance Developments 
The first significant change to occur in the WEPB was the appointment of a new 
trust board. Reacting to the demands of the Energy Companies Act, a board of 
commercially experienced business-people was formed under the guidance of 
"one of the CA firms" (GM, Contracting) rather than through the traditional 
community election process. By mid 1991 the board had transformed providing 
the impetus for organizational change. 
''The key drivers in this (change) process was the first commercial 
board of directors was appointed as compared to local body 
elections and elected board members. (They were) pretty keen 
people on our board. We had a guy, ex member of parliament for 
Kapiti, who had in the mid to late eighties actually driven a lot of the 
electricity sector reforms" (Manager, Human Resources). 
The first visible change introduced by the new board was the renaming of the 
organization. Concerned with breaking away from the traditional image of the 
EPB and creating a distinct point of difference from the past, the board 
developed a new corporate/commercial identity rebranding the organization 
Waitemata Electricity (WEL). 
''The Waitemata Electric Power Board as the first part of the reforms 
tried to create a new image for itself and moved away from the 
power board and called itself Waitemata Electricity. (These were) 
the first efforts to move it towards a new company - the first step 
along the journey towards becoming privatised and deregulated 
and ultimately listed on the sharemarket. It (the name change) 
wasn't a huge shift it was really the, first recognition that things had 
to change" (Manager, Human Resources). 
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At the same time the board was concerned with ensuring that WEL's senior 
management had the ability to lead the organization through change. Anxious 
that such skills were absent, the board employed a professional change agent. 
"0ne of their first appointments at that point was a person who was 
by profession a change agent or organizational development 
professional, and she was brought in direct relationship to the 
board" (Manager, Human Resources). 
The board asked the change agent to review the skills and abilities of WEL's 
senior management and recommend changes at this level and throughout the 
organization. 
"She (the change agent) was responsible for the first sort of cultural 
audit - where are we at and what do we have to do to change" 
(Manager, Human Resources) 
5.17.2 A New CEO 
Following several weeks of investigation the change agent recommended that 
the entire senior management level would need to be changed, confirming the 
board's suspicions. The first to go was the CEO who was replaced in late 
1991. 
"One of the first things that happened was the (old) CEO got the 
boot and a new CEO was appointed and she (the change agent) 
was part of that. (The new CEO) was 38 at that stage, PhD, 
groomed in the industry (having come) up through ECNZ, (he) 
really has been a bit of a young star" (Manager, Human 
Resources). 
With assistance from the change agent the board selected the new CEO for his 
abilities in both the traditional (engineering) and emerging (marketing) operating 
paradigms, proven during his time at ECNZ as national manager of electricity 
marketing. The appointee was considered part of a "new breed" (CEO) of 
professional managers appearing within the sector and as such aligned with the 
vision that the board had for the future of WEL. 
The new CEO with the assistance of the change agent immediately set about 
recreating the organization from the top down, starting with the executive team. 
"She (the change agent) was brought in under the CEO too with a 
human resource/organizational development (focus). She headed 
what was supposed to be a two year project the fact that she stayed 
here for six or seven years is another story. The first things they 
(CEO and change agent) did was they took the structure and 
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immediately placed over it a level of commercial managers. So 
they went to the market place and attracted some people into the 
company - that was the first change intervention was to actually 
bring in some external competence into the company" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 
Within two months a level of commercially experienced managers with 
experience outside the traditional boundaries of the organization and electricity 
industry was placed over the existing structure of WEL. 
"Three new GMs were brought on board these were external 
people. Commercial experience was one of the key attributes for 
selection. So these guys (senior management) came to work for 
this guy (CEO) - he was the guy he built his team" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 'The CEO was pretty much a driver of the 
whole thing" (Manager, Financial Services). 
5.17.3 Strategic Change 
Following the development of a new CEO and senior management team the 
next step was the creation of a strategic vision for the organization. Led by the 
CEO, the vision focused on developing WEL's structure and culture to place it 
in a position where it could exploit a deregulated environment. 
"Our vision had always been to grow through mergers and 
acquisitions. Our vision was you cold do it (operate) nation-wide 
and get synergies" (Manager, Financial Services). 'The early vision 
was to be the best energy company in New Zealand. The CEO had 
the ability to create the vision and strategy which the company 
needed right then - that was sort of personified by the CEO himself' 
(Manager, Human Resources). 
With the skills of the newly appointed executive team in place and a vision of 
creating a flexible, customer focused, vertically integrated national energy 
company the new management team set about simultaneously changing the 
structure and culture of WEL. 
5.17.4 Structural Change 
The CEO, with assistance from the change agent, redesigned WEL's structure. 
'XThe change agent) had the ability to understand that to do that 
you had to design change structures and a vel}' integrated set of 
change initiatives to move the company forward. Those were pretty 
much designed and led by (the change agent) and CEO and 
designed by them" (Manager, Human Resources). 
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Three profit-centres were developed to reflect distinct disciplines within the 
organization - contracting, network, energy/customer services. Each was 
forced to acknowledge their competencies and focus on developing a 
competitive, profitable service. A fundamental change was the separation of 
network and energy disciplines. 
"We wanted to create some clear accountabilities and bring about 
some internal as well as external tensions that would start to drive 
performance and change people's behaviour. The key driver was 
creating competition. We did that in a brutal way by creating a 
barrier between network and contracting. In the past networking 
and contracting were fully integrated. We created the environment 
where every single thing they (contracting) did was up for grabs. 
We created an environment where our own guys had to compete to 
work on our network. Competition created a lot of internal tension, 
but it started making people very efficient to really drive in the 
performance we needed" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Divisionalisation also meant that for the first time in its history WEL had a 
department specifically dedicated to the development of customer relations. 
'That was the first time we'd pulled together in a tight business unit 
the people who were involved in that direct customer interface as 
well as the internal processes which actually drive customer 
service. So it was the first chance to really line up things like billing 
and call centre credit management the whole communication with 
customers" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Associated with the process of divisionalisation was investment in and 
improvement of management support systems. Significant development of 
accounting and information technology was made to provide each division with 
the ability to accurately track operational resources. 
"Systems have been quite a big focus" (Manager, Financial 
Services). 'The support systems were put in place so that there 
was a framework to enable that level of empowerment across all 
functions to occur. The IT platform has was upgraded and all of 
that kind of good stuff' (Manager, Human Resources). 
5.17.5 Cultural Change 
Concurrent with strategic and structural change was the development of a 
cultural change programme that aimed to create a culture of flexibility and 
accountability more aligned with the needs of WEL's strategy. 
'The recognition was that we needed to change the culture of the 
mind set - the behaviour of our people - to drive financial success, 
that was the key driver" (Manager, Human Resources). "We 
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wanted a flexible and productive workforce. Our biggest problem 
was how much we paid people and flexibility" (GM, Contracting). 
However the terms of employment and power of trade unions seriously reduced 
management's ability to introduce change; "They (unions) were sort of trying to 
drive the staff where they didn't actually fit in where we wanted them to go" 
(GM, Contracting). WEL's strategic management considered the industry level 
collective contract inappropriate and sought to reduce union influence. 
'~t that point we had a very aggressive industrial relations strategy. 
The GMs probably spent in that first year over half their time on pre-
industrial relations either preparing for or engaging in direct 
negotiations with the unions" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Through a series of steps planned by WEL's change agent and implemented 
with the aid of professional human resource managers, levels of hierarchy 
within the organization were reduced and the role of unions minimised. The 
first step to cultural change was spearheaded through the creation of the new 
position of Employee Manager (EM). 
"We created this new beast called an employee manager (who) by 
definition was anybody that had people report to them and 
accountability for a team of some sort. Second, third maybe even 
fourth level of the organization were ca/led employee managers" 
(Manager, Human Resources). 
EMs were fundamental in the cultural change process, providing a role model 
and force for change at the operational level. Given training in aspects of 
financial· and people management ("we didn't just dump it on people" Manager, 
Human Resources), EMs were delegated the power to make day-to-day 
management decisions. However the placing of EMs on individual employment 
contracts had the most impact on the culture of WEL. 
"We created employee managers and put them onto IECs 
(individual employment contracts). In the space of two weeks we 
put 100 people onto individual employment contracts. Anyone 
called an employee manager by definition was not allowed to be on 
a collective contract. (EMs were told) you now work for the 
company, you represent the company, you are now a manager and 
we want to have an individual relationship with you. We want you 
to realign yourself away from collectivism and the union, we want 
you to align yourself with the goals and objectives of the 
organization. You're now part of the management team, you're now 
part of the team that's going to take us forward and we're going to 
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offer you a bright new future and you'll be on an individual 
employment contract" (Manager, Human Resources). 
With remuneration tied to individual and group performance the introduction of 
EMs began to reduce the influence of unions and through their motivation 
encouraged wider change. 
'The theme was performance through empowerment. The concept 
was at a micro level to make people accountable for their own 
performance to make team leaders and managers accountable for 
the performance of their part of the business. But more importantly 
it wasn't just performance against objectives it was growth as well. 
It was how are you (as an individual employee) taking the company 
forward' (Manager, Human Resources). 
WEL's management also utilised the Employment Contracts Act (1991) to 
reduce union influence at lower levels of the organization. 
'The unions were a barrier (to change) for sure. They had a 
collective strength, so we actually went and we started splitting up 
the work groups. And unions didn't like it because they got the 
same amount of union fees but they have a lot more work to do. 
And what we did is had an expiry date of all of our collective 
contracts at a different time so the union have to come around 
every month and negotiate an employment contract" (GM, 
Contracting). 
Refusing to accept the industry collective agreement WEL's management, 
guided by the change agent, was able to break the employment collective. 
"We broke down the national award in Wellington. We turned up 
there and refused to negotiate with the unions and we were 
probably the catalyst for breaking down the national award at that 
point and walking away from it so we got rid of that second tier 
bargaining" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Reactions to this change in employment relations varied. 
"Some people we thought would have resisted it (change) 
embraced it and are still here today through all the changes and are 
an integral part of the team. Others who you'd expect to go with 
you fought you. The bottom line to that is if you weren't part of that 
(change) you either stayed where you were and didn't last much 
longer or you made a decision yourself to move on in life. Most saw 
it as an opportunity - those who saw it as a threat or a challenge fell 
by the wayside quite quickly" (Manager, Human Resources). 
The development of employment contracts fundamentally changed the 
employee/employer relationship. It provided senior management with a tool to 
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implement "a lot of targeted and aggressive restructuring" which destroyed the 
"job for life" (GM, Contracting) mentality. This was particularly evident in late 
1992 during an operations review that resulted in one hundred people losing 
their jobs. To counter morale problems associated with redundancy senior 
management emphasized two central policies. First significant investment was 
put into the education and training of the workforce. 
"There was obviously a whole lot of training (to get) a lot of buy in to 
the concepts" (Manager, Human Resources). "We actually did a bit 
of testing of some of the workforce. We actually found that a couple 
of people were illiterate as well so we actually had to educate the 
people. And we did some things that hit the hot points of people. 
We said 'We're going to invest in training and safety'. That's the 
sort of thing we did. (With) some of our staff their skill mix is pretty 
low so we had a policy that you're investing in training and you can 
actually sell it (change) to them" (GM, Contracting). 
Second management established achievable milestones, targeting the "Iow-
hanging fruif' (GM, Contracting) to maintain the momentum for change. 
"We got people to buy into the vision on what we thought were 
some key things that we actually needed to achieve. So what we 
did was we actually thought well this is the long term objective of 
what we want to achieve lets put in place some short term ones. 
And I'm talking the ones you can achieve in a month or two months 
whatever and get all of the low hanging fruit. But actually do it so 
that the staff could actually get some wins so they could actually 
see that Yeah we were achieving what we said we'd achieve, we're 
not as stupid as they (management) thought we were" (GM, 
Contracting). 
5.17.6 Structural Refinement 
The operations review of late 1992 sought to further refine WEL's structure, in 
particular the separation of network management and contracting functions. 
The rationale was that separation would stimulate the reduction of contracting 
costs ("cutting out the faf' GM, Contracting) through the introduction of 
competitive pressures. The divisionalisation process was implemented at the 
operational level by "transition teams" (GM, Network). 
"We split the total network into network services and an asset 
management group. We actuallY did that collectively through 
transition teams. That was done involving people from a number of 
different functions and that worked reasonably well" (GM, Network). 
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However although the rationale for change was clear to senior management, 
change created resentment and anger particularly amongst those in the 
contracting division. 
"When the first major contract to do some work on the network was 
given to somebody else there was literally physical fights. There 
were people jumping over the table it was very, vel}' aggressive. 
These were guys that owned and built this network, guys who had 
been here for forty years who with tears in their eyes talking about 
how they did the Wairau Road substation. To have someone else 
come and work on their network was really emotional stuff' 
(Manager, Human Resources). 
The operational and emotional upheaval associated with the introduction of 
competition was utilised by senior management as a means to stimulate 
change. This took the form of the ISO accreditation process that first 
standardized the operation's functions to create a quality, competitive operation 
and second acted as tool for cultural change. 
"We had 13 branches (offices) and we decided that we needed ISO 
accreditation to get us into some markets we had earmarked. We 
used it (the ISO process) as part of a cultural thing" (GM, 
Contracting). What it (divisionalisation) started to do was start 
driving competition, because once these guys had to tender for 
work on the network your internal processes improve you strip out 
the fat you become efficient you do better ways of doing things" 
(Manager, Human Resources). 
As the changes made to WEL's structure and culture took effect, the CEO 
concerned himself less with internal issues and more with exploring strategic 
options for growth. 
"We'd got to the point where we'd stripped out a lot of the fat. We'd 
developed internal processes that were, if not world class or best 
practice, were certainly getting towards that. Our structures and our 
internal processes were all working well, we'd kind of got our culture 
where . we wanted it (that) signified the change in the CEO's 
direction. As we got into the more complex governance ownership 
structure issues the CEO tended to take more of an external focus 
and was more worried about positioning of the company within the 
industry and ownership and board issues" (Manager, Human 
Resources). 
The CEO's desire to position the organization as a dominant national player 
resulted in the development of the role of Chief Operations Manager. 
t~t that point the company plateaued (sic.) and we changed the 
structure. We put in place a chief operations management role. 
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That signalled the fact that (the CEO) would take a strategic role 
and position the company in a market and make sure that we were 
well positioned to grow through acquisitions" (Manager, Human 
Resources). 
The Chief Operations Manager sat alongside the CEO and was charged with 
handling day-to-day operational issues, while the change agent and human 
resource department continued to manage the change process. 
"It (change) was being done through the human resource manager 
or organizational development manager and the chief operating 
manager" (Manager, Financial Services). 
This left the CEO free to concern himself solely with issues of a wider strategic 
and political nature. 
(The CEO wasn't vel}' good with people - a vel}' good thinker and 
strategist and that but he left the general people issues to (the chief 
operations manager) because he couldn't handle if' (GM, 
Contracting). 
Consequently early 1993 was as period of consolidation for WEL as it sought to 
refine its systems, structures and culture in readiness for competition while (the 
CEO board was tl}'ing to drive to sharemarket listing" (Manager, Human 
Resouces) and finalise the terms of a merger with nearby Valley Power. 
5.17.7 Valley Power Merger 
With the removal of franchise areas after April 1 1993, WEL entered into a 
management contract with the boards of directors of the Thames Valley Electric 
Power Board (Valley Power Limited - VPL) both parties seeking the creation of 
a larger entity to achieve scale benefits. 
"We wanted to capture the economies of scale and lock in the 
synergies and efficiencies, we wanted to set the industry 
benchmark in terms of cost and service and reliability and then look 
for new opportunities to grow the business" (CEO). 
To effect the merger WEL's CEO created Power New Zealand (PNZ), a new 
entity comprising of WEL management that would develop other energy 
companies with the goal of becoming the,leading provider of energy services in 
New Zealand. Legal complications slowed the merger process. 
(The problem with the merger was that the approvals required to 
make the merger dragged on, and we were effectively operating as 
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joint companies for months before we actually formally merged. It 
was quite messy in that sense" (Manager, Human Resources). 
On 1 July 1994, following the Minister of Energy's approval, the merger 
between WEL and VPL was formally constituted, creating {'the second largest 
company, virtually equal with Mercury (and) equal in terms of size" (Manager, 
Human Resources). Subsequently a new board was formed, comprising three 
WEL and two VPL directors, and the combined organization renamed Power 
New Zealand. 
tlWe were trying to establish the model of assimilating these 
companies. The philosophy was that that (assimilation) was best 
obtained through you know the good will associated with a merger 
than a hostile nature of a take-over as this was essentially the first 
of many" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Yet despite the rhetoric surrounding the deal, the merging of the two companies 
as PNZ was in retrospect seen as a WEL take-over in everything but name. 
{Power New Zealand was the dominant player. It was described as 
a merger but we were taking over" (General Manager, Contracting). 
{'We (WEL) were really taking over. Corporate offices were 
centralised here quite quickly. All duplication was removed to 
extract the synergies. Politically we tried to make it an even 
process but it was dominated out of Auckland. History has shown 
that what was the old Valley Power doesn't exist there isn't even an 
office down there any more. So it was a political merger but we 
were the aggressor, we were the dominant party" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 
With the guidance of the change agent PNZ set about aligning VPL's structure 
and culture with WEL. 
tlWe were trying to establish §l model of assimilating these 
companies" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Critics of the merger anticipated problems. 
{'There were a lot of criticisms that these weren't contiguous 
networks we were geographically separated and there are a whole 
lot of issues there. And of course we picked up a whole new culture 
which was the Valley Power culture - this (WEL's) culture had 
moved on a bit at this point" (Manager, Human Resources). 
To plan the assimilation process managers from both organizations participated 
in a three-day retreat overseen by WEL's human resource department. Later 
acquiring the title of 'The Bunker', the meeting determined structural and 
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human resource changes required for the realization of PNZ's long-term growth 
strategy. 
"0ne of the things that happened from day one was a thing which is 
now in our corporate mythology called The Bunker'. The Bunker' 
was a group of not just top (managers) but also stars from around 
the company and the odd influential person/informal leaders of the 
company. These 15 people were brought together and they didn't 
move for three days. They were told 'Don't go home. Tell your 
family you're not going to see them for three days. We'll bring in 
food, you can shower and no-one goes home until we get this thing 
sorted out'. That was the first attempt at strategic planning" 
(Manager, Human Resources). 
'The Bunker' was primarily concerned with reducing VPL's operating costs 
through the reduction of layers of hierarchy and the removal of "deadwood" in a 
manner similar to that implemented in WEL. The process was recognised as 
crude and brutal but effective. 
''There were some amazing things done in 'The Bunker'. One of 
them was the classic 'Here's your organization structure on the 
wall', and we had everyone's name and photographs. The (bunker) 
team by consensus classed (those) people as an A), a 8) or a C). If 
you're an A) you're a star and you've got a future no matter where 
we find you in this new structure. If you're a 8) we think you're 
competent and we think there probably is a future but it's up to you. 
And if you're a C) you're deadwood and you're out of there. That 
was a brutal exercise to go through but that was the step-change 
required and that's what drove the downsizing in the early days. It 
was presented to the organization in a slightly more dignified way if 
you like with a greater level of respect for people but effectively 
there were some quite brutal things that happened" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 
Based on conclusions reached in 'The Bunker' VPL managers, with guidance 
from WEL human resource managers, initiated the restructuring and 
assimilation process. Although "one of the things which helped drive the 
change was lots of staff communication" (Manager, Human Resources) 
between senior management and staff, it was the utilisation of those identified 
as "stars' in VPL that played a fundamental role in the communication of the 
need for change. 
''The top people were tapped on the shoulder at a personal and 
professional level and were presented with the future for them and 
what's in it for them in their new role in the company" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 
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Selected for their role as organizational "opinion leaders", the "stars" of VPL 
were asked to head integration teams "by definition a combination (of people 
from VPUWEL) but typically Waitemata weighted" (Manager, Human 
Resources) to implement change. The diversity of integration teams and the 
influence of their leaders provided a conduit through which new strategic, 
structural and cultural ideas could flow into VPL. 
'There were some deliberate cross fertilisation of people (between 
WEL and VPL) in those early days. Some senior people there 
(VPL) were given opportunities up here (WEL), some people here 
went down" (Manager, Human Resources). 
The primary focus of integration teams was to agree on the standardisation of 
structures, systems and procedures between the two organizations while 
minimising conflict. 
"Integration teams worked to merge the companies together and 
make recommendations on which of the systems in play out there 
should be adopted throughout the company. So the idea was that 
we'd end up with one system where we had five. There was just a 
lot of duplication of systems and duplication of people. We had to 
sit down and formalise the things we wanted done. A big chunk of 
the job was to formalise standards, to establish a commercial basis 
for having work done. That was totally new concept to them (VPL) 
and so (it was) very much a work with them type situation. It could 
have been very adversarial" (GM, Contracting). "We tried to install 
certain standards and put common things across the company" 
(Manager, Financial Services). 
This process relied on WEL's experience with the ISO system. 
"We picked out a number of people at all different levels and trained 
them as procedure writers, turned them loose on the company and 
said 'Right, come up with a procedure to do something'. We used 
that process to drive the company together" (GM, Contracting). 
A secondary benefit of the integration team approach was its stimulation of 
cultural change. First the teams provided a forum within which job descriptions, 
employment contracts and terms and conditions of employment could be 
negotiated. Second integration teams allowed managers to finalise the 
selection of employee redundancies based on skills, abilities, attitude and 
personal involvement. 
"Integration teams allowed us to get rid of people that weren't 
contributing. That worked reasonably well as it was legitimised 
through a facilitated process" (GM, Network). 
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Finally cultural acceptance of change was stimulated through staff participation 
in the development of the Power New Zealand brand. Although WEL's CEO 
had finalised the concept, staff participation in the selection and design of 
corporate uniforms and colours involve people in the change process and 
forced them to acknowledge that the "good old days were not coming back" 
(GM, Contracting). 
"Although the brand had already been designed we asked the staff 
if you like the uniforms all those things. The idea was people 
commit to what they help create. So while we recognised that 
some people were still very resistant and waiting for the power 
board to come back the philosophy was to actually get people 
involved in the change process particularly for those who were 
directly affected" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Over the following year VPL was absorbed under the PNZ brand and the 
organization made substantial performance and cultural advances. 
"We underwent a really steep curve of cultural development (that) 
really did drive the performance of the company. Every year we 
were making more money the head count was going down we were 
getting the company lean and mean and performing well with a 
good culture" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Although the VPL merger marked the first step in PNZ's expansion, the 
organization lacked the financial ability to maintain this strategy. To raise the 
necessary capital and anticipating that other power companies would take a 
similar approach PNZ moved to float the organization on the NZSE. 
"We were trying as part of our growth strategy to swallow up other 
power companies. As part of that process of growing the business 
through m and a (merger and acquisition) activity we needed some 
investment and we were actively seeking an overseas cornerstone 
shareholder. At that point we decided to list on the sharemarket 
and do a share-give away. All of these (electricity) organizations 
were expected to privatise fully and create an ownership structure 
that had greater financial accountability directly at an ownership 
level" (Manager, Human Resources). 
The motivation for the board and CEO was to secure the support of an 
internationally based cornerstone shareholder that would bring commercial 
experience and capital to PNZ. 
"We were actively seeking an overseas cornerstone shareholder to 
bring some things to the company particularly some investment to 
the company" (Manager, Human Resources). 
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Following several months of public consultation shares were issued to the 
former customers of WEL and VPL while Utilicorp New Zealand, a joint venture 
between Kansas based Utilicorp United and New Zealand's Todd Corporation 
was selected as cornerstone shareholder and sold a 20 percent holding. 
"We chose Utilicorp because they had a similar philosophy. We 
selected that shareholder for their expertise" (GM, Network). 
Utilicorp's vision was you could do it (operate) nation-wide and get 
the synergies" (Manager, Financial Services). 
With negotiations completed New Zealand's second largest electricity company 
went public on December 9, 1994. 
5.18 Reactive Change in PNZ 
5.18.1 Strategic Inertia 
Delays to government reform resulted in less significant environmental change 
than either the board or management of PNZ had anticipated. Consequently 
few electricity companies chose to follow PNZ's lead as the majority of cases 
opted to protect the status quo. 
"Some of the senior players, Mercury in particular and the others 
didn't put in place structures that allowed them to be attacked I 
guess the naivety of our structure was that it did" (Manager, Human 
Resources). 
PNZ became an attractive take-over target, particularly to neighbouring 
electricity company Mercury Energy (MEL). On the day of listing MEL launched 
a hostile takeover bid for the control of PNZ. 
'~s a wonderful piece of corporate theatre on the day we listed the 
Mercury chief executive and chairman marched into the building, up 
the escalator, into the middle of a board meeting and said 'We're 
taking you over'. Marvellous stuff! We had (received) a lot of legal 
advice that that couldn't happen, but nevertheless that started a 
battle for control that went on for a couple of years" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 
Determined to counteract MEL's aggression the attention of the board, CEO 
and senior management was diverted from issues of organizational 
development and PNZ's strategic, operational and cultural development stalled. 
"Suddenly our managers were distracted to defend themselves to 
defend the company. It was disrupting for staff with speculation that 
went on from day one" (Manager, Human Resources). 
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MEL succeeded in gaining a thirty percent shareholding. With the right to 
representation on the board the presence of a competitor on the board created 
organizational, political and personal tensions at the highest level of PNZ that 
prevented the organization's management from exploring and implementing 
strategic change. 
"The biggest impediment (to change) was not having a board that 
was aligned and able to provide direction to the company. We were 
hamstrung because Mercury was also a competitor (and) that major 
shareholder did stop us doing a lot of the strategic moves that we 
wanted to. If you have a shareholder with thirty-five percent of your 
shares they can actually stop you doing anything" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 'They (Mercury) stopped a couple of major 
mergers so it did have a major effect on the company" (GM, 
Contracting). 
The political instability that resulted from MEL's involvement reduced the role 
that cornerstone shareholder Utilicorp could or would play in PNZ's 
development. 
'The fact that we needed control meant that our cornerstone 
shareholder wasn't willing to invest or share in technology" (GM, 
Network). 
Denied access to Utilicorp's resources and the ability to implement change the 
momentum for strategic development and change within PNZ ground to a halt. 
"We could never move forward - Mercury had a vision just focused 
on creating a mega-Auckland company. They were just a 
completely different focus and mindset" (Manager, Financial 
Services). 'This impasse at an ownership level was very difficult, it 
actually got to the point where nothing could happen" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 
The loss of control suffered by senior management had serious repercussions 
for the operation, specifically in respect to cultural development. 
'~s soon as we lost control of it (the board) the thing (change 
culture) blew out of the water. A lot of that I guess was because of 
inconsistency in management styles. We had a board that was 
effectively internally fighting and had different agendas - very 
dysfunctional. If we couldn't get alignment at the top we couldn't 
send consistent messages down the company" (Manager, Human 
Resources). 
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Distracted by the battle for control of PNZ, communication between 
management and staff suffered and organizational development faltered. 
Senior management credibility increasingly came under scrutiny. 
"When there's dysfunction at that higher level it doesn't take long to 
spread throughout the entire company. The senior team lost 
credibility and we were going backwards during that period of time. 
People down in the lowest level got a pretty good feel for the mood 
at the top level so I'd say that that was a major impediment to 
actually taking the company forward" (Manager, Human 
Resources). 
The organization both operationally and culturally began to stagnate. 
'The culture and the mood of the organization plateaud and then 
dived" (Manager, Human Resources). 'There was a lot of 
resentment (of management). It made my job a lot more difficult 
and get team work to move ahead and our people could actually 
see other power companies moving ahead" (GM, Network). 
After three years of conflict Mercury and Utilicorp formed a compromise 
solution to the ownership struggle and in May 1997 the board voted to combine 
their shareholdings to create a jOint venture holding company HoldCo. 
"All of a sudden this HoldCo deal happened overnight and bang we 
had this huge conglomerate put together, it just started a huge bun 
fight. Utilicorp would provide the CEO and Mercury would supply 
the chairman of the board" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Opposed to this solution the CEO and change agent resigned, unwilling to work 
with the new board. 
'The first thing was that the chief executive left, directly followed by 
(the change agent). The whole leadership team of the company 
was in turmoil" (Manager, Human Resources). 'There was 
casualties and a lot (of senior management) didn't get on with the 
new style so they decided to leave. Also it was probably seen that 
the industry wasn't really going where the vision was that the 
company would go" (Manager, Financial Services). 
Utilicorp appointed an interim CEO, selecting a senior CEO from their Canadian 
operation to see the organization through the transition period while searching 
for a permanent appointee. 
"I was over here on an interim basis until the HoldCo partnership 
could acquire control of PNZ and at that time they did an 
international search for a permanent CEO" (CEO). 
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However at the end of 1997 impending regulatory changes under the Energy 
Companies Act (1998), complications with legalities surrounding Utilicorp's 
cornerstone agreement and catastrophic operational failures at MEL put a halt 
to HoldCo. 
"Because of (electricity supply) problems with Mercury and change 
in the regulatory regime and the electricity reform act provided 
opportunity for Utilicorp to acquire control of PNZ" (CEO). "It 
(HoldCo) was never actually put in place because it legally couldn't 
be put in place it would have been a direct breech of the 
cornerstone agreement that said we (PNZ) weren't allow to discuss 
strategic issues with a third party so they put at risk their 
investment" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Utilicorp International acquired MEL's interest in PNZ. 
"It smoothed out quickly, HoldCo fell over it was just staggering 
stuff. It left Utilicorp in control of PNZ and so it blew that whole 
ownership structure apart. Having got Mercury off our back that we 
had a shareholder that could actually support their investment" 
(Manager, Human Resources). 
With a controlling interest in PNZ Utilicorp secured a majority representation on 
the board and appointed their interim CEO to the pOSition fulltime. 
"Because HoldCo didn't come to fruition that search (for a CEO) 
was abandoned and I'm now here representing in effect the majority 
shareholder" (CEO). 
5.18.2 Strategic Change 
Following his appointment the CEO's first priority was to stabilise the ranks of 
senior management. With the departure of the previous CEO many senior 
managers had left the organization and although the CEO persuaded several to 
remain with the organization he was forced to search for replacements. Many 
of these replacements came from outside the electricity industry. 
'The senior management are new to the organization. Some are 
from overseas some of them from New Zealand. You'd be lucky if 
twenty percent of our senior management - that's the top two or 
three tiers - actually come from a power industry background, they 
come from a commercial type background and their used to 
international and commercial drivers" (GM, Contracting) 
This was a deliberate policy on the CEO's behalf. 
"I brought in a lot of new policies, for instance the fact that we fill 
more and more positions from outside the company than we would 
inside' (CEO). 
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With the freedom, mandate and resources to implement strategic change the 
CEO with his reformed senior management team began the process of re-
establishing PNZ. 
"I encouraged the need for us to change. It really was a need; it 
wasn't something that we came on ourselves. I've encouraged that 
need for change to bring about more significant changes than we 
really have to implement and we have to have complete cultural 
change" (CEO). 
Utilizing North American management techniques familiar to the CEO the 
strengths and weaknesses of PNZ were analysed. 
"I am on the telephone all the time to my secretary in Canada. I say 
'Hey do you remember that form we put together there two years 
ago remember that strategic plan we worked on? See if you can 
dig it up'. You have these templates, management by templates -
I've got a template for everything floating around somewhere and 
I've only had to change a few words" (CEO). 
These techniques were perceived to be significantly advanced to those used in 
New Zealand's electricity industry. 
"My parent is in is in energy and the management techniques back 
in North America and Canada are ten years ahead of what they are. 
Your country is rather isolated and has not been able to take 
advantage of a lot of new techniques. Maybe there hasn't been a 
lot of the desire to do it either. The influence that has been brought 
to bear on this company isn't coming from this country there's not a 
lot of good models out there to use. The models I use are all from 
North America. The model I use for the strategic planning process 
is where we identify our mission, our vision and our values our 
strategic objectives. Behind that are key success factors in our 
strategies and from that we develop our company objectives and 
we have a list of stakeholders in this whole process - customers, 
shareholders our employees and then our suppliers. This is an 
analysis we go through to develop the strategies, we look at the 
market and the products. Academic stuff but it forces us into some 
discipline. I think in general they worked" (CEO). 
Based on their findings the management team agreed that the unfolding 
regulatory regime, with its requirement to divest either network or electricity 
retail aspects of the business, created, an environment that provided growth 
opportunities primarily through network management and maintenance. 
"We gave consideration to our core competencies the weighing of 
the assets and the profitability and the risk and reward profile. We 
made the decision to be a network company. Our new focus was to 
own networks and manage networks and provide network services, 
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our vision is to be the premiere network company in New Zealand 
performing to world-class standards. Our strategies are to achieve 
the lowest cost structure, deliver service reliability, performance on 
the top quartile, leverage our international expertise, set costs and 
service benchmarks for the industry, share benefits with the 
consumers" (CEO). 
With an amended vision and strategy for PNZ managers throughout the 
organization were charged with reviewing the suitability of current structural 
forms and infrastructural processes. 
5.18.3 Structural Change 
Based on the new vision for the future PNZ's CEO "established what I call an 
asset management structure" (CEO) developing a matrix form similar to that 
developed in other organizations he had managed. 
"We've gone through a reorganization here with the basic principles 
of effective asset management. There's a clear focus on 
maximising return on assets for the life cycle, cost minimisation, 
operation and maintenance and capital deployment of optimisation 
and effective risk and performance management. I've done it in 
every organization I've moved into" (CEO). 
Four separate business units were created, structured vertically to reflect core 
competencies of network management, contracting, retail and generation with 
IT, accounting and human resource support services centralised to reduce 
overheads. 
"We created a matrix organization with core business units in the 
vertical and on the horizontal we have the support services -
finance and accounting, human resources, information services, 
organizational development and effectiveness, and corporate 
services including corporate communication, legal property, 
corporate secretary pricing and regulatory" (CEO). 
To promote opportunities for growth the contracting division was given a new 
identity. 
"Contracting has been operating under a different name totally 
different name totally different branding. It has been very important 
:..... some of our customers didn't like the Power New Zealand name 
on our trucks" (GM, Contracting). 
5.18.4 Cultural Change 
Concurrent with structural change was a major effort to rekindle the cultural 
change process - "We had a total change in culture. A lot of it is because we 
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have an international shareholder" (GM, Contracting). The impetus for cultural 
change had taken a significant setback during the MEL years. 
"We almost had anarchy management. Anarchy where managers 
were so empowered and those who were new to the organization 
had their way of doing things their own little models. We lost our 
framework, which gelled the whole thing. So a combination of the 
battle (with MEL) and combination of the eye off the ball and the 
combination of not reinforcing those philosophies which had driven 
the company you know through this (cultural change) then we 
started to go down and there was cultural slippage" (Manager, 
Human Resources). 
Concerned at the extent of stagnation since MEL's takeover bid the human 
resource department was tempted to recentralise staff management functions. 
This strategy was rejected. 
"There's this huge tendency to centralise, decentralise, recentralise, 
decentralise and we were that close to recentralising everything 
again that we would have ruined all the progress we had made. So 
instead of recentralising and getting control again we've actually 
just said 'No we're not going to recentralise but we are going to take 
a snapshot in time right now and address it and ask all the 
fundamental questions again. Have we got it right philosophically? 
We're in that process right now" (Manager, Human Resources). 
Instead the human resource team invested in the development of IT support 
systems and training programmes for GMs to re-establish a coordinated 
change framework that would promote organization-wide cultural alignment. 
PNZ also "got some outside consultant facilitators to support those teams" 
(CEO) through the change process. 
"We (the human resource department) moved away from 
developing human resource policies and procedures to towards 
developing managers guide lines. We acknowledged their (EM) 
people management ability and gave them a bit more latitude, less 
prescribed. We said 'Here are the things you have to do by law, 
here are some basic guidelines from the company as to how we 
want to operate and behave for some consistency'. That was really 
empowering to managers. It gave them the freedom to manage 
their part of the business and human resource (department), 
instead of being a group of twenty personnel administrators, 
became a group of five people whose sole aim in life was to design 
the empowerment framework. The management of people was 
fully decentralised and the support systems put in place so that 
there was a framework to enable that level of empowerment to 
occur. And of course the IT platform has to support that so that was 
upgraded" (Manager, Human Resources). 
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Cultural change was encouraged through clear and regular communication of 
the rationale, expectations and requirements of PNZ's new strategy and 
structure. 
"Once a month all the senior managers in the company get together 
in a room for an hour and a half and we talk about what we are 
going to do to improve the performance, what does it look like for 
next month and so on. That's all new stuff for this company. It's 
done to try and find a way of getting the whole organization 
engaged in the business and they've (managers) been given 
training so once they have that information they then take that out 
to the troops" (CEO). 
This message for change was reinforced by the development of key 
performance indicators (KPls) that provided a standardised measure of 
performance. 
"We developed a number of KPls at an individual business unit and 
company level which are financial and non-financial measures 
rather than just a purely net profit focus. Customer satisfaction's a 
big driver and there's there were quarterly surveys done on 
customers impressions of Power New Zealand. They were 
influential in driving change. It (change) was all focused on service 
to the customer - the customer was the key" (Manager, Financial 
Services). "Key performance indicators are so important to perform" 
(CEO). 
The ability of KPls to promote cultural change was further enhanced when the 
remuneration of senior management and EMs were tied to monthly results. 
"We introduced a performance based incentive plan for our all our 
management employees. I'd like to introduce it for all our 
employees because you end up with a very different culture" (CEO). 
"In the last twelve months an incentive related based remuneration 
has been put in place which has focused people on KPls" 
(Manager, Financial Services). 
With financial incentives for reaching targets, team managers were encouraged 
to motivate their staff by encouraging personal and professional development. 
"It wasn't just performance against objectives it was growth as well. 
It was how are you taking the company forward, are you managing 
the capability and the competencies of your part of the company. 
Not having a middle management capable of implementing change 
is a major impediment. You can conceptualise until you're blue in 
the face but if you can't actually translate it (into action) you 
struggle" (Manager, Human Resources). 
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This determination to improve organizational performance through employee 
development was underscored with the creation of the position of Manager, 
Organizational Development. 
"It's (staff development) not as good as it should have been over 
the years and that's one of the reasons why we brought in a new 
position a few weeks ago. His title is organizational development 
and his sole purpose in life is to enhance the capabilities of the 
people in the organization" (CEO). 
By late 1998, following almost eighteen months of intensive development, the 
management of PNZ considered itself successful in revitalising the culture. 
"We're now pulling it (culture) around again and starting to reinforce 
those philosophies and getting buy-in again" (Manager, Human 
Resources). 
As we left the organization the introduction of legislation forcing the ownership 
separation of electricity retail and generation aspects of the business has seen 
PNZ refocus on expanding its network operation. 
5.18.5 Attributes of PNZ's Change Process 
Although Power New Zealand is a case of reactive change, the extent of 
change implemented within the organization means it bears little resemblance 
to earlier cases. The nature and extent of change is directly attributable to four 
key features; the influence of the board of directors, the CEO and the senior 
management team, the size and urban location of PNZ and the overall 
dominance of the corporate management philosophy. 
PNZ's ownership structure and board was fundamental to the change process 
from the outset. Similar to earlier cases of reactive organizational change, 
PNZ's board was formed as a community trust in reaction to legislation. The 
intent of the board was also similar - to maximise the value of the organization 
for shareholders (the community). However the commercial experience and 
philosophy of individuals serving on the board meant that a corporate rather 
than community focused ideology was dominant. This meant that the board 
was less concerned with implementing protectionist strategies that preserved 
the value of PNZ for the community than it was with creating value through 
expansionist strategies. This corporate vision set the scene for the 
organization's development throughout and created a governance structure 
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more aligned with a competitive/commercial ideology that that of its 
contemporaries. Although this stimulated second order strategic, structural and 
cultural change early on it also exposed the organization to a hostile takeover 
bid by a nearby competitor. This created a non-alignment at the board level 
that resulted in a loss of strategic focus, diverting resources and the attention of 
PNZ's strategic management away from the implementation of change. The 
result was catastrophic from strategic management's point of view as early 
strategic, structural and particularly cultural advances were lost. It was not until 
the ownership struggle was resolved that the process of organizational change 
could begin again in earnest. 
Despite the board's role in initiating change the implementation of change was 
left to senior management. Both CEOs were fundamental in this process. The 
first CEO was an industry insider with commercial/strategic skills and abilities 
considered fundamental for the turnaround of PNZ. Unlike the past, the first 
CEO was free to develop a change strategy unhindered by the board. He did 
so in consultation with a specialist change manager and team of senior 
management personally selected by the CEO for their commercial experience 
in other industries. This injection of new blood and ideas provided the skills for 
the implementation of discontinuous strategic, structural and cultural change. 
The second CEO, also an industry insider with considerable experience in 
North America, played a more stabilising role in the development of PNZ. 
Following the conclusion of the ownership struggle, the second CEO built on 
the foundations of his predecessor and introduced American formal 
management techniques to assess and refocus PNZ's direction. 
The urban location and size of PNZ also fundamentally influenced the process 
of organizational change. Based in a large urban environment the decision 
making process of PNZ's board and management was less influenced by 
concerns for community welfare than in smaller, rural based contemporaries. 
As only one player in a larger regional economy, PNZ's management was able 
to implement radical organizational changes without fear of significant 
ramifications for the welfare of the surrounding community. PNZ's location in 
New Zealand's largest urban centre also provided the organization's 
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management with access to a larger talent pool. Related to its location was 
PNZ's size, which influenced the resources available to devote to 
organizational change. In combination these variables allowed PNZ's 
management to implement change strategies more rapidly and more radical 
than smaller, rurally based peers. Furthermore PNZ's large customer base 
made competition in its area feasible and cost effective for the entrance of other 
organizations. This meant that the organization was exposed to a far more 
competitive environment than rural based electricity companies and forced 
PNZ's management to develop a strategic, structural and cultural configuration 
with a competitive edge. 
The case of change in PNZ is one of discontinuous change in reaction to 
environmental upheaval. Seeking a competitive advantage, the board and 
management of PNZ implemented a corporate strategy in an effort to break 
from the constraints of the traditional electricity archetype. This initially followed 
a linear path, but competitor aggression and regulatory changes prolonged the 
process of change during the solidification of its new configuration, resolved 
only when the environment stabilized. 
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5.20 Electra Limited (ELL) 
5.21 Overview 
Electra Limited (ELL) is a small electricity company based in Levin on the North 
Island's Southwest (Kapiti) coast. Formerly the Horowhenua Electric Power 
Board (HEPB, established 1920), the board restructured under the 
requirements of the Energy Companies Act (1992) to become Horowhenua 
Energy Limited (HEL). This organization is wholly owned by the Horowhenua 
Energy Trust (HET) on behalf of local customers (shareholders) and is widely 
known by the trading name Electra. Today ELL supplies 35,288 customers 
over a mixed urban/rural area of 1,628 square kilometres. With staff numbering 
80, ELL is one of New Zealand's smallest electricity companies. Sharing the 
strategic, structural and cultural configuration typical of the historic electricity 
power board archetype. However despite the similarities with other EPBs, the 
path of organizational change followed by ELL has been radically different with 
a strategic, structural and cultural change programme that has seen the 
organization become regarded as one of New Zealand's most progressive 
electricity distribution companies. 
5.22 The Electricity Archetype in HEPB 
5.22.1 Organization Strategy 
The strategy, structure and culture of the HEPB were typical of the electricity 
industry archetype. As one of the larger employers in the region the power 
board operated in a quasi social-welfare manner. 
'The power board were performing a social function. It was really 
for the community - it provided employment and lots of it and put 
lots of dollars back into the local economy. But as a company it 
was actually going nowhere it was never going to change" 
(Company Secretary/ Support Operations). 
With legislation demanding accountability purely in relation to the maintenance 
of a reliable electricity supply the HEPB grew to become a cash-rich, 
bureaucratic organization. 
'This business and this industry has been characterised by very low 
levels of debt and very sleepy sort of organization structures that 
haven't had any pressure put on them at all. It was quite a 
bureaucratic environment that used to exist. We were in the 
biggest building in town - most power boards seemed to have and 
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the building gave a good indication of the environment of the 
company. It was vety dysfunctional" (CEO). 
As a consequence of this and the stable operating environment strategic 
provided by protectionist legislation, strategic planning systems did not exist as 
management focused primarily on building and operating electricity networks. 
"There was no formal marketing plan, no organized formal business 
planning at all" (Coach Sales/Project Team). 
Furthermore the 'strategic' emphasis on electricity network development and 
operation meant that like its peers the management of HEPB focused on over-
investment in engineering aspects of the organization. This created a self-
sufficient vertically integrated business. 
"Like most power companies the business was really all about 
contracting. It was inspectors all the engineering side of the 
business. We had our own pole factoty our own garage and we did 
evetything basically with all the people running around doing all the 
fault work and all the maintenance and all those sorts of things. 
And we had a number of appliance stores" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). 
5.22.2 Organization Structure and Culture 
As a result the HEPB structure, mirroring the industry archetype, "was vety 
hierarchical" (Coach Sales/Project Team) and "quite a bureaucratic 
environment used to exist" (CEO). 
"You came from a background where you were indoctrinated at 
different levels. You were a worker and you had your boss and the 
big CEO sat at the top" (Coach Network Team). 
As a result of the strongly embedded strategic and structural norms the culture 
of the HEPB was also aligned with the electricity industry archetype. 
Conforming to the traditions associated with the industry and the recognition of 
hierarchy, the CEO of the HEPB had grown up through the organization. 
'The old chief executive had started work in the company when he 
was 16 and had come through the ranks and had been in a variety 
of roles" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
With no requirement to introduce significant change, management maintained 
the status quo. As seen in other EPBs, this stability encouraged the 
development of a divide between administration ('management') and network 
management ('workers') staff. The culture that emerged was adversarial 
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between the two groups, with the engineering culture dominating the 
organ ization. 
"You had people in finance know about finance but they knew damn 
all about the business let alone engineering and vice versa" (CEO). 
"You had very much the focus of accounting on one side of the 
business, engineering on the other side of the business not much 
talking to each other. You get to meetings where you had a clash 
of heads just because it's generally an engineering or accounting 
problem and no one would find the happy bit in the middle. Power 
companies in the past have always been for whatever reason very 
much accounting focused for the management and sort of 
engineering to the other side" (Coach Sales/Project Team). "The 
office and the depot had two annual separate social functions they 
were entirely different. The office staff went to some local ball and 
all got dressed up and the other guys had it around the department. 
It was almost like two separate organizations" (Coach Network 
Team). 
With no competitive pressures for change and little concern for efficiency over 
effectiveness performance accountability was seen in retrospect as non-
existent. 
"I could have sat there for six months in my office and not done 
anything that's the way it was really" (Coach Marketing/Project 
Team) 
With little accountability and few performance objectives the archetypal job for 
life mentality was well entrenched, with few formalised procedures and 
knowledge internalised to ensure job security. 
"It was very much the old power board days or government 
business 'do as you please type attitude' the old government job for 
life and why should I change type of thing" (Coach Sales/Project 
Team). 'There were unwritten processes in place, for example 
things that had to happen before you could have an outage and 
they weren't written down but they were included as part of an 
unwritten network controllers training if you like. You were just 
expected to know it was hand to mouth on the network side" (Coach 
Network Team). 'There were lots of little boxes all around the show 
and information in lots of people's heads. You often spent two or 
three days tracking down the right person or the right piece of paper 
to get the answer" (Coach Project Team). 
So too was the culture concerned more with electricity than customer service. 
"Our building in Queen Street was old and (had) a myriad of rooms 
and a bit built on to it but when customers came in to pay their bills. 
You'd come into the main doors into a main foyer with frosted glass 
screened across part of it. And you'd come up, push the buzzer 
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and when somebody thought they should get off their backside they 
would pull back the frosted glass screen and they would do their 
business standing there. You'd listen to the way they treated 
customers and you could hear the arrogance almost 'well you'll do 
what we tell you and we'll do whatever we damned well like'" 
(Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
The strategic, structural and cultural state of the HEPB was identified as "top 
down, procedurally driven, externally directed, command and control focused 
with formal and indirect communication processes" (EY Report), summed up 
well by one organizational member. 
"It was like stepping back 20 years into a government department. 
It was very much strictly ruled and you had ways to do things and 
they'd been like that for a hundred years so you didn't change it and 
you didn't step outside the norms" (Coach Project Team). 
5.23 Anticipatory Change in the HEPB 
5.23.1 Governance Developments 
Following the Energy Companies Act (1992) the HEPB was for the first time 
forced into introducing large-scale organizational change. This started with the 
creation of a new commercially focused board, established with the assistance 
of conSUltants. The membership and approach of the new board was 
significantly different from the past. 
"In the old board days the old farmers used to be on the board. 
Now the board is very well received by all the team members as 
they are all well respected business people they've all got their own 
businesses. And they're very approachable, they'll wander through 
and sit down and say 'hi'" (Coach Sales/Project Team). 
The board's first responsibility was to determine the ownership structure of the 
HEPB. 
"The new board had been appointed and they were starting the 
process of looking at what they needed to do with the company" 
(Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
The trust structure, the dominant form adopted by New Zealand electricity 
companies, was selected over other forms such as full privatisation. This form 
ensured that organizational assets would remain in local ownership and that the 
business would retain ties with the community. 
'The trustees saw it as potentially a very progressive company and 
why let it slip, let it go" (Coach Network Team). 'This (the 
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organization) is trust owned so the trust have got a real vested 
interest in owning assets for (the benefit of) customers" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). (The trust will not entertain selling" 
(Coach Project Team). (The trustees have been velY focused on 
the local ownership type role" (CEO). 
On 7 April 1993 the Horowhenua Energy Trust (HET) took control and 
transferred the holdings of the HEPB to Horowhenua Energy Limited (HEL). 
5.23.2 A New CEO 
With legislation providing the timeline for change the board, concerned that the 
incumbent GM did not possess the vision, skills and abilities to lead change, 
sought a new CEO to pilot the corporatisation process. 
"It (change) would never have happened with the old CEO, which is 
why the board pushed him aside. It (change) wouldn't have 
happened without somebody who had a vision and could bring 
other people along with him. with that vision" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). 
With assistance from an employment agency, the board selected an industry 
outsider experienced in management consulting and information technology 
development. 
(The CEO's background was management consulting and the 
computer industlY in the UK. The board appointed the CEO to see 
the transition through to a limited liability company" (CEO). (~new 
CEO was appointed and that was the catalyst for deregulation, and 
we had to become a company by April 1994" (Coach Project 
Team). 
Employed on a three-year contract, the new CEO's role in the organization was 
clear. 
(The new CEO was put in as change manager by the board" 
(Coach Marketing/Project Team). "He was brought in as the 
change agent to make us competitive in the new environment" 
(Coach Project Team). 
His personal style reflected this need. 
"He brought the focus to the team of the customer orientation 
approach. It was velY much a one to one style of management. He 
was a little bit hard to approach but you velY much knew where you 
were. He was velY directive of the outcome he wanted and it was 
up to you to go out and get that outcome." (Coach Sales Team). 
"He was a great leader and he always managed to convey an idea 
and share it and get evelYone to buy in so it was really charismatic I 
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guess is a good word" (Coach Project Team). 'The right man was 
appointed for the job because he seemed to have that personality 
that could reorganize people and they didn't realise they were being 
reorganized. He had a vel}' firm vision of what the company should 
be like and he never varied from it, he stuck right to it" (Coach 
Network Team). 
The CEO's first act was the assessment of senior management positions. 
Subsequently "all the management positions were advertised" (Coach Project 
Team) and all managers were required to reapply for their positions. This 
process provided the CEO with the opportunity to review and renew the 
organization's skills base. 
"More people were brought in externally (from outside the firm) and 
expertise such as energy trading that we needed" (Coach Project 
Team). 
With assistance from employment consultants the CEO personally selected 
individuals from within and outside the organization and industry to fill each 
senior management position. 
"He employed myself and a couple of other people and that really 
kicked of the business process reengineering exercises to take our 
electric power board through Horowhenua Energy and now trading 
as Electra" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 'The CEO appointed 
the rest of us really to see the transition through to a limited liability 
company" (CEO). 
By July 1993 a new management team was in place. At the same time HEL's 
CEO embarked on a major rebranding exercise. In a move intended to give the 
company a fresh new image, HEL rebranded itself Electra. Accompanied by 
investment in the staff uniforms to create a professional, corporate appearance 
and publicity through various media of the 'new' business the rebranding 
process visibly dissociated Electra from the past for both staff and customers. 
"When we changed to Electra the image was definitely upgraded 
and made to look vel}' professional. Frontline staff were made to 
wear uniforms, that vel}' much created a corporate image rather 
than the shorts and walk socks brigade" (Coach Project Team). 
5.23.3 Strategic Change 
Although changes had been made to the former EPB's image and senior 
management a definitive change strategy had not been determined. 
'The organization needed to start looking at marketing and sales 
focus and a customer focus as opposed to an engineering focus 
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probably and we knew very well that we had to look at what was our 
core business" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
Concurrent with the changes made to senior management the CEO employed 
consulting firm Ernst and Young (EY) to study the organization and recommend 
changes that would enable to organization to compete in a deregulated market. 
"The management team saw some added value could quite easily 
be made. So we went through a BPR exercise" (CEO). 
In October 1993 EY submitted their final report, recommending that Electra 
follow a Business Process Reengineering (BPR) methodology to completely 
revise the structure and in particular the culture of the organization. 
'The HEL culture is clearly negative and far from conducive to the 
attainment of the stretching corporate objectives that are necessary 
for survival. The extent of the changes suggested is almost 
overwhelming in magnitude: The reorganization of HEL around 12 
major processes with supporting sub-processes, activities and 
tasks; The introduction of a new team based organizational 
structure with fluidity in staffing and leadership; A major upgrade of 
info systems with a range of new applications supporting all areas 
of the business; The development of a new culture based on 
rewards for contribution as a team member" (EY Report). 
Management embraced the BPR recommendations. 
'The company needed this (BPR) to be operated efficiently and 
effectively. There was a mixed perception about what their power 
company should be doing and the commercial realities and the 
environment within which the company operates which had 
changed fundamentally" (CEO). 
The first step in the process was the clarification of strategic objectives. 
Assisted by EY, Electra's senior management was encouraged to view the 
organization through a new lens. 
"We started looking at the thing (organization) from a process point 
of view rather than a strict departmentalised view" (CEO). 
The systematic review of Electra's operation provided senior management the 
opportunity to gain a clear understanding of the organization's core 
competencies. 
"We had to look at what was our core business" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). '~s a result of that exercise we were able 
to identify the core business - the lines and energy and focus on 
processes rather than on the strict finance and engineering and god 
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knows what else departments we had" (CEO). 'There was that 
focus on core competencies" (Coach Sales/Project Team). 
The process of "core" identification enabled Electra's senior management to 
identify what, how, why and for whom the organization operated. 
"We looked at the things that are of strategic importance to the 
business, our core competencies and what the hell it is we should 
be doing and campaigning for, trying to throwaway some of the flak 
(non-core aspects) and try and focus" (Coach Marketing/Project 
Team). 'There was that focus on core competencies - which was 
supply electricity" (Coach Sales Team). 
The CEO with support from the board championed the process. 
'The chief executive and the board looked at those core things and 
dragged other people along with them and stuck to their guns and 
said: 'Look we know we need to do something, we know we need to 
reduce our costs we need to improve reliability' and focused on 
those. The CEO acted as an anchor in doing those things with 
support of the board" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
From the review process emerged a short, medium and long-term strategic 
vision for the future of Electra. 
"We wanted to be the best power company in the country process 
and team based - it was written down in the manual" (Coach 
Network Team). 
To achieve this end Electra's management established three immediate 
objectives; first ensure the provision of a competitive and secure electricity 
supply; second achieve outstanding management performance; and third 
create strong financial stability. 
"We focused on minimising costs, maximising returns to the 
maximum allowable for the regulation, very much trying to maximise 
returns to the shareholder by controlling costs and having pricing 
set at a level that the regulations will aI/ow" (Coach Network Team). 
These short-term objectives were incorporated into a medium term (two year) 
strategic vision called 'Target '95'. 'Target '95' aimed for Electra to be a 
"healthy business, meeting the needs and desires of its owners, satisfying its 
customers, motivating its employees and safe from predators" (EY Report). 
The general concepts of 'Target '95' were transformed into a set of four tangible 
goals to be achieved by 31 March 1995. These were to: 
1. Replace 95% of routine, repetitive activities with automated systems. 
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2. Be process focused in management and organization of the business. 
3. Ensure no less than ten days training per employee per year. 
4. Have fewer dissatisfied and more satisfied customers than any other 
electricity company, with a target of one percent dissatisfied and 20 percent 
delighted customers (EY Report). 
"We had a vision something that we were working towards. Target 
'95 was aiming to get all these (operational) processes in place and 
have them operating" (Coach Project Team). 
Finally Electra's and EY developed a long-term strategic vision called 'Target 
2000'. Also referred to as the 'Electra Concept', 'Target 2000' was a radical 
vision for Electra's future based on the development of advanced operational 
processes and management competencies associated with the BPR exercise. 
Based on such organizational developments 'Target 2000' established the 
vision that Electra could evolve its processes and competencies to exceed 
international best practice and become a recognised industry leader. By 
achieving these targets it was envisioned that Electra's management would 
have the opportunity to expand and grow the business through the provision of 
advanced asset management services to other electricity companies. 
"'Target 2000', which we also called the 'Electra Concept', (meant) 
we had the vision of going and being able to manage other 
electricity companies" (Coach Project Team). 'We wanted to 
promote what we call the 'Electra Concept' which was (saying) 'You 
don't need to wony about change of ownership, you don't need to 
worty about all your governance type issues they can all stay right 
where they are. Let us come in and manage the companies for 
you'" (CEO). 
With the documentation of a growth vision and strategy based on customer 
satisfaction, the management of Electra embarked on the process of structural 
and cultural change recommended by EY. 
"We had a goal, we knew where we wanted to be, we wanted to get 
there and achieve it and we just did it (change) as fast as we could" 
(Coach Project Team). 
5.23.4 Structural Change 
The structural change process in Electra was a highly ordered affair that closely 
adhered to EY's recommendations, focusing on actions that "could be 
implemented within four to eight weeks, were based on the existing structure 
207 
and would introduce a team based approach to Electra" (EY report). The 
organization was split apart to create specialised network, contracting, 
electricity retail and appliance sales businesses. 
"We started looking at the thing from a process pOint of view rather 
than a strict departmentalised view. As a result of that we did some 
pretty straightforward but quite fundamental things. We split the 
business into four and created separate structures for each" (CEO). 
As a 'non-core' division, appliance retailing was corporately separated from 
Electra's operation. Uncompetitive as a regional business, management 
entered into a joint venture with a larger national retail chain. This provided the 
catalyst for the businesses' eventual divestment in 1996. 
"Our appliance retailing went into a joint venture with somebody 
who actually knew something about appliance retailing and we 
subsequently exited that business. It was not core business. 
There's more than adequate competition in appliance retailing. The 
rationale for setting it up many years ago was to promote the use of 
electricity appliances and the reason for that is long gone. The 
national chains and the bulk buying and bulk advertising just 
passed the electricity industry" (CEO). "We knew very well that we 
had to look at what was our core business which is why we took the 
appliance stores and sold them" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
Similarly the previously coupled contracting (network maintenance) and 
network management aspects of Electra were separated with the new 
contracting division given the title construction and maintenance. 
''The first part was to split that (contracting) business and put up a 
manager in there that was actually (going to) manage that business 
away from the planning side of (network management). So a 
practical operation side of the business was split off under a 
another manager but still part of Electra and that was the first step 
to change" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). ''The old (contracting) 
depot became what was called construction and maintenance" 
(Coach Sales/Project Team). 
Further, an electricity marketing and customer management function was 
created, a process function that was identified by the EY report as an area of 
emerging importance. 
''Then he (the CEO) set up the sales team and the account 
management team and away we went" (Coach Sales/Project 
Team). "We knew (that) we needed to have a marketing focus" 
(Coach marketing/Project Team). 
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All 'non-core' functions such as pole manufacturing, ground keeping and 
"everything else has been out-sourced" (CEO) resulting in the reduction of 
levels of hierarchy and several redundancies. Associated with corporate 
separation was the relocation of Electra's core management and operational 
staff to a new headquarters. A new smaller facility was located that allowed the 
CEO to reshape the working environment to create an open plan workspace 
designed to combat the traditional closed-door culture. 
'We used to have about 200 people and all of a sudden we were 
down to 40 something at that stage and walls came down to make it 
(the office space) open plan" (Coach Project Team). "We decided 
we'd go to open plan. So we moved to this building, chucked down 
a few walls stuck the CEO in the middle of the room and the rest of 
us around him - it took a while to get used to" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). "All the walls in the office were knocked 
down so people couldn't hide in their offices because there were 
none there were just desks. Now we've got little dividers (with cells) 
seating four people, but (back) then those walls were totally 
knocked down there was no dividers (and the) CEO sat in the far 
corner" (Coach Network Team). 
The CEO's implementation of an open plan office structure assisted in the 
formation of cross-functional process teams recommended by EY. Each staff 
member was appointed to at least one of seven 'key skill groups'; technical 
operations, technical trades, network design, planning and analysis, customer 
contact, clerical and administration, management. 
'They (EY and senior management) identified all their processes. 
From that they put teams around those processes so you weren't 
aligning tasks with people you were aligning the people with the 
process. That was quite unique. That just made it more fluid, more 
dynamic I think than it possibly could be otherwise" (Company 
Secretary/Support Operations). 
These skill groups focused on meeting customer demands in four core 
business processes (task management, sales and service, resourcing and 
infrastructure) identified by EY based on attitudinal requirements. This 
structural configuration allowed the senior management of Electra to form five-
member cross-functional project teams able to address specific problems from 
an organizational perspective. Team formation was a democratic process with 
one team member elected to the position of team coach (leader) depending on 
the specific process skills and knowledge required. 
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"We became a team concept whereby we had coaches and team 
members and we moved in and out of teams for specific jobs. 
Once we were put into the process teams there was a coach 
appointed to an area and we went from departmental managers to 
multi-skilled and intermingled teams. The operational area and 
people (in it) was your home base with a coach. But then you 
didn't spend much time there, there were so many other projects 
happening at the same time. A project captain was appointed to 
that (project) and would select the (project) team so people would 
be drawn from all different areas and any team that you were on 
you'd have to have a cross pollination of people" (Coach Project 
Team). "We have revolutions where people interchange between 
teams so the idea was people multi-skilled enough so they could do 
and processes were documented well enough that people could 
interchange quite freely" (Company Secretary/Support Operations). 
The open-plan office arrangement encouraged open communication and the 
development of a more responsive organization as teams could be formed to 
'address problems quickly both in a structural and physical form. 
'The open plan environment that we've got down there (means that) 
you hear a lot of the conversation you can either dial in or out of 
conversations - that's not eaves dropping it's very open. And 
because we've all got the same type of desk type of environment -
my desk is no different to anybody else's and my PC's no different 
to anyone else's either - it means that we can be very flexible" 
(CEO). 
5.23.5 Cultural Change 
The development of the open-plan facility and the structural reconfiguration of 
the organization along process lines radically challenged the cultural norms 
traditionally associated with the old EPB. The open-plan environment aimed to 
break down the entrenched barriers (hierarchical, physical and social) to 
organizational communication, development and change identified by EY as 
preventing Electra from meeting customer expectations. 
"It was totally open plan. (However) at first in that corner there was 
the CEO and his second in command and his secretary and over 
there was all the engineers. So to break that down they (CEO and 
senior management) shuffled up as in (that is) made people sit 
amongst other people even to the fact that the lowest people sat in 
the CEO's group. That really broke down the barriers and social 
levels within the office" (Coach Network Team). "Every cell got 
someone from each group. You might have sales, one from 
engineering, accounting so you got that cross-section. Then 
everybody understands how the business works and there are no 
secrets then, whereas before you might have a sales team hidden 
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in an office somewhere and accounting somewhere else you never 
get to see anyone else" (Coach Sales Team). 
Initially the process-team and open-plan reconfiguration met with some 
resistance as some staff tried to erect physical barriers to replicate traditional 
and task orientated offices. 
"Those that had been in the office and used to having their own 
offices and own secretaries did not like it (open-plan) one little bit 
and tried to push themselves separate in the open-plan" (Coach 
Network Team). 
Those unwilling or unable to accept the deconstruction of tasks into process 
areas - in particular historic managers and administrators - were especially 
resistant to change as their hierarchical power base was removed. This 
resulted in several redundancies. 
"Some people just didn't want to change or just couldn't handle 
change and couldn't see how the organization could possibly exist 
without them doing their particular task. I thought that way myself, 
and you'd say 'That can't possibly happen it will fall apart'. But its 
just a change in attitude. Some people by themselves worked 
through that process and got around it. But people who didn't help 
us originally were task orientated in billing or something and never 
got out of that (mindset that) they had to complete this task 
otherwise the world will fall apart. They were the ones that tended 
to be made redundant you just couldn't change them" (Coach 
Network Team). t'He (CEO) got rid of a lot of the historical 
departmental managers. One of the things that I noticed most was 
he got rid of the checkers who checked the checkers and flattened 
the structure. Ultimately some of the people that were constantly 
negative were made redundant" (Coach Project Team). 
Redundancies came as a shock to the organization traditionally a provider of 
life-long employment. Those most opposed to change either left or found 
themselves asked to leave. 
ttThere was) anything from outright aggression from the old school 
guys who had been here from college, 20 or 30 years. They did 
not want to see the change, couldn't handle the change and the first 
option at redundancy they took it whether they were pushed or 
whether they were invited to take it. But they just weren't going to 
change their focus, the old government job for life and why should I 
change type of thing. That attitude ranged right through to some of 
the younger (employees). It took a bit of time for that change to 
happen so (the response was) anything from embracing it fully with 
arms out wide type thing to outright hating it. But at the end you 
have to get rid of dead wood had to get rid of the people that 
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weren't going to change and go on from there and its worked" 
(Coach Sales/Project Team). 
As the team structure developed and those resistant to change departed 
cultural acceptance of the new structural configuration grew. 
"People started seeing the sense of it (the team structure). You 
didn't have to make an appointment to go and see a guy, he might 
be sitting on the other side of the desk and you could ask him or get 
up and walk to the other side of the office. But people worked 
together as a team and the whole place seemed to gel a lot better. 
People became interested in what other people were doing there 
was no ulterior motive they were just interested to see how other 
parts of the business worked" (Coach Network Team). 
Those that remained with Electra were assisted through the 
organizational/cultural change process with the introduction of processes 
focused on the alignment and enhancement of individual competencies with the 
demands of process areas. Aptitude testing implemented at all levels of the 
organization allowed the organization to audit, assess and align individual 
competencies with various organizational roles. 
'We did aptitude testing in terms of whether they (employees) made 
good managers, identified the best and took them" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). 
Significant investment was made in establishing an ongoing training and 
development programme to ensure that individuals developed the ability, 
confidence and culture to allow full participation in Electra's change process. 
"We gave a whole lot of training, from simple things like a couple of 
day course to do customer service training to technical training of 
those people in all the IT processes. We used a number of local 
agencies (and) it didn't all happen at once. We'd do a little bit of 
training and then do some more. We were focusing on service 
excellence through training of staff and making sure we had the 
systems in place and the processes to . improve that as well it 
sounds bloody easy but it didn't happen overnight" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). "There was a lot of training we had a lot 
of training on the sorts of questions customers would be asking and 
training about the electricity industry" (Coach Project Team). 
Less formal 'on-the-job' learning, associated with cross-functional team 
interaction, reinforced the formal training process and enhanced the 
development of cultural change. 
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"People unconsciously learned what their neighbour was doing. If 
someone was away it wasn't dramatic, you just carried on anyway 
and did two jobs for a day. That started the break down of 
individuals into teams and was a good way of doing it when you 
look back, but not at the time especially when you came from a 
background where you were indoctrinated at different levels (of 
hierarchy)" (Coach Network Team). "It was great because all of a 
sudden you were talking and working with people that you hadn't 
clapped eyes on before. You might have seen them at the tea table 
or you know passed in the hall but all of a sudden people became 
human to me and people to work with it was great. There was a lot 
more communication and sharing cell blocks with people we hadn't 
worked with before or shared accommodation with before. You 
certainly become more aware of things that were happening in the 
organization" (Coach Project Team). 
Cultural change was further stimulated 'on-the-job' through a policy introduced 
by the CEO that required all Electra staff to work in the customer services 
department, in particular answering customer telephone inquiries. 
"Everybody was given one day a month answering the customer 
inquiries on the phones. Everyone did it CEO included" (Coach 
Project Team). 
This awoke the wider organization to the specific concerns and demands 
associated with exceptional customer service, a considerable break from the 
past where electricity consumers were asked only to pay monthly accounts. 
'That was a very radical move. Everyone that had been Sitting 
quietly in a back office all of a sudden had to learn how the 
customer information system worked and how you found your way 
around it and what customers might ask and how you might deal 
with angry customers. That's one of the moves that I most strongly 
resisted as you can imagine it was a real change. It really helped 
everybody focus on what we were there for. We were there to 
focus on the customers, it really made us concentrate on what we 
were there for, focus on our priorities. That was the start of the real 
(customer) focus and the good name that. Electra got for quality 
service to customers" (Coach Project Team). 
Cultural change was reinforced through the development of formal performance 
appraisal policies. Unlike traditionallength-of-service based pay rises Electra's 
management introduced quarterly performance reviews. These were based on 
the evaluation of individual and group achievement in relation to documented 
goals and objectives established at the beginning of the quarter. Overseen by 
team coaches, the documented process provided a channel for each team 
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member to objectively review strengths and weaknesses, scrutinise 
performance at the group and individual level, refocus and record personal 
objectives and set personal goals. 
"Every four months we stop the organization go through a 
performance review process. The coach will review the team 
member's performance. Everybody does it slightly differently we 
get the person (under review) to fill out the pre-printed form that has 
got the objectives we both agreed at the end of the previous review, 
how they thought they went. And then we sit down and talk about it 
and set the objectives of the next cycle. To me it's not one person 
dictating to the other and beating them over the head if they've got 
things right or wrong, but suggesting things for improvement and 
documenting what it is that's expected and how you've gone. That 
documentation, without getting too pedantic, is really important. It's 
very easy to say 'Well no I didn't say that' or 'This isn't quite what I 
meant'. It (documentation) encourages objectivity and allows you to 
thrash out exactly what it is you're doing and what you should be 
doing or would like to be doing. That allows us (to gain a) clear 
focus on what it is we want to do and also allows team members to 
refocus on their personal objectives. So (we look at) how the 
business is going, the business plan, the persons own aspirations 
and (ask) how do we keep continually melding the two together. 
That's quite powerful" (CEO). 
In conjunction with the formal appraisal system an informal reward policy was 
developed. Initiated by the CEO following EY recommendations, informal 
rewards paid light-hearted but public recognition to individuals that made 
exceptional contributions to the development or operation of the organization or 
team. The informal, social nature of the reward programme was seen to 
encourage personal contribution to and ownership of the organizational 
achievements, breaking the traditional 'command-and-control' hierarchical 
mindset. This in turn strengthened the team culture and reduced resistance to 
change. 
"We made examples of them (exceptional achievers). We've got a 
reward system where you could give each other (team members) 
awards. There were three sets: TAs - thanks for being amazing; 
BAs - bloody amazing; and an MBA - most bloody amazing. So if 
you're on my team and you've done a good job I'd give an award. 
We give people gifts, a bottle of wine or a basket of goodies. At the 
team briefing every month all awards that had been given you 
posted on the notice board. And at the team briefing the person 
who the CEO and everybody feels has made the most contribution 
to the company gets an MBA and dinner for two wherever you like 
whenever you like. That was introduced by (the CEO), it's a good 
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team building thing and meant people were prepared to say This 
has got to change' or This isn't working' and come up with an 
answer" (Coach Project Team). 
Financial incentives were purposefully avoided. Rather positive reinforcement 
through the quarterly review process, investment in staff training and 
development and personal empowerment were utilised as a means to focus 
individuals on the positive effects of change. 
"We do have a bonus system, but bonus systems at the best of 
times are somewhat objective. Even using the four-month review 
period we tie that to bonus and performance payments it's still 
relatively subjective. The way to achieve things is actually just 
saying to people 'Look you're valued here, we respect what you 
are, we respect what you do, get on and do it and your job 
satisfaction should improve'" (CEO). 'They (staff) were given a lot 
of training and encouragement and empowerment was the big word 
as you can imagine and it worked really well" (Coach Project 
Team). 
Fundamental to the cultural change process was the CEO's trust in the abilities 
of his staff. 
'tThe CEO) said that it was OK to try something and make a 
mistake and then say you're sorry and work out how to fix it. He 
preferred that much more than having somebody sit back and be 
worried about making a mistake and never try anything. So he 
really gave us the opportunity to if you're brave enough get in and 
make it (change) happen" (Coach Project Team). 
In a period of just over a year the culture was seen to have fundamentally 
transformed and was recognised by new employees as unique to the New 
Zealand electricity industry. 
'tThe transition from bureaucracy to teams) realistically took twelve 
to eighteen months. But there were so many things that were going 
on that people could actually see change. Again the feedback we 
used to do the reviews every three months, people could actually 
see the change they could measure the change. And we put 
systems in place that allowed them to measure the change, it may 
sound really trite but if you can't measure you can't do it" (CEO). 
'This organization's got such a strong culture of its own that it's very 
distinguishable from other companies. Quite different from 
anywhere else that I've worked in the fact that the team set up and 
nothing's accepted so someone puts a proposal forward it's 
generally challenged" (Company Secretary/Support Operations). 
"People did change noticeably. Pride is the name I would use, pride 
in the company and our achievements. We were given good 
feedback from customers and there was definitely pride in where 
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you worked. Up until then I was very loath to say that I worked at 
Horowhenua Energy and the power board. And we had a vision 
something that we were working towards" (Coach Project Team). 
Concurrent with the process of structural and cultural redevelopment, Electra's 
senior management invested consider~ble resources in the standardisation of 
operational processes and development of infrastructural support systems. In 
the first instance experts in process documentation were engaged to train a 
process team in the methods of capturing organizational processes. Electra's 
documentation team then carefully analysed tasks within each process area to 
compose a standard policy manual, the entire process taking less than a year 
to complete. 
tlDocumentation specialists were brought in to train people. And 
then there was a specific documentation team set up that went 
around and talked to people about all the different processes and 
did documentation of the processes specific to Electra. Then it was 
handed on to operational areas and it was their responsibility to 
maintain the documentation" (Coach Project Team). 
The documentation process fundamentally destroyed the hierarchical power 
structure and culture upon which EPBs rested. 
tiThe CEO of the time said to me he was determined to get the 
control functions out from under the final technicians. He said he 
felt at the time of major change that the technicians held the sway 
of power if you like. They held all the knowledge of how the 
company network ran and he really wanted to get that written down" 
(Coach Network Team). 
The creation of standard and freely available references to operational task 
procedures meant that individuals were forced to share and allow all 
organization team members access to internalised knowledge. 
tlThat was received not very well by some. Like anything else there 
is a bit of pride in what you know and job security basically. That 
was overcome by gentle persuasion and leaning hard on people. If 
they (resistant staff) didn't play the game then (it was) 'Sorry guys-
good bye'. The indication was always there that if you didn't go with 
the flow the outcome for any particular individual was if you didn't 
play the game they'd (management) find some incentive or let you 
go. For a couple of years it was pretty rugged" (Coach Network 
Team). 
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Despite resistance the documentation process went on to provide teams with 
the ability to review operational procedures, standardise procedures and 
develop improved operational policies. 
"It (the documentation process) allowed us to review what we did 
and keep improving from it. It certainly helped in training and 
bringing new people on board was much easier as they didn't have 
to learn by osmosis, everything was written down step by step" 
(Coach Project Team). "Processes were documented well enough 
that people could interchange (roles) quite freely" (Company 
Secretary/Support Operations) "It was good for everybody because 
you learnt personally where things were missing, there were gaps in 
the information where you thought you knew but actually didn't. 
Everybody did the same task in the same way it got everybody into 
process mode if you like instead of going off on a tangent and doing 
things individually. The process is written down if there isn't a 
process then create one we're encouraged to write things down. Its 
probably cost them the earth to do it (the documentation) but in 
theory you can pick up a manual and if you want to know how to 
apply for an outage it's all written down, you just follow the steps" 
(Coach Network Team). 
The documentation process also stimulated growth and development by 
providing Electra's management with the ability to effectively benchmark 
operational and customer service procedures against those implemented in 
other progressive organizations, not necessarily those in the electricity sector. 
"Some of the companies we try to benchmark against we've tried to 
get exchange of information or have exchanged information in 
systems. Power New Zealand, their maintenance systems and 
practices are really good so we try to talk with them and learn from 
them" (CEO). "We refined the processes that we have and try to 
benchmark ourselves against not only local power companies but 
also companies that are delivering frontline service because we 
don't believe that other power companies are the right people to 
benchmark ourselves against" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
"You've got to look at your Telecoms and some of your fuel 
(companies) like Caltex are good, Air New Zealand, Telecom, 
Clear's. People went and visited quite a few of those just to get 
some information" (Coach Sales Team). 
Significant investment in the development of a computer-based information 
database to assist in process streamlining was also associated with the 
documentation process. In early 1994 a Local Area Network (LAN) was 
installed, linking all Electra staff to a central customer and network information 
backbone. 
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"0ne of the big things was we put in a corporate LAN and made all 
the information in the place (organization) available to everyone in 
the company, apart from confidential things like human resource 
files and anything that was strategically confidential. Just being 
able to have the customer information available on your desk or the 
network records through the NIM (Network Information and 
Management) system. One of the big drivers of the project was that 
everyone would be able to dial up on the network and view the 
information any time they wanted to advise customers which was 
quite a different strategy compared to what we had before" (Coach 
Project Team). "We had computers installed on a common LAN 
and if you wanted to look up something then it was usually on the 
LAN you could find it" (Network Manager). 
The development of this new centralised communication tool removed barriers 
to information access and provided all Electra staff with the ability to monitor 
organizational performance, disseminate information and address operational 
problems in real time. A significant consequence of this was improved 
performance and the ability to track real operational costs for the first time. 
"You could focus on the planning, the strategic issues and how can 
we get down our costs. They can now focus on putting together the 
asset management plan, having those listed and making sure that 
they get done. So that was driving down our maintenance costs, 
improving our reliability making sure we had the systems in place 
and the processes to improve that" (Coach Marketing/Project 
Team). 
At the same time the customer accounts system was integrated with the 
network monitoring system, allowing Electra to develop a centralized customer 
call centre. Called 'ServiceLine' and staffed with specially trained personnel, 
the call centre became the primary customer/staff interface, providing 
customers with an avenue to quickly access information and staff the 
opportunity to assess public perception of the organization. 
"We put the information that a customer might ask about in front of 
the person answering the phones so that you just did away with 
having to transfer calls and those sort of things. So simplifying 
(processes) and making sure that people actually had the 
information to do the job right in front of them" (CEO). 'The focus 
was to not only change the way we did things through systems and 
processes but provide them (customers) support. So if they (call 
centre staff) were talking to a customer and had stuff (information) 
on screen they could answer on the spot instead of having to ring 
up and get passed from pillar to post until they (customers) got the 
right person. We put as much information on screen as possible 
and they became customer service reps instead of account clerks. 
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We also gave them training with the IT system the Generation-
Track system that was developed so 90 to 95 percent of the calls 
could be answered first off. We also brought the control centre into 
the office so that it was in our call centre so they (call centre staff) 
knew what was going on. Our objective was customer service" 
(Coach Marketing/Sales). 
To further enhance customer awareness, support and loyalty the marketing 
team established regular customer newsletters and an accredited business 
partner scheme that offered a range of discounted and endorsed products and 
services. Public support for and awareness of the benefits of change was also 
encouraged through the introduction of a price discount scheme. 
"We returned our profit or surpluses by way of discount. Some 
people were saying 'Why don't you just reduce your price'? We did 
not do that for the simple reason that it's (discounting) a powerful 
indicator that you're doing something right in the business and our 
customers have been able to see that. By returning money to them 
by way of discount on the power account they see this company is 
doing something for them, it's doing well and that's a powerful 
influence particularly in the way customers perceive the company, 
they perceive it vel}' positively" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
5.24 Reactive Change in ELL 
Following eighteen months of continuous and radical reconfiguration the 'Target 
'95' March deadline arrived. At that stage Electra's management considered 
the organization as an industry leader prepared for the demands of a 
competitive operating environment. 
"It (change) was about acknowledging we had to lower our costs 
which we did, we had to improve our customer service which we 
did, we had to focus on reliability which we did. We got those 
things right and benchmarked ourselves against others done pretty 
damned well" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). "We realised we 
were one of the leaders" (Coach Project Team). "It's a power 
company that if not at the top is near the top as a power company 
or network management company" (Coach Network Team). 
The organization's size was seen to be particularly influential in allowing the 
rapid implementation of change. 
"We've been able to be nimble and flexible, a lot more so than 
some of the big companies like Mercul}'. It's like turning an ocean 
liner compared to turning a speed-boat. The reengineering and the 
restructuring of the company was able to be completed in a 
relatively short period of time because of the size of us. We could 
throw it up it up in the air and reshuffle it. If we'd been working with 
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five or six hundred people it would have been quite different" 
(Coach Project Team). 
Having refined internal processes and policies to what was seen as industry 
'best-practice', Electra's senior management turned their attention outwards to 
focus on maintaining the impetus for change by focusing on achieving the 
growth and economies of scale targets envisioned by the 'Electra Concept' and 
'Target 2000'. 
"Having cleaned up the 'back-yard' we went out and talked with 
other companies as to whether or not we could offer our 
management services to those companies" (CEO). "Because we'd 
been through all of the changes that we'd been through we had got 
our costs our overheads down to a vel}' good level for 36000 
customers. We knew that if you're looking at customer service, if 
you're looking at the IT systems, the call centre, management billing 
and metering it's all about economies of scale and we knew that we 
wanted to position ourselves for the future we had to grow" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). 'There was the threat of others catching 
up. So we were not sitting back on our achievements and thinking 
we got there" (Coach Project Team). 
Electra actively sought to establish partnerships with several neighbouring 
electricity companies, "basically evel}' company in the lower North Island and a 
few in the top of the South Island" (CEO), selling the operational and financial 
gains associated with utilising Electra's change and asset management 
services. 
"Basically (we were) relying on the improvement that the statistics 
and the key performance indicators that we had. We went out to a 
number of trust owned companies and said 'Hey look we'd like to 
promote what we call the Electra Concept'" (CEO). 
Initial interest in the philosophy and strategic gains associated with the 'Electra 
Concept' was high. 
"We had quite a few people visit and come and look at what we've 
done and you could see they went away vel}' thoughtful" (Coach 
Network Team). lilt was successful to the point where people 
seriously contemplated it" (CEO). "Electra's been out in the forefront 
for the last four or five years. A lot of them (electricity companies) 
have been following us rather than us following them. Electra 
seems to be well thought of in the electricity industl}'" (Coach Sales 
Team). 
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Early progress was secured with the successful formation of a retail electricity-
purchasing collective that provided all participants with the scale necessary for 
discount electricity purchasing. 
"We got together in a club environment and set up a company 
called (PowerBuy' in the wholesale energy market. That was a 
subset of the Electra concept. It (PowerBuy) was half a dozen 
power companies scattered throughout the country all buying their 
power in the wholesale market from that source" (CEO). 
5.24.1 Strategic Change 
However by the end of 1995 it emerged that the operating environment was not 
about to change as quickly or as radically as anticipated by Electra's 
management and potential partners rejected the 'Electra Concept'. Despite 
acknowledging the potential benefits of the approach, Electra's management 
philosophy was perceived by others to be a threat to organizational self-
determination and potentially ownership, employees and income. 
(Trusts have got a real vested interest in owning assets and 
customers and end users" (Coach Marketing Team). 
Citing the lack of radical environmental change and the dominance of the trust 
structure, Electra's management found that managers, organizations and the 
wider industry were neither prepared nor compelled to implement change. 
(~s we got along trust ownership and a few other things (meant) 
change wasn't happening as fast as it think perhaps the board plus 
the management team had anticipated. The barrier was local 
ownership and local management - the trust owned structures is a 
significant barrier to that (Electra's management of assets) 
happening. They (other power companies) could see the benefits 
of it but didn't want to go through the cost of restructuring, or more 
importantly be seen to be laying off people in their local area 
because somebody else from 'outside' was coming into manage 
their power company" (CEO). "We learned that you can't just come 
along with a good story and people will accept it. If the company 
doesn't recognise the need to have that (change) then you're not 
going to be successful. I think what we were trying to do the 
electriCity industry at the time probably didn't believe that these 
things needed to happen and the government hadn't made it 
happen and it hasn't. It just wasn't quite the time we were just a bit 
ahead of our time" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
With the 'Electra Concept' rejected, management withdrew from promoting the 
asset management approach and moved to protect sources of competitive 
advantage. 
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I~t first a lot of companies invited themselves to come through and 
see what we were doing which we did, and then thought hang on 
we're giving away secrets so stopped it that's the only competitive 
advantage that we've got" (Coach Sales Team). 
With the poor response to the 'Electra Concept', Electra's management 
refocused on 'Target 2000' strategies concerned with the evolution of 
processes and competencies to exceed international best practice and become 
a recognised industry leader. 
5.24.2 A Second CEO 
The beginning of 1996 also marked the departure of the CEO, whose three-
year contract came to an end. 
"He had a three year contract and at the end of three years he got 
offered a partnership back at Ernst and Young. He's restructuring 
another company in the communication field so he's the type of guy 
who gets out and does process change" (Coach Sales Team). 
The search for a leader who could carry on the Electra's development in a 
compatible and similar manner began. In mid 1996 the former chief financial 
officer was appointed to the CEO position. Employed as part of the change 
management team in 1992, the new CEO was intimately familiar with the 
changes that had swept through Electra and was committed to seeing the 
continuation of the momentum for change. 
'XThe new CEO) who took over continued with the direction. He 
knew what the hell they (strategies) were about and what to focus 
on - the real things, the core business what our core competencies 
were or needed to be and building the support of the board" (Coach 
Marketing/Project Team). 
The new CEO's personal style was slightly different from his predecessor', but· 
the focus on quality and continuous improvement remained. 
"Both CEO's have acted as an anchor in doing those things 
(change)" (Coach Marketing/Project Team). "He set the strategic 
direction, he's the co-ordinator of all the teams and the liaison 
between the board and the trustees and (is) probably one of the 
more lateral thinkers, vel)l important" (Company Secretal)l/Support 
Operations). "He's a lot more approachable" (Coach Sales Team). 
5.24.3 Structural Change 
The extent of structural change in Electra altered in reaction to the defensive 
stance taken by the wider industry and followed an evolutionary path. In late 
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1996 the contracting arm of Electra was fully corporately separated as 
'UNEwork'. Having separated the operational areas as construction and 
maintenance several years earlier this was not regarded as a significant 
structural change. 
"We set up another company called LlNEwork Limited which held 
our construction and maintenance business. We set that up totally 
stand alone business other than at board level where the board 
comprises two of the Electra board plus the chief executive" (CEO). 
"It was always operated separately anyway so there was no big 
deal - just appoint someone to run it (a) CEO and critical staff and 
send them on their way" (Coach Network Team). 
The motivation for corporate separation was to capitalise on the financial and 
competitive opportunities that contracting presented in the operating 
environment. Contracting had emerged as one of the few areas where 
effective competition had developed in the industry. This provided Electra's 
management the opportunity to fully separate asset management from asset 
maintenance and reduced network maintenance and construction costs 
through the introduction of contestability. 
"LlNEworks is still owned by Horowhenua Energy Limited but 
independent, and they are free to go and seek other business and 
also to do some of our contracting our maintenance and capital 
works those sorts of things. But they don't necessarily get a 
hundred percent of Electra's business" (Coach Marketing/Project 
Team). 'They still had the majority of the business from the parent 
company and they still do (but) that gets less and less" (Coach 
Network Team) 
Having implemented significant change with 'Target '95' (''they had to go 
through the same process of reorganization" (Coach Network Team) 
'UNEwork' sought and gained ISO accreditation, providing the organization 
with the ability to tender for work outside the traditional franchise area based on 
proven operational standards. Despite the advanced systems and procedures 
implemented with 'UNEwork', the financial stresses of competition forced the 
new organization to issue redundancies. 
"The driver was return on assets so' you got to the stage where the 
only way you to increase any return is to shed people. That was 
devastating for some, real devastating for some of those who were 
left behind that suddenly found they were expected to carry on" 
(Coach Network Team). 
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Corporately isolated from this process, the cultural ramifications for Electra 
were minimised. With the separation of 'LiNEwork' from Electra, the 
management core reduced "down to about 18" (CEO), ''we went through huge 
change in the numbers that they dropped off with the splitting of LlNEworks" 
(Company Secretary/Support Operations). 
5.24.4 Cultural Change 
As the government signalled the potential for the separation of electricity 
network and retail functions in 1997, those that remained with Electra focused 
on the continuous refinement of the management support infrastructure to 
provide an exceptional electricity retailing, asset management and customer 
service. While the industry remained entrenched, impetus for the maintenance 
of a culture seeking continuous change was maintained through continuous 
external benchmarking, and in particular participation in national manageme~t 
and service excellent competitions. 
"We went into national quality wards and service excellence awards 
(like) the Arthur Andersen service excellence awards to test 
ourselves against other benchmarks better benchmarks. We were 
up against all sorts of companies in the Arthur Andersen and the 
other quality awards from ASB Bank to Caltex and all those sort of 
organizations in the business of delivering customer service. That 
was extremely important because it forces me to look at yourself 
and how well you're going in order to make the application in the 
first place. So you have to make sure your systems and processes 
are documented they were anyway and it's good feedback for staff 
great feedback for staff' (Coach Marketing/Project Team). 
In 1998 Electra met with success when it won the Arthur Andersen national 
award for service excellence. This recognised Electra for exceptional business 
performance finding that "the service was effective and in some cases brilliant 
and Electra was ahead of all benchmarks for other New Zealand electricity 
companies" (Electra Annual Review, June 1998). The award reinforced to 
Electra's team that they were meeting their vision of leadership in their field. 
5.24.5 Strategy Revisited 
By 1998 the environment was slowly changing. The government's increasing 
demands for reformation of the industry resulted in the introduction of the 
Electricity Industry Reform Act, forcing ownership separation of electricity 
network and retail businesses. This forced the industry to change and provided 
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Electra's management with the opportunity to sell their management 
competencies and the 'Electra Concept' to other organizations. A major step 
towards the realisation of this strategy was taken in 1998 when Electra 
capitalised on call centre and technological competencies that had been 
developed and entered into a joint venture. 
"We put a joint venture together between ourselves and Tasman 
Energy. The joint venture was called Javelin and it does all the 
billing telephone answering remittance processing and credit control 
for the organization. The javelin thing really is a subset of the 
Electra Concept" (CEO). 
Promoted as a way to minimise administration and customer costs through 
scale effects, Javelin was seen as the first move towards Electra becoming an 
asset management company in as envisioned by the CEO six years earlier. 
"Javelin was the same sort of concept (as the 'Electra Concept') 
but only in a partial form so we still thought we could do it" (Coach 
Project Team). 
5.24.6 Attributes of Electra's Change Process 
The change process in Electra is one of transformational change in reaction to 
environmental developments. Concern with maintaining ownership of the 
organization's assets and long term income stream, Electra's board initiated the 
change process by hiring a CEO with the competence for the implementation of 
radical strategic, structural and cultural reconfiguration. Aligned at this top 
level, the board remained aware of, but unlike its predecessor exercised no 
control over, the change process. Driven by the CEO, Electra's senior 
management was completely renewed to provide Electra with the skills and 
abilities necessary for the implementation of change. Electra's size and urban 
location meant facilitated access to a skilled labour pool. With strong 
leadership embedded it became possible to develop a change strategy. 
Fundamental . to this process was the employment of professional change 
management consultants. With an objective approach the consultants provided 
a new perspective and strategic focus for the organization, which fundamentally 
changed the structure and culture of the former EPB. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Chapter Six 
Cross Case Comparison 
This chapter compares the process of organizational change implemented in 
each of the seven electricity companies. Although legislation provided the 
trigger for change and despite each organization beginning the change process 
with the strategic, structural and cultural norms of the traditional operating 
archetype, two distinctly different change types - or clusters - emerged. While 
three of the organizations adapted to environmental shifts and followed an 
incremental change path departing only slightly from the traditional archetype, 
the remainder followed a discontinuous path reorienting their strategy, structure 
and culture to align with the values of a new archetype. 
In support of extant organizational change theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Donaldson, 1995) environmental change was the 
primary trigger for organizational change (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Thompson, 
1967; Isabella, 1992). The choice of ownership and governance structures 
mediated the influence of deregulation on organizational change. The data 
provide strong evidence that this strategic choice and the degree of 
organizational change was a function of how embedded and aligned the values 
of organizational managers and owners were with the norms of the traditional 
electricity archetype, supporting the theories of Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 
1993). I propose that the values of the immediate operating context, 
environment or 'community' influenced the process of organizational change in 
the seven electricity companies. The strength of 'community' values and the 
extent to which they were shared by owners/managers influenced the 
consideration, acceptance and implementation of a new design archetype, 
determining the extent and nature of organizational change. This thesis 
proposes that the nature and scope of organizational change is mediated by 
ownership and governance structures, which are shaped by community and 
institutional norms. 
6.2 The Electricity Archetype and Trigger for Change 
Contributors in each of the organizations that participated in this research made 
reference to the traditional strategy, structure, values and norms that had 
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dominated the electricity industry prior to deregulation. Referred to by many 
respondents as the 'good old days', this institutionalised configuration was 
identified as the traditional electricity industry archetype. 
The traditional electricity archetype was a uniquely discernible configuration of 
strategy, structure and culture that dominated each of the case studies before 
deregulation. In support of Greenwood and Hinings (1993), the development 
and convergence towards this one 'legitimate' archetype can be directly 
attributed to the normative and coercive forces that dominated the institutional 
environment (Fligstein, 1996). In each of the cases fundamental strategic 
components that defined the operation - purpose, domains of operation and 
criteria for evaluation (Schein, 1985) - were determined and reinforced by the 
certainty of an environment supported by the policies of successive central 
governments. This central and externally driven strategy remained unchanged 
for over sixty years and resulted in the institutionalisation of policies (strategy) 
and principles (structure) of organizing that corresponded with the traditional 
Weberian construct (Edelman and Such man, 1997; Greenwood and Hinings, 
1993; Carroll, Delacroix and Goodstein, 1988; Schein, 1985; Thompson, 1967). 
In operational terms, this manifested itself in each of the seven participating 
organizations as a bureaucratic, hierarchical and highly complex task orientated 
structure often ascribed to government departments. The nature of the 
operating environment also had a profound effect on the culture of each of the 
organizations. What emerged was a 'job for life' mentality and a shared 
'electricity brotherhood', based on a culture of engineering where a sense of 
personal pride and achievement was associated with excellence in the 
development of the electricity infrastructure. Based on the strategic, structural 
and cultural characteristics evident in this research and defined as the 
electricity archetype, it is possible to utilise the organizational typology 
developed by Miles and Snow (1978: 5) and categorise each organization 
based on the "patterns of adaptive behaviour" as a 'defender' prior to 
deregulation. 
"Defenders are organizations which have narrow product domains. 
Top managers in this type of organization are highly expert in their 
organization's limited area of operation but do not tend to search 
outside of their domains for new opportunities. As a result of this 
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narrow focus, these organizations seldom need to make major 
adjustments in their technology, structure or methods of operation. 
Instead they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of 
their existing operation" (Miles and Snow, 1978:29). 
However, it is necessary to modify slightly the concept of defender in the 
context of the New Zealand electricity industry. As protected monopolies 
electricity companies were not compelled to invest in aggressive strategies to 
protect the organization from competition and instead followed a passive 
approach that focused on the incremental development of electricity networks 
to provide an effective, rather than efficient, service (Miles and Snow, 1978: 
37). This created strong entry barriers, fostered the evolution of a stable and 
certain operating environment and legitimised the archetype/organizational 
template, generating inertia and resistance to change (Fligstein, 1996; Oliver, 
1992; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Zucker, 1977, 1987,1983; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This also stunted the 
development of technical efficiency within the electricity companies. 
The government's withdrawal of support for the traditional archetype through 
legislation provided the trigger for organizational change (Dobbin and Dowd, 
1997 Isabella, 1992; Singh et ai, 1991; Tichy and Ulrich, 1984). However 
although the timetable for change was proscribed by legislation, the data from 
this research indicate that each organization followed a unique trajectory of 
change and despite each organization sharing a similar regulated institutional 
context, common history, technology and culture, the process and outcome of 
change was Significantly different. ESAs in this study clustered into two clearly 
identifiable groups. Three organizations - BEL, EAL and MPL - implemented 
first-order adaptive change, remaining committed to the community welfare and 
asset retention values of the traditional archetype. The remaining four 
organizations - SPL, DEL, PNZ, ELL - implemented second-order change to 
create a new strategic, structural and cultural template in reference to a new 
commercial archetype focused on wealth creation. Table 6.1 (overleaf) 
provides a compelling overview of the characteristics of archetype inertia and 
transformation in New Zealand electricity companies. The following chapter 
argues that the difference in change trajectories in each case was linked to the 
ownership structure selected by each and the nature and strength of 
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community ties. These two variables ultimately determined the strategic focus 
(community vs. commercial) in each case. 
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Community Involvement 
Influence of Community, High . High Low 
Resistance to Change 
Ownership Involvement 
Strategic Decision Making, Resistance to High High Low 
Change 
Ownership/CEOlManagement Alignment High High High 
Management 
Independence, Leadership, Turnover, Low Low High 
Commercial Experience 
Degree of Strategic Change 
Vision, Alliances/Joint Ventures, Low Low High Customer/Commercial Focus, 
Internal/External Competition, Consultants 
Degree of Structural Change 
Divisionalisation, Decentralisation, . Low ". Low High 
Divestment, Consultants .... .... .. 
Degree of Cultural Change , 
Communication, Redundancies, Low Low High 
Formal Change Programme, Consultants 
StrategiclStructuraVCultural High High Transition ~ High Congruence 
Table 6.1 Characteristics of Archetype Inertia and Transformation in New Zealand Electricity 
Companies 
6.3 Cases of Adaptation - Archetype Inertia 
Of the seven organizations that participated in this research, three - BEL, EAL 
and MPL - underwent a change process that was first-order in nature and 
evolved incrementally in reaction to environmental change (Greiner, 1972; 
Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Tushman et. aI., 1986; Bartunek and Moch, 
1987; Meyer et aI., 1993). All were EPBs prior to corporatisation and the 
dominant belief in each was tha~ consumers were best served by ensuring the 
retention of assets for the community. The adoption of the trust ownership 
structure reinforced these ideals and values, ,resulting in few resources being 
devoted to the development of a significantly different structural and cultural 
configuration, predisposing each to follow a reactive, incremental change 
process. 
6.3.1 The Influence of Ownership Structure 
The selection and development of BEL, EAL and MPL's community trust 
structure was fundamental in charting the strategic change process. Initially the 
government had intended to commercialise the wider electricity sector and 
separate ownership from management in a manner similar to that developed in 
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SOEs through the Energy Companies Act (1992) (Spicer, 1996). However the 
government's inability to secure control of property rights meant that the 
incumbent board of each EPB had the opportunity to consult the community 
and determine an ownership structure that would secure the status quo, even 
after corporatisation. The inability or unwillingness of the owners of BEL, EAL 
and MPL to consider an alternative configuration of ownership structure is 
indicative of their commitment to the traditional electricity archetype 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; 1993). This supports the thesis of Greenwood 
and Hinings (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; 1993) that archetype inertia 
occurs where the values and ideals of organizational elite are consistent with 
and strongly embedded in the prevailing interpretive scheme. 
However inertia in these cases was not only a product of embedded ness within 
the institutional environment, but also embedded ness within the local 
community environment. The proactive determination to maintain the 
ownership of electricity network assets for the community evident in BEL, EAL 
and MPL is indicative of this. Privatisation threatened ongoing local ownership 
of assets and the impact of such changes- employment and financial - was 
identified by BEL, EAL and MPL as detrimental to the economic and social well 
being of the community. In all the three cases the organization and 
organizational elite were so strongly embedded within the community that the 
impetus for change remained focused on retaining ownership and control of the 
assets in local hands. The boards of BEL, EAL and MPL therefore lobbied for 
and, due to the government's inability to force otherwise, eventually won the 
right to adopt the community trust form. This empowered trustees with voting 
and distribution rights over tradable shares and required them to act on behalf 
and in the best interests of consumers in a mariner similar to the past (Farley, 
1994; Electricity Task Force, 1989). 
The selection of the trust structure had significant implications for the extent 
and process of organizational change in each case. Following the recognition 
of the trust structure in the Energy Companies Act (1992), BEL, EAL and MPL 
were no longer threatened by "asset expropriation" but were instead legally 
obliged to develop and operate in the best interests of the community. This 
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philosophy remained at odds with the government's intent, but allowed BEL, 
EAL and MPL to more or less maintain the status quo. Accordingly, although 
each organization was required to operate in a more commercial manner by 
government, this did not engender a radical shift in strategy, structure or culture 
but instead placed operational demands on the board and management of 
each that resulted in reactive and incremental changes. Furthermore, with trust 
members elected from within the community by local electricity consumers, the 
strategic direction of BEL, EAL and MPL remained closely aligned with the 
public service values and ideals associated with the traditional power board 
archetype. These two factors - a legal compulsion to act in the best interest of 
the community and public ownership of an organization with strong community 
ties - shaped the nature of organizational change. 
The effect that public ownership had on the process and extent of change in 
BEL, EAL and MPL supports the propositions of Meyer and Zucker (1989) that 
public ownership creates inertia. Meyer and Zucker (1989) argue that public 
ownership prevents change for two reasons; first because the costs and 
benefits of change are diffused and second, as is seen in these cases, there is 
a perceived lack of benefit from private ownership. Change was not welcomed 
as it posed a threat to the existence of each organization and ultimately to the 
welfare of the community - the traditional focus of ESAs. With the trust 
structure preserving strong and direct community ties, the trustees of BEL, EAL 
and MPL remained strongly influenced by the immediate environmental 
context. These strong bonds prevented strategic management from 
conSidering changes that could potentially threaten the values, ideals and 
longevity of both organization and community (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988). 
These organizational and community forces for inertia determined the 
ownership structure selected for BEL, EAL and MPL and therefore the nature 
and extent of change. 
6.3.2 The Influence of Leadership 
The incremental nature of the changes implemented in BEL, EAL and MPL was 
strongly reflected in the appointment and selection process of each 
organization's CEO and senior management. Kanter (1983), Nadler and 
Tushman (1990; 1989), Nadler et al. (1995) suggest that the composition and 
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selection of organizational leaders - in these cases the board and senior 
management - plays a critical role in determining the nature and extent of 
organizational change. It is argued that during a time of upheaval, a lack of 
significant change in the ranks of organizational decision-makers, the 'dominant 
coalition' (Thompson, 1967), affects an organization's ability to change, as 
strategic decision-makers may not possess the skills, ability, knowledge or 
willingness to adapt (Newman, 2000; Kotter, 1995). This thesis is well covered 
in literature both academic and popular (e.g. Peters and Waterman, 1982) and 
our data supports this well explored issue. 
In BEL, EAL and MPL all three boards appointed an industry-insider to the 
position of chief executive. In 1988, the board of BEL appointed a long serving 
accountant from within the company as the new CEO. This appointment was 
necessitated by the retirement of both the incumbent chief engineer and the 
treasurer. In 1988, the board of EAL changed the title of its incumbent Chief 
Engineer/General Manager to that of CEO. In early 1988, the board of MPL 
appointed an accountant who had been with the electricity industry for more 
than 20 years as its new CEO. Furthermore, as board appointees, directors 
could ensure that the mindset and focus of each CEO was aligned with their 
somewhat conservative strategic aims for the organization - and therefore 
indirectly with the aims of trustees and the local community. Of note is that the 
CEO of MPL initially viewed himself as a transition manager and embraced the 
liberalization theme of the deregulatory legislation, advancing a semi-
privatisation proposal that would see the sale of shares to an outside investor. 
However MPL's board viewed the legislation differently and prevailed upon him 
to change his views. 
The appointment of senior management to 'new' positions during the 
restructuring of each organization followed a similar process. While the 
structure of BEL, EAL and MPL changed to meet legislative requirements, little 
other than the formalization and separation of the financial relationship between 
each historic department was required. This incremental structural 
development did not challenge the operational boundaries present within each 
case, and fundamentally resulted in the CEO 'renaming' existing positions to 
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conform to the industry's emergent terminological norms and 'reassigning' 
existing senior management. While this conforms to the archetypal 'job-for-life' 
approach and the cultural unacceptability of redundancy, the CEOs of BEL, 
EAL and MPL justified this measure as being borne out of necessity rather than 
tradition. Each CEO cited the size, lack of resources available to and isolation 
of each organization as factors that reduced their ability to attract new 
management with the skills necessary for the implementation of radical change. 
Consequently managerial positions were filled in a traditional manner based on 
a length of service, rather than on merit. 
In support of Kanter (1983) Nadler and Tushman (1990; 1989), Nadler et al. 
(1995) and Hambrick (1987), the lack of change made to the ranks of senior 
management found its ultimate expression in the inertia experienced by BEL, 
EAL and MPL. Just as with the trust board, the CEO and senior managers were 
drawn from within a local community that generally supported the traditional 
strategy of ESAs. As a result, lacking input from commercially experienced 
'new blood', the 'dominant coalition' (Thompson, 1967: 135) remained 
homogeneous, introspective and committed to the values and ideals of the 
traditional electricity archetype. 
Furthermore, although ownership and management were forced to separate in 
a legal sense to promote economic efficiency (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the 
strength of community ties held by the trust and management overrode agency-
based principles that motivated this split. Embedded in a community with direct 
interests in the organization at a cultural and financial level, the trust and 
management were bound to the implementation of a common defensive 
strategy (Miles and Snow, 1978) that would preserve the status quo for the 
benefit of that same community and ultimately themselves. Consequently 
internal pressure for radical change was not evident, for strategic management 
explicitly shared the operating values held by the board of trustees, which 
created an aligned set of preferences, or strategic predisposition for a course of 
'in'-action (Hinings et ai, 1996; Beyer, 1981). As a result, despite the formal 
separation of owners from management, the board of trustees determined the 
nature and extent of organizational change in BEL, EAL and MPL, which 
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authorised each organization's CEO to introduce adaptive changes that would 
ensure legislative demands and community expectations were met. This 
supports the arguments of Greenwood and Hinings (1996) that organizations 
more embedded in and aligned with their institutional context (archetype 
congruence) are less likely to undertake transformational change than 
organizations less embedded. It also suggests in extension to their argument 
that embedded ness may be linked to ownership, control and the strength of 
community ties. While Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993, 1996) proposed 
that embedded ness affects the organizational change process, they did not 
empirically investigate the cause of this phenomenon. This research therefore 
contributes significantly to the understanding of the forces contributing to 
organizational embedded ness and the effects this has on the organizational 
change process. 
Meanwhile, although there was external pressure for more radical change from 
central government, BEL, EAL and MPL ability to meet all legislative 
requirements meant that the government was legally and politically hamstrung 
and unable to force more change without further legislation. While deregulation 
provided the trigger for radical change in other organizations, the trust 
ownership structure with its overriding concern for community welfare overrode 
commercial concerns in BEL, EAL and MPL. This resulted in a· lack of 
motivation for radical archetype change from the trust, CEO or senior 
management. 
6.3.3 The Ownership - Management Relationship and Adaptive Change 
The determination to preserve the status quo exhibited by the trust and 
management of BEL, EAL and MPL meant that the degree of strategic, 
structural and cultural change in each organization was minimal. Such 
coherence to the norms and values of the past even during a period of 
upheaval conforms to Greenwood and Hinings' (1988, 1993,1996) definition of 
organizational inertia. The dominance qf the traditional archetype's 'prevailing 
set of assumptions' (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993: 1071), in part encouraged 
by the strength of organizational ties with the local community, fundamentally 
determined the extent and nature of the change process in BEL, EAL and MPL. 
With the community, owners and senior management inextricably intertwined, 
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the adaptation of each organization to meet the demands of a deregulated 
environment was interpreted and implemented through the frame of the 
traditional archetype (Giddens, 1979; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Weick, 
1995). The inability for legislation to force more radical frame-breaking change 
(Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Tushman et ai, 1986;) only served to reinforce the 
legitimacy of this interpretation and approach. Consequently, irrespective of 
the potential for radical change and the developments of other organizations, 
BEL, EAL and MPL management and owners were either unable (Newman, 
2000) or unwilling to consider an alternative structural, strategic or cultural 
configuration during a time of environmental upheaval. 
6.3.3.1 Strategic Adaptation 
The ramifications of continued archetype coherence for the strategic 
development of BEL, EAL and MPL were clear as each organization 
maintained a focus on the historic strategic objective of providing and ensuring 
the effective delivery of electricity. Of note is that these strategies were 
internally generated, reliant on the vision, skills and abilities of the board and 
management, rather than those of consultants external to the firm. 
Organizational change literature, in particular Tushman et ai, (1986) and Tichy 
and Ulrich (1984), has identified that to overcome inertia and encourage 
discontinuous change requires the introduction of new ideas and development 
of understanding through the inclusion of 'new blood' or opinions outside the 
organization. Where the ranks of 'organizational elite' (Hinings et ai, 1996: 885) 
- strategic management- remain unchanged during a period of upheaval, 
understanding the implications of change are reduced and the likelihood of 
inertia increases (Newman, 2000). Where companies follow conventional 
presumptions to maintain strategic fit during a time of change, strategic 
ambitions are restricted to those that can be met with available resources 
preserving consistency through conformity of behaviour that focuses on 
achieving traditional, formal objectives (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). Where 
organizations take such a strategic approach, this suggests that an inverted U-
shaped relationship can develop between the extent of environmental and 
organizational change (Newman, 2000). The experience of BEL, EAL and MPL 
235 
supports this position. As the extent of change in the operating environment 
increased the ability and willingness of these organizations to respond reduced. 
The only significant strategic development in each case was the growth of the 
marketing function. Taking cues from state owned generation companies, BEL, 
EAL and MPL established a marketing programme that promoted the 
organization and the use of electricity. EAL in particular devoted a significant 
amount of resources to this, winning awards for their campaign. However the 
development of a formal and 'commercial' type marketing approach neither 
challenged nor changed the prevailing archetype. Instead it reinforced the 
importance of the electricity company's role as an essential public service in 
each community. Further, unlike the other companies in this study, BEL, EAL 
and MPL did not diversify or enter into strategic alliances. Electrical network 
(contracting) services continued to be provided 'in-house', the threat to local 
jobs considered too high to consider outsourcing. Paradoxically, all three 
companies made intermittent attempts to win tenders for work outside their 
region that met with varied success. BEL in particular did consider the 
possibility of pursuing several other strategic options. The CEO of BEL met 
with the head of a neighbouring company to discuss the possibility of a 
collaborative approach or merger to realise potential synergies in electricity 
supply shortly following his appointment. However the proposal was aborted 
without fully exploring opportunities and costs, as the move was not seen to 
offer significant benefits to their respective communities by the management 
and board of both organizations. In another project that conformed to the 
strategic norms of the traditional electricity focus, BEL sought government 
permission to develop generation capacity, a scheme that the board and 
management believed would benefit the country through the provision of 
additional capacity and community through employment. However this project 
was denied resource consent, the government citing conservation concerns, 
much to the chagrin of the community, which bolstered popular and 
organizational resistance to further institutional change. 
Events in BEL, EAL and MPL support Tushman et ai, (1986), Tichy and Ulrich 
(1984), Hinings et al (1996) and Newman (2000), providing evidence that 
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without change in the ranks of organizational elite the motivation and ability to 
implement strategic change during a period of environmental upheaval is 
significantly reduced. This research extends this argument further and 
suggests that even where the motivation for strategic change exists, as in MPL, 
the strength of the community-board, community-management and 
management board relationship and the values that underlie this relationship 
determine the strategic change process. That is the extent and nature of 
strategic organizational change relies not only on the skills and ability of the 
organizational elite but also, particularly in cases where strong community ties 
magnify the social implications of organizational change, the support of wider 
organizational stakeholders. This makes explicit the argument that 
organizational change must be viewed as a political process, with the extent 
and scope of change reliant on the strength of the bonds between ownership, 
governance and the community (Meyer and Zucker, 1989). 
6.3.3.2 Structural Adaptation 
Just as strategic change was limited in scope in BEL, EAL and MPL, so too 
was structural change. When an institutional template is so embedded in the 
psyche it is considered the right way to organize (Oliver, 1992) change is 
unlikely unless stimulated by radical environmental upheaval. However even 
during a period of change, organizations take divergent paths that see some 
remain aligned to traditional structural configurations. Hinings et al (1996) 
suggest from empirical data that there is a strong correlation between the 
values held by the 'elite' (organizational owners/management) and the 
manifestation of an organization's structure that can explain this divergence. 
Where values of organizational elite remain unchanged the structure remains 
tied to what is regarded as the legitimate traditional template (Oliver, 1992). I 
believe this proposition can be extended suggest that the strength of 
community ties maintained by organizational elite (personal embeddedness in 
the local operating context) also influences structure. Where organizational-
community ties are strong, the values of· the local operating context permeate 
the decision making process of organizational elite to create a strong alignment 
of values that fundamentally influences the scope and extent of structural 
change. 
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This phenomenon was apparent in all three cases, with many respondents 
claiming that they 'ignored' the developments of other electricity companies. 
While BEL, EAL and MPL all undertook a reorganization of departments to 
meet legislative requirements, the structural ramifications were limited to the 
renaming of traditional functional areas and the formalisation of internal 
financial relationships. This initiated an investment in infrastructure to bring 
financial reporting abilities up to the standard required by the government. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the development of computer systems that 
would allow more accurate tracking of records, billing functions and assets. 
Interestingly this was also the only area where consultants were employed in 
any of the three organizations to assist in the change process. However 
although this infrastructural development process was a significant 
development, it was fundamentally the adaptive refinement of existing systems. 
These changes did not result in significant structural changes involving the 
creation or divestment of functional areas or affect employees and the local 
community through downsizing. Instead each remained rooted in what 
Spencer (1994) terms the 'mechanistic paradigm', where managers think, 
employees do (Clemmer, 1992; Burns and Stalker, 1961 b). Inertia was 
embedded at the organizational level; change was 'perceived' by owners and 
management as an unnecessary challenge to the organization's established 
structure and routine as there was no discernible benefit for the organization's 
performance or the community's well being. The cases of BEL, EAL and MPL 
were therefore stuck, focused on traditional core competencies that became 
core rigidities and halted structural change (Barnett et aI., 1994; Burgelman, 
1994; Leonard-Barton, 1992). While the potential to create the momentum for 
radical structural change was present with the deregulation of the operating 
environment, it was not realised as the strength of the traditional archetype and 
community ties prevented organizational leaders from considering alternative 
configurations. 
This inertia during a time of environmental change supports the proposition of 
Hinings et al (1996) that significant changes in organizational structure can 
occur only when the values of the organizational elite are 'revised or re-
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assessed' (888) or replaced (Tushman et ai, 1986; Tichy and Ulrich, 1984). 
This also provides evidence of the need for popular support of a change 
initiative where community-organization ties are strong. 
6.3.3.3 Cultural Adaptation 
As a consequence of the lack of strategic and structural change, the traditional 
culture of BEL, EAL and MPL remained mostly intact. Organizational culture is 
defined as a set of beliefs and values shared by organizational members and is 
therefore a critical component in instituting change as it communicates in an 
unwritten manner 'how things ought to be done' (Schein, 1969, 1985; Smircich, 
1983; Meyer, 1982; O'Reilly, 1989). A formal cultural change programme was 
not instigated in any of the cases of inertia. However while the macho, 
engineering, public service culture of the past continued to dominate each 
organization, a shift away from focusing on effectiveness to efficiency did drive 
itself through each organization. Although not a radical shift, this cultural 
change was driven both by emergent institutional pressures and internal CEO 
driven policies for financial accountability. However the community focus in 
BEL, EAL and MPL continued to dominate expenditure decisions, essentially 
preserving the public service culture. For example BEL continued to advertise 
in the local newspaper to ensure its survival. 
This institutionally driven cultural shift had its most obvious impact on the 
CEO's position, with accounting experience coming to the fore over and above 
that of engineering. However while the CEO in each case may have been 
recently appointed, he was an industry and/or organizational insider with 
several years of experience and, just as importantly, an established member of 
the community. Similarly with no changes forced upon the locally sourced 
management team, a close sense of kinship was evident based upon shared 
organizational and community experiences, values and ideals. While such 
'bonds' provided the basis for good performance (Michel and Hambrick, 1992) 
during a period of stability, during a period of environmental uncertainty, which 
had the perceived potential to threaten both the organization and community, 
these bonds promoted a wariness and resistance to institutional change among 
the organizational elite. Consequently each organization withdrew to a 
defensive position and the organizational culture, or 'way of life', changed little. 
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While some devolution of decision-making did occur, the management style 
and culture in each of the three cases remained autocratic, hierarchical, 
centralised and mechanistic with the CEO maintaining a firm control of day-to-
day operational affairs. Communication remained informal in nature and there 
was a low level of formalisation in job descriptions. Yet this managerial style 
did not appear to cause obvious friction within the organization, at least at the 
senior management level, as the directive manner in which business was 
conducted was an accepted and established norm. 
6.3.4 Summary 
Despite the opportunity for radical change presented by deregulation, BEL, 
MPL and EAL maintained the traditional configuration of strategy, structure, 
culture associated with the electricity archetype, conforming to Greenwood and 
Hinings' (1988, 1993, 1996) definition of archetype inertia. Inertia had a 
momentum of its own, the product of a lack of changes made at the ownership 
and governance level and a determination to preserve ownership and control in 
the local community. While the ownership structure selected by the community 
mirrored that of the past, and the ranks of senior management remained 
unchanged, each organization remained strongly embedded in the traditional 
values and beliefs of the electricity archetype and local community. 
Consequently a defensive (Miles and Snow, 1978) strategic position emerged 
in BEL, EAL and MPL that remained focused on the organization continuing to 
meet the electricity and welfare needs of the community by ensuring asset 
retention and control. 
This strategic predisposition limited the structural configurations considered 
valid by agents in BEL, EAL and MPL, precluding the introduction of radical 
organizational change and significantly reduced the effect of deregulation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Meyer and Zucker, 1989). 
Organizational decision-makers did not share government's opinion of the 
appropriateness of the change programme. This triggered a cautious adaptive 
change process that remained aligned to the values of the traditional electricity 
archetype. Consequently changes implemented in BEL, EAL and MPL were 
primarily structural developments of the first-order, remained congruent with the 
prevailing interpretive scheme and strongly affected the development of the 
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operating environment (Giddens, 1979; Ranson et. aI., 1980; Hinings and 
Greenwood, 1988; Weick, 1995). Further, as the government faltered in its 
change timetable and with public ownership diffusing 'the costs and benefits of 
organizational performance', there was no cognition of a looming 'performance 
crisis' (Oliver, 1992: 568) and therefore little urgency for radical organizational 
and institutional change (D'Aunno et ai, 2000: 684). 
6.4 Cases of Recreation - Archetype Transformation 
In stark contrast to the process of change in the previous cases, SPL, DEL, 
PNZ and ELL all invested significant resources into aggressively transforming 
their strategic, structural and cultural configuration with the aim of developing a 
commercially focused operation. The dominant ideology in each of these cases 
was that the organization could best benefit the community by implementing a 
commercially focused corporate strategy fundamentally different from the past. 
However although each case shared this common objective, the motivation for 
change was different. SPL and DEL, MEDs prior to corporatisation, both 
followed a radical and anticipatory change process to secure ownership of the 
electricity company. PNZ and ELL are interesting in the sense that although 
they were originally EPBs, in stark contrast to their peers, they also followed a 
radical, anticipatory change process but rather than seeking to secure 
ownership instead sought to enhance the value of the organization in 
anticipation of privatisation. However despite this contrast in motivations the 
corporate rationale upon which change was predicated resulted in the process 
of organizational change in each case following a fundamentally similar 
trajectory to DEL and SPL. 
6.4.1 The Influence of Ownership Structure 
Unlike the inertia present in the previous cases, the customary owners of SPL, 
DEL, PNZ and ELL each looked beyond the strategic and structural 
confinement of the traditional archetype to seize the opportunity for radical 
organizational change - archetype transformation (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1988). The initial step in this change process was the creation of a corporate 
ownership structure significantly different from the past that would enable each 
organization to secure significant commercial advantages, government 
endorsement and, in turn, provide the basis for the institutionalisation of a new 
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organizational template. The strategic choice to follow a corporate rather than 
'community' ideology provides a major point of departure from the earlier cases 
and highlights the importance that ownership plays in shaping the dynamics of 
organizational and institutional change. These cases challenge the 
functionalist notion that the environment determines organizational 
characteristics (Donaldson, 1987; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991), and support a view that organizational change is a political 
process involving both proactive and reactive initiatives that can influence the 
environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Child, 1997). 
The influence of changes to the ownership structure on the institutional 
environment and organizational change process is captured particularly well by 
the cases of SPL and DEL. Alerted to the likelihood of reform in 1987 after the 
corporatisation of the New Zealand Electricity Division (NZED), the MEDs of the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) and Dunedin City Council (DCC) were 
corporatised in anticipation of the Energy Companies Act (1992). The primary 
concern for both councils was to provide evidence that municipal ownership 
would not compromise the commercial operation of the MEDs. The process in 
which corporatisation was implemented in both MEDs followed a similar path. 
The CCC and DCC first established an independent review committee to 
recommend immediate changes to the governance structure and operations of 
its MED in anticipation of deregulation requiring such change. Both committees 
established that preservation of ownership could only be achieved by 
separating of ownership and control in a fashion similar to that implemented by 
the government in other SOEs. The SOE model implemented by the 
government saw the reduction of political control of organizations based on 
operating principles that required organizations to run as successful businesses 
with managers, guided by a board of directors modelled on the private sector, 
responsible for establishing commercially viable operating strategies. This 
belief in the need for owner-manager, separation had developed out of the 
theoretical statements of agency theory, which argue that organizational 
efficiency and change can be encouraged only through the development of 
independent management empowered to act in the best interests of the 
organization (Fama, 1980). Accordingly the DCC (1988) and CCC (1989) 
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appointed independent boards of commercially experienced directors and 
charged them with ensuring that each electricity company was developed along 
corporate lines. The separation of ownership and control reduced the 
traditional political/community forces that had in the past influenced the 
strategic and structural development of the MEDs. This affected the extent of 
organizational change and the development of the institutional environment, 
particularly after the government, having seen it in operation, endorsed the 
legitimacy of this configuration in the Energy Companies Act (1992). 
Although EPBs, the process of organizational change in PNZ and ELL both 
present an interesting contrast to that implemented in BEL, EAL and MPL. In a 
manner similar to these organizations, PNZ and ELL's predecessors had 
transferred the ownership of their assets to trusts after the Energy Companies 
Act (1992). However, unlike BEL, EAL and MPL the trustees of PNZ and ELL 
looked beyond the frame of the traditional archetype and anticipated the 
eventual privatisation of their electricity assets. Consequently rather than 
implement a strategy intent on retaining ownership and control, both sought to 
enhance the value of their assets with a long-term view to divestment. As the 
present CEO of ELL observed: 'The expectation was that someone would 
come along with big fat cheque book and that would be it". Therefore PNZ and 
ELL followed a change trajectory similar to SPL and DEL that focused on 
creating new institutional norms and resulted in the separation of ownership 
and control through the development of a corporate structure and a commercial 
strategy. 
The change trajectory of PNZ was the most convoluted of all the organizations 
in this research having been formed in 1994 as a result of the merger of former 
EPBs Waitemata Electricity (WEL) and Valley Power (VPL). As the initiator of 
the merger and the larger of the two organizations, the management 
philosophies, strategy, structure and culture of WE was dominant. The EPB 
that had established WEL had done so ih anticipation of major changes to the 
electricity industry following the Electric Power Board Amendment Act (1989) 
and (1990). In 1991 WEL trustees, in anticipation of further change, appointed 
a new board composed of individuals with commercial experience; particularly 
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influential in determining the trust's direction was a former Member of 
Parliament that had been involved in the development of earlier electricity 
reforms. The reconfiguration of the board and the trust's insistence on the 
development of a corporate and commercially viable enterprise saw the formal 
distancing Of ownership from management and provided the board the freedom 
to re-evaluate and change the strategic and structural configuration of the 
organization. The first indication of corporatisation involved the renaming of the 
organization to PNZ in' an attempt to change the public's perception and 
distance the 'new' operation from the past. The timing of change in ELL was 
more akin to that of BEL, EAL and MPL in that corporatisation occurred only 
after the Energy Companies Act (1992). However unlike those cases of 
adaptive change ELL's trustees, like PNZ, appointed and empowered a new 
board to develop the organization in anticipation of further environmental 
change. However while the trust encouraged the company to launch radical 
changes internally, it was less supportive of external moves to form joint 
ventures and alliances. 
Although motivated to change for different reasons - asset retention in the case 
of SPL and DEL, wealth creation in WEL (hereafter referred to as PNZ) and 
ELL - the customary owners of each organization acknowledged the need for 
change, primarily based on changes effected in SOEs. Unlike the cases of 
BEL, EAL and MPL, the boards in these cases understood the commercial 
imperatives for change and were prepared to implement change to align their 
organizations with this 'corporatisation' movement. There were several 
perceived benefits in doing so, including the ability to extract substantial 
financial gains through operational developments and from the spin-off effects 
that government recognition of their particular organizational form as the 
legitimate configuration would provide (Meyer and Zucker, 1989). The effect 
was the separation of managerial and ownership interests within each 
organization. StrategiC and operational, concerns became the sole concern of 
organizational managers rather than owners and provided strategic 
management in each case with the authority and freedom to develop a new 
corporate focus, effectively eroding the influence and constraints of the 
traditional archetype. This indicates that the values and ideals of organizational 
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elite were not as strongly embedded in the norms of the traditional institutional 
archetype and again adds weight to the thesis of Greenwood and Hinings 
(1988, 1993). New board members, having been appointed (rather than 
elected) based on commercial experience and for the sole purpose of 
implementing change, brought with them a new perspective to the operation of 
the electricity companies that challenged the traditional archetype and made it 
possible to transform these organizations. 
When referring to the cases of archetype inertia, the effects of owner-
management separation and corporatisation on DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL most 
strongly impacted upon the ability of the community to influence the change 
process. Although the implementation of change had been predicated on the 
traditional notion that it would benefit the community in a manner somewhat 
similar to BEL, EAL and MPL, unlike these cases, the separation of owners-
managers meant that management was accountable to the board in a purely 
commercial/financial sense. As a result the community could not affect the 
organization's strategy through the application of pressure on the board or 
council as had happened in the past. That the boards of DEL, SPL, PNZ and 
ELL initiated such a radical change in itself suggests that the board-community 
relationship was not as strong an influence in the organization as was obvious 
in the previous cases. This supports to the argument of this thesis that 
community embedded ness influences the process and extent of organizational 
change. 
Unlike BEL, EAL and MPL that were based in small townships where the 
electricity company was a significant contributor to the economic and social 
well-being of the community, DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL were based in larger 
urban centres. This distanced the organization and organizational decision-
makers from the community, the effect being that there were no direct ties to 
the community. The effects of organizational change had a less obvious impact 
on the welfare (social/financial) of the larger community, as each organization 
was only one of several large employers. This distance provided the board of 
each anonymity and freedom to implement radical change without fear of 
personal repercussions and enabled them to assess in a more objective 
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fashion the costs and benefits of archetype change. I therefore suggest that 
through ownership-management separation, organizational and community 
forces for inertia were minimised and provided a basis upon which radical 
organizational change - archetype transformation - could be launched. 
6.4.2 The Influence of Leadership 
Although the owner-manager separation was fundamental to the organizational 
change process, this alone did not stimulate the necessary strategic, structural 
and cultural reconfiguration. In order to achieve the degree of change required 
for organizational transformation, boards recognised that it was necessary to 
import and develop a new strata of strong leaders with professional skills 
required in a commercial environment (Newman, 2000; Nadler and Tushman, 
1989, 1990; Kotter, 1995). 
The first step in this process was the recruitment of a new CEO. As highlighted 
earlier in the cases of archetype inertia, the CEO is recognised in change 
literature as a fundamental force for transformational change (Shaw, 1995; Van 
de Ven and Poole, 1995; Kanter, 1983; Tichy and Ulrich, 1984). Although 
organizational change in these cases was sparked both in anticipation of or 
reaction to environmental upheaval, new organizational leaders with 
commercial skills, abilities and perspectives were explicitly and proactively 
sought out to initiate transformational organizational or archetype change 
(Tushman et ai, 1986; Schein, 1985). In the cases of SPL and ELL the board 
recognised this requirement without outside assistance. In SPL, the board 
appointed a new CEO that had previously been a general manager in the MED 
and also involved in the corporatisation of the NZED. As an engineer with 
formal marketing skills acquired during his time with ECNZ, he possessed a 
diversity of skills and abilities that would allow him to exploit traditional and non-
traditional areas of the organization to promote development in a new 
commercial environment. Similarly ELL's board sought to replace the 
incumbent CEO, who they felt was unsuitable for the new emerging 
environment. The board wanted a CEO that would extract the best from and 
prepare the organization for a competitive environment should there be a need 
for divestment. The position was advertised and they appointed an individual, 
on a three-year contract, with no experience in the electricity industry but a 
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background in management consulting and specialist knowledge of the 
computer industry. In DEL and PNZ, professional management consultants 
were employed to systematically review the organization prior to the 
employment of a new CEO. In both instances consultants recommended 
sweeping changes and urged that these begin at the top with the appointment 
of new senior managers capable of implementing a growth strategy. As a 
result, the incumbent CEOs of DEL and PNZ were let go and new individuals 
appointed. Similar to SPL, DEL's CEO was originally an engineer but had 
developed accounting skills during his time with another, but state-owned, 
electricity company. PNZ also selected a new CEO for his abilities in both the 
traditional (engineering) and emerging (marketing) operating paradigms, proven 
during his time at ECNZ as national manager of electricity marketing. As the 
current CEO noted, the appointee was considered part of a 'new breed' of 
professional managers appearing within the sector. That boards in DEL, SPL, 
PNZ and ELL sought the employment of change agents in a proactive manner 
and explicitly provided these CEOs with a clear mandate for change illustrates 
further the effect that the corporate structure had in distancing the organization 
from the constraints of the traditional electricity archetype. Without owner-
management separation and the subsequent development of a corporate 
mindset within the board, this thesis argues that these organizations would not 
have considered radical changes to the CEO's position as this went against the 
inherent 'job-for-life' mentality. The effects on the change process would have 
been substantial, as the board would have remained embedded in and 
constrained by the institutional norms of the traditional archetype. 
The appointment of new CEOs had immediate implications for the wider 
organization, the first impact was felt in the ranks of senior management. 
Oliver (1992) asserts that changes to the composition of this 'dominant 
coalition' of senior management are a fundamental and necessary precursor to 
the successful implementation of transformational change. Others (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1990; Goss et ai, 1993; Hambrick, 1987) highlight that the 
composition, individual skills and abilities and interpersonal relations of the 
dominant coalition are a fundamental determinant of the success of a 
transformational change initiative. Where the CEOs in the cases of archetype 
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inertia were constrained by institutional and community norms, in each of the 
cases of transformational change the CEO was free to review the dominant 
coalition to ensure their alignment with the new commercial needs of the 
organization. Although the process in which this was done differed within 
cases, the result was the same as each CEO implemented significant changes. 
In SPL and PNZ, the CEO assembled a 'dominant coalition' (Thompson, 1967) 
from people he had previously worked with on similar projects in other 
organizations. This provided a basis from which rapid organizational change 
and performance gains made, as a 'team' culture and interpersonal/working 
relationships had already been established (Hambrick, 1997). In DEL and ELL 
the CEOs relied on management consultants to recommend changes. 
Subsequently all senior management positions were advertised and filled 
predominantly by individuals from within the firm. However, that these positions 
were filled internally did not seem to hinder the organization change process, 
possibly because new appointments were selected for the specific purpose of 
implementing change, shared a common bond, were younger than the 
incumbents and enthusiastic to implement strategies that had been suppressed 
in the 'old regime'. The changes implemented in the 'dominant coalition' 
(Thompson, 1967) of each of these organizations ensured the development of 
a common mindset around the CEO and board's vision for the future corporate 
development of the organization (Hambrick, 1987). While it did not eliminate 
debate and arguments, these changes did ensure that there was a shared 
awareness of the need for change and an ability to communicate at a 
professional level, unhindered by the values and ideals of the traditional 
archetype (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). The changes implemented at the 'top' 
of the organization signalled a clear departure from the past and generated an 
internal pressure for the implementation of change. 
The ownership-management separation was fundamental to the 
transformational change process implemented in DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL. 
Unlike the cases of archetype inertia, this split had been made on the proviso 
that it would promote economic efficiency (Fama and Jensen, 1983) in the 
name of asset retention in the cases of DEL and SPL, and wealth generation in 
PNZ and ELL. Owner-manager separation extracted each organization from 
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institutional and community norms in which they were embedded and, with a 
corporate management structure, granted managerial authority to a new 
'dominant coalition'. This removed the dynamic constraints of the 
organization's past and provided the CEO (the key driver in each of these 
cases) with the resources and mandate to proactively scan for and develop 
solutions to organizational issues beyond the scope considered legitimate in 
the traditional archetype (Miles and Snow, 1978: 20-21). Consequently, rather 
than follow a defensive strategy to maintain the status quo like the cases of 
archetype inertia, the CEOs of DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL sought to create 
opportunities and meet strategic goals through the development of new 
strategic, structural and cultural configurations. This reassessment process, 
lead by the CEO, forced a global perspective into each organization and, in a 
manner similar to Miles and Snow's (1978: 29) definition of prospectors, 
provided the momentum with which DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL could both 
respond to and create the emerging institutional environment. 
6.4.3 The Ownership - Management Relationship and Transformational 
Change 
The determination to radically reconfigure the strategic, structural and cultural 
framework of DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL and align each organization with new 
corporate norms and values conforms to Greenwood and Hinings' (1988,1993, 
1996) definition of archetype transformation. The owners' dissatisfaction with 
the traditional configuration, generated by the perceived requirements of a 
deregulated environment, forced the acceptance of a corporate ownership 
structure and with it the development of a new 'prevailing set of assumptions' 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1993: 1071). The owner-manager separation 
associated with this move broke apart the restrictive community-owner-
management bonds, and allowed the newly installed 'dominant coalition' to 
reframe and recreate the organization and the organization-environment 
relationship (Thompson, 1967; Giddens, 1979; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; 
Weick, 1995). 
6.4.3.1 Strategic Transformation 
While the motivation for change differed in DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL, the 
process of implementing strategic change was similar in each. Although each 
board had laid down generic strategic goals, the actual process of achieving 
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asset retention and wealth creation had not been determined. Consequently 
the CEO, empowered in each case to implement commercial initiatives, chose 
to employ professional change consultants to assess each organization, 
understanding that it was necessary to acquire information on the state of the 
organization in a non-partisan fashion to develop of a clear strategy for change. 
Organizational change literature (Tush man et ai, 1986; Tichy and Ulrich, 1984) 
emphasises that the generation of new ideas and discontinuous change 
requires the input of influences from outside the organization. The result of this 
exercise in each case was enhanced managerial knowledge of the 
organization's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats and further 
understanding of the requirement and implication of change. Unlike the cases 
of archetype inertia where such knowledge was assumed, this process 
provided a concrete basis upon which a change initiative could be launched 
and progress measured against. Newman (2000) states that explicit 
managerial knowledge of these factors is required before organizational inertia 
can be overcome. 
Central to the consultant's contribution in each case was their assistance in 
determining the organization's vision - its strategic focus and reason for being. 
A vision is said to 'outline a strategy and lofty action plan' (Nutt and Backoff, 
1997: 491) devised by organizational leaders in reaction or anticipation of 
environmental turbulence (Block, 1991; Tichy and Devanna, 1992). A vision 
promotes transformational organizational change as it provides a trigger and 
focus for change that incorporates the views and engages the passions of 
many stakeholders while identifying obstacles to its implementation (Nutt, 1997: 
490 - 492). A vision can recreate the organization by defining its purpose in a 
more complex and diverse way (Ackhoff, 1981). However as a means of 
anchoring organizational identity, change to the definition of the organization 
can result in resistance to change (Bartunek, 1984; Reger et ai, 1994). 
The 'envisioning' process in DEL, SPL, 'PNZ and ELL highlights the significant 
difference between the cases of inertia and transformation. The need to 
transform the vision in each of these cases only arose out of the shift in the 
organization's focus (community to commercial) associated with the owner-
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management separation. Historically each organization had regarded itself as 
an electricity company providing electricity services to consumers, and over the 
decades had grown in a haphazard way to encompass other ancillary services 
that blurred the strategic direction and complicated the organization's structure. 
Through a series of meetings the senior management of each organization was 
able to re-evaluate the organization, what it does and what it should do in a 
deregulated environment without political interference. Based on these 
perceptions, developed partly in reference to the effect that deregulation had in 
other industries, a vision was enacted that allowed management to provide a 
rationale for change and develop a commercial vision around which critical 
success factors and strategic imperatives were derived. 
DEL and ELL developed a similar commercial vision that sought to exploit 
managerial competencies to create an asset management company. ELL in 
particular devised a specific change programme to achieve this in a strategic 
plan called 'Target 2000'. SPL recreated itself as an energy (as opposed to 
electricity) company and sought to diversify into complementary energy 
services. PNZ focused on aggressively exploiting the potential of a deregulated 
environment to create the country's largest electricity company through a 
process of mergers and acquisitions funded through a public listing. However 
this proved to be a huge strategic risk when Mercury Energy, New Zealand's 
largest electricity company, launched an aggressive take-over bid. This 
created a period of uncertainty as the different political interests of various 
owners and management created infighting. As a result senior management 
lost credibility within the organization and a number resigned, including the 
CEO, stalling the change process. The issue was only resolved when Utilicorp 
emerged as the major shareholder and was able to bring stability by appointing 
a new CEO who set the organization on move again. The problems 
experienced by PNZ serves to reinforce the importance of managerial 
autonomy, strong leadership and the owner-management alignment and 
support in achieving transformational change (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kanter, 
1983; Tichy, 1983; Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Kotter, 1995). 
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The development of a vision and mission in each case provided management 
with the ability to identify measurable critical success factors that could be 
bench marked against national and international best practice. Unlike the cases 
of inertia that remained focused on the traditional aspects of safety and 
reliability of supply, the emerging commercial imperatives associated with 
deregulation saw the ascension in importance of customer value, productivity, 
financial performance and market share. From these factors four key factors 
were brought to the fore as strategic imperatives: customer focus, staff 
development and alignment, operational efficiency and commercial direction. 
At the heart of each case of transformational change lay a revised focus on 
customer rather than consumer services. Customer focus has been identified 
as a vital in ensuring survival in a competitive environment, for example 
Atkinson (2000:8) states that customer perception of service delivery is 
'imperative and will shape their (customer) choice of supplier or service 
provider'. The change in strategic mindset, triggered by the perceived effects 
of deregulation, established a new feedback loop that enabled each 
organization to identify and learn customer needs, assess organizational 
effectiveness and mobilise commitment to change at all levels (Day, 1999). 
This same process was observed in electricity utilities in Northern Ireland where 
a focus on customers created an ongoing 'dialogue' that motivated 
organizational change (Henderson and O'Neill, 2000). In the New Zealand 
context, quality and cost were identified as key areas that customers would use 
to compare electricity companies in a competitive environment. Consequently 
DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL made changes in two areas. First, in an attempt to 
distance themselves from the poor image of their past, investment was made in 
the development of a 'corporate' styled image that involved new names and 
logos, 'corporate colours' and uniforms, professional advertising material and 
customer service training. Second, in an effort to reduce costs to customers, 
links were established with other organizations to create electricity retail trading 
companies while electriCity contracting services were opened up to competitive 
tender. 
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The customer/commercial focus that emerged in DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL as a 
result of the 'vision creation' process drove the structural and cultural change 
process in each of the cases of transformational change. In support of agency 
theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the owner-management separation forced 
the development of a commercial ideology into each organization that resulted 
in management generating organizational strategy based not on the desires of 
political influence but instead on the needs of customers and operational 
efficiency. This shift to a commercial, rather than community orientated, 
strategy marks a significant shift in values and ideals that led to archetype 
transformation. 
6.4.3.2 Structural Transformation 
Structural change was also implemented with the assistance of consultants and 
followed a process similar to that experienced by other service industries that 
had experienced the effects of deregulation over the previous decade, such as 
airlines, banking and telecommunications (Dowling et ai, 1994; Bacharach et ai, 
1996). The development of New Zealand's electricity generation SOE was a 
particularly strong influence and model for structural change. First DEL, SPL, 
PNZ and ELL focused on identifying core operations in reference to the 
strategic vision. Once identified, measures were implemented in these core 
functional areas to encourage the development of competition, quality, 
productivity and decreased cost. The result in each case was divisionalisation, 
divestment, decentralisation and the emergence, legitimisation and 
institutionalisation of what D'Aunno et al (2000) refer to as a new organizational 
template. 
Although the structure of DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL appears similar to the cases 
of adaptive change, this process of change involved more than the renaming of 
previously integrated functional areas. Motivated by commercial rather than 
community imperatives, divisionalisation was implemented in each case of 
transformational change with the intent of. developing and streamlining business 
processes in anticipation of the development of a competitive environment. This 
involved the restructuring of the organization around core businesses or profit 
centres - network, contracting, retail and in SPL appliance retailing - to 
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encourage operational efficiency through process redesign and internal 
competition. Although only ELL referred to this explicitly as business process 
reengineering (BPR) with their 'Target 2000' plan, the changes in each 
organization conformed to the definition of BPR, which is seen as a means to 
'achieve dramatic improvements in performance by radically changing the 
process design,' (Aldowaisan and Gaafar, 1999: 5). While the monopoly 
function of network operation remained at the heart of each organization, in 
anticipation of competition electricity retailing and contracting functions were 
spawned off as stand-alone corporate entities, with contracting required to 
compete for internal business. Consequently established organizational 
relationships and processes were redesigned to cope with the competitive 
framework. Unlike the cases of inertia where all aspects of the firm were 
identified as necessary, areas not considered essential in delivering strategic 
objectives were divested, resulting in a significant number of redundancies in all 
cases. DEL sold off a power generation plant and its electricity retailing 
business. DEL, PNZ and ELL sold their appliance retailing businesses. 
However SPL initially invested in the development of appliance retailing, using 
this business as an opportunity to learn competitive practices in an already 
highly competitive market as much as to provide a total energy service. 
Associated with the divisionalisation process was decentralisation and the 
delegation of managerial authority. Decentralisation is said to bring 'the market 
inside the firm' (Baker et ai, 2001: 212) while delegation encourages ownership 
of the change process (Ching, 2001; Garvin, 1993). This is recognised in 
change literature as an essential aspect for stimulating organizational change 
and development, assisting in the creation of an organic, flexible, quality, 
customer focused organization where 'leaders as well as followers' can learn 
(Binney and Williams, 1997: 157; Gharajedaghi and Ackhoff, 1984). ELL in 
particular developed a radically different team structure to assist in the 
institutionalisation of change, with the. CEO initiating the creation of cross-
functional teams in a manner similar to those in the computer programming 
industry. To provide a means to support, manage and monitor the progress of 
this process all organizations invested heavily in new computer technology, 
accounting/information systems and staff development/training. Unlike the 
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cases of inertia where new technology was used as a way to track expenditure 
and introduce incremental improvements to existing processes, in DEL, SPL, 
PNZ and ELL it was utilised as a means to introduce transformational changes. 
Investment in decision support systems and staff training provided each with 
the means to 'collect operational data and transform it into useable information' 
(Hampshire and Rosborough, 1993: 26) that is assist in both the commercial 
decision making and organizational change process. 
6.4.3.3 Cultural Transformation 
Markedly different from the cases of archetype inertia was the recognition in 
DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL of the importance in investing in transforming the 
organizational culture. In a process driven by the leader, the cultural change 
programmes in each of these cases sought to reinvent what Wilson (1989) calls 
the 'personality' of the organization, realigning employee goals and values with 
those of the new commercial vision. In all cases the cultural change process 
was regarded as slower than desired and anticipated. 
The CEO was central to the cultural change process in each of the cases of 
transformation. Organizational change literature (Kotter, 1995; Hennessey, 
1988; Graves, 1986; Schein, 1985) recognises the importance of the beliefs, 
actions and expressions of the CEO and other leaders in the transformation of 
an organization's culture. The CEOs in DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL were 
enthusiastic champions of change and the way in which cultural change was 
implemented was closely aligned with each CEO's personal beliefs, 
philosophies and competencies. Consequently the process of cultural change 
followed different methodologies. However despite· the differences in 
execution, each CEO manufactured a sense of urgency for cultural change by 
developiog three core areas; communication, formal change programmes and 
the renegotiation of labour-management relations. 
Communication of the need for change formed a vital component of the cultural 
change process in DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL. The vision for the organization 
and industry's future was shared with the wider firm by the CEO who personally 
engaged in informal meetings at all levels, while also formally fronting 
workshops, 'roadshows', videos and newsletters. Whether formal or informal, 
the message remained consistent with the vision that commercial criteria would 
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be basis of organizational decisions rather than the traditional community focus 
and emphasised the threat to the organization's future should change not 
occur. This made market issues a priority and established a sense of urgency 
for change throughout each (Day, 1999). Unlike the cases of inertia, a 
significant amount of management time and organizational resources was 
invested in this process. The development of open communication channels 
also played a key role in the process of cultural change. Investment in 
computer technology in all cases provided the means for more open and rapid 
sharing of information, breaking down traditional hierarchical cultural barriers to 
organizational change. This was assisted by the redesign of the physical office 
environment. The design of office/work-spaces has been shown to influence 
communication and the process of organizational change (Crabb, 1993). While 
SPL and PNZ retained a more traditional office format with some minor 
modifications to speed work processes - particularly customer service - DEL 
and ELL implemented a more radical open-plan design. Senior management 
identified the development of this open-plan environment as a means to break 
down traditional hierarchical barriers, increase cross-functional communication 
and promote the process of organizational and cultural change. Both DEL and 
ELL shifted into new premises. The most radical change was implemented in 
ELL who devised a flexible working space to fit around the needs of cross-
functional process teams and removed physical barriers to communication -
personal offices and doors - associated with hierarchy. 
While communication alerted individuals to the need for change this alone did 
not mobilise wider commitment, or institutionalise change, to achieve what 
respondents referred to as 'buy-in' to the change process. The cultural 
acceptance and institutionalisation of change is identified as fundamental to 
implementing transformational change as it ensures that barriers to change -
cultural or otherwise - can be identified and confronted at all levels to prevent 
the organization 'reverting to its old ways' (Day, 1999: 19). Cultural refocusing 
was achieved through the development of formal training and development 
programmes that created a sense of urgency for change and encouraged 
individuals at all levels of the organization to identify and internalise how 
change could be of benefit to them and the organization. Management style to 
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achieve this was therefore significantly different from the past and, although 
change was initiated from the 'top down', followed a consultative rather than 
autocratic manner. The implementation of the initiatives closely reflected the 
competencies and preferences of each CEO. Not wishing to repeat the 
adversarial approach seen during his time with ECNZ, SPL's CEO used his 
marketing background to develop an inclusive 'focus on customers' 
programme, while ELL's CEO utilised experience in the computer industry to 
implement a team development programme revolving around the 'Target 2000' 
strategy. The CEOs of DEL and PNZ followed a financial and process 
management approach that saw the implementation of ISO and financial 
training, a process that was standardised and repeated in the case of PNZ 
when engaging in mergers and acquisitions. 
However despite the differences in approach, each programme shared 
common traits to generate cultural change: close senior management 
involvement; establishment of cross-functional teams; documentation of 
processes; development of customer feedback loops; training in customer 
service and financial management; utilisation of new technology; development 
of new operational benchmarks. Individually or in combination, each of these 
variables brought with them improvements to organizational processes and 
benefits to the individual that assisted in 'buy-in' and the development of 
cultural change (Pascale et aI., 1997). The motivation to change was 
reinforced early in all cases when strategic management aimed to create 
success by initiating change projects that promised quick and measurable 
results - what management referred to in some cases as picking 'low hanging 
fruit' and Day (1999: 14) as an 'early win'. These 'wins' were broadcast 
throughout the organization as significant milestones to develop and maintain a 
momentum for change as well as create and embed a new organizational 
folklore and culture. Central to the stimulation of cultural change was the 
introduction of internal competition for work on the electricity network, which 
challenged everything that the traditional archetype represented. 
Aligning the culture with the commercial strategic vision of each organization 
was not an entirely smooth process. For many the new structure and culture 
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associated with the commercial archetype created cognitive dissonance as 
change threatened the 'common logic' (Kahle, 1984: 11; Bacharach et ai, 1996) 
of the organization, established positions of authority and individual security. 
Where investment in communication and organizational development failed to 
address this resistance it was overcome by the renegotiation of the labour-
management relationship and, where necessary, selective redundancy. 
Organizational change affects industrial relations and the management of 
human resources that, if well managed, can have significant benefits for the 
organization (Katz, 1985; Kochan et ai, 1988). Downsizing, as a tool for 
achieving efficiency gains and cultural fit, is also a significant and institutionally 
accepted driver for change. DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL reduced union 
involvement in the organization with the assistance of the Employment 
Contracts Act (1992), and where necessary introduced redundancies in an 
effort to transform the nature of the employee-employer relationship and 
institutionalise cultural alignment with the emerging commercial archetype. The 
Employment Contracts Act (1992) freed up employment law, granting strategic 
management and employees the freedom to negotiate organization and 
individual specific employment contracts (with minimal union input) to align with 
the strategic direction of the organization. As a result of this remuneration was 
tied not to tenure but performance, forcing individuals to focus on increasing 
their skills and abilities - a process formalised in DEL and PNZ with the ISO 
programme, while SPL and ELL utilised a similar methodology. This also acted 
to extract and disseminate internalised knowledge to promote teamwork and 
economic efficiency. Those individuals that remained opposed to this or were 
not able to meet the demands of a commercial environment were removed. 
With the introduction of internal competition, this resulted in a significant 
number of redundancies. While this was identified as initially having a negative 
affect on the organization associated with morale low and uncertainty high, 
overall this was seen to have a positive affect on the performance and culture 
of each organization. 
6.4.3.4 Environmental Stasis 
However, although significant efficiency gains were made as a result of 
changes implemented in DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL, the anticipatory and radical 
258 
nature of the change process created problems when the institutional 
environment failed to develop in a truly commercial/competitive fashion. 
Although the Energy Companies Act (1992) did provide scope for radical 
change, most organizations retreated in a defensive stance to protect parochial 
interests. This restricted strategic opportunities to implement the vision for the 
organization and consequently slowed the momentum for change in each of the 
cases of transformational change. DEL and SPL began to move towards the 
less aggressive strategic norms of the emerging environment. ELL, although 
hamstrung in their attempts to develop an asset management company, 
continued to focus on internal efficiency and the development of strategic 
alliances wherever possible. PNZ's change process suffered significant 
setbacks when its early exposure to the sharemarket encouraged a hostile 
take-over battle that resulted in a management - ownership clash. As a 
consequence of this the dominant coalition dissolved. The process of change 
was only re-ignited when a party resolute in implementing change secured 
ownership and the services of a strong, internationally experienced CEO. 
6.4.4 Summary 
In anticipation of the development of a fully competitive electricity industry DEL, 
SPL, PNZ and ELL transformed their strategic, structural and cultural 
configuration to implement a commercial conforming to Greenwood and 
Hinings' (1988, 1993, 1996) definition of archetype transformation. Although 
motivated to change for different reasons, either asset retention or wealth 
creation, the process and extent of strategic change was similar with several 
key variables providing the momentum for transformational change. 
The primary independent variable at the core of archetype transformation was 
the full corporate separation of ownership from management. This was a 
significant departure from the past, as it shifted stakeholder focus and power 
away from the demands of the traditional owners and instead towards 
customers and provided organizational. management with the mandate to 
develop an organizational strategy based on commercial, rather than political, 
imperatives. Second, each board encouraged transformational change by 
appOinting a new, commercially experienced, CEO. This ensured that the 
CEO was aligned with the board's vision for the organization and possessed 
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the skills and abilities to lead transformational change. Associated with the 
CEO's appointment was the introduction of 'new blood' to the wider 'dominant 
coalition' (Thompson, 1967). This ensured that the ranks of strategic 
management were aligned with the needs of the CEO and organization, and 
developed a strong team for change who were not as personally embedded in 
the organization or traditional institutional environment as their predecessors. 
As a result of this 'freshness' to the organization strategic management did not 
assume knowledge of organizational strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats and therefore explored strategic options in the face of deregulation with 
a new global perspective, assisted by consultants, in a systematic fashion. As 
a result of this evaluation process, strategic management in each organization 
developed an aggressive, prospector-like (Miles and Snow, 1978) vision for the 
future that provided strategic, structural and cultural opportunities beyond the 
confines of the traditional archetype. Although achieving this vision was 
hampered by the failure of the legislated environment to change as anticipated, 
the process resulted in the emergence of a corporate styled, customer focused 
and efficient organization. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Whether in anticipation or reaction to change, deregulation of the electricity 
industry triggered the development of two strategic approaches, defensive and 
prospective (Miles and Snow, 1978; Isabella, 1992) that led to first- and 
second-order changes respectively. The data provide evidence that this 
strategic choice and the degree of organizational change was a function of how 
embedded and aligned the values of organizational managers and owners 
were with the institutional norms of the traditional electricity archetype and the 
community. The congruence of the community/owners/management 
influenced the consideration, acceptance and implementation of a new design 
archetype, determining the degree of organizational change. 
Where community/owner/management .ties were high (BEL, EAL, MPL), the 
degree of change was limited to that acceptable and congruent with the values 
and ideals of the traditional archetype, owners and community. In these cases 
owners maintained control of the organization, retaining the services of CEOs 
aligned with the strategic imperatives of the status quo, resulting in the 
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emergence of a defensive strategy. Strategic direction was determined by the 
owners and implemented by incumbent management based on personal 
experience and the values of the community and traditional electricity 
archetype. 
Where community/owner/management ties were low (DEL, SPL, PNZ, ELL), or 
intentionally reduced through owner/management corporate separation, 
organizational transformation could occur. In these cases CEOs armed with 
the requisite skills and aligned with the owner's commitment to change were 
employed and granted the freedom to implement strategic, structural and 
cultural changes regarded necessary for success in a competitive environment. 
This allowed management, with external assistance, to radically redefine the 
strategic direction of each organization with reference to the effects of 
deregulation in other industries. Consequently a global perspective of the 
organization developed shifting stakeholder power away from the traditional 
political influence of owners into the hands of customers. This resulted in the 
development of a prospective strategy and encouraged the radical 
reconfiguration of strategy, structure and culture, hampered only by the failure 
of the institutional environment to develop as anticipated. Table 6.1 presented 
earlier (section 6.2) outlines the characteristics that resulted in organizational 
inertia or transformation. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion and Implications 
This thesis has focused on identifying the factors that have influenced the 
process of organizational change in seven New Zealand electricity companies. 
To date literature on organizational change has lacked empirical data, but 
instead has been based on anecdotal evidence. Change management 
literature has also been markedly silent on the role that ideals, values and 
politics play in both organizational and institutional change (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1993). Based on the data and themes developed from in depth and 
cross-case analysis presented in chapters four, five and six, the following 
chapter discusses the effect that ownership has on both the institutional and 
organizational change process. First, having observed the emergence of both 
adaptive and transformational change types in the same institutional setting, 
the chapter argues the thesis that ownership, governance structures and 
community ties influence organizational change. Second, I argue that change 
should be viewed as a political process, and therefore examined from a 
strategic choice and multilevel perspective. Third, the thesis supports the view 
that the CEO and dominant coalition play a centrally important role in the 
change process. Finally, a model of the change process is presented and the 
implications of these findings are discussed in relation to policy development. 
Management practice suggestions for future research are also presented. 
7.2 The Effect of Ownership on the Change Process 
A conclusion drawn from the preceding chapters is that institutional changes 
involving ownership and governance issues, such as deregulation, are better 
viewed as a political process by explicitly focusing on organizational influences 
on the institutional change process. This supports the call for the adoption of a 
multilevel perspective on the investigation of organizational change. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1993) and Fox-Wolfgramm et al (1998: 91) suggest 
'that ignoring a multilevel perspective re'sults in a lack of understanding of how 
change is embedded in and affected by its institutional and temporal context'. 
Child (1997) in particular argues the point further in his assertion that to 
understand the motivation and effects of change, strategic choice should be 
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viewed as a 'political process' (44). Adopting a socio-political perspective in the 
investigation of change allows researchers to locate 'the agency-structure 
relationship within its context' (Child, 1997: 69) and acknowledge the dynamic 
relationship that exists between the institutional environment, strategic choice 
and organizational configuration. By doing so organizational change literature 
and theory can, as Pettigrew and associates (2001: 697) assert, develop a 
mature and complex 'understanding [of] the dynamics and effects of time, 
process,discontinuity, and context'. 
7.2.1 The Effect of Ownership on Institutional Change 
As Oliver (1992: 584) points out, 'most empirical work from an institutional 
perspective has focused exclusively on exogenous sources of institutional 
change'. In this research, organizations were far from mute victims of change 
during a period of institutional change, but instead played an active role in 
laying claims to ownership and governance. Legislative changes did provide 
the catalyst or 'trigger' for change, driven by the government's desire to 
promote efficiency through commercialisation, deregulation and eventual 
privatisation (Dobbin and Dowd, 1997; Isabella, 1992). Although this was part 
of a wider socio-political phenomenon, without this 'trigger' it is entirely 
conceivable (and acknowledged by respondents) that the organizations that 
partiCipated in this study would not have considered it necessary to implement 
any degree of organizational change. In the previously stable operating 
environment each organization maintained an identical strategic, structural and 
cultural configuration (archetype), with no compulsion to change as each 
fulfilled institutionalised expectations/activities that reinforced and sustained the 
"way things are" (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Scott, 1987: 496). It was only 
when the government, as opposed to the organizations themselves, perceived 
mounting performance problems that it identified a problem with 
institutionalized norms. This realisation shifted expectations from operational 
effectiveness to efficiency, signalling changes that would impact each 
organization's ownership structure arid the industry, that change was 
considered. 
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However, rather than passive acceptance of government policy, each case 
affected changes to their ownership structure that influenced the development 
of legislation, the level of institutional change, and also set the foundation for 
the organizational change process. That is, institutional change was a political 
process. Extending the argument of Greenwood and Hinings (1988), this thesis 
proposes that both institutional change and organizational change were 
formulated on the basis of the interpretive schemes of owners. The 
commitment of owners to the existing or alternative archetype determined the 
legitimacy with which the alternative interpretive scheme was regarded and the 
level of organizational and environmental deinstitutionalization. 
Faced with deregulation, the primary strategic concern of the boards of BEL, 
EAL and MPL lay with protecting ownership of the organization in, and for the 
welfare of, the community. Each organization had successfully met institutional 
requirements in the past and served the community well, both in terms of 
providing electricity services and employment, and the board was determined 
to defend this (Miles and Snow, 1978). Deregulation and commercial 
imperatives posed a threat to this equilibrium and was not perceived to be of 
benefit to either the organization or community (Meyer and Zucker, 1989). In 
an attempt to maintain stability, boards lobbied this view to regulatory bodies 
and successfully challenged the government's claims of ownership and right to 
implement change. Subsequently, each board selected a community trust 
ownership structure that, while required to meet obligations associated with 
corporatisation, provided for board control as well as conformed and 
maintained institutional values and ideals associated with the traditional 
archetype (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; 1993). This supports and extends 
Spender's (1989) argument that institutionalized strategic 'recipes' inhibit the 
ability of agents (Whittington, 1988) to introduce both organizational and 
institutional change by preventing the development of 'innovative responses to 
changing environmental conditions' (Child, 1997: 50). 
In contrast, the boards in control of SPL, DEL, PNZ and ELL viewed 
deregulation as an opportunity to implement change and institutionalise a new 
commercially orientated template. Unlike the previous cases, the boards of 
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these organizations identified that there potentially was a pending operating 
crisis and that significant financial and operational benefits could be achieved 
through the early adoption of a commercially orientated structure (Meyer and 
Zucker, 1989). Consequently, the boards were prepared to sacrifice control of 
the organization in anticipation of change to achieve this. While traditional 
institutional norms had served well in the past, the configuration was not 
perceived to be compatible with the demands of a deregulated environment. 
Taking their cues from changes implemented by the government in its SOEs, 
the boards separated ownership from management in a process indicative of 
the concepts of mimetic and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). In DEL and SPL, this configuration was implemented well in advance of 
deregulation, actions that successfully convinced legislators that councils could 
legitimately own electricity companies without compromising their commercial 
operation. While PNZ and ELL made changes in reaction to legislation, they 
too adopted a radically different commercial structure in anticipation of the 
development of a competitive environment, with PNZ going so far as to list on 
the sharemarket. While the community did have input into the process, unlike 
the previous cases where community-organization bonds were strong, welfare 
concerns were not the dominant factor in the strategic decision making 
process. Instead, the ownership-management separation provided boards the 
opportunity to minimise community and organizational forces for inertia and 
stimulate a momentum for institutional and organizational archetype change 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1988, 1993). 
The strategic choices made by each board to follow either a traditional 
community or develop a commercially focused ownership structure influenced 
the development of legislation and the institutional environment. While the 
government was able to demand efficiency through the corporatisation of the 
sector, the lobbying and actions taken by each organization prevented it from 
securing ownership and control. This provided the owners of each organization 
the latitude to determine their own ownership and governance structure. The 
active manner in which the board of each organization acted to claim ownership 
rights saw an institutional environment emerge where new commercial and 
traditional community-focused archetypes could exist in parallel. This finding 
265 
extends the work of Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993) and suggests that 
inertia is more likely to occur not only in organizations more embedded in their 
institutional environment, but also those more embedded in their local operating 
context or community. It also suggests that radical institutional change such as 
deregulation is not simply a matter where exogenous factors force 
organizational reconfigurations (Zucker, 1988), but is instead a complicated 
two-way political process. Irrespective of deregulation, the acceptance of 
deinstitutionalization or archetype change occurred only where the owners 
recognised the potential benefits of a new environment and that operating on 
the basis of traditional values and beliefs threatened a performance crisis (cf. 
Bartunek, 1984) that would challenge the organization's ability to survive. The 
action taken by owners, to change or remain embedded in the traditional 
archetype, eroded the strength of the institutional status quo and in turn created 
the very environment in which they operated. 
7.2.2 The Effect of Ownership on Organizational Change 
Despite having shared the same archetype and in spite of facing the same 
environmental pressures for change, the scope, extent and process of change 
varied significantly in each of the seven organizations. Organizational 
responses ranged from incremental and reactive, to radical and anticipatory. 
As we have seen, the owners of SPL, DEL, PNZ and ELL embraced the 
opportunity for change to develop a corporate ownership structure. BEL, EAL 
and MPL in contrast challenged the need for change and clung to the norms of 
the traditional community archetype. This divergence in strategic paths 
challenges the functionalist view that the operating environment determines 
organizational change and configurations (Donaldson, 1987; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Instead this suggests that within 
the same institutional setting ownership can significantly influence the scope 
and extent of organizational change. In short the ownership structure chosen 
by electricity companies mediated the effect that deregulation had on the 
organization. 
In the cases of BEL, EAL and MPL, the selection of the community trust 
structure allowed each organization to maintain a strategic, structural and 
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cultural configuration aligned with the past. Having secured ownership rights 
there was little urgency for change in each case and, based on established 
institutional norms, they adopted a defensive strategic approach (Miles and 
Snow, 1978) to maintain the status quo. The selection of the trust form was the 
first step. The choice to maintain ownership with the community ensured that 
the decision making process of each organization remained strongly embedded 
in and aligned with the demands of institutional and community norms, which 
anchored the strategic decision making process to the ideals and values of the 
traditional archetype. The strong institutional and community bonds maintained 
by the ownership structure acted as forces for inertia as the adaptation of each 
organization to meet the demands of a deregulated environment was 
interpreted and implemented through the frame of the traditional archetype 
(Giddens, 1979; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Weick, 1995). This meant that 
the degree of strategic, structural and cultural change in BEL, EAL and MPL 
was minimal, reactive and adaptive in nature and scope. At the strategic 
management level the ranks of senior management were fundamentally 
unchanged and with membership made up of industry insiders sourced from 
the local community, remained strategically focused on traditional social welfare 
concerns. Consequently strategic opportunities outside traditional operational 
boundaries such as mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures were not fully 
explored, as they had not traditionally been possible or of concern in the past. 
Structural change was limited to the development of infrastructural support 
systems and the renaming of divisions. Similarly with little change in other 
facets of each organization there was little investment made in cultural change. 
Although each organization did implement changes to their structure and 
culture, these changes did not aggressively challenge the status quo. Instead 
each organization's reconfiguration in reaction to corporatisation was 
accomplished within the confines determined by the traditional archetype. The 
inability for legislation to force radical frame breaking change (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1989; Tushman et ai, 1986). and create uncertainty or erode the 
validity and perceived utility of institutionalized practices (Oliver, 1992: 562; 
Hinings and Greenwood, 1988) only served to reinforce the legitimacy of this 
interpretation and approach. Despite the potential for radical change, the 
ownership structure implemented in BEL, EAL and MPL mediated the impact 
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that environmental change had on the strategic, structural and cultural 
configuration of each organization. 
In the cases of SPL, DEL, PNZ and ELL ownership structures based on 
commercial models were selected to enable each to effectively and efficiently 
operate in the anticipated competitive environment. Each organization's board 
chose to pursue the development and institutionalisation of a new corporate 
archetype, a prospective strategic approach (Miles and Snow, 1978) that 
generated urgency for organizational change. This supports the notion that 
'loss or anticipated loss of institutional incentives for. .. compliance ... is likely to 
deinstitutionalize procedures' (Oliver, 1992: 571). This also extends the 
arguments of Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) Meyer 
and Scott (1983) that institutional norms are not only perpetuated, but also 
changed, to acquire organizational legitimacy and prestige, access to resources 
and social support and approval (Oliver, 1992: 571). While deregulation, or the 
potential of, provided the trigger for change, the selection of the corporate form 
and the associated owner-management split determined the extent and scope 
of organizational change. Management became accountable to the board in a 
commercial/financial sense forcing the re-evaluation of fundamental strategic 
objectives. This resulted in a shift in managerial mindset from a community- to 
commercial-focus as organizational objectives shifted from being determined by 
political forces to the demands of customers. The corporate form therefore 
reduced even further each organization's institutional and community 
embeddedness. Institutionalised forces for inertia were tempered as 
community and political involvement in the organizational decision-making 
process was minimised. Breaking these traditional bonds enabled each 
organization to develop a new commercial frame of reference (Giddens, 1979; 
Weick, 1995) and provided the momentum for transformational change. New 
CEOs with commercial experience were appointed and, with the assistance of 
a reformed 'dominant coalition' (Thompson, 1967), granted the mandate to 
implement radical change. Consequently radical and aggressive strategic 
options emerged that encouraged growth and wealth creation - including 
diversification, mergers and acquisitions. Structural changes including 
divisionalisation, divestment and downsizing occurred alongside infrastructural 
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development to create a more customer focused and cost effective operation. 
Investment in formal cultural change programmes was made, ensuring that 
employees acknowledged and accepted the need for change and had the 
requisite skills and abilities to effectively implement change. The process of 
radical reconfiguration challenged the legitimacy of taken-for-granted activities 
(Oliver, 1992; DiMaggio, 1988; Zucker, 1983) within each organization and 
radically transformed the norms of operation, a process made possible only by 
the shift in values and ideas of the owners. 
The decision to follow either a traditional community or develop a commercially 
focused ownership structure made by the conventional owners in each of these 
cases set the course or 'path' (Strebel, 1994) for the organizational change 
process. The owners of each organization chose to implement either a 
defensive or prospective strategic response to actual or potential environmental 
change (Miles and Snow, 1978). This choice was informed and framed by 
owners with regard to the effect deregulation would have on 
embedded/institutionalised organizational routines and cultures (Child, 1997; 
Bartunek, 1988) as well as implications for social/community welfare. In 
support of Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993, 1996), where the cases were 
strongly embedded in both institutional and community norms (EAL, BEL, 
MPL), forces for inertia dominated the strategic decision making process of 
owners and prevented radical organizational/archetype change. Where cases 
operated in the same institutional context but were less embedded in the 
community (SPL, DEL, PNZ, ELL), organizational owners were free to pursue 
strategies beyond the traditional institutional frame, reducing the 
embedded ness in the institutional context and enabling radical 
organizational/archetype change. Therefore I· extend the propositions of 
Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993, 1996), and suggest that organizational 
and archetype change is more likely to occur where an organization is less 
embedded in the institutional environment and local community. In each case, 
the impact that environmental change had on the extent, scope, nature and 
pace of organizational change was mediated by the ownership structure. 
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7.3 The Role of Management in the Organizational Change Process 
The third conclusion reached in this thesis is that senior management, 
particularly the CEO, plays a key role in determining the extent and nature of 
change at the organizational level. The cases show that the selection of the 
CEO and senior management ('dominant coalition', Thompson, 1967: 135), 
their personal values, ideas, skills and abilities, alignment with the strategic 
goals of owners and embedded ness in the local community was fundamental 
for the development and implementation of organizational change. Again the 
strategic direction desired by the owners determined whether a new CEO was 
employed, mediating the effect that environmental change had on the 
organization. Where owners took a defensive stance towards institutional 
change little modification was made to the ranks of senior management and 
change was generated external to the organization. In these cases change 
was reactive and adaptive. Where a prospective stance was adopted 
substantial changes were made to the ranks of senior management that 
generated an internal urgency for organizational change. In these cases 
change was anticipatory and transformational. Such evidence supports the 
argument (Newman, 2000; Kotter, 1995; Peters and Waterman, 1982, 
Thompson, 1967) that changes to senior/strategic management affects an 
organization's ability to change. It also supports the theories of Buchanan and 
Badham (1999) that pOliticisation of the change process plays an important role 
in the acceptance or rejection of change initiatives. 
7.3.1 The CEO 
In concert with the owners' initial strategic choice to implement a community or 
commercial ownership structure, the selection and appointment of the CEO 
was the most visible and influential difference between the cases of archetype 
inertia and transformation. In support of the likes of Kanter (1983) and Nadler 
and Tushman (1990, 1989), the nature and extent of organizational change 
was a function of the owner-management relationship and the values, ideals 
and competencies held by organizational leaders, specifically the CEO (Kotter, 
1995; Hennessey, 1988; Graves, 1986; Schein, 1985). The skills, abilities, 
behaviour and style of a CEO are recognised in change literature as a 
fundamental influence on the change process for the CEO sets the frame of 
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reference for organizational development (Buchanan and Badham, 1999; 
Shaw, 1995; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Hambrick, 1995; Kanter, 1983; 
Tichy and Ulrich, 1984). 
In the cases of archetype inertia, all three boards reacted to environmental 
change in a defensive manner and appointed an industry- and organization-
insider drawn from the 'local community to the CEO position. This traditional 
selection method provided the board the means through which it could control 
the strategic direction of each organization. Giving preference to an insider 
maintained the established working and political relationship between the board 
and management. This ensured the ideals and values of the CEO were tightly 
aligned with, and therefore strongly embedded in and controlled by, the 
traditional norms of both the board and community. The resulting stability 
meant that the CEO did not generate pressure for or urgency for organizational 
change (Lorsch and Khurana, 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) through a 
radically different vision. Instead each CEO maintained a focus on meeting the 
demands and expectations deemed legitimate by the values and ideals 
associated with the traditional archetype. This resulted in a strategic 
predisposition or political predisposition for a course of 'in' -action (Buchanan 
and Badham, 1999; Hinings et ai, 1996; Beyer, 1981) with the CEO maintaining 
a traditional course of action and style of management that limited the extent 
and nature of strategic, structural and cultural change. 
In contrast, the boards in all four cases of transformational change - SPL, DEL, 
PNZ, and ELL - antiCipated a radical environmental shift and appointed a new 
CEO. In preference to a background in the electricity industry, CEO selection 
was based on criteria that emphasised personal skills in and experience with 
organizational development in a commercial and competitive environment. 
Consequently in each of these cases individuals that were selected to occupy 
the CEO position were new to the organization and even to the industry. The 
replacement of incumbents with individuals that had not necessarily developed 
within the company or industry was a radical departure from the traditional 
'ascension through the ranks' selection process. In conjunction with the 
development of a commercial ownership structure this influenced stakeholder 
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perception of the role and intent of leadership_ (Lorsch and Khurana, 1999) as 
the owners relinquishing of control promoted transformational change by 
providing the CEO with the autonomy to reduce each organization's 
embedded ness in the institution and community. This broke the socio-political 
control of the organization traditionally asserted by the owners and granted the 
CEO the mandate to implement widespread organizational change based on 
commercial imperatives. In support of Nadler et al (1995), high involvement 
strategies coincided with discontinuous ad anticipatory organizational change. 
The style of management of each CEO, although directive, was far more 
consultative and inclusive than the past, promoting communication and 
organizational learning that helped create an internal momentum for change. 
However, despite the comparative freedom that the prospective approach 
granted each CEO, maintaining alignment with the strategic intent of each 
board was equally as important as in the cases of inertia. To achieve this, the 
board emphasised evaluative criteria that developed alignment not through 
traditional direct political control of the owner-manager relationship but instead 
via results based performance measures. The shift in power from owner to 
consumer and each CEO's ability to communicate the urgency of and create an 
internal desire for transformational change resulted in significant strategic, 
structural and cultural reconfiguration (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The CEO selection process reflected the strategic intent of the owners of each 
of the cases and is indicative of the mediating effect of ownership. Where 
owners wanted to defend the status quo individuals indoctrin~ted and 
embedded in the political and social (archetypal) norms of the organization and 
institution were selected to head the organization. In contrast where owners 
sought fundamental changes to create and exploit the potential of a competitive 
operating environment, individuals less embedded in the archetype and 
community were appointed to lead the organization. The subsequent 
alignment of CEOs - their strategic ancj political predisposition, ideology and 
management style - with the desires of each organization's board in turn 
determined the nature and extent of organizational change (Buchanan and 
Badham, 1999). Furthermore, in support of Hambrick (1995) the personality 
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and competencies of each CEO dominated to influence the direction of 
organizational change. 
7.3.2 The Dominant Coalition 
The impact that owner-CEO alignment had on the organizational change 
process was first felt in the ranks of each organization's senior management. 
For change to occur it is commonly argued that organizational members, 
particularly senior management or the 'dominant coalition' (Thompson, 1967), 
must acknowledge the need to change and have the requisite skills and abilities 
to implement that change (Kanter, 1983; Nadler and Tushman, 1990, 1989; 
Nadler et aI., 1995). 
In the cases of archetype inertia, the desire for control and associated lack of 
impetus for change generated by the defensive strategy of the owners resulted 
in the CEO making few changes at the senior management level. Incumbent 
senior managers of BEL, EAL and MPL were retained by the CEO and, with 
membership drawn from the local community, remained homogeneous, 
introspective and tightly embedded in the traditional ideals, values and norms of 
the community and institution (Hambrick, 1994). Although established top 
management teams have been identified as having a positive affect on the 
organization and implementation of change (Hurst et. aI., 1989) there is also 
the potential that institutional and organizational barriers to change are 
reinforced through 'common team-wide shortcomings ... and groupthink' 
(Hambrick, 1995: 110). That is a lack of change in the 'dominant coalition' 
(Thompson, 1967) can affect an organization's ability to change, as decision-
makers may not possess the skills, ability, knowledge, willingness or strategic 
perspective to adapt beyond the confines of embedded and institutionalised 
norms (Newman, 2000; Kotter, 1995; Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). This pattern 
was evident in the cases of inertia. The lack of change at the top, strong CEO 
control and a shared desire for protecting ownership of the organization for the 
benefit of the community limited the scope and extent of organizational change 
and predisposed each to a reactive, incremental process. Where change was 
evident it had been driven by a need to meet external legislative requirements 
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rather than for internal demands for change in a manner illustrative of the effect 
of coercive institutional forces (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
In stark contrast to this, the owners' desire for the development of a commercial 
archetype ~n DEL, SPL, PNZ and ELL granted the CEO the mandate to review 
the top management team to ensure alignment of skills, abilities and values 
with the needs of the organization. Each CEO assembled a management 
group for the explicit reason of implementing change, with selection based on 
individual competence. The CEO personally appointed members, and in 
several instances individuals were 'head-hunted' for their skills or their ability to 
work well with the CEO proven by their relationship in previous organizations. 
Consultants were used extensively in each of these cases where another 
perspective was required or additional skills and resources were necessary in 
the short term. The effect of external input and turnover at the senior 
management level encouraged 'normative fragmentation' (Oliver, 1992: 575) a 
process where members new to the organization bring different values and 
ideals that generate new ideas, models and perspectives of the organization 
and its environment. This reduced the dynamic constraints of the 
organization's past and encouraged the development of a 'global' perspective 
in the senior management team where strategic, structural and operational 
options beyond the scope considered legitimate (normative) in the traditional 
archetype could be introduced (Miles and Snow, 1978: 20-21). From this 
process a new vision for the organization's future compatible with the intent of 
the owners emerged with models from other industrial sectors adopted in a 
mimetic fashion (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Consequently individual and 
organizational embedded ness in institutional and community norms was 
reduced, creating a sense of declining performa:nce that generated an internal 
urgency for radical, transformational change. As a result strategic change in the 
form of diversification, differentiation, mergers and alliances occurred, culturally 
disparate events that forced the (structural and cultural) reconfiguration of each 
organization. 
The effect that changes to the ranks of senior management had on each of the 
cases of organizational change supports Oliver's (1992) assertion that changes 
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to the dominant coalition's composition are a fundamental and necessary 
precursor to the implementation of transformational change. Again the control 
that the owners maintained over strategic management mediated the effect that 
environmental change had on the organization. In the cases of BEL, EAL and 
MPL direct board pressure on the CEO to remain aligned with their community 
focused strategy meant that it was not deemed necessary to change the ranks 
of organizational managers. Therefore they remained tightly embedded in the 
institutional, organizational and community context and had neither the 
mandate nor the perspective to initiate radical or anticipatory change. The 
extent of organizational change was restricted to that deemed compatible with 
the traditional archetype and consequently followed a reactive, incremental 
change path. In contrast in SPL, DEL, PNZ, ELL the shift to a corporate 
governance structure required that the CEO implement a new commercially 
focused strategy making necessary the introduction and development of a new 
focus as well as skills and abilities within the organization. This was achieved 
through the implementation of significant changes to the dominant coalition. 
7.3.3 Summary 
This research suggests that ownership mediates the effect that environmental 
change has on the organizational change process. In contrast to the majority of 
literature on change that argues environmental/institutional change leads to 
organizational change (e.g. Tushman et ai, 1985) due to mimetic, coercive and 
normative pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), this research supports the 
theory proposed Buchanan and Badham (1999) that suggests that change is a 
more complex, political process. Empirical evidence provided by the case 
studies supports Greenwood and Hinings' (1988, 1993, 1996) assertion that 
radical organizational change occurs only where interpretive schemes - the 
values and beliefs that legitimate an organization's configuration - are forced to 
change. The strength or embedded ness of the interpretive scheme determines 
the 'track' - inertia or movement - between archetypes. In support of 
Greenwood and Hinings (1988) I found that transformational organizational 
change occurred only where 'prevailing ideas and values legitimacy [were] 
discredited' (306), the research suggesting that it is imperative that this shift 
occur at the ownership level. However this research also offers an extension to 
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Greenwood and Hinings' thesis and provides a mUlti-level explanation of 
archetype change. The experience of change captured in the cases suggest 
that in order to understand the organizational change process researchers 
should account for the impact of prevailing ideals and values of not only the 
organization's owners and management, but also the community. 
In all cases of organizational change in the New Zealand electricity industry, the 
interpretive scheme was highly institutionalised, based on the historically 
established expectations of the government, organizational managers, owners 
and the community. Although deregulation - or the antiCipation of - triggered 
the reassessment of strategic, structural and cultural configurations, the nature 
and extent of organizational change implemented in each of the organizations 
varied significantly. Where organizational change was most resisted and an 
'inertia' type track followed, the bonds between organizational management, 
owners and the community (particularly the owner-community relationship) 
were highly intertwined. Although the government's attempt to commercialise 
the electricity sector was legitimate from a rational-economic perspective, as a 
radical challenge to established institutional, organizational and community 
norms the owners of these organizations did not necessarily share such a 
perspective. Concerned with maintaining control of the organization for the 
welfare of the community, the extent and scope of change encouraged by 
owners was limited to that which conformed to the 'legitimate' ideals and values 
of historic norms. Subsequently a governance structure that preserved the tight 
owner-management and organization-community bonds was selected, where 
the change was adaptive in nature, limited in scope and externally generated. 
In extension to the arguments of Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993, 1996) I 
suggest that radical organizational change in anticipation or reaction to an 
environmental shift is less likely to occur where organizations, their owners and 
management, are more embedded in their institutional and local community 
context. Where an organization is strongly embedded in a community and 
plays both an important corporate and social role, such as BEL, EAL and MPL, 
gaining social approval for organizational change appears to be more important 
than achieving institutional legitimacy. Institutional changes that threatened the 
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established archetypal socio-political order of the organization and community 
were resisted and a defensive stance taken by owners. In contrast where an 
organization, its owners and management are less embedded in the community 
and primarily fulfil a corporate role, such as SPL, DEL, PNZ and ELL, the 
overriding concern during a period of environmental upheaval appears to be 
establishing institutional legitimacy. Changes that redefine socio-political 
relationships, although possibly not initially welcomed, were used as an 
opportunity by the owners to effect archetypal change that could allow the 
organization to exploit the potential of and even define the emerging operating 
environment. Irrespective of the extent of environmental change, the extent 
and scope of organizational change was mediated by the strategic choice of 
owners, a choice influenced by the institutional and community context. 
7.4 Model of Organizational Change 
The relationship between owners, management, the community and the 
organizational change strategy is captured in the following model (Figure 7.1). 
ENVIRONMENTAL --------r----.~ ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE i CHANGE STRATEGY 
ARCHETYPE CHANGE 
COMMUNITY'" ~ OWNERSHIP ... ~ MANAGEMENT 
I Figure 7.1 The OrganizationaVArchetype Change Process 
The model shows that irrespective of environmental change, the extent and 
scope of strategic organizational change is dependent on whether archetype 
change occurs. Archetype change is dependent on whether the owners of an 
organization make a strategic choice to implement radical or adaptive 
organizational change. The values and ideals of the owners and management 
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and the degree to which they are embedded in and influenced by the 
community determine this choice. Therefore while organizations may face the 
same environmental pressures, the scope and extent of change can vary 
significantly, from incremental and reactive to radical and anticipatory. 
This study found that where the values and norms of the owners are highly 
embedded and aligned with established institutional norms and the community, 
environmental change that threatens this relationship is likely to be resisted, 
limiting the extent and scope of organizational change. In three of the cases, 
environmental change (in the form of legislation) was perceived as a threat to 
the organization's traditional archetype, a set of values and ideals that focused 
on community welfare as much as the operation of the organization, 
embedding the organization-community relationship. During a time of 
environmental change these traditional values dominated strategic planning as 
maintaining control and ownership of the organization in the community 
became the primary objective of the owners. This resulted in the owners 
implementing a reactive and defensive organizational change strategy, 
developing an ownership structure that maintained community ties and allowed 
for direct owner control of the organization. This maintenance of control, 
congruent with the traditional electricity archetype, was allowed to develop 
through the government's failure to gain ownership rights. This provided 
owners with the ability to restrict the extent and scope of organizational change 
to that considered legitimately aligned with the values and ideals of the 
traditional archetype. Consequently the impact that environmental change had 
on the organization and the community was limited. Senior management 
remained unchanged and thus aligned with traditional ideals and values. 
Where change did occur it was generated externally and limited in extent and 
scope to that which was acceptable in the frame of the traditional archetype. 
In contrast where the values and norms of the owners were embedded in 
institutional norms but not the community, organizational change was more 
radical in extent and anticipatory in nature. In the remaining four cases 
although the values and ideals of the owners of each of the organizations were 
embedded in institutional norms, their association with and the control exerted 
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on them by the local community was not direct. This established a distance 
between the organization, its owners and the community. As a result the 
owners implemented strategies less concerned with ensuring community 
welfare than they were with operating an effective organization for financial 
gain. Environmental change, or the potential of, therefore provided owners the 
opportunity to explore strategic alternatives and develop new operating ideals 
and values - a new archetype - that would best served the interests of the 
organization. This resulted in the owners implementing a prospective change 
strategy, developing a governance structure that separated ownership from 
control. The ranks of senior management were radically altered, the 
importation of a new dominant coalition facilitating the internal development of 
new operating principles. This internal momentum for change impacted 
significantly on the organization, resulting in a radical and anticipatory 
organizational change strategy that saw the reconfiguration of strategy, 
structure and culture in a quest to establish and gain the benefits of a new 
commercial archetype. 
7.5 Implications of the Study 
Understanding that organizational change is a complex political process has 
significant implications for policy makers and also for management practice. 
This research also has implications for further investigation of organizational 
change. 
7.5.1 Implications for Policy 
In the organizational change process this study found that organizations tightly 
embedded in their institutional and community context are less likely to 
undertake transformational change than organizations less embedded 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) and that such embedded ness may be linked to 
ownership and control. Understanding the implications of this finding could 
have significant benefits for policy formulation. 
The fashion in New Zealand's political scene in recent decades has been to 
reduce direct government control of potentially competitive industries through 
deregulation and privatisation. Motivated by a rationale that emphasised the 
socio-economic benefits of change, this found success in the operation of 
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SOEs. However in the context of the traditionally protected electricity 
environment, the government's inability to secure ownership of the 
organizations and force the separation of ownership and control reduced its 
ability to control both the organizational and institutional change process 
through a process of institutional coercion. This allowed the owners of each 
organization to determine their own strategic response to change based on 
values and ideals established by the owner-community and owner-
management relationship. This resulted in the parallel development of 
defensive and prospective strategies, a dichotomy that saw the emergence of 
an operating environment somewhere between the past and the competitive 
deregulated market sought by the government. 
Recognising that organizational change is a pOlitical process suggests that 
policy-makers intent on implementing discontinuous institutional change need 
to understand the values and ideals that determine and define archetypal 
norms. In the electricity context, although the strategies and structures of 
organizations were widely recognised as a barrier to efficient industry 
operation, it was in fact the values and norms (a function of the historic 
association of owners, managers and the community) reinforcing these 
configurations that required the attention of policy-makers. Even with 
legislation requiring change, these underlying forces meant organizations 
responded neither in a uniform nor predictable manner, resulting in the 
development of an operating environment far from that envisioned by 
government at the start of the deregulation process. It is therefore argued that 
in order to achieve institutional change policy-makers must endeavour to 
understand the emotional basis upon which an archetype is constructed before 
embarking oh a discontinuous change programme. Rather than implement a 
standard change format or model, in this context the SOE model, policy makers 
must consider the potential impact that idiosyncratic institutional and 
organizational values and ideals have on the change process. In depth field 
research would go some way to providing insight into the values and ideals that 
pervade at both an organizational and industry level. This would provide policy-
makers with a deeper knowledge of potential normative barriers to change and 
allow them to determine key emotional issues at the organizational and 
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institutional level that, if leveraged, could reduce embeddedness and engender 
widespread support for change. 
Policy makers must also make an attempt to align public and institutional 
opinions to convince them of the need for change. This study showed that 
where owners and the community did not subscribe to government policy the 
costs of change were perceived to outweigh the benefits. The result was 
organizational resistance to change and archetype inertia. Rather than direct 
intervention, which could raise legal, political, organizational and social 
opposition, policy makers must create support for change within organizations 
and communities by educating key stakeholders, outlining the motivation and 
desired effects of change, while at the same time recognising and appealing to 
traditional values and ideals. Organizational stakeholders - particularly owners 
- must be made to feel that they have some input into and control of policy 
development. In the cases of anticipatory change this sense of control was 
already present, with owners conviced that through their actions they could 
control the organization's destiny and influence the development of the 
institutional environment. If policy makers were to provide a sense of control of 
the change process for all organizations it would go some way creating a sense 
of ownership, internal ising the need for change. This would not only stimulate 
the acknowledgement, or even acceptance, of change at the institutional, 
organizational and community level but it would also provide the means through 
which policy makers could develop a new shared normative framework and 
institutional archetype. 
The development of a sense of urgency through the rapid deployment of 
change pOlicies is also a necessary factor in achieving significant strategic, 
structural and cultural change. Although policy makers were initially intent on 
the speedy recreation of the electricity industry, legal and political wrangling 
prevented the rapid introduction of change. This allowed organizations highly 
embedded in the estabJished operating environment to develop defences 
against change. New government policy therefore must have rapid, direct and 
distinct implications that cause organizational owners and management to 
question the legitimacy and efficacy of the archetypal configuration and its 
effects on operation, performance and development. 
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7.5.2 Implications for Management 
This study shows that for organizational and archetype transformation to occur 
changes should be made to the composition of the dominant coalition -
particularly the CEO. This supports a well-established body of literature (e.g. 
Shaw, 1995; Kanter, 1983; Thompson, 1967) that the CEO and dominant 
coalition are fundamental in initiating and leading the change process. The 
appointment of senior managers from outside the organization, and even the 
industry, introduced new and varied ideals, values and skills that provided a 
new perspective of the organization and triggered organizational change. 
Equally important to the composition of the senior management team is how 
this group is managed. Although management in each case was mostly 
aligned with and intent on meeting strategic objectives, organizational change 
occurred only where the CEO delegated managerial authority. Where authority 
remained vested solely in the CEO the organization remained embedded in the 
bureaucratic, hierarchical structure of the past. This engendered little 
momentum or support for change. Conversely where the CEO delegated 
managerial authority the power distance between the top and bottom of the 
organization was reduced. This enabled organizational members at all levels of 
the organization to participate in the redevelopment or transformation of 
strategic and structural norms. Delegation and empowerment developed a 
sense of ownership of the change process that assisted in awakening the 
organization to the need for change, in turn shifting values and ideals to 
overcome inertia. The use of external consultants was also an important factor 
in the development of change. Where managers employed external 
consultants they were provided with another, arguably non-partisan, 
perspective and assessment of the organization that assisted in the recreation 
of the strategic, structural and cultural configuration. 
Delegation and empowerment alone is not enough to initiate and institutionalise 
archetype change within an organization. This study has shown that it is also 
imperative for senior management to establish and clearly communicate a 
vision of the organization's future and the strategy for change. Through 
communication management can establish a common basis on which all 
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stakeholders - the community, employees, owners - can develop an 
understanding of the rationale for change, potentially reducing opposition. 
Communication can also create of a sense of internal dissatisfaction with the 
status quo and urgency for change amongst employees by developing the 
notion of a looming performance crisis. This research showed that where the 
pressure for change to counter this threat was generated internally, rather than 
externally, the extent and scope of change was greater. To maintain the 
momentum for change, managers must also establish achievable goals and 
celebrate milestones to provide evidence of the success of, and therefore 
reinforce and justify, the change process. 
In conjunction with communication, managers seeking to implement change 
should invest in organizational development programmes so that the skills and 
abilities of employees are able to meet the expectations and demands of a new 
strategic focus. Such programmes reduce uncertainty and ensure the 
expectations of employees and managers are aligned. Customer feedback 
programmes are also an important part of the change process, providing 
evidence of organizational shortcomings that could counter internal 
assumptions that maintaining the status quo was justified. Where opposition to 
change remains ingrained managers must immediately counter the resistance 
by ensuring that they win the support of key organizational members whether 
they hold formal or informal positions of influence and where necessary 
removing individuals unwilling to change. 
7.5.3 Implications for Future Research 
This research has shown that the impact of environmental change on 
organizations is not a one-way process. In fact what emerged from the data 
was that change to institutionalised organizational configurations of strategy, 
structure and culture is mediated by the values and ideals of owners. This 
research found that where these values and ideals were strongly embedded in 
the institution and the community established configurations gained a self-
reinforcing social and organizational' legitimacy that when faced with 
environmental change was difficult to challenge. In contrast those 
organizations less embedded in the community Were less averse to change, a 
situation that resulted in two distinct archetypes operating in parallel. Where 
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the data from this research ends it was not clear which archetype would prevail. 
Future research could investigate whether normative, mimetic and coercive 
forces did eventually stabilise the operating environment, resolving the 
archetype conflict by validating a particular strategic and structural 
configuration. Such a longitudinal extension of this research would provide 
further insight into the institutional, organizational and socio-political forces that 
influence the organizational change process and deinstitutionalization. 
A future research direction may also attempt to "unpack" the association 
between community embeddedness and ownership/governance and seek 
answers to whether they always coincidental and in which situations they may 
have differential effects. Given the legislative impetus for change, I did not 
enter the field with a priori assumptions that ownership and the community 
would have such a profound effect on the organizational change process. 
Research built around this finding in particular may lead to a better 
understanding of the organization-owner-community relationship and the 
impact this has on the organizational change process. 
This research was confined to investigating seven of New Zealand's more than 
thirty electricity companies. Replication of this study in other electricity 
companies nation-wide would provide further data to either confirm or challenge 
the findings in this research. A single in depth case study that collected data 
not just from senior management, but from individuals throughout the 
organization would also serve to validate these findings. Furthermore the 
context in which this study was conducted was unique as the electricity industry 
exhibits several characteristics associated with monopolies. Given the 
similarity with which electricity companies have been operated worldwide, and 
similar moves by other governments to deregulate the electricity sector, 
replicating this research internationally may give further insight into the change 
process and the effect of ownership and control has in other situations. 
Replication in organizations that face 'a fully competitive environment would 
serve to verify or negate the findings of this study in other industries. 
The experience of change captured in each of the cases also suggests that in 
evolving institutional environments radical, anticipatory changes may not 
284 
always be the best option. SPL, DEL, PNZ and ELL discovered this, as the 
changes that they expected did not occur. As a result, they went through a 
stagnant phase and had to revisit some of their earlier strategies. As the 
legislative environment was continuing to develop during the data collection 
phase of this research future research could look at the implications and effects 
that each strategic path - reactive and anticipatory - had on the development 
of each organization. 
Further this research did not look at the effects of organizational change on 
performance, as such retrospective data was not available during the change 
process. Future research could look at those organizations that followed an 
anticipatory path and investigate whether they realised greater operational and 
financial performance benefits than those following a reactive strategy. Such 
research could also question how strategic and structural configurations 
affected overall performance over time. 
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Appendix 1.2 
Letter of Introduction 
Chief Executive 
Dunedin Electricity 
PO Box 1404 
Dunedin 9015 
Dear Sir 
My name is Michael Duncan, and I am currently enrolled in the PhD 
programme of the Department of Management, University of Canterbury. My 
area of interest and current research is that of organizational behaviour -
primarily strategic and structural reaction to change. With the recent changes 
in the electricity distribution and retail sector, the unique opportunity exists to 
study organizational behaviour during a period of rapid and widespread 
change. As a key player in the industry, Dunedin Electricity is an obvious 
candidate for such a project. 
In order to carry out this research, the methodology that I utilise requires me to 
conduct a number of interviews with people involved in the management of 
EPCs - the likes of board members, corporate planners and heads of 
departments. These interviews take approximately 45 minutes, and inquire into 
how the organization has changed, in for example human resource practices, 
over the past few years. 
Obviously I cannot say what the final outcome of this research will be. 
However, with New Zealand at the forefront of change I believe a project such 
as this will enable electricity companies, as well as industry in general, to gain a 
deeper understanding of the critical processes and factors associated with 
organizational change. 
I will, if you don't mind, call you later in the next week so that we can discuss 
this project and my needs. If you would prefer to call me, or have any queries 
or concerns please do not hesitate. 
I look forward to speaking to you. 
Yours sincerely 
Michael Duncan 
PhD Research Student 
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Appendix 1.3 
Observation Notes 
Managing Director 
Southpower Limited 
24 February 1998 
Location: Personal Office, Southpower Headquarters, 318 Manchester Street, 
Christchurch 
BE (Electrical), Reg Eng, AFNZIM, MNZIMC 
Managing Director of Southpower since 1989 and he is a director of Enerco New 
Zealand Limited. Worked for New Zealand Electricity, the Otago Central Electric Power 
Board and the Christchurch Drainage Board, and was South Island regional manager 
for Electricorp Marketing. He is chairman of Energetics Pty Limited and a director of all 
other South power subsidiaries. 
After entering South power's headquarters, contact was made with the MD's secretary 
through reception. After a short wait I was issued with a temporary identification card 
and ushered to the second floor. After approximately five minutes waiting in a small, 
dankly decorated but homely reception, the MD walked up and introduced himself. He 
led me through to his office, a medium sized workspace cluttered with various 
documents, a computer and with a relatively pleasant view to the street below. He 
apologised for the mess as he had just finished a teleconference. After a brief chat 
about my intentions to relax both parties involved, the interview proper commenced. 
This was a very informative and relaxed interview, philosophical at times - and offering 
rich data unsolicited. He seemed to be very much a people person rather than an 
'engineer' as such, despite his training as an engineer. 
From first impressions of this interview, he was very concerned with these points; 
1. Communication 
2. Trust 
3. Customer service 
4. Leadership 
5. Team work 
6. Pride 
7. Ownership 
He was very enthusiastic about the changes and the philosophy that Southpower took 
towards them. He was aware of the differences between his/Southpower's approach 
and took great pride in ownership of the company and the changes. 
After switching off the recorder we continued to discuss several matters where he 
raised the point of the trade-offs between maintaining or selling contract businesses -
the transaction cost problem of short term financial gains through selling vs. preventing 
competition and maintaining control and reliability. 
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Appendix 1.4 
Research Questions 
• Opening Questions 
How long have you worked in the electricity industry? 
What is your current position, and what responsibilities do you have? 
How long have you held your current position? 
Other work/other electricity companies? 
• Change Specific Questions 
In your opinion .... 
What have been the key drivers of change? 
Why have these factors been so important? 
How has the structure of this organization changed? 
Why? 
What factors have been most influential in structural decisions? 
Over what time period has this change occurred? 
How has the strategy of this organization changed? 
Why? 
What factors have been most influential in strategic decisions? 
Over what time period has this change occurred? 
How have the human resource practices of this organization changed? 
Why? 
What factors have been most influential in human resource decisions? 
Over what time period has this change occurred? 
How have the marketing practices of this organization changed? 
Why? 
What factors have been most influential in marketing decisions? 
Over what time period has this change occurred? 
• Wrap Up 
Is there anything we haven't discussed that you think is important? 
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Appendix 1.5 
Coding 
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BOB TAYLOR 
Rationalisation through a process of sharing responsibility and accountability and ~ 
matching the skills needed in the organisation with individuals. The impact of this was 
that the direct to indirect ratio reduced to 3.6:1. As a result of this process, the 
company went from 419 people earning 18-20 million dollars five years ago to 167 
people earning 30 to 35 million dollars for the 95/96linancial year. 
CHRIS LAURIE 
with the ownership that was there it wouldn't have happened as readily if it hadn't 
been for the legislation because the legislation almost gave us a mandate for some of 
the things that - whilst they were politically undesirable in a local sense - they were 
commercially necessary. And so it gave the owners a way of rationalising what was 
an unpalatable political situation to the public you know, because there was always 
you know, you're shedding a hundred and something staff that' s terrible they're losing 
their jobs and families and things like that 
Well I mean if you look at the organisation now it bares no relationship to the, what it 
was in the past. I don't, can't tell you exactly what the staff' number difference is, but 
we have to be looking at thirty forty percent average staff' reduction - you know 
overall staff reduction. And that's even though we've got a marketing group and a 
sales group that we didn't have before you know. I mean if you look at our 
contracting group, the numbers have gone down the best part of probably fifty or sixty 
percent, and productivity has gone up hugely. 
JOENGRAY 
all the blue collar workforce really have been r~.4~'p'1~~sl into Connetics limited and 
our meJering company which is calledG<IIi!;>ra limited we estimate that in a full year 
there was an enormous amount of downsizing you know well to start with you see the ~.;"O~J .. _-._'. 
things we've done was to separate our businesses into individual entities and I mean ~_ 
~lj>ag~r' '--~ie'c i-~~'" 4136'"~ [At iO;9cmi.O~,"'?cJ:t.l3:~"~':";£t ~;:i;':·§7ict;~;F~<'-:f;r20i." ~;~ ~c ...... . ... ~. . .. 
Illustration of the computer assisted manual coding process. 
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